The world is changing at an accelerated rate. The signs of the world recovery from the clutches of the crisis first appeared in the autumn of 2009. Apparently, the world economy is going to face another, more or less profound, restructuring. In a somewhat new environment Russia will have to deal with the task of comprehensive modernization, and its outcome can critically determine Russia’s place in the post-crisis world. Modernization requires not just new ideas, projects, financial, technical and scientific base, but also the development of goal-setting motives in all tiers of the Russian society, formation of creative atmosphere. International common understanding and pragmatic cooperation in the interests of all actors are equally important.
1
One of the vital preconditions of a modernization breakthrough in Russia is an adequate assessment of the current situation. Such assessment must be based on the substantial knowledge of the world, the country, its past and present. Even a more important skill is the ability (at least in part) to forecast the vector of the world development and one’s place in this development at present and in the future. Another item on the agenda is to develop such type of socio-political and historical knowledge that would precisely and accurately reflect both the richest and highly diversified experience of countries and nations, and Russian human values and national interests per se.
The on-going disputes on the problems of domestic policy, roads of development, economic reform against the background of a relatively high degree of the freedom of coexistence of different views caused a multitude of collisions of «half-truths» in Russia. Judging by the public discussions, having entered the 21st century, the Russians have only limited knowledge of the history of their own country, and quite often have only vague understanding of the logic of Russia’s centuries-old existence in the global system of coordinates.
Probably, this is why Russian elites and grassroots have quite acutely perceived the onset of the world economic crisis, although life in the crisis environment is nothing new to the Russians. Once again, the crisis proved that the pluralism of opinions does not guarantee comprehensive knowledge about oneself and the surrounding world. People have little knowledge of the structure and functioning of the modern international system with the coexistence and interaction of globalism and national, regional and local forms of development. Sometimes all three forms of existence survive side by side in one and the same country and do not converge for centuries, or merge into a homogenous lifestyle. All those circumstances have a substantial overall impact on the respective countries, on their international behavior, and on the state of the world system in general – through their foreign policy. Therefore, we urgently need a broad intellectual dialogue – truly global, sincere, and based on the comparison, and mutnal respect for, of values, but at the same time – not overburdened by political prejudice.
The crisis proved that mankind has common enemies. It is not only transnational terrorism. In many ways the crisis was provoked by corporate egotism of certain business sectors, connivance of certain governments, inadequate «intellectual control» over the authorities and business and, finally, dependence of the mass media on the «fat cats». Didactically important is the fact that the crisis did not spare either the «countries of democratic orientation» or authoritarian regimes. There is another illuminating aspect: the threat of a deepening crisis brought world powers together. United in the G20 format, the most influential of them assumed responsibility for developing a concerted policy to overcome the crisis, having put aside (most probably, for the time being) ideological and philosophical disagreement.
Let us imagine that in the face of the crisis we would be once again divided by the degree of greater or smaller commitment to democracy, higher or lower level of democratic standards. How would that affect the life of our people, our voters, and men-in-the-street? It remains unknown, when the world would get out of the crisis and what outcome it will produce. So far, we surely know that the present crisis, widely compared with the upheavals of the 1920–1930s, not only failed to trigger the slide to a war but on the contrary, initiated a trend to solidarity of countries and nations on the «anti-crisis basis». I believe that to a large extent it happened because the ideological debate of the 2000s, after all, goes in the common field of self-proclaimed attachment of the majority of the world countries to the democratic community. And there is no more debate as to whether the «communist system» is better than «bourgeois democracy» or not. We even argue and quarrel «inside democracy» about imperfections of democratic instruments, models and forms of democratic development.
It does not signify that a new, economically tense international environment can be an excuse for a failure in political progress, or a pretext to limit civil liberties. But this all suggests that the world has many issues on the agenda, apart from the debates on the correspondence or conflict of the views on how much democracy and freedom are needed per each individual or nation at every specific stage of their lives and history.
In principle, the deficit of democracy is available anywhere and at all times. The question is: what is the notion of democracy in a given country. Every country faces the problem of protection of democratic achievements. Democracy has outer enemies like international terrorism, and internal antagonists. In that number one will find political indifference and apathy, distrust of the powers-that-be, cynicism of bureaucracy, crisis of the partisan systems, uncontrollable consumption, crisis of moral values, and use of scientific and technical achievements to the detriment of man. Therefore, every state has to take care of its own democracy. Cooperation in this sphere, without trying to retreat into the shell of national boundaries, is beneficial to all.
By all indications, countries of the European Union are a citadel of democracy. Nonetheless, it is obvious that one of the main purposes of the Lisbon Treaty is to make the European Union more democratic, to bridge an enormous gap between the needs of the average man and high-rolling Brussels offices, and to add democratic legitimacy thereto. The EU citizens feel quite critical about the degree of democracy of common European institutions.
The problem is not to convince each other: let us be more democratic, consistent and responsible in doing our homework on the subject of «democracy». We all support the advancement of the democratic order in our countries. The democratic choice has been made, and the future belongs thereto. The problem lies in a different sphere. No one should have the sole right to give an incontestable opinion and assessment of democratic standards. Today there is no need in the democratic Inquisition, like there was no need in the religious Inquisition in the past.
Certain encouraging changes in the world are noticeable not only in economy but also in politics. The incumbent US Administration under B. Obama is less inclined, at least at the present stage, to come up with rigid ideological concepts. To a considerable degree former President G. Bush was well-known for his absolutely uncritical self-assessment, feeling himself a «political messiah», in his own way. On the contrary, B. Obama with the novelty of the image and traits of directness began to alter America’s image. The new President has obviously captivated the US citizens. And we can see the triumphant welcome given to his public addresses in the «third world», which, a propos, was a «rogue reservation» for Mr. Bush.
Besides, the EU and developing countries are entirely different cultural and economic entities. They are going to coexist without merging for quite a long time, maybe forever. For instance, the European Union is consistently eliminating the sovereignty of individual states and is calling others to follow suit. Such ideas do not even occur to the African and Asian nations, as the sovereignty issue is fused with the problem of identity of individual states, and in a number of instances is considered to be a completely «inviolable» concept. Even in Eastern Europe the sovereignty issue is a subject of serious discussions which to a large degree go in the legal rather than political context. The debate is focused on the interaction of individual countries with the European Union in general, extension of the EU authority onto the fields of foreign affairs, defense, security, and financial policy. It only emphasizes the obstacles on the road toward the establishment of a uniform standard of «political existence» common to all nations. However, there are serious doubts about the necessity of a uniform standard – whether it is feasible within the diversity of so deeply different world cultures. The answer is not at all clear.
2
At the same time, it is necessary to synchronize the viewpoints and to work out universal rules of the game in international relations. Multiparty formats of discussion can be an effective instrument of rapprochement of perceptions. Probably, keeping in mind the recent successful experience of the «twenty» format, lately, a certain decline in «institutional nihilism» (typical of intellectual discussions 18–24 months back) has become apparent. Critical, but generally positive mood of experts proves that the world has moved into the phase of sober comprehension of advantages and disadvantages of multilateral institutions.
In fact, the dwindling crisis showed that the mechanisms of coordination of economic standpoints, e.g. traditional institutions as the IMF, World Bank Group, or G20 (which received a powerful impetus to further development) turn out to be helpful in the minimally required effort coordination among individual governments. Probably, that was the reason of the first signs of simultaneous and relatively prompt exit of individual countries from a sufficiently tough phase of recession. It is important to point out that the leaders of world economy managed to reduce the pressure on underdeveloped and poorer countries. This is what makes the current crisis different from the preceding shocks of the world economy where poorer countries were more hardly hit than well-to-do nations.
It is illustrative and so far novel that, in fact, the current environment is the first global economic test for Russia to be responded to jointly with its partners. The crisis of the late 1990ies does not count: Russian involvement into the world economy at the time was entirely different and much more primitive, while its participation in G8 was only nominal. In 2008–2009 in the framework of multilateral efforts Russia succeeded for the first time to put forward its own, not entirely perfect, but widely discussed plan of world economy reforming.
It is worth to note the rise of a more balanced proportion between the traditional inter-state diplomacy and multilateral efforts in the group framework. In fact, the G8 and G20 formats are amalgamations of the club type, an assembly of the selected few. They are a variation of the positive «conspiracy of the strong» with the dominance of the statehood and sovereignty principle. The more actual political, economic, financial and cultural sovereignty a country has the more chances it has to join a circle of the few. Club members work out common attitudes to international decision-making, while the decisions and their implementation are, to a considerable degree, the task of the «old» international organizations.
It is impossible to reach an ideal coordination between the «new» and «old» institutions. Maybe, it’s for the better. Otherwise, we would get bogged down in the endless and fruitless job of implementing the dreams of the «world government». The optimum is attainable; in fact, this was the aim of the League of Nations and the UN. Today the ramified system of multilateral relations (which is a mix of classic international organizations, universal, regional, subregional and sectoral structures supplemented by the «clubs») is an instrument of such coordination.
This system can be subject to endless completion and adjustments, it can introduce highly demanding international legal regimes (non-proliferation, maritime law, human rights), while in any case the source of the change remains the political will of sovereign states. The decisions of G8 or G20 can hardly get off the ground without the assistance of traditional international institutions – the UN, World Bank, IMF, OECD, regional and sub-regional inter-government organizations.
The drive to interact in the club format of multilateral relations and traditional international cooperation became visible in the late 1990s. That was the time when a whole range of «crisscross» UN and G8 initiatives were launched, mutual references and document quotations made. It can be seen not only in economy, but also in the field of non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons (MDW), counterterrorism, struggle against illegal drugs and money-laundering.
The opinion that a traditional system of multilateral institutions is being forced out and replaced by the elite clubs is not accurate. Rather, on the contrary – the process of their convergence is underway. A tight and effective symbiosis of the state and multilateral principles is beginning to emerge in the world economy and politics. The clubs give a new impetus to the operation of older international bodies, they fine-tune the bulky and awkward old mechanisms of international organizations.
At the same time, it is difficult to imagine that such a diversified and multibranch colossus as the established UN system can be replaced by anything else. If there had been no UNO, it should have been invented again. The UN system and regional organizations of general jurisdiction (OAS or the Arab League), in many ways resembling the UN, are in fact a supporting structure of contemporary international relations. The point is to ensure effective use of this infrastructure.
According to the UN, currently there are 16 on-going armed conflicts in the world, but not a single one of international nature; they all erupt between political forces or constituent territories of a state. One would think that we can register at least some progress as compared to the previous decade when the world counted 21 active «burning» armed conflicts. But another figure is worth paying attention to: apart from 16 open armed conflicts, the UN and international organizations carry out 60 diverse peacekeeping operations in the world which stabilize and temporarily «freeze» another sixty conflicts. If there had been no peacekeeping efforts of the world community, the number of the «hotspots» on the planet could have reached a hundred, keeping in mind that the total number of the world countries is about two hundred.
Russia actively supports the UN peacekeeping efforts through the Security Council, and experiments with the establishment of new peacekeeping mechanisms itself. The process of establishing the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is currently underway. In 2009 Russia and a number Central Asian states reached critical agreements on the establishment of CRRF, and launched practical efforts in building joint military contingents in Central Asia.
In this connection one can suggest the following: stabilization to the north of the Tajik-Afghani border ensured by the CSTO and CTTF forces, i.e. Central Asia, must be synchronized with stabilization to the south of the Tajik-Afghani border, in Afghanistan and Pakistan where the Western coalition is operating. Russia and the West could provide joint guarantees of stability in this wider region, in its own area of responsibility each. With that in mind, Russia and the CSTO countries could apply for a UN mandate for border stabilization and establishment of an antidrug «belt» to the north of Afghanistan, as in their efforts to block the northern route of drug-trafficking from Afghanistan/Pakistan, Russia and its Central Asian allies operate (and invest considerable forces and means) in the interests of entire Europe.
Today a widely discussed issue is the role of non-government entities in the international arena. With regard to the security sphere they are mentioned in the context of frequent military conflicts. They operate in the «grey zone» inaccessible to the international law, multilateral settlement or somehow effective democratic government control.
It is a peculiar form of contemporary mercenary units with both political and commercial roots. According to the UN statistics, today the market turnover of private military services is about $120 billion per annum. Russia supports the endorsement of a new UN Convention which would provide for the regulation of activity of private military and security companies by the international community. MGIMO (University) scholars and experts took active and practical part in drafting the above Convention.
A new element of the Russian-American dialogue on the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms has become more pronounced, though not so promptly and radically as many had expected. According to the data available in early 2009, there are 8392 deployed nuclear warheads (over and above the standby units) in eight countries of the world. Even if this number is to be reduced approximately twofold upon implementation of the new agreements currently negotiated by the US and Russia, all the same, there would be a lot of problems which require modification in the stance of other countries. Probably, we should think about consolidation of diverse mechanisms working in the field of non-proliferation. The modern principle of network diplomacy should not contradict the logic of transparency and effectiveness of efforts in such a sensitive sphere.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty concluded in 1996 has not yet come into effect. Another problem in this field was posed by the nuclear test undertaken by North Korea in May 2009, which once again has left an unanswered question: whether the world community has the criteria and instruments to respond to the evident violations of the non-proliferation regime? One of the keys to the possible answer would be the actual entry into force of the CTBT. Russia is waiting for the American Congress to ratify the Treaty.
Introduction of the ban on production of key fissile materials is also «skidding». Let me remind the reader that the world has accumulated the excess of approximately 1379 tons of highly enriched uranium and 255 tons of weapons-grade plutonium (as well as another 246 tons of «civil» plutonium) which are not used for the military purposes but are potentially applicable in the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. The above excess is a serious terrorist risk. Russia is prepared to cooperate in identifying new measures to enhance the safety of those materials and to prevent further piling-up of the dangerous nuclear materials. In this connection the crucial task is to establish a special international regime for the civil, essentially energy-wise, nuclear materials.
Even a brief survey of the spheres of application of multilateral efforts confirms their value and expediency for the states, their economic development, for ensuring external political stability and internal security.
3
The alienation between Moscow and Washington upon the election of President B.Obama began to change into a watchful expectation mixed with cautious optimism. The relations are still at the crossroads: whether they will swing toward greater mutual disenchantment, or the cooperation vector can be extended.
The concern is still evident both in Washington and in Moscow. Over the last twenty years Russia and the US have invested too much in the improvement of their bilateral relations to disregard a possible loss of the results of the difficult and costly (to Russia, in any event) rapprochement. Another factor is also evident: one cannot deal with the partner who fails to take your interests seriously. Whatever importance, friendship or antagonism with America is not a crucial factor in the life of the Russians.
A new trait of the American policy is a burst of moderately interested debate on Russia. The phenomenon has its own human prerequisites. Among the experts on our country there are quite a few newly appointed officers in the US National Security Council, State Department and intelligence community. The key state machinery connection is the tandem of two former mbassadors to Russia: A.Vershbow, Assistant Secretary of Defense on International Security Affairs,while W.Burns, his counterpart, Under Secretary of State on Political Affairs.
In spring of 2009 former American Ambassadors to Moscow initiated publication of a special report on behalf of the Commission on US Policy on Russia. Its contributors were American scholars specializing in Russian affairs, former US congressmen and retired diplomats formerly posted in Russia – practically all of them – first-rate, knowledgeable and seasoned public servants. There were no «pro-Russian» contributors among them: all are American patriots, convinced liberals and great-power nationalists obsessed by the idea to make the world happy with the light of American understanding of the world harmony.
Officially, the commission was not a bipartisan body, and the Congress had nothing to do with its architecture. It was just «saturated» with a bipartisan spirit – it was a joint project of two think-tanks – the Nixon Center (Republican) and the Harvard Kennedy School (Democratic). It was an inflorescence of intellects, shrewd and reasonable people. But it is doubtful that they represented the majority of the American elite, probably, that was why they expressed their ideas so boldly.
Anyway, for the first time over the last twenty years the American reader was sincerely told that, for instance, the US interests and those of the Russian neighbors are not identical. By all appearances, it is an obvious truth, though under the former American President no one has put it that way. There were other sound judgments, e.g. that the United States did not have to fear Russian investments into the US or EU economy. The authors stood for the prolongation of START-1, immediate Russia’s entry to the WTO, and cancellation of the already embarassing «Jackson-Vanick» amendment. Already in spring of 2009 the authors called for the new talks on Russia’s involvement and participation in running the American antiballistic missile system in Poland and Czechia.
The report presented completely revolutionary ideas that America should refrain from trying to build its zones of influence right on the Russian borders and at the same time to figure on a «constructive response» from Moscow. The key message of the report was that the American Administration must give up its attempts to ignore Russian interests because the US needs this relationship to accomplish the tasks of American diplomacy in non-proliferation issues and settlement of the «Iranian problem».
Washington also needs Russian assistance in the Afghan issue, and unexpectedly, in sharing intelligence on terrorism. The Americans admit that they have made good progress in technical interception of relevant information in the world cyberspace, while they are short of the field humint on the Middle and Near East.
The American intellectuals recommended to the Administration to change the style of its relations with Moscow, to give up the habit to «make the Russians face the facts» of unilaterally adopted decisions, to limit its sermon as regards proper understanding of democracy, to streamline a systematic dialogue on international issues and to establish a special mechanism thereof, to revitalize the idea of applying the measures of trust in specific issues of international security. Some of the measures are already under discussion by their respective representatives at the working level.
However, the US doesn’t give up its guideline: the moves of American diplomacy should be undertaken with due regard of the available potential to support them; wherever possible – by persuasion and economic incentives, if impossible – by force. The substance of the American colleagues’ proposals is a radical change in the atmosphere of Russian-American relations with the revival of friendliness and mutual respect. This was the proposed way to overcome distrust which has lately developed not only in the camps of the left and extremely right Russian politicians, as well as the centrists, but even in the circles of moderate Russian liberals. Smart Americans picked up the message. Over the recent months of the Republican rule America started to «lose contact» with the Russian elite and public at large. Its restoration can be beneficial both to the US and Russia.
The problem is that it still remains unclear how far the Russian and US interests can be reduced to a common denominator. Undoubtedly, in autumn of 2009 a bold step and a serious confirmation of Washington’s readiness to take into account the Russian stance was the decision adopted by the Obama Administration to revise its plans to deploy the ABM defense infrastructure in Czechia and Poland. But does it really mean that the US has stopped seeking the restoration of its absolute strategic invulnerability, and that tomorrow it would not come up with another, more sophisticated project aimed at the same objective that undermines the traditional foundation of strategic stability?
Russian diplomacy has learned its lesson of disenchantment of the 1990s: the NATO-oriented mutation of Eastern Europe and the Black Sea, the Balkan wars, dented relations with the Ukraine and, finally, military destabilization on the Russian borders in the Caucasus.
Today there are all grounds to believe that the times are changing. If the US is focused on the improvement of Russian-American relations as earnestly as Russia, difficult talks on a large range of issues including the problems of regional security can be a success.
The road to success has many hurdles. In the first place, America urgently needs mutual understanding with Russia on non-proliferation issues, where Iran is a special case.
Moscow is anxious about the reform of the security system in Europe in general. Many issues will depend on the degree of potential mutual understanding with the US on the reform. Prognostication is a difficult and ungrateful job. Russia seeks stable and friendly relations with the United States. However, for the Russian foreign policy it is not an end in itself, but an important instrument in building a more secure and problem-free world. All the same, Russia has to pursue this route, if possible, in cooperation with the US, if necessary, totally on its own.
Moscow is trying to apply this principle to many aspects of international relations. Russia is the largest European country, and in general, security in Europe is a crucial problem of national security of the Russian Federation. Moscow is watching with interest the progress of the European Union integration project, which seems quite a promising venture. A significant number of European states in its framework unite their efforts to overcome common problems and to accomplish common tasks. The climate of economic prosperity and social peace established in the EU confirms that they are doing a good job. The Lisbon Treaty will allow even higher effectiveness of the EU.
It does not directly dwell on the problems of building a «Greater Europe», though in the longer run the European Union will expand its influence on the development of the entire region, and not only on its legitimate territory. It will seek to export the political, juridical and socio-economic solutions it has chosen for itself. Moreover, the EU is striving to become a model for all other European countries.
Russia suggests a more realistic in the foreseeable future and more democratic vision of «Greater Europe». According to the plan, the Russian Federation, the European Union and other European countries should jointly build a world where they would all like to live. It is important that the new world should be constructed on the equal rights basis and it should be equally comfortable to all states and nations.
In the short-term and medium-term perspective there is no likelihood that the European countries, non-EU members, would join the Union. No one is prepared to this contingency. The European Union itself can hardly digest it. Entry of the European Union into «Greater Europe» is not on the agenda either. On the one hand, the EU already finds itself in «Greater Europe», on the other hand so far «Greater Europe» looks more like a hope for the better future than a reality.
However, one has to live in peace and tranquility till the better future arrives. Therefore Russia, at one with other countries, is trying to reform the fundamentals of security in Europe. If the task demands to renew the formerly signed agreements or to conclude new ones, we have to hurry. For one, we have been talking for a long time about the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, or about signing «Helsinki-2» agreement, a legally binding document (in contrast to «Helsinki-1») on the fundamentals of European security. There are also other documents of vital importance developed and endorsed in the OSCE framework. They can be still operational, having been adjusted to the current needs. At the same time, some of the arrangements which have to be the foundation of the Euro Atlantic security system have to be reviewed. From time to time they were ambiguously interpreted in the actual practice of international relations. A task on the today’s agenda is to find common understanding as regards how and what rules of the game will be observed by every state, any administration or government structure.
The essence of President D. Medvedev’s initiative on the European Security Treaty envisages yet a larger scale. It is not only about kind words and promises. It says about the need to upgrade the existing executive security mechanisms in the Euro-Atlantic space, and to complement them with the new ones.
The United States, European Union, Russia and other interested parties must be granted an opportunity to «launch» mechanisms of preventive diplomacy and settlement of conflicts at the earliest stages of their origin. This is the substance of only one proposal verbalized by the expert community. The concept of the treaty per se determines the positive vector of the international relations development in the Euro-Atlantic region.
Presumably, the initiative of concluding a new treaty primarily focused on the problem of «strict security» creates the necessary prerequisites for more effective cooperation in the fields of law, economic and social policy, as long as business requires political stability, legal and economic permanence, certainty that the universal rules of the game shall be observed. Therefore, if we succeed in getting closer to the construction of a more effective model of security in the Euro-Atlantic region, and resolving the problems of mutual trust, financial investments would arrive in greater volumes. It would be easier to come to terms in larger economic projects, and the prospects of rapprochement of legal standards and synchronization of relations in «Greater Europe» would become more viable.
* * *
We need an open and unbiased debate on what factors divide the nations, what brings them together or facilitates rapprochement. The most crucial outcome of the last 20 years is the extinction of the old, really antagonistic ideological and political schism of the world. Unwittingly the people got accustomed to its absence, and appreciate it no longer. It even seemed to them that practically nothing had changed, and once again we can run the risk of greater conflicts for the sake of achieving a victory, after all, in the back-yard and limited disputes. In a way, this «syndrome of peace habituation» looks like the «syndrome of habituation to the absence of crises», of which we have been just cured by the global recession – rudely, impudently and for big money. It would be a mistake to let the man learn once again the value of peace through a crisis.
