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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">intertrends</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Международные процессы</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>International Trends / Mezhdunarodnye protsessy</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">1728-2756</issn><issn pub-type="epub">1811-2773</issn><publisher><publisher-name>AEFIR</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.17994/IT.2022.20.1.68.7</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">intertrends-177</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ФИКСИРУЕМ ТЕНДЕНЦИЮ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>CATCHING A TREND</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Развитие американского рынка частных военных и охранных компаний. На примере конфликта в Афганистане 2001–2021 годов</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Evolution of United States’ private military and security companies. The case of Afghanistan 2001–2021</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Королькова</surname><given-names>Е.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Korol’kova</surname><given-names>Ye.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Елена Королькова</p><p>Оренбург</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Yelena Korol’kova</p><p>Orenburg, 119049</p></bio><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Небольсина</surname><given-names>М.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Nebol’sina</surname><given-names>M.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Мария Небольсина</p><p>Москва</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Mariya Nebol’sina</p><p>Moscow, 119454</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">nebolsinama@gmail.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-2"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Российский совет по международным делам</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Russian International Affairs Council</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><aff-alternatives id="aff-2"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>МГИМО МИД России</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>MGIMO University</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2022</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>30</day><month>03</month><year>2022</year></pub-date><volume>20</volume><issue>1</issue><fpage>122</fpage><lpage>147</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Королькова Е., Небольсина М., 2022</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2022</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Королькова Е., Небольсина М.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Korol’kova Y., Nebol’sina M.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.intertrends.ru/jour/article/view/177">https://www.intertrends.ru/jour/article/view/177</self-uri><abstract><p>31 августа 2021 г. официально завершилась двадцатилетняя международная военная операция в Афганистане, возглавляемая США. Подводя предварительные итоги, американский президент Джозеф Байден заявил об окончании эры крупных военных операций США по переустройству других стран. В настоящем исследовании мы поставили задачу изучить развитие американского рынка частных военных и охранных компаний (ЧВОК), оценив влияние на них военной операции в Афганистане. Для этого был проведён анализ изменений американского рынка услуг таких компаний, изучены методы и механизмы заключения и исполнения контрактов с ними. Также мы рассмотрели официальную позицию властей США по регулированию рынка частных военных и охранных услуг, принятые ими меры нормативного регулирования ЧВОК и развитие институциональных механизмов этого регулирования в США. Благодаря своей длительности и непрерывности афганская военная операция стала плацдармом для ЧВОК, создавшим условия для накопления и усовершенствования ими высокотехнологичного опыта. Вооружённый конфликт в Афганистане позволил сформировать такой рынок услуг, который не только задействует традиционный человеческий капитал, но и позволяет производить, использовать и обслуживать средства и технологии, способные минимизировать прямое участие специалистов в военных действиях. Одновременно с изучением развития самого американского рынка ЧВОК проведённое исследование позволило выяснить, какие расследования проводились в США в связи со злоупотреблениями подрядчиков, действовавших в Афганистане, как в связи с этим происходил пересмотр процедур и механизмов для исключения недобросовестного исполнения подрядных обязательств, как менялась законодательная практика и какие выводы были сделаны с точки зрения подходов к регулированию ЧВОК. Исследование также позволяет сделать выводы о сильных и слабых сторонах политики США в отношении ЧВОК за весь период вооружённого конфликта в Афганистане и оценить, насколько удачными были попытки США осуществлять контроль за подрядчиками. Получив существенный опыт контрактной деятельности в Афганистане, американские ЧВОК продолжают укрепляться в технологическом плане, а американские ЧВОК, прошедшие двадцатилетний опыт участия в вооружённом конфликте, создают дополнительное конкурентное преимущество США перед Россией и Китаем, где рынок частных услуг в сфере безопасности, хотя существует и развивается, подобного опыта не имеет.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The withdrawal of troops on 31 August 2021 which was carried out in accordance with the Agreement signed on 29 February 2020 between the U.S. government and the Taliban (an international terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation) marked the end of the international military campaign in Afghanistan which lasted twenty years. Assessing the preliminary outcomes of nearly a quartercentury of the US military and their NATO allies’ presence in Afghanistan, U.S. President Joseph Biden announced the end of “an era of major military operations to remake other countries”. Though the consequences of the Western coalition campaign in the area remain to be evaluated and they are unlikely to turn out to be unequivocal, the Atlantic strategy aimed at rebuilding and democratization of Afghanistan proved itself as bankrupt. Our research focuses on the way the twentyyear military campaign in Afghanistan affected the development of the U.S. private military and security companies (PMSC) industry. For these purposes, we, firstly, studied and traced the transformation of the private military and security services market in the U.S., and examined the changes of approaches and mechanisms used to contract PMSCs. Secondly, we analyzed the way the U.S. authorities addressed the challenges new market evoked, focusing on the measures of legal regulation that were applied to PMSCs, and the way the working of the U.S. institutional mechanisms was transforming. The final part of the research contains conclusions on the perspectives for the development of the American PMSC industry after the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan. We believe that due to its duration and continuity, the Afghan operation ensured a launchpad for the PMSC industry and provided conditions for private military and security companies to acquire and master highend experience which in turn, contributed to the development of a certain market that goes well beyond the involvement of conventional human capital. It provided solutions for the production, utilization, and maintenance of the equipment and technologies, allowing the minimization of the direct participation of specialists in hostilities. Alongside the development of the American PMSC industry itself, the research studies the investigations conducted by the U.S. authorities into the cases of abuse committed by the contractors during their participation in Afghan war. It discusses the way this practice encouraged the transformations of United States procedures and mechanisms aimed at reducing malpractice when performing contracts and launched changes in U.S. legislation. It also demonstrates the lessons learned by the U.S. from the contractual practice with regard to the regulation of PMSCs. The research reveals the strengths and weaknesses of the American policy regarding PMSCs during the whole period of the military conflict in Afghanistan and helps to evaluate the success of the U.S. efforts in monitoring contractors across Afghanistan. To conclude, we reckon that considerable contractual experience acquired in Afghanistan ensures technological and procedural progress of the U.S. PMSC industry. Given the enduring rivalry between the U.S., Russia, and China, including in the military and technological spheres, the twentyyear experience of direct participation in hostilities by U.S. PMSCs boosted its competitive advantage compared to Russia and China, whose PMSCs still lack such an experience.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>вооружённый конфликт в Афганистане</kwd><kwd>вывод войск</kwd><kwd>рынок частных подрядчиков в США</kwd><kwd>част ные военные и охранные компании</kwd><kwd>субподрядчики</kwd><kwd>контракты</kwd><kwd>международное гуманитарное право (МГП)</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>military operation in Afghanistan</kwd><kwd>withdrawal of troops</kwd><kwd>the US industry of private security contractors</kwd><kwd>private military and security companies</kwd><kwd>subcontractors</kwd><kwd>outsourcing of functions</kwd><kwd>IHL</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Лукин А., Губин А. 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