intertrendsМеждународные процессыInternational Trends / Mezhdunarodnye protsessy1728-27561811-2773AEFIR10.17994/IT.2022.20.1.68.3intertrends-175Research ArticleРЕАЛЬНОСТЬ И ТЕОРИЯREALITY AND THEORYСкорость законодательного процесса в Европейском Союзе количественный анализFactors behind legislative duration in the Uropean Union. Quantitative analysisКавешниковН.KaveshnikovN.

Николай Кавешников

Москва

Nikolay Kaveshnikov

Moscow, 119454

Moscow, 125009

ДамановА.DomanovA.

Алексей Доманов

Москва

Aleksey Domanov

Moscow, 125009

Moscow, 119454

МГИМО МИД России; Институт Европы РАНРоссияMGIMO University; Russia Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of SciencesRussian FederationИнститут Европы РАН; МГИМО МИД РоссииРоссияInstitute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Russia MGIMO UniversityRussian Federation20223003202220180108Copyright © Кавешников Н., Даманов А., 20222022Кавешников Н., Даманов А.Kaveshnikov N., Domanov A.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.intertrends.ru/jour/article/view/175

В настоящей работе проведено количественное эмпирическое исследование факторов, влияющих на скорость процесса принятия решений (законодательный процесс) в ЕС. Базу эмпирических данных составили директивы вторичного права ЕС, принятые в 1990–2019 годах (1124 директивы). Исследование проведено по методике анализа выживаемости (модель Кокса). Мы выяснили, что после 2004 г. порядок голосования в Совете (единогласие или квалифицированное большинство) не оказывает влияния на скорость законодательного процесса, что меняет традиционное представление о функционировании Совета. Доказано, что из всех расширений состава ЕС лишь расширение 1995 г. оказало замедляющее влияние на законодательный процесс. Прочие расширения ЕС, в том числе и вступление 10 стран ЦВЕ в 2004 году, не оказали значимого влияния. В ходе исследования было показано, что из всех реформ основополагающих договоров, имевших место после 1990 г., лишь Амстердамский договор способствовал ускорению процесса принятия решений. Помимо этого, сделан вывод, что Межинституциональное соглашение 2007 г. Между Советом и Европарламентом способствовало ускорению процесса принятия решений за счёт консолидации кооперативных практик (триалогов) между институтами ЕС. Исследование на новом материале подтверждает некоторые выводы предшествовавших работ: более активное подключение Европарламента к законодательному процессу (обычная законодательная процедура), новизна и сложность рассматриваемого акта замедляют принятие решений. Проведённое исследование демонстрирует, что анализ выживаемости, в частности модель Кокса, является эффективным инструментом изучения процесса принятия решений в ЕС.

This article investigates the impact of various institutional factors on the duration of legislative process negotiations in the European Union. The empirical data consists of EU secondary law directives adopted in 19902019 (1124 directives). We use the methodology of survival analysis (Cox model). We detected that after 2004 the rules of voting in the Council (unanimity or qualified majority) do not affect the duration of the legislative process; this conclusion changes the traditional vision of the functioning of the Council. We prove that of all the EU enlargements, only that of 1995 has influenced the legislative process and slowed it down. Other EU enlargements, including one in 2004 when 10 CEE countries joined the EU, did not show a significant impact. We demonstrate that of all basic treaty reforms that have taken place since 1990 only the Amsterdam Treaty has accelerated the decisionmaking process. In addition, we conclude that the Interinstitutional Agreement of 2007 between the Council and the European Parliament had a stronger impact on the legislative process than most treaty reforms. It favoured the acceleration of decisionmaking by consolidating cooperative practices between EU institutions based on trilogues. Besides, the study confirms some previous conclusions tested on the new dataset: more active involvement of the European Parliament in the legislative process (ordinary legislative procedure), the novelty and complexity of the act slow down the decisionmaking process.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.