intertrendsМеждународные процессыInternational Trends / Mezhdunarodnye protsessy1728-27561811-2773AEFIR10.17994/IT.2021.19.1.64.7intertrends-236Research ArticleСтатьиТень санкций стратегические последствия различий в санкционной политике США и РоссииThe cloud of sanctions contending U.S.-Russian approaches & strategic implicationsСталбергА. Н.StulbergA. N.

Адам Н. Сталберг

Атланта

Adam N. Stulberg

Atlanta, 30332

adam.stulberg@inta.gatech.eduДарсиДж. П.DarseyJ. P.

Джонатан П. Дарси

Атланта

Jonathan P. Darsey

Atlanta, 30332

Технологический институт штата ДжорджияСоединённые Штаты АмерикиGeorgia Institute of TechnologyUnited States20213003202119174102Copyright © Сталберг А.Н., Дарси Д.П., 20212021Сталберг А.Н., Дарси Д.П.Stulberg A.N., Darsey J.P.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.intertrends.ru/jour/article/view/236

Экономические санкции стали определяющим инструментом во взаимоотношениях США и ЕС, с одной стороны, и России – с другой, после начала конфликта вокруг Украины в 2014 году. И Москва, и Вашингтон, похоже, ожидают, что санкции будут оставаться в силе неопределённо долго. Западные политики неоднократно вводили дополнительные ограничения, несмотря на отсутствие свидетельств того, что санкции сработали для достижения декларируемых целей. Подобное упорство парадоксально и требует объяснения. В данной статье исследуется природа и происхождение этого парадокса с использованием многомерного анализа действий и дискурса России и США с момента введения санкций в отношении Москвы, связанных с Украиной, в марте 2014 года. Мы выявляем фундаментальные различия в том, как стороны воспринимают целесообразность и стратегический контекст этих мер, обусловленные кардинальными расхождениями во взглядах Москвы и Вашингтона. Эти расхождения во взглядах потенциально способны усугубить риски неопределённости, возникающие при введении санкций, и привести к переливу конфликтности в другие сферы и соответствующему резкому росту издержек политики санкций для вводящей их стороны. Если не удастся изменить нынешнюю динамику, могут быть подорваны усилия по возобновлению стратегического взаимодействия США и России. Возможны и сценарии внезапной и опасной эскалации. Наш метод состоит в сопоставлении паттернов американских и российских действий на основе выборки событий из баз данных GDELT и ICEWS, а также на изучении западной экспертной литературы по санкциям и выступлений представителей различных групп российских элит. Предварительная аналитическая оценка контуров российской политики позволяет наметить новые направления для эмпирических исследований и разработки теории стратегических рисков введения санкций в условиях современного противостояния великих держав.

Economic sanctions have been the defining feature of the relationship between Russia and the U.S. / EU since the 2014 Ukraine crisis, and both Moscow and Washington appear to accept that sanctions will remain in place indefinitely. This persistence of sanctions presents a paradox: Western policy makers have repeatedly increased the breadth and depth of these sanctions, despite little evidence that the sanctions have ‘worked’ to achieve their explicit and tangible objectives. This paper examines the nature and origin of this paradox using a multi-dimensional examination of Russian and US actions and discourse since the first imposition of Ukraine-related sanctions on Russia in March 2014. This analysis exposes fundamental differences over how the two sides perceive the appropriateness and strategic context of these sanctions, which reflect a basic difference in worldviews between Moscow and Washington. These contending worldviews potentially compound burdens of uncertainty and costly signaling in sanctions between the U.S. and Russia, which also introduces cross-domain risks that can defy efforts to fine-tune the imposition of costs. If not redressed, this dynamic can derail efforts at strategic reengagement, if not inadvertently elevate prospects for dangerous escalation.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.