intertrendsМеждународные процессыInternational Trends / Mezhdunarodnye protsessy1728-27561811-2773AEFIR10.17994/IT.2020.18.2.61.8intertrends-226Research ArticleПИСЬМО В РЕДАКЦИЮLETTER TO THE EDITORНовые контуры стратегической стабильности в глобальной многополярной конкуренцииOutlines of Strategic Stability in Global Multipolar CompetitionМизинВ. И.MizinV. I.

Мизин Виктор Игоревич - кандидат исторических наук, ведущий научный сотрудник центра постсоветских исследований

Москва

Victor I. Mizin - Dr., Leading Research Fellow, Center for Post-Soviet Studies,MGIMO University

Moscow, 119454

vmizin@hotmail.comМГИМО МИД РоссииРоссияMGIMO UniversityRussian Federation202030062020182141168Copyright © Мизин В.И., 20202020Мизин В.И.Mizin V.I.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.intertrends.ru/jour/article/view/226

В статье рассматривается современная ситуация с концепцией стратегической стабильности в условиях кризиса во взаимоотношениях России с НАТО и США, а также появления новых влиятельных игроков. По словам В.В. Путина, система стратегической стабильности в мире продолжает деградировать. В то же время автор подчёркивает императивную задачу разработки новых основ и подходов к глобальным параметрам стратегической стабильности с учётом современных реалий. По мнению автора, новая концепция стратегической стабильности может быть сфокусирована не только на приоритетности недопущения ядерного конфликта между крупнейшими ядерными державами. Она должна учитывать всю совокупность факторов, определяющих военнополитическую ситуацию в современном мире, включая политические и социально-экономические тенденции глобального развития. Анализ назревшего системного поворота в мировых процессах невозможен без кардинальной переоценки всей парадигмы международной безопасности, и прежде всего концепции стратегической стабильности, являющейся теоретической основой как военной политики, так и подходов к контролю над вооружениями. Академическому сообществу требуется разработка принципиально инновационной стратегии контроля над вооружениями в новых условиях. Будет ли это двусторонняя российско-американская схема или многосторонняя конструкция — вопрос, требующий прояснения в процессе дипломатических консультаций. Требуемая концепция должна, очевидно, быть как многокомпонентной (стратегическое ядерное оружие, нестратегические ядерные системы, противоракетная оборона, «глобальный обычный удар», гиперзвуковое, кибернетическое, космическое, лучевое, дроны и другие «экзотические» виды и типы оружия), так и многосторонней (то есть должна учитывать ядерные силы и ядерный потенциал третьих стран, а не только двух традиционных соперников – России и США). Такая концепция стратегической стабильности должна, таким образом, быть гораздо более «целостной» и всеобъемлющей, охватывая не только военный потенциал ведущих держав, но и, принимая во внимание их политические отношения и разногласия, задачи обеспечения сдержанности и предотвращения крупных конфликтов в современном мире. Как таковая она предполагает всестороннее изучение реалий кризиса в международной системе, прежде всего в отношениях «диад» Россия–НАТО и Россия–США на фоне появления новых обладателей ядерных вооружений. Помимо всего прочего, эти факторы возникающего соотношения сил в мире делают невозможным переход к безъядерному миру в обозримом будущем. В этой связи автор ставит перед экспертным сообществом задачу формулирования конкретных путей внедрения новых концептуальных основ оценки глобальных параметров эволюции мировой системы, разработки прагматических инициатив, которые могут быть предприняты для повышения общей стабильности и взаимодействия между США, НАТО, Россией и другими формирующимися глобальными игроками.

The article is devoted to the problems of ensuring strategic stability and the task of a comprehensive study of the current situation with strategic stability, developing new approaches to it, taking into account modern realities in the context of a crisis in the international situation, especially in relations between Russia and NATO, Russia and the United States. According to President Vladimir Putin, as a result, the system of strategic stability in the world continues to degrade. The main factors of this aggravation are analyzed. The task is to develop new foundations for strategic stability and assess its global parameters. The new concept of strategic stability can no longer be focused solely on the priority of preventing nuclear conflict between major nuclear powers, but must also take into account the totality of factors that determine the security situation in the realities of the modern world order. An analysis of the long-overdue systemic shift in world processes is arguably impossible without a fundamental re-evaluation of the entire perception of international security, and, above all, the concept of strategic stability, which is the theoretical basis of military policy and theoretical approaches to arms control. Academic community needs to develop a fundamentally innovative strategy for arms control in the new environment. Whether this will be a bilateral Russian-American format or a multilateral arrangement is a question that needs to be clarified in the course of diplomatic consultations. The required concept should obviously be both interdisciplinary (covering with various methodological tools a number of sciences such issues as strategic nuclear weapons, non-strategic nuclear systems, missile defense, "prompt global conventional strike", hypersonic, cyberwarfare, space, beam, drones and other "exotic" types of weapons), and multilateral (that is, it should take into account the nuclear forces and nuclear potential of "third" countries, and not just the two traditional rivals – Russia and the United States).Such a concept of strategic stability should thus be much more "holistic" and comprehensive, covering not only the military potential of the leading powers, but also taking into account their political relations and divergences, the imperative of providing restraint and preventing major conflicts in the modern world. As such, it involves a comprehensive study of the crisis realities in the international system, primarily in the Russia–NATO and Russia–US “dyads” interrelationship against the background of the emergence of new nuclear weapons stakeholders. Among other things, these factors in the global balance of power make it impossible to proceed to a nuclear-free world in the foreseeable future. In this regard, the author sets the task for the expert community to formulate certain concrete ways to implement new conceptual frameworks for assessing the global parameters of the world system's evolution, and to develop pragmatic initiatives that can be taken to improve overall stability and interaction between the United States, NATO, Russia, and other emerging global actors.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.