REALIST CONSTRUCTIVISM
A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON NORM THEORY

ANNE CROWLEY–VIGNEAU
MGIMO University, Moscow, 119454, Russia
University of Reading, Reading, RG6 6UR, United Kingdom

ANDREY BAYKOV
MGIMO University, Moscow, 119454, Russia

WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH
Dartmouth College, Hanover, 03755, United States

Abstract

We contribute to the advancement of scholarship on realist constructivism by illustrating its potential to enrich norm theory and elucidate the role of states in shaping identities. The primary challenge in fully realizing the potential of realist constructivism lies in reconciling constructivists' perspectives on norms as carriers of universal ethical standards with realists' emphasis on their instrumental value for state interests. We address this contradiction by highlighting the existence of two distinct types of norms: individual and group norms. Individual norms are grounded in fundamental and inalienable human rights, exhibiting universality and resilience. In contrast, group norms primarily address collective rights and interests, rendering them more susceptible to instrumentalization by states and thus more contingent and changeable. Realist constructivism enables us to acknowledge the coexistence of both types of norms and analyze their interactions. Our framework is empirically tested using two norms concerning individual rights (the norm against anti-personnel landmines and the norm against torture), two norms related to group interests (the norm promoting the green energy transition and the norm of world-class universities), and one borderline case (the norm against genocide). We show that efforts to frame norms of the second category and to graft them onto the human rights discourse have yielded intriguing outcomes, legitimizing and empowering new principles of interntional governance. Conversely, the instrumentalization of norms from the first category to serve national interests can weaken them, leading to a loss of credibility on the international stage.

Keywords:
Realist constructivism; Barkin; norms; interests; universalism

Introduction

"The pursuit of the United States' own tribal interests is not the same thing as the realization of the universal liberal values that inform its own existence" [Sterling-Folker 2004: 342].

The idea that individuals perceive their own projects as universal lies at the core of a long-standing debate regarding the diffusion and internalization of norms rooted in universal ethical principles in the global arena. Constructivists argue that such norms represent progress for humanity as a whole, while realists contend that norms are merely tools employed by powerful states to advance their interests

and maximize their power. Realist Constructivism, introduced by S. Barkin in the early 2000s, seeks to reconcile these two schools of thought [Barkin 2003] by offering a framework to comprehend the complexity of a world that appears inclined to embrace fundamental moral principles while still being governed by state interests.

However, the existing literature offers limited insights into how realist constructivism impacts norm theory and how to bridge the divide between realist and constructivist perspectives on the role of morality versus interests in norm development. Our objective is to address this gap by exploring the following research question: Can norms simultaneously reflect state interests and universal principles, and what are the consequences of their implementation?

To unravel this puzzle, we employ the theoretical framework of realist constructivism within norm theory, revealing the presence of two distinct categories of norms in the international system: individual norms and group norms. Individual norms are rooted in fundamental and inalienable human rights, exhibiting a universal character that transcends an individual's citizenship or ethnocultural identity. These norms tend to possess greater resilience over time. On the other hand, group norms predominantly focus on the rights and interests of social and cultural identity groups, often states or other cohesive political communities, and are more prone to instrumentalization by states, rendering them susceptible to contestation and erosion. Through an analysis of carefully selected international norms, we investigate how morality and state power interact to shape specific political outcomes, influencing the likelihood of a norm's survival. While realists primarily concentrate on norms of the group category, constructivists predominantly emphasize norms of the individual category. Realist constructivism, by examining both types of norms, provides a more comprehensive understanding of the international system, revealing that change emerges from the interplay and confrontation of ideational and material forces represented by interests, norms, and their situational combinations.

Our analysis focuses on five international norms: two pertaining to individual rights (the norm against anti-personnel landmines and the norm against torture), two related to group-based norms (the norm promoting the green energy transition and the norm for world-class universities), and one contentious case (the norm against genocide). Through these case studies, we illustrate the diverse nature of norms and offer novel insights into normative behavior in the international arena.

The paper begins with an examination of norm theory and a review of realist constructivism to establish the context and significance of the study. Subsequently, we discuss existing empirical studies employing this new paradigm, present or develop theoretical perspectives on norms, and apply them to the aforementioned case studies. The final section provides a summary of the findings and a discussion of their implications.

Norms for Constructivists

Realist scholars traditionally perceive norms as products of the interests of the most powerful states and do not believe that ethical norms impose constraints on states' behavior in the international arena [Mearsheimer 1994: 6]. Neoliberal thinkers, on the other hand, view norms as a means for facilitating collective action, aiming to minimize transaction costs and enhance interaction [Keohane 1984: 382]. In the constructivist literature, norms hold a significant position as they are considered to define social realities. Constructivists argue that norms are embedded within the social structure and shape the identities of actors [Wendt 1987: 335]. Social norms have been defined as "appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity" [Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 891], and empirical studies have demonstrated the influence of norms in determining outcomes in world politics, highlighting the importance of intersubjective reality as distinct from objective and subjective realities [Hoffmann 2010: 2].

During the 1990s, scholars developed initial models to explain norm emergence and evolution, such as Nadelmann's evolutionary pattern [1990: 479–482], Sikkink and Finnemore's

norm life cycle [1998: 887], and the spiral model proposed by Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink [1999: 6]. Studies on norm dynamics have moved beyond the notion of a division of labor between constructivism, which focuses on how interests are formed, and realism, which examines how interests are exercised and influence state behavior [Legro 1996: 134-135]. Efforts to bridge the gap between constructivist and rationalist approaches to norms, and even to merge and synthesize them, have led to investigations into norm contestation, sabotage, decay, and decline [Wiener 2014: 1–15; Panke & Petersohn 2016: 3; Schneiker 2021: 106].

The debate between the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences [March & Olsen 1998: 951] reveals that constructivism has moved beyond the notion that moral considerations are the sole driver of norm creation, evolution, and internalization. Acknowledging that material interests (not just ideas) shape behavior suggests the potential for reconciliation between different paradigms. When actors determine the appropriate course of action, they weigh their own interests against the normative context. If conflicts arise, the final behavioral outcome depends on factors such as the level of internationalization of the norm, potential repercussions from norm violations, and the material consequences of adhering to the norm. Rational decision-making often plays a role in the calculation of whether to act normatively.

The literature remains divided, with constructivist studies focusing on compliance with norms and exploring successful cases of normative transformation transcending material interests, while contestation studies emphasize the continuous evolution and adaptation of norms in different contexts, overcoming opposition or succumbing to it. As noted by Hoffmann [2010: 9], compliance studies tend to focus on how actors react to external norms and socialization attempts, while contestation studies examine how communities of norm acceptors can alter the meaning of constitutive norms through their bounded interpretations and actions aligned with those interpretations.

Nevertheless, both perspectives recognize that norms aligned with national values and interests are more likely to be adopted. When faced with a new international norm, states assess how they can interact with it and even modify it to their advantage [Hoffmann 2010: 9]. Norms can sometimes serve as justifications for state interests [Cortell & Davis 2005: 25], leading to the hypothesis that norms can be instrumentalized by states under certain conditions.

Constructivism is often associated with calls to incorporate ethics in the study of international relations and with attempts to explain global system change through a moral lens. Hoffmann questions whether "Constructivist Ethics" might be an oxymoron [Hoffmann 2009: 242]. International norms are seen as vehicles for human progress, aiming for an improved and more ethical world. However, the definition of what is considered moral remains unclear, and constructivist studies primarily focus on norms currently deemed universally "right" in principle and at present (e.g., human rights, environmental protection). Immoral behavior is always perceived as a norm violation rather than constituting the norm itself, regardless of its widespread occurrence. A search for the term "immoral norm" on Google Scholar yields no relevant results, suggesting the absence of such a notion. However, certain forms of unethical behavior can be so prevalent that they may be considered norms. Such norms would likely be viewed as amoral rather than immoral by those adhering to them. Similarly, past behavior that was globally accepted (such as slavery or torture) is not theorized as having constituted a norm (if anything it could at best be designated as an institution in the English school terminology), although it exhibited many characteristics of norms and was promoted by groups similar to Transnational Advocacy Networks.

In contrast, the realist school appears more pragmatic, highlighting that interests are not always moral but guide states' behavior on the international stage and carry more weight than ethical considerations. Realists argue that norms and institutions are created by powerful states and, although they may benefit less powerful states, they can be discarded by great powers if their interests demand it. As Mear-

sheimer [2018: 3] states, "Institutions are effectively rules that states themselves devise and agree to follow because they believe that obeying those rules is in their interest." However, norms cannot be solely reduced to sophisticated and effective instruments designed by states to promote their national interests while concealing their true motives. The constructivist assumption that identities are largely independent of states can also be contested. While the English School of International Relations initially attempted to bridge the gap between realist and constructivist positions, realist constructivism offers a more promising perspective for analyzing the ambivalence of normative agendas.

Initial Theorising of Realist Constructivism

The idea that International Relations meta- (or grand) theories (realism, liberalism, constructivism etc.) should be mutually exclusive was criticised, among others, by Samuel Barkin who argued that paradigmatic views "obscure both the compatibilities among different approaches and the complex ways in which they interrelate" [Barkin 2010: 2]. Although realism and constructivism are often placed at opposite ends of the spectrum, particularly in textbooks, scholars have argued that there is no equivalency between realism and constructivism as the latter is more often recognised as a methodology or an ontology. It is thus more appropriate to compare and oppose constructivism to materialism or rationalism [Katzenstein et al. 1998: 646].

The traditional association of liberalism with constructivism on the one hand and realism with materialism on the other has led to undermining the idea that realism and constructivism are compatible [Katzenstein et al. 1998: 646]. The benefits of reconciling the two approaches were characterised by a novel theorisation of realist constructivism in the 2000s, which analysed the progress that could be made in resolving common IR debates (agent-structure dialectic, social constraints and public interest) by overcoming paradigm-centric approaches [Barkin 2010: 13]. The apparent contradiction between normative change resulting from intersubjectivity and state power under condi-

tions of anarchy is the centrepiece for a constructive discussion on the influence and limitations of norms on international politics.

The nascent literature on realist constructivism served in the 2000s as a warning to mainstream constructivist scholars that they were falling into utopianism by studying successful cases of normative developments and neglecting power realities [Bucher 2007]. The distinction between 'realist constructivism' and 'constructivist realism' goes beyond semantic connotations as the first places an emphasis on constructivism, integrating elements of realism including the primary role of power in international relations, while the second considers realism which would give a place to norms and ideas in the power structure [Jackson & Nexon 2004: 338]. The attempt to reconcile realism and constructivism stems both from the need to ensure that material realities and power are not neglected in IR analysis and from the desire to infuse realism with moral considerations [Sterling-Folker 2004: 341].

While morality has a place in classical realism, the focus on power amongst realists has led to a Machiavellian streak questioning the place of ethics in international relations. The common ground with constructivism is that realists recognise human beings as social species who find their identity by living in a group [Sterling-Folker 2004: 342]. As pointed out by Richard Ned Lebow, realist constructivism can build on the perceptions of Thucydides, Carl von Clausewitz, and Hans Morgenthau, realists who believed that identities and values were more significant than external determinants [Lebow 2004: 346].

The notion of integrating constructivist norms into realist theory as a means to promote a more moral use of power remains a subject of controversy, as it assumes the universality of norms as carriers of political morality [Barkin 2003: 338]. Nevertheless, a potential compromise can be reached by accepting Kenneth Waltz's premise that power cannot be transcended in international politics [Waltz 1979: 116–128], while also recognizing the existence of multiple forms of power, including the power of conviction and moral authority [Risse et al. 1999: 7; Mattern 2004: 344].

However, the broad definition of power embraced by constructivists may undermine the analytical utility of the concept, as it risks encompassing all social interactions as manifestations of power [Barkin 2004: 350]. It is important to acknowledge that state interests can be socially constructed and extend beyond mere survival, indicating that the maximization of power cannot be considered an end in itself [Barkin 2020].

Realism and constructivism share a common ground in recognizing that states and leaders influence international politics by inspiring, causing, and implementing changes that impact the identity and preferences of various actors [Barkin 2020: 11]. This perspective combines the idea that uses of power and their purposes are agentive choices that shape outcomes, drawn from realism, and the notion that the institutional context for such choices is historically contingent, intersubjective, and subject to change, derived from constructivism [Barkin 2020: 11-12]. The focus of realist constructivism shifts towards understanding how states employ power to strengthen their position within the system and, consequently, alter the structure itself [Barkin 2020: 11–12].

While not explicitly referring to realist constructivism, other theoretical reviews argue in a similar vein, emphasizing the need to consider both material forces and ideas within a unified theoretical framework [Sorensen 2008: 5]. Sorensen advocates for an eclectic approach that combines neorealism and social constructivist perspectives to account for changes in statehood, highlighting the neglected influence of social forces on material outcomes [Sorensen 2008: 5-8]. The identity of states is seen as dependent on their interactions with other states as well as on internal socialization processes [Copeland 2000: 191].

In conclusion, realist constructivism emerges as a way to temper the enthusiasm surrounding norms and to underscore the significance of material considerations over ideational ones in certain cases. However, realist constructivism falls short of fully explaining the distinction between successful and unsuccessful norms. Building upon this framework, this paper advances the notion that there exist different types of norms: those aligned with state interests, often created by states and subject to change, and those rooted in universal values, thereby exhibiting greater durability.

Empirical Studies of Realist Constructivism

Scholars have applied realist constructivism to analyze real-world cases, shedding light on the social dimensions of states and the conditions of their construction. Krebs and Jackson, for instance, conducted a study on political rhetoric, revealing the emergence of "coercive constructivism" and arguing that persuasion can be a form of constraint, posing theoretical challenges for constructivism [2007: 35]. Boyle's case study on Taiwan [2020: 73–100] explored how the country's identity formed under exceptional circumstances, highlighting the delicate balance struck in its communications with its citizens, China, and the USA. The multiplicity of discourses allowed Taiwan to maintain its existence, as declaring independence or unifying with China would jeopardize its statehood. The combination of realist and constructivist insights, particularly regarding survival and identity, helps explain the persistence of the status quo in this case.

Realist constructivism also offers insights into why the United States modified the non-proliferation regime by signing a Civilian Nuclear Agreement with India [Bano 2020: 101–122]. Despite India's history of breaking non-proliferation rules, the recognition that India would never relinquish its nuclear weapons led George W. Bush to accept India as a responsible nuclear power–an acceptance rooted in realist considerations. The United States emphasized the exceptional nature of the Indian case to prevent the weakening of non-proliferation norms. In this instance, both hard-line realist and hard-line constructivist positions would have undermined the non-proliferation treaty. Marginalizing nuclear states outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty or fully integrating them into the NPT would have weakened the norm.

A study on Turkey-EU relations during the 2016 migration crisis revealed significant con-

cessions made by the EU to Turkey, despite its previous criticism of Turkey's illiberal practices, to secure cooperation on managing the Aegean crossing [Martin 2019: 1349]. Realist constructivism was employed to explain how the EU was willing to compromise its liberal democratic principles to advance its material interests. This case exemplifies a fluid identity shaped by power dynamics and constraints. State identities are constructed based on a multitude of factors, including ideals, ethics, and material interests. This aligns with constructivist perspectives that emphasize the diffusion and internalization of norms based not only on the logic of appropriateness but also on the logic of consequences and the logic of habit [Risse et al. 1999: 13–16].

A realist constructivist perspective offers valuable insights into the India-Pakistan conflict by highlighting the interplay between power dynamics and identity factors. Rather than solely attributing the rivalry to power asymmetry (realist perspective) or endogenous questions of identity and religion (constructivist perspective), the combination of both aspects is essential [Michael 2018: 100–114]. This case demonstrates how power structures shape norms and identities, which in turn contribute to redefining power balances.

In examining US policy towards China, a realist constructivist lens brings out the attempt by the United States to use norms to ensure China's peaceful development and discourage military engagement [Wei 2020]. While constructivists emphasize the influence of liberal norms in socializing Beijing through dialogue and discourse, realists highlight the US's temporary position of power in the international system and its ability to influence China's behavior through the threat of repercussions.

Realist constructivism suggests that discourse can serve as a form of constraint, particularly when countries seek recognition in the international arena. In the China-US case, "coercive engagement" is seen as a goal-oriented strategy aimed at entrapping China, rather than a purely communicative approach [Wei 2020: 123]. This echoes the notion that "soft power isn't so soft" [Mattern 2005: 583;

Babayan 2016]. As Wei points out, realist constructivism uncovers the coercive language underlying the process in which engagement extracts pro-social behavior from Beijing, highlighting the contextually contingent nature of Chinese conformism [Wei 2020: 125]. Norms, while aiming for liberal and universal goals, can also be non-liberal and characterized by compulsion. However, the idea that the means justify the ends can lead to dangerous precedents and compromises to liberal principles.

An analysis of the practical consequences of the notion of co-constitution sheds light on the contradictions in Western countries' foreign policies, as exemplified by US relations with Latin America [Delacour 2020: 145]. The US support for the failed coup against a democratically elected government in Venezuela in 2002, and the departure from liberal norms it entailed, exposed tensions between social perceptions within the US and the government's foreign policy actions driven by material (realist) interests [Delacour 2020]. However, the US government could not deviate too far from public opinion and quickly distanced itself from the coup after the fact, aligning with the generally accepted normative discourse [Delacour 2020: 170]. This case reveals that governments may take liberties with international norms, supported by public opinion domestically, but eventually face the need to realign and bear the consequences of deviating too far from liberal principles. It provides evidence to support the claim that the US is internally liberal and realist in its foreign policy but also underscores the limits and potential double standards of this dual framework.

Realist constructivism has also been employed in the study of the norm of the responsibility to protect (R2P) in the international arena, demonstrating that while power politics and states' self-interest remain central to international security, the widespread recognition of human rights has led to changes in international customary law [Iancu 2020: 171]. The acknowledgment of individuals' rights has created exceptions to state sovereignty and, in certain cases, has justified military interventions.

Presentation of Two Normative Categories

This extensive body of literature suggests some potential for enriching norm theory with insights from realist constructivism. To realize this promise, it is imperative to move beyond the dichotomy that portrays norms as moral in the constructivist perspective and amoral in the realist perspective. Instead, we argue that an examination of different categories of norms with distinct characteristics is essential. This new perspective also helps to explain the existence of immoral norms that may have gained acceptance in the past but are currently vehemently rejected. We classify norms into two broad categories, as depicted in Table 1: norms on individuals and norms on groups. This distinction revolves around the inherent nature of the norms themselves and the specific issues they address, rather than a differentiation based on universalism versus particularism or the intended beneficiaries.

The first category primarily falls within the domain of constructivism and encompasses norms that focus on the rights of individuals. These norms include, for instance, the prohibition of torture, which condemns any act that infringes upon an individual's physical and mental integrity, as well as the norm advocating for the universal right to education, defined as the provision of free and compulsory primary education for all. Many of these individual-centric norms are enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; however, their implementation and the resulting contestation surrounding them remain subjects of ongoing scrutiny from a constructivist perspective. Norms pertaining to individual identities and rights are universal in nature as they do not differentiate among individuals based on their national affiliations and affinities but instead recognize each person's primary identity as a human being. In this regard, constructivism shares a common focus on the individual with liberalism, as both frameworks exhibit profound concerns for the rights of all individuals worldwide [Mearsheimer 2018: 5].

These norms, which safeguard the inalienable rights of individuals, possess a robust moral and ethical component, making their condemnation in principle highly unlikely. Few would openly argue that torture, for example, is an acceptable practice. Nevertheless, these norms face challenges in their implementation, particularly when they clash with other norms. Some individuals may seek to justify torture under specific circumstances, such as when interrogating terrorists who pose a threat to the safety of large groups of people. In such cases, a conflict arises between the rights of the individual and the rights of the community. Norms concerning individual rights are particularly vulnerable to attempts at differentiation among distinct groups of people and framing strategies aimed at dehumanizing certain individuals. Historical instances, like slavery, exemplify situations where human rights were not recognized due to the denial of slaves' humanity. For instance, the 1788 Constitution of the United States stated that any person who was not free would be counted as three-fifths of a free individual to determine congressional representation[1]. Hence, human rights activists adamantly advocate for the universal preservation of human rights, irrespective of the circumstances and specificities of the individuals involved, rather than solely for the protection of those individuals[2].

The second category of norms is primarily concerned with the rights and interests of groups, whether they are communities or states, and is best understood within the realist paradigm of international relations. The concept of collective identity necessitates differentiation between groups, and in many instances, the process of state-building requires artificially creating shared characteristics among

---

[1] Slavery and the making of America. (2022) The U.S. Constitution, Article 1. Section 2. The "Three-Fifths Clause" Ratified 1788, Courtesy of National Archives, "Charters of Freedom" Exhibit. Retrieved on 25 May 2022 from https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/slavery/experience/legal/docs2.html.

[2] *Hammarberg T.* (2010) The prohibition of torture is absolute and no exceptions allowed, ever. Council of Europe. Retrieved on 25 May 2022 from https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/blog/-/asset_publisher/xZ32OPEoxOkq/content/the-prohibition-of-torture-is-absolute-and-no-exceptions-allowed-ever?

individuals while deliberately distinguishing them from other communities. Practices such as facial scarring in African tribes or the promotion of national languages at the expense of local dialects, as observed in the French case, exemplify the ongoing efforts required to maintain a national identity [Hobsbawm 1996]. Norms pertaining to groups prevail when the criteria defining a community outweigh those defining us all as human beings. "Nationalism is built on the belief that the world is organized around discrete nations that have their own culture and are best served by having their own state so they can survive in the face of threats from the 'other'" [Mearsheimer 2018: 21]. Norms concerning groups may focus on promoting the identities and interests of states. While states may opportunistically promote norms aligned with their interests, the likelihood of successfully creating, diffusing, and internalizing such norms by other communities is slim, as it requires long-term strategic planning and execution, which states often struggle to implement.

The potential risks of such initiatives backfiring also factor into a state's rational calculation when deciding whether to influence other nations in favor of initiatives that serve its own interests. The instrumentalization of norms for the promotion of state interests poses challenges, and the existing expert literature does not provide clear-cut cases of the successful utilization of new norms as soft power. Nevertheless, states frequently endorse the diffusion of norms they perceive as advantageous. Norms concerning groups are more likely to be driven by interests rather than ethical considerations, and they are also more susceptible to contestation compared to universal norms. It is worth noting that norms from the second category are often framed as norms from the first category as a strategic approach to increase their global acceptance. All international norms claim to be universal and beneficial for states that adhere to them. This is a condition sine qua non for their global diffusion and internationalization. Realists observe that even a universal norm typically benefits one side more than the other, leading to shifts in the balance of power.

There is no inherent contradiction between the realist and constructivist understandings of norms, their emergence, and their impact on the international system. Realist constructivism aids in comprehending that while certain norms concern individuals and possess universality, others are linked to the rights and interests of communities and states. The ability to determine the category to which a norm belongs can help predict its evolution and the degree of contestation it may encounter, as well as whether it is prone to regression and obsolescence or likely to gain resilience over time. These two types of norms coexist and interact, sometimes merging with each other, while in other cases, they may compete. Norms on individuals (category 1) and norms on groups (category 2) can come into conflict, creating tensions within the international system.

For instance, the individual norm regarding the environmental rights of future generations (which asserts the right of individuals to live in a clean environment) clashes with the group norm on economic development (which asserts the right of states to utilize resources for promoting economic growth). Although the norm in the first category appears more legitimate than the norm in the second category, it is weakened by the fact that it pertains to hypothetical individuals (future generations) rather than existing ones, and by the framing of the right to economic growth as both a developmental and human rights issue by states. Initially, the norm on economic growth was concerned with states' right to develop their wealth and ensure their security, but it was subsequently merged by developing countries with the norm of human rights to an adequate standard of living, giving it a significant boost.

Another example is the conflict between the norm of preserving peace embodied by the "conscientious objectors" movement and the norm of defending national territory. States, as entities, prioritize self-preservation, and national governments often take strong measures to suppress attempts to avoid fulfilling the "military duty" of protecting the state's territory. However, global movements advocating for peace in the postmodern era increasingly emphasize the wastefulness of human lives

Table 1
Contrasting Norms on inidividuals and Norms on groups

	Norms on individuals	**Norms on groups**
Level of acceptance	Universal	Local, national, regional
Description	Based on the common rights of all human beings globally	Based on the political differentiation between groups
Theoretical Framework	Constructivism, liberalism	Realism, marxism (in the case of socioeconomic transnational groups)
Contestation	Limited	Widespread
Moral underpinning	High	Low
Conflicting norms	Norm of 'conscientious objectors'	Norm of defending the national territory
	Norm on the environmental rights of future generations	Norm on economic growth

even in defensive battles, and the need to move away from state-centric identities. These cases of normative conflicts reveal that although norms on individuals enjoy greater legitimacy, norms on groups can supersede them, particularly in matters related to state survival.

Overview of five norms

This section adopts a realist constructivist perspective to examine five international norms: two related to the rights of individuals (norm on anti-personnel landmines and norm on banning torture), two belonging to the category of norms on groups (norm on the green energy transition and norm on world-class universities), and one borderline case (norm against genocide). The selection of these cases serves multiple purposes: to illustrate the theoretical model using clear-cut examples from each category (norm on anti-personnel landmines, norm on the green transition), to test the model by considering cases involving strong contestation or less recognized norms (norm on banning torture and norm on world-class universities), and to challenge the model using a borderline case associated with one category but sharing features of another (the norm against genocide).

The first four norms were chosen because they are typically representative of each respective category, while the last norm represents a "difficult case" aiming to test the wider applicability of the theoretical framework. These norms were also selected from the existing literature, ensuring that they have already

been widely recognized as norms, as the focus of this paper is on the evolution of norms within different categories, rather than determining whether a specific phenomenon qualifies as a norm or not.

To analyze these concrete cases, secondary sources and primary materials from previous research are utilized. This approach demonstrates how the dual theoretical framework presented in this article generates novel insights into normative behavior in the international arena. The findings also illuminate how realist constructivism offers a better explanation for the evolution of these five norms compared to other paradigms.

The norm on anti-personnel landmines

The norm on anti-personnel landmines is categorized as a norm on individuals because it primarily pertains to the rights of each and every person, specifically the right to physical integrity. Although arms control norms generally fall under the category of norms on groups, the norm on anti-personnel landmines was framed as a humanitarian issue and linked to the established norm on human rights.

What sets landmines apart from other conventional armaments is their characteristics as lethal autonomous weapon systems. Their operational failures can have severe consequences as they lack adaptability to new circumstances. Landmines also lack empathy and disrupt the traditional line of military command, leading to challenges in attribution and accountability. Additionally, landmines were

designed to maim rather than kill, further distinguishing them from other weapons.

While in the past it was considered more advantageous in combat to harm rather than kill enemy soldiers due to the resource burden it imposed on the opponent, the main uses of landmines in combat zones, such as guarding key infrastructure, have been replaced by high-tech detection devices. The widespread use of landmines in internal conflicts, their indiscriminate nature, and the persistent threat they pose even after hostilities end have diminished their credibility as weapons of war. Evidence that 85% of landmine casualties affect civilians, including children, and the advocacy campaigns led by over 300,000 survivors contributed to a strong popular mobilization against their production and use. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, initiated in 1992 by six NGOs and later expanding to a network of over a hundred countries, played a crucial role [Rutherford 2000: 74–78].

The public pressure resulted in the adoption of the Ottawa Treaty in 1997, which prohibits the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines, as well as the destruction of existing stockpiles and demining of affected areas. Currently, 161 states are party to the treaty, and 28 states have completed mine-clearance programs. However, public awareness and mobilization were not the sole factors that led to the ban. The diminishing interest of powerful states in using landmines due to their reduced combat effectiveness and their representation as an indiscriminate and particularly cruel form of autonomous weapon threatening human rights also played significant roles. Military experts highlighted the costliness of deploying and maintaining landmines, their ineffectiveness against modern tankers, and their historical inability to win battles or protect infrastructure [Harland 2008: 242].

Realist constructivism elucidates how two parallel processes—the waning interest of powerful states in utilizing landmines and the portrayal of landmines as separate, indiscriminate, and exceptionally cruel autonomous weapons threatening human rights—made their stigmatization and eventual ban possible. Techno-logical advancements and the potential for lethal autonomous weapons systems to discriminate between combatants and civilians would not make landmines more acceptable, as the core belief underlying the norm is that decisions regarding life and death on the battlefield should always and fundamentally be made by humans only. The norm against landmines may face further challenges if these weapons regain strategic utility on the battlefield, but the underlying principle of the norm, that inflicting death or injury on another human being requires a value-based judgment, is likely to remain deeply ingrained in the public conscience. However, the fact that major world powers such as the U.S., Russia, China, and India have not signed the Convention suggests an ongoing threat to the consolidation of the norm. Norm contestation, such as the use of landmines in combat, does not necessarily result in norm reversal, and if condemned by a majority of states on the international stage, it could even strengthen the robustness of the norm, as noted by Deitelhoff and Zimmermann [2019].

The analysis of landmines within the framework of the first category of norms on individuals reveals that the strength of this norm is linked to its moral value and anchoring in basic human rights, while the threats it faces are proportional to the utility of landmines on the battlefield. This case suggests that individually, realism and constructivism do not allow for a complete appreciation of the evolution of this norm, as both its emergence and its endurance depend on a combination of ideational and material factors.

The norm on banning torture

The norm prohibiting torture serves as a prime example of the first-category norm, focused on the prohibition of inflicting bodily harm. It emerged in tandem with the recognition of universal rights, and by the year 2000, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights boasted 147 signatories who acknowledged this prohibition against torture. The U.S. government strongly advocated for this treaty and emphasized that there could be no exceptions to this ban [Committee Against

Torture 2000]. Instances of violations against this norm worldwide were typically met with denial on the offender's part and condemnation from the global community.

From a constructivist standpoint, the ascension of this norm represents a classic success story, attesting to the capacity of norms to influence state conduct [McKeown 2009: 7]. In contrast, realism argues that the costs of prohibiting torture were relatively low for the majority of states, as their security did not critically hinge on the interrogation of individuals. However, in the 2000s, the U.S.-initiated 'war on terror' posed a significant challenge to this norm, and the torture of suspected terrorists became increasingly commonplace [McKeown 2009: 5]. While officials of the Bush administration denied the use of torture, their actions suggested an awareness that their methods were deserving of condemnation, and efforts to amend the legal framework surrounding torture posed a real threat to the norm.

The 2002 Bybee memorandum paved the way for the utilization of special interrogation techniques and a debased, essentially meaningless definition of torture [Koh 2004: 646]. Attempts to erode the taboo surrounding torture proved effective, as public opinion polls in the United States indicated that the majority of the population believed that torture was justified after the events of 9/11 [Gronke et al. 2010: 437]. The regression of the ban on torture in the U.S. had a mixed impact on this international norm globally. While some nations condemned the rehabilitation of torture by the U.S., others used it as a justification for their own transgressions. In total, approximately 54 states cooperated to some extent with the CIA's interrogation program, suggesting that disregard for the torture ban extended beyond the U.S., as it was actively diffused by the American government, functioning in this instance **as a norm entrepreneur** [Singh 2013: 8].

Nonetheless, a global analysis of compliance indicates that, even though U.S. violations served as a pretext to legitimize some countries' abusive practices, the use of torture by states did not increase globally after 2000 [Schmidt & Sikkink 2019: 113]. The initial diffusion and subsequent challenge to the norm prohibiting torture can be best comprehended through the lens of realist constructivism. Torture evolved into a taboo through collective efforts to protect individual rights and physical integrity but faced challenges due to the security concerns of a powerful state. Even constructivist scholars acknowledge that there exist 'circumstances under which powerful states can shape the robustness of global norms' [Schmidt & Sikkink 2019: 105].

The external shock of 9/11 precipitated a temporary weakening of the norm within the United States, which is now displaying indications of recuperation, particularly in the rhetoric of the American Presidency[3]. While the U.S. government has initiated a comprehensive review of the illicit practices of the 2000s, the primary arguments presented against torture essentially retain their realist nature and are grounded in the belief that torture should be prohibited because it fails to effectively mitigate risk or danger. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's Report [2014: xi] stresses that "The CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees" and further asserts that: The CIA's justification for the use of enhanced interrogation techniques rested on inaccurate claims of their effectiveness" [2014: xi][4]. Implicitly, it suggests that if torture were indeed effective, it might be justified in the name of safeguarding the security of the majority.

However, the resilience of the ban on torture, as evidenced by its sustained adherence on a global scale despite U.S. contestation,

---

[3] *Biden J.* (2021) Statement by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. on International Day in Support of Victims of Torture. Retrieved on 26.05.2021 from https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/26/statement-by-president-joseph-r-biden-jr-on-international-day-in-support-of-victims-of-torture/

[4] Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. (2014). Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Accessed on 16/09/2022 at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf

underscores that efforts to portray it primarily as a matter of national security are unlikely to succeed or garner broader support. The unwavering and continual public focus on human rights abuses in Guantanamo reflects a robust public stance against torture, both within the United States and internationally.

The norm on the transition to clean energy

Environmental protection has been conceptualized as an international regime comprising multiple norms, one of which is directed towards the mitigation of CO_2 emissions to combat climate change [Ross 1998: 809; Nagtzaam 2009]. The transition to clean energy has emerged as an international norm, characterized as a widely accepted standard of appropriate behavior. This norm gained global prominence as states recognized the necessity of a comprehensive approach, given that the progress achieved by some countries could be negated by the inaction of others [Dubé et al. 2014: 201].

During the 2000s, this norm experienced a cascade effect and found formal expression through various international agreements, including the 2015 Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which brought together over two hundred nations to establish goals for mitigating global warming [Banister 2019: 565; Toganova 2016]. The overarching objective is to expedite the development of renewable energy sources to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and combat climate change. While advancements are being made in technology to make fossil fuel production and usage cleaner, the transition to green energy is more commonly associated with breakthroughs in the renewable energy sector, including advancements in solar energy storage [Gallo et al. 2016: 813]. This transition is also conceptualized as a global, just, and participatory endeavor [Fuso Nerini et al. 2018: 10], enabling transnational advocacy networks to employ various framing techniques.

This case aligns with the category of norms pertaining to collective action, as the decision to shift away from fossil fuels toward cleaner energy sources primarily hinges on governmental decision-making and is not directly tied to human rights, unlike some other environmental issues such as waste management. Despite its wide dissemination and institutionalization, the norm promoting clean energy remains largely unimplemented, with many governments merely paying lip service to climate change concerns. Only a few countries are willing to compromise their economic development by prioritizing renewable energy. This norm on clean energy aligns with the transition agenda championed by the European Union and several other predominantly Western nations. While this norm guides the energy policy agenda in the West, it lacks the universal acceptance of norms rooted in human rights principles. Attempts to graft the clean energy norm onto the rights of future generations to a safe environment have encountered numerous obstacles, including uncertainties fueled by climate skepticism, apocalyptic determinism, and more immediate economic and political priorities [Castrejon-Campos et al. 2020: 2—3]. The international norm promoting clean energy comes into conflict with other robust norms, such as the right of countries to utilize fossil fuels for economic development and the well-being of their population: "These contradictory scripts call into question the uniformly beneficial impact of the world polity on the natural environment" [Henderson 2019: 393].

The constructivist perspective provides valuable insights into the emergence of the norm but falls short in explaining its sluggish adoption in other regions of the world. Conversely, the realist perspective can highlight the material advantages that EU countries stand to gain in the long term by transitioning away from fossil fuels, particularly in terms of energy independence. A realist constructivist approach suggests that the norm's success depends on both the backing of influential states and the mobilization of the global community, thus offering a comprehensive interpretative framework. Despite efforts to frame the norm in moral terms, the underlying moral considerations remain underdeveloped.

The norm, given its short-term potential threat to the well-being of entire national communities, is likely to remain limited to a select number of developed countries. These coun-

tries have the financial capability to support the transition and also stand to materially benefit from developing their domestic energy sources while reducing their dependence on imports.

The norm pertaining to a clean energy transition falls within the second category of norms, implying that its global implementation will likely become feasible only when technological advancements make the use of renewables more economically advantageous than fossil fuels.

The norm on world-class universities

The emergence of the norm advocating the establishment of world-class universities[5], which originated in the United States and the United Kingdom after World War II, implies that all nations should develop universities of a specific caliber capable of competing globally [Crowley-Vigneau et al. 2022: 4, Altbach 2003]. This norm, centered on world-class universities, falls into the second category of norms as it does not directly address human rights but rather views education as an economic and, to some extent, national endeavor rather than an individual's inherent right to learn. World-class universities are characterized as international, research-focused institutions with a stakeholder-oriented approach, capable of attracting talent and driving their country's economic progress [Salmi 2009: 17].

The norm proliferated rapidly during the 1990s and 2000s, with governments worldwide making substantial investments in initiatives aimed at enhancing excellence in higher education to elevate the global standing of their most promising universities [Escher & Aebischer 2018: 37]. The norm reached a tipping point in the late 2000s when the World Bank actively advocated for the establishment of world-class universities in developing nations as a means to foster their economic development. The World Bank released several manuals containing recommendations on how governments could support their higher educa-

tion systems to compete globally (e.g., "The Challenge of Establishing World-Class Universities" by Salmi 2009].

However, the norm is currently encountering resistance in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia, alongside its solid internalization in the Western world. The core principles underpinning this norm, notably elitism, the predominant use of English, the marginalization of the humanities, the promotion of Western values, the corporatization of universities, and their evaluation by Western ranking agencies, face strong criticism from countries that had previously embraced the norm [e.g., Guo et al. 2021; Maesse 2017]. The idea of the norm's universality is being rejected, with several states accusing the West of using education to advance their economic interests, leading to brain drain and significant financial outflows toward Anglo-Saxon countries. This has resulted in a misalignment between national higher education systems and the needs of local economies. For instance, while China had previously fervently pursued excellence in higher education initiatives and emphasized the development of leading universities, it has recently shifted its policy focus toward supporting local demands and promoting the Chinese language and culture [Yang et al. 2021: 429–430].

From a constructivist perspective, the norm's objective is to enhance global higher education and research, facilitating the exchange of best practices among universities and fostering fair competition, all while contributing to the economic development of developing nations. On the other hand, a realist viewpoint would emphasize how beneficial the norm has been for the US, UK, and other Western countries. They have been able to establish and dominate the framework while reaping substantial financial rewards from their top positions in global university rankings. However, neither perspective in isolation can fully elucidate why many major states initially embraced the norm but later rejected it.

---

[5] The endeavor to create world-class universities has acquired a normative status with many governments and higher education institutions striving to adopt this 'standard of appropriate behavior' (Crowley-Vigneau et al. 2022: 4).

A realist constructivist framework provides a more comprehensive understanding, revealing that a norm may thrive when it is perceived as universal but loses credibility when instrumentalized for narrow interests. This framework also suggests that, since the norm of world-class universities is not firmly rooted in universally accepted values that directly impact individual rights, it remains susceptible to challenges from competing norms that promote different values and organizational principles, such as national sovereignty.

The norm on the prohibition of genocide

The selection of the norm regarding genocide presents a unique challenge: it is commonly perceived as a norm pertaining to groups due to its association with the persecution of a significant number of people. However, unexpectedly, the taboo surrounding genocide seems to be rapidly solidifying on the international stage. Given this apparent contradiction, we raise questions about whether the norm prohibiting genocide is genuinely a group-related norm. Furthermore, we underscore that the prevention of genocide is not without controversy.

The first argument posits that the most effective means of categorizing a norm (whether it pertains to individuals or groups) does not involve merely quantifying the number of people affected by it but rather entails an examination of its underlying principles. Genocide, as per Article II of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, can be defined as acts committed with the intent to deliberately kill a substantial number of people and annihilate their national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. The norm's acceptance, in principle, appears to be universal, with no states or groups asserting that the categorical prohibition of exterminating a group based on shared beliefs can be justified. Similarly, the norm possesses a strong moral foundation and is rooted in the natural rights of all human beings globally. All these attributes align with norms pertaining to individuals, leading to the postulate that while the global attention to genocide is often drawn by the number of people affected, making it

appear as a norm pertaining to groups, the prohibition of genocide primarily concerns the rights of the individuals who constitute that group. The international community's primary concern is each individual's right to exist and choose their ethnic, national, or religious identity.

The 1948 Convention, by designating genocide as a jus cogens prohibition, places it in the same category as aggression, crimes against humanity, war crimes, piracy, slavery, and torture. All of these norms are fundamentally concerned with the human rights of individuals. Additionally, the Convention underscores a universal responsibility to prevent genocides, recognizing that they 'endanger the fundamental interests of the international community' [Verhoeven & Wouters 2005: 403]. The universal impact of genocide suggests that each individual is personally affected by the persecution of a person for their characteristics, irrespective of whether these characteristics are shared with a group or not. The primary focus of the norm prohibiting genocide is not the political differentiation between groups but the rights of individuals, as evidenced by the exclusion of political groups from the Convention's definition of genocide. Furthermore, a review of attempts to mobilize the international community reveals that the norm against genocide is frequently and effectively linked to the well-established norm of universal human rights [e.g., Duncan 2007; Budabin 2015], and NGOs specializing in individuals' rights (such as Aegis Trust, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International) are the primary actors monitoring claims of genocide. In summary, categorizing the norm prohibiting genocide as pertaining to individuals may be justified.

The second argument challenges the notion that the norm against genocide is uncontested, especially in its application. The initial reluctance of a significant number of national governments, including Western countries such as the UK and Australia, to sign the Convention, along with the challenges in determining whether genocide is occurring [Smith 2014: 247], divulges the difficulties encountered when mobilizing states to prevent genocides. National interests of states can also introduce

bias into assessments, as exemplified by the UK's reluctance to thoroughly investigate reports of genocide in Biafra [O'Sullivan 2014: 311]. While the British eventually yielded to requests to establish an observer team, their report was heavily criticized for lacking objectivity and seemingly serving the purpose of justifying the UK's support for the Nigerian government. The UK responded to pressures "to take action that it viewed as inimical to its interests (such as imposing an arms embargo on the FMG), and thus it needed specifically to rebut the claims of genocide to relieve the pressure" [Smith 2014: 248].

Indeed, condemning acts as genocide necessitates assessing not only the objective situation on the ground but also the intentions of the perpetrator, often a state. Conflicting narratives, such as 'ethnic war' versus genocide, reveal that differences in the material interests of states can lead to changes in framing [Hammond 2018: 434] and potentially the instrumentalization of the norm against genocide, which could weaken it further. Once again, the evolution of this norm is best explained by a realist constructivist perspective, which elucidates why the norm gained prominence but also why it remains challenged due to the interests of powerful states. This borderline case is better understood when categorized as a norm on individuals rather than a norm on groups, suggesting that the prohibition of genocide will continue to solidify over time, despite its significant clash with the norm of state sovereignty.

In summary, these cases demonstrate that a dual perspective, such as realist constructivism, is more effective in explaining changes in the international system than single paradigms. The findings also affirm that norms concerning individual identities and rights, because of their universality, possess greater resilience, whereas norms focusing on groups are not universal and are more likely to face challenges as they represent (or are perceived as promoting) the national interests of a select number of countries.

The norm against landmines is fundamentally a norm aimed at protecting individuals, and it faces minimal risk of being discarded, given the technological advancements that have rendered landmines obsolete. The norm against torture, according to the realist constructivist framework, should eventually overcome infringements like those by the US, as it is strongly linked to the norm of human rights. In contrast, the norm promoting the green energy transition, despite the attention it has garnered, remains fragile due to its potential adverse effects on the economies of both developing and developed countries. It is also criticized for being politically motivated by Western powers. The norm promoting world-class universities is another norm pertaining to groups that spreads rapidly but remains highly vulnerable because it lacks a foundation in individual and universal values. Identity-based controversies cannot be overlooked in the endeavor to establish universities following a distinctly Western model.

An analysis of the characteristics of the genocide taboo reveals that, possibly counterintuitively, it is a norm primarily focused on individuals. This perspective emphasizes that the norm is concerned with the rights of individuals who comprise a group, rather than emphasizing the collective rights of the group itself. Viewing the genocide taboo as a norm centered on individuals suggests that it possesses robustness because it is rooted in fundamental human rights. However, this does not eliminate the numerous operational challenges involved in preventing genocide from occurring in practice.

It is important to clarify that we are not asserting that norms related to groups are better explained by realism and norms related to individuals are better explained by constructivism. Instead, we argue that comprehending the evolution of each of these norms requires a multifaceted perspective. The categories outlined in this paper provide insights into the durability of norms based on their inherent characteristics, with norms centered on individuals exhibiting more enduring features than norms focused on groups.

Conclusion

Our analysis of realist constructivism has demonstrated how this approach can enrich

norm theory by elucidating the roles that states and power/interest considerations play in shaping identities. We have reconciled the seemingly conflicting perspectives that construe norms as inherently moral according to constructivists and as devoid of morality according to realists. In doing so, we have proposed the existence of two fundamentally distinct categories of norms: norms centered on individuals and norms focused on groups.

Norms of the first category are firmly rooted in fundamental individual rights, making them both universal and highly resilient. Norms of the second category, on the other hand, primarily concern the rights and interests of groups and are susceptible to instrumentalization by states, which jeopardizes their longevity. While realists tend to emphasize norms of the second category, constructivists prioritize those of the first category. This paradigmatic dichotomy fractures the representation of norms in the international system. Realist constructivism enables scholars to recognize the existence of both types of norms and explore how they interact.

Efforts to reframe norms of the second category and integrate them with human rights have yielded intriguing outcomes, legitimizing and empowering new principles. Conversely, the instrumentalization of norms from the first category to serve national interests can weaken them.

Our examination of five international norms using the realist constructivist framework—two related to the rights of individuals (the norm on anti-personnel landmines and the norm on banning torture), two belonging to the category of norms on groups (the norm on the green transition and the norm on world-class universities), and one representing a borderline case (the norm against genocide)—has allowed us to test this theoretical framework and offer fresh insights into the resilience and future development prospects of these norms.

References

Altbach P. (2003). The costs and benefits of world-class universities. *International higher education*. (33) https://doi.org/10.6017/ihe.2003.33.7381

Babayan D. (2016). 'Soft Power' and 'Hard Weakness' in Chinese-Mongolian Relations, *Mezhdunarodnye protsessy*. Vol. 14. No. 4. P. 99–105. In Russian: "Мягкая сила" и" жесткая слабость" в китайско-монгольских отношениях.

Banister D. (2019). The climate crisis and transport. *Transport Reviews*. Vol. 39. No. 5. P. 565–568.

Bano S. (2020). The India–US Nuclear Deal: Norms of Power and the Power of Norms. *The Social Construction of State Power: Applying Realist Constructivism*, Chap. 5 (101–122).

Barkin J.S. (2003). Realist constructivism. *International Studies Review*. Vol. 5. No. 3. P. 325–342.

Barkin J.S. (2004). Realist constructivism and realist-constructivisms. *International Studies Review*. Vol. 6. No. 2. P. 348–352.

Barkin J.S. (2010). *Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relation Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barkin J.S. (Ed.). (2020). *The Social Construction of State Power: Applying Realist Constructivism*. Policy Press.

Bode I., Huelss H. (2018) Autonomous Weapons Systems and Changing Norms in International Relations. *Review of International Studies*. Vol. 44. No. 3. P. 393–413.

Boyle M. (2020). Huadu: A Realist Constructivist Account of Taiwan's Anomalous Status. *The Social Construction of State Power: Applying Realist Constructivism*. Bristol University Press. P. 73–100.

Bucher B. (2007). The false promise of constructivist optimism. In *Standing Group on International Relations (ECPR)'s Sixth Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Making Sense of a Pluralist World, University of Turin, Italy*.

Budabin A.C. (2015). Celebrities as norm entrepreneurs in international politics: Mia Farrow and the 'Genocide Olympics' campaign. *Celebrity Studies*. Vol. 6. No. 4. P. 399–413.

Carpenter R.C. (2014). *Lost Causes. Agenda Vetting in Global Issue Networks and the Shaping of Human Security*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 234.

Castrejon-Campos, O., Aye, L., Hui, F.K.P. (2020). Making policy mixes more robust: An integrative and interdisciplinary approach for clean energy transitions. *Energy Research & Social Science*, volume 64. ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101425.

Chengeta T. (2017). Defining the Emerging Notion of Meaningful Human Control in Weapon Systems. *Journal of International Law and Politics*. Vol. 49. No. 3. P. 833–890.

Copeland D.C. (2000). The constructivist challenge to structural realism: a review essay. *International security*. Vol. 25. No. 2. P. 187–212.

Cortell A., Davis J. (2005). When Norms Clash: International Norms, Domestic Practices, and Japan's Internalisation of the GATT/WTO. *Review of International Studies*. Vol. 31. No. 1. P. 3–25.

Crowley-Vigneau A., Kalyuzhnova Y., Baykov A. (2022). World-class universities in Russia: a contested norm and its implementation. *Journal of Studies in International Education*. 27(3).

Deitelhoff N., Zimmermann L. (2019). Norms under challenge: Unpacking the dynamics of norm robustness. *Journal of global security studies*. Vol. 4. No. 1. P. 2–17.

Delacour J.O. (2020). Taking Co-constitution Seriously: Explaining an Ambiguous US Approach to Latin America. *The Social Construction of State Power: Applying Realist Constructivism*. Bristol University Press. P. 145–170.

Dubé L., Addy N.A., Blouin C., Drager N. (2014). From policy coherence to 21st century convergence: a whole-of-society paradigm of human and economic development. *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*. Vol. 1331. No. 1. P. 201–215.

Duncan F.J. (2007). *Framing African genocide: location, time and gender in the coverage of genocide in Rwanda and Sudan* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Missouri-Columbia) 104p.

Escher G., Aebischer P. (2018). Pour des universités de rang mondial: Défis et chances des universités européennes au XXIe siècle. *Futuribles*. Vol. 424. No. 3. P. 37–45.

Finnemore M., Sikkink K. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization*. Vol. 52. No. 4. P. 887–918.

Gronke P., Rejali D., Drenguis D., Hicks J., Miller P., Nakayama B. (2010). US public opinion on torture, 2001–2009. *PS: political science & politics*. Vol. 43. No. 3. P. 437–444.

Fuso Nerini F., J. Tomei L.S.T., Bisaga I., Parikh P., Black M., Borrion A., Spataru C., Broto V.C., Anandarajah G., Milligan B. (2018). Mapping synergies and trade-offs between energy and the Sustainable Development Goals. Nat. Energy 3, 10–15. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-017-0036-5.

Gallo A.B., Simões-Moreira J.R., Costa H.K. M., Santos M.M., Dos Santos E.M. (2016). Energy storage in the energy transition context: A technology review. *Renewable and sustainable energy review*. 65. P. 800–822.

Guo Y., Guo S., Yochim L., & Liu X. (2022). Internationalization of Chinese higher education: Is it westernization?. *Journal of Studies in International Education*, No. 26(4). P. 436–453.

Hammond P. (2018). When frames collide: 'Ethnic war'and 'genocide'. *Media, War & Conflict*. Vol. 11. No. 4. P. 434–445.

Harland C. (2008). Anti-Personnel Landmines: Balancing Military Utility and the Humanitarian Cost. *Centre for Land Warfare Studies Journal*. P. 236–248.

Henderson K.E. (2019). Contradictory governance norms within world society: energy development strategies, environmental protection, and carbon dioxide emissions. *Environmental Sociology*. Vol. 5. No. 4. P. 393–404.

Hobsbawn E. (1996). Language, culture, and national identity. *Social research*. P. 1065–1080.

Hoffmann M.J. (2009). Is constructivist ethics an oxymoron? *International Studies Review*. Vol. 11. No. 2. P. 231–252.

Hoffmann M.J. (2010). Norms and social constructivism in international relations. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*. P. 1–23.

Iancu A. (2020). The Bridging Capacity of Realist Constructivism: The Normative Evolution of Human Security and the Responsibility to Protect. *The Social Construction of State Power: Applying Realist Constructivism*. 171 p.

Jackson P.T., Nexon D.H. (2004). Constructivist realism or realist-constructivism? *International Studies Review*. Vol. 6. No. 2. P. 337–341.

Katzenstein P.J., Keohane R.O., Krasner S.D. (1998). International organization and the study of world politics. *International organization*. Vol. 52. No. 4. P. 645-685.

Keohane R.O. (1988). International institutions: Two approaches. *International studies quarterly*. Vol. 32. No. 4. P. 379–396.

Koh H.H. (2004). A world without torture. *Colum. J. Transnational Law.*, 43. P. 641–662.

Krebs R.R., Jackson P.T. (2007). Twisting tongues and twisting arms: The power of political rhetoric. *European Journal of International Relations.* Vol. 13. No. 1. P. 35–66.

Lebow R.N. (2004). Constructive realism. *International Studies Review*. Vol. 6. No. 2. P. 346–348.

Legro J.W. (1996). Culture and preferences in the international cooperation two-step. *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 90. No. 1. P. 118–137.

Maesse J. (2017) The elitism dispositif: hierarchization, discourses of excellence and organizational change in European economics. *Higher Education*. Vol. 73. No. 6. P. 909–927.

March J.G., Olsen J.P. (1998) The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders. *International Organization*. Vol. 52. No. 4. P. 943–69.

Martin N. (2019). From containment to realpolitik and back again: A realist constructivist analysis of Turkey–EU relations and the migration issue. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*. Vol. 57. No. 6. P. 1349–1365.

Mattern J.B. (2005). Why soft power isn't so soft: representational force and the sociolinguistic construction of attraction in world politics. *Millennium*. Vol. 33. No. 3. P. 583–612.

McKeown R. (2009). Norm regress: US revisionism and the slow death of the torture norm. *International relations.* Vol. 23. No. 1. P. 5–25.

Mearsheimer J. (2018). The rise & fall of the liberal inter-national order. Paper prepared for presentation at *Notre Dame International Security Center*. Available online at: https://ndisc.nd.edu/assets/288231/rise_%20and_fall_of_the_liberal_international_order.september_11_2018.pdf

Mearsheimer J.J. (1994). The false promise of international institutions. *International security*. Vol. 19. No. 3. P. 5-49.

Michael A. (2018). Realist-Constructivism and the India–Pakistan Conflict: A New Theoretical Approach for an Old Rivalry. *Asian Politics & Policy*. Vol. 10. No. 1. P. 100–114.

Moszynski P. (2004). Nairobi summit opens with call for action for landmine survivors. *British Medical Journal*. No. 7478. P. 1306.

Nadelmann E. (1990) Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society. *International Organization*. 44. P. 479–526.

Nagtzaam G. (2009). *The making of international environmental treaties: Neoliberal and constructivist analyses of normative evolution*. Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham. 259 p.

Nayan R. (Ed.). (2013). *The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and India*. Routledge.

O'Sullivan, K. (2014). Humanitarian encounters: Biafra, NGOs and imaginings of the Third World in Britain and Ireland, 1967–70. *Journal of Genocide Research*. Vol. 16. No. 2–3. P. 299–315.

Panke D., Petersohn U. (2016). Norm challenges and norm death: The inexplicable? *Cooperation and Conflict*. Vol. 51. No. 1. P. 3–19.

Pape R.A. (2012). When duty calls: A pragmatic standard of humanitarian intervention. *International Security*. Vol. 37. No. 1. P. 41–80.

Price R. (1998). Reversing the gun sights: transnational civil society targets land mines. *International organization*. Vol. 52. No. 3. P. 613–644.

Risse T., Risse-Kappen T., Ropp S.C., Sikkink K. (Eds.). (1999). *The power of human rights: International norms and domestic change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 291p.

Rosert E., Sauer F. (2019). Prohibiting autonomous weapons: Put human dignity first. *Global Policy*. Vol. 10. No. 3. P. 370–375.

Ross L. (1998). China: Environmental protection, domestic policy trends, patterns of participation in regimes and compliance with international norms. *The China Quarterly*. No. 156. P. 809–835.

Rutherford K. (2000). The evolving arms control agenda: Implications of the role of NGOs in banning antipersonnel landmines. *World Politics*. Vol. 53. No. 1. P. 74–114.

Salmi J. (2009). *The challenge of establishing world-class universities*. Washington D.C.:World Bank Publications. Published online: http://publications.worldbank.org/ecommerce/catalog/product?item_id=8973956

Schmidt A., Sikkink K. (2019). Breaking the ban? the heterogeneous impact of US contestation of the torture norm. *Journal of Global Security Studies.* Vol. 4. No. 1. P. 105–122.

Schneiker A. (2021). Norm Sabotage: Conceptual Reflection on a Phenomenon That Challenges Well-Established Norms. *International Studies Perspectives*. Vol. 22. No. 1. P. 106–123.

Singh A.(2013). *Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition*. New York: Open Society Justice Initiative. Texas University Press. 216p.

Sjoberg L. (2020). Permutations and Combinations in Theorizing Global Politics: Whither Realist Constructivism? *The Social Construction of State Power: Applying Realist Constructivism*, 193 p.

Smith K.E. (2014). The UK and 'genocide' in Biafra. *Journal of Genocide Research*. Vol. 16. No. 2–3. P. 247–262.

Sorensen G. (2008). The case for combining material forces and ideas in the study of IR. *European Journal of International Relations*. Vol. 14. No. 1. P. 5–32.

Sterling-Folker J. (2004). Realist-constructivism and morality. *International Studies Review*. Vol. 6. No. 2. P. 341–343.

Verhoeven S., Wouters J. (2005). The Prohibition of Genocide as a Norm of Ius Cogens and its Implications for the Enforcement of the Law of Genocide. *International Criminal Law Review*. Vol. 5. No. 3. P. 401–416.

Wei C.H. (2020). Coercive Engagement: Lessons from US Policy towards China. *The Social Construction of State Power: Applying Realist Constructivism*. 123 p.

Wendt A. (1987). The Agent-Structure Problem. *International Organization*. Vol. 41. No. 3. P. 335—70.

Wiener A. (2014). *A theory of contestation*. Springer. Berlin. 95 p.

Yang L., Yang J., Wang C. (2021). The research-intensive university in a glonacal higher education system: the creation of the world-class university in China. *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management*. P. 1—20.

РЕАЛИСТСКИЙ КОНСТРУКТИВИЗМ
НОВЫЙ ВЗГЛЯД НА ТЕОРИЮ НОРМ

АНН ВИНЬО
МГИМО МИД России, Москва, Россия
Рединский университет, Рединг, Великобритания

АНДРЕЙ БАЙКОВ
МГИМО МИД России, Москва, Россия

УИЛЬЯМ УОЛФОРТ
Дартмутский колледж, Хановер, США

Резюме

В своей работе мы дополняем научные исследования о реалистском конструктивизме, демонстрируя его потенциал в том, что касается обогащения теории норм и прояснения роли государства в формировании идентичности. Основная проблема, препятствующая в полной мере раскрытию потенциала реалистского конструктивизма, заключается в согласовании взглядов конструктивистов на нормы как векторы универсальных этических стандартов с позицией представителей реалистской школы, рассматривающих их в качестве инструментальных каналов трансляции государственных интересов. Мы разрешаем это противоречие, подчёркивая существование двух различных типов норм: индивидуальных и групповых. Первые основаны на фундаментальных и неотъемлемых правах человека — они обладают универсальностью и устойчивостью. Вторые ориентированы, в свою очередь, на коллективные права и интересы, что делает их более подверженными инструментализации со стороны государств и, следовательно, более неопределёнными и изменчивыми. Реалистский конструктивизм позволяет нам признать сосуществование обоих типов норм и проанализировать их взаимодействие. Наша концепция прошла эмпирическую проверку на примере двух норм, касающихся индивидуальных прав (норма по запрещению противопехотных мин и пыток), двух норм, связанных с групповыми интересами (норма, способствующая переходу к «зелёной» энергетике, и норма, продвигающая создание университетов мирового класса), и одного пограничного случая (норма по недопущению геноцида). В статье показывается, что усилия по переосмыслению норм второй категории и их увязывание с правами человека привели к неожиданным результатам, легитимировав новые принципы и придав им силу. С другой стороны, инструментализация норм первой категории в угоду национальным интересам может привести к их ослаблению, что влечёт за собой потерю авторитета на международной арене.

Ключевые слова:

реалистский конструктивизм; Баркин; нормы; интересы; универсализм