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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">intertrends</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Международные процессы</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>International Trends / Mezhdunarodnye protsessy</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">1728-2756</issn><issn pub-type="epub">1811-2773</issn><publisher><publisher-name>AEFIR</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.46272/IT.2025.23.4.83.1</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">intertrends-1007</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>Статьи</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Влияние информационных сигналов ЕС о грядущих и введенных санкциях на финансовые рынки России</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>The Impact of EU Information Signals About Upcoming and Imposed Trade Sanctions on Russian Financial Markets</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Рычков</surname><given-names>Владислав</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Rychkov</surname><given-names>Vladislav</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Владислав Валерьевич Рычков – кандидат экономических наук, научный сотрудник Института международных исследований ; доцент Кафедры финансов, кредита и биржевого дела </p><p>Москва; Пермь</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Dr Vladislav V. Rychkov – PhD in Economics, Research Fellow, Institute for International Studies; Associate Professor, Department of Finance, Accounting and Economic Expertise</p><p>Moscow, 119454; Perm, 614068</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">v.rychkov@inno.mgimo.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>МГИМО МИД России; Пермский государственный национальный исследовательский университет</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>MGIMO University; Perm State National Research University</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2025</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>28</day><month>06</month><year>2026</year></pub-date><volume>23</volume><issue>4</issue><fpage>50</fpage><lpage>81</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Рычков В., 2026</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2026</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Рычков В.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Rychkov V.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.intertrends.ru/jour/article/view/1007">https://www.intertrends.ru/jour/article/view/1007</self-uri><abstract><p>В исследовании на основе анализа санкционной политики ЕС в отношении России выдвигается концепция информационного санкционного воздействия как автономного «финансового оружия». Автор показывает, что механизмы опережающей переоценки рисков участниками рынка способны генерировать реальный стоимостный ущерб, сопоставимый с эффектом от материальной имплементации ограничений или превышающий его. В работе обосновывается статус информационных сигналов как самостоятельного инструмента принуждения, провоцирующего волатильность рыночных котировок (валютных курсов, фондовых индексов и доходностей облигаций) независимо от последующей физической реализации угроз. На конкретных примерах продемонстрировано, что краткосрочный эффект от официально не введённых мер может достигать триллионных значений, выполняя функцию триггера, запускающего системный стресс финансовой системы. Исследование фиксирует качественную трансформацию реакции рынков в условиях «санкционного цунами» после 2022 года: выявлено снижение амплитуды отклика на фактические пакеты мер ЕС, что говорит, с одной стороны, о том, что система адаптировалась к непосредственно механизмам ограничений, однако, с другой стороны, сохранила высокую чувствительность к информационному фону. Полученные результаты расширяют теоретическое понимание санкций как многоканального инструмента и подтверждают универсальность модели трансмиссии санкционного влияния через каналы финансовых рынков. </p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>This study verifies the concept of informational sanctions pressure as an autonomous “financial weapon” through an empirical analysis of the European Union’s sanctions policy toward Russia. The author demonstrates that mechanisms of anticipatory risk repricing by market participants are capable of generating real valuation losses comparable to, or even exceeding, the effects of the material implementation of restrictions. The paper substantiates the status of informational signals as an independent instrument of coercion, capable of provoking volatility in financial markets - including exchange rates, equity indices, and sovereign bond yields – regardless of the subsequent physical enforcement of announced measures. Empirical evidence shows that the short-term impact of officially non-implemented measures may reach trillion-scale valuation effects, functioning as a trigger for systemic financial stress. The study also identifies a qualitative transformation in market reactions under the conditions of the post2022 “sanctions tsunami”: while the amplitude of responses to formally adopted EU sanctions packages has declined, indicating systemic adaptation, financial markets remain highly sensitive to the informational environment. The findings expand the theoretical understanding of sanctions as a multi-channel instrument of pressure and confirm the universality of a transmission model operating through financial market channels. </p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>санкции</kwd><kwd>Россия</kwd><kwd>Евросоюз</kwd><kwd>информационное воздействие санкций</kwd><kwd>финансовые рынки</kwd><kwd>реакция рынков</kwd><kwd>мягкая сила</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>trade sanctions</kwd><kwd>Russia</kwd><kwd>European Union</kwd><kwd>information impact of trade sanctions</kwd><kwd>financial markets</kwd><kwd>market reaction</kwd><kwd>soft power effect</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Геополитика санкций / Под ред. Е.Я. Араповой. М.: Аспект Пресс, 2025. Гл. 2–4.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Arapova E.Ya. (Ed.). (2025). 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