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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">intertrends</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Международные процессы</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>International Trends / Mezhdunarodnye protsessy</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">1728-2756</issn><issn pub-type="epub">1811-2773</issn><publisher><publisher-name>AEFIR</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.17994/IT.2020.18.3.62.3</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">intertrends-196</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ФИКСИРУЕМ ТЕНДЕНЦИЮ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>CATCHING A TREND</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Постоянная вовлечённость в киберпространстве: новая стратегия США и её соотношение с концепцией киберсдерживания</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Choosing between Persistent Engagement and Deterrence in the American Cybersecurity Strategy</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Себекин</surname><given-names>С. А.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Sebekin</surname><given-names>S A.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Себекин Сергей Александрович - аспирант кафедры мировой истории и международных отношений </p><p>Иркутск</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Mr Sergei Sebekin - PhD Candidate, Department of World History and International Relations</p><p> Irkutsk, 664003</p><p> </p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">sebserg37@gmail.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Иркутский государственный университет</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Irkutsk State University</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2020</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>30</day><month>09</month><year>2020</year></pub-date><volume>18</volume><issue>3</issue><fpage>96</fpage><lpage>125</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Себекин С.А., 2020</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2020</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Себекин С.А.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Sebekin S.A.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.intertrends.ru/jour/article/view/196">https://www.intertrends.ru/jour/article/view/196</self-uri><abstract><p>Резюме</p><p>Статья посвящена анализу нового подхода США к обеспечению кибербезопасности – стратегии постоянной вовлечённости в киберпространстве, и тому, как она соотносится с доминировавшей долгое время стратегией киберсдерживания. Стратегия постоянной вовлечённости предусматривает проведение киберопераций, не достигающих уровня вооружённого конфликта и сочетающих элементы обороны и нападения. Она призвана помешать конкурентам Соединённых Штатов осуществлять злонамеренные действия в киберпространстве, а также помочь США сохранить превосходство, навязывая дополнительные стратегические затраты противникам и создавая им тактические препятствия. По мнению американских экспертов, постоянная вовлечённость превосходно согласуется с особенностями киберпространства – взаимосвязанностью и постоянным контактом, в отличие от стратегии сдерживания, подходящей для традиционных областей военных действий. Тем не менее из официальных документов следует, что руководство США не готово отказываться от стратегии киберсдерживания и ищет пути концептуального объединения двух подходов. Стратегия постоянной вовлечённости имеет ряд ключевых характеристик: 1) кибероперации не достигают уровня вооружённого конфликта; 2) постоянная вовлечённость не является формой военного противостояния; 3) акцент делается на создании тактических препятствий и стратегических издержек для противников США; 4) оборона предполагает осуществление упреждающих действий (в том числе наступательных) в отношении противников. В статье изложены и проанализированы экспертные мнения о перспективах стратегии постоянной вовлечённости. В том числе аналитические эксперты рассчитывают, что она будет способствовать формированию критериев приемлемого поведения в процессе согласованной конкуренции (когда государства постоянно осуществляют кибероперации друг против друга). Среди минусов анализируемого подхода можно выделить возможную эскалацию конфликта. В статье проведён анализ трансформации концептуального статуса киберпространства и институциональных изменений, ставших следствием принятия нового стратегического подхода. Выводы относительно перспектив данной стратегии неоднозначны. Её преимущества и риски станут понятны лишь со временем в ходе накопления эмпирического опыта применения этой стратегии. Актуальность проведённой работы обусловлена характером отношений между Россией и Соединёнными Штатами. Понимание подходов США к обеспечению кибербезопасности и ключевых стратегических изменений в них важно не только для формирования собственной политики кибербезопасности, но и для выстраивания конструктивного диалога с Вашингтоном по вопросам кибербезопасности.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The article examines the adoption by the United States of a new policy for ensuring cybersecurity, a strategy of peristent engagement in cyberspace, and how it is related to the strategy of cyber deterrence that remained dominant for a long time. The strategy of persistent engagement implies the constant conduct of cyber operations that do not reach the level of an armed conflict and combining purely defensive activities with offense. Such strategy is designed to prevent US rivals from carrying out malicious actions in cyberspace and to preserve strategic advantages of the United States by imposing additional costs on opponents and creating tactical friction for them. According to experts, persistent engagement perfectly suits the unique characteristics of cyberspace (interconnectedness and the condition of constant contact), unlike a strategy of deterrence that is suitable for traditional areas of military operations. Nevertheless, the US leadership is not ready to abandon the cyber deterrence strategy, and it is looking for ways to conceptually combine the two strategies. The paper presents the key characteristics of persistent engagement, some of which are: 1) cyber operations do not reach the level of an armed conflict; 2) persistent engagement is not an armed conflict; 3) creating "tactical friction" and imposing costs on US opponents; 4) preventive defense. Expert opinions on the prospects of persistent engagement are presented and analyzed. The paper demonstrates the analysis potential advantages and drawbacks of this approach. American specialists expect that persistent engagement will lead to an automatic formation of criteria for acceptable behavior in the process of strategic competition. Among the obvious drawbacks of the analyzed approach, one can single out a possible international escalation due to its application. The author analyzes the transformation of the “conceptual” status of cyberspace and the institutional changes, caused by this new strategic approach. The conclusions regarding the prospects for this strategy are ambiguous. Its effectiveness, safety and risks will become known only with time during the actual application of this strategy and the accumulation of empirical experience. The relevance of the work is due to the current strategic situation between the United States and Russia. Understanding the United States' approaches to cybersecurity and the key strategic changes in them is crucial not only to formulate Russia`s cybersecurity policy, but also to build a constructive dialogue with the United States on cybersecurity issues.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>постоянная вовлечённость</kwd><kwd>сдерживание</kwd><kwd>стратегическая конкуренция</kwd><kwd>конкурентное пространство</kwd><kwd>негласные переговоры</kwd><kwd>киберпространство</kwd><kwd>упреждающая защита</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>persistent engagement</kwd><kwd>deterrence strategic competition</kwd><kwd>agreed competition</kwd><kwd>competitive space</kwd><kwd>tacit bargaining</kwd><kwd>cyberspace</kwd><kwd>defending forward</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Зиновьева Е.С. 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