intertrendsМеждународные процессыInternational Trends / Mezhdunarodnye protsessy1728-27561811-2773AEFIR10.17994/IT.2023.21.4.75.8intertrends-395Research ArticleРЕАЛЬНОСТЬ И ТЕОРИЯREALITY AND THEORYВоенная сила государства-посредника и урегулирование вооружённых конфликтовThe Influence of Mediator Military Power on Armed Conflicts ResolutionМустафинаВикторияMustafinaVictoriaМальцевАртёмMaltsevArtemНациональный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики», МоскваРоссияHSE University, Moscow, 101000Russian FederationНациональный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики», Москва. Московская высшая школа социальных и экономических наук, Москва.РоссияHSE University, Moscow, 101000. Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences, Moscow, 125009.Russian Federation202325042024214640Copyright © Мустафина В., Мальцев А., 20242024Мустафина В., Мальцев А.Mustafina V., Maltsev A.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.intertrends.ru/jour/article/view/395

Изучение посредничества при урегулировании вооружённых конфликтов остаётся перспективным направлением исследований международных отношений. Тем не менее до сих пор не установлено, действительно ли доминирование в военной силе государства-посредника может влиять на прекращение боевых действий и имплементацию итоговых мирных соглашений. Мы предположили, что превосходство посредника в военной мощи (или отсутствие такового) можно охарактеризовать в терминах асимметрии и паритета. Для оценки соответствующих характеристик военной силы мы предлагаем воспользоваться обобщённым показателем военной асимметрии, созданным посредством проведения простого сравнительного анализа. В рамках представленной в статье методики различные метрики военной мощи сторон конфликта и посредников попарно сравнивались между собой по критерию пороговых значений (квартилей), констатирующих наличие асимметрии военной мощи или её отсутствие (паритет военной мощи). Затем для агрегирования бинарных оценок в единый показатель также использовались различные пороги достаточной асимметрии от 20 до 50%. В результате проведённого исследования, с помощью оценки серии регрессионных моделей, удалось установить, что совокупное превосходство государства посредника в военной силе над враждующими сторонами конфликта статистически значимо способствует как непосредственно прекращению боевых действий, так и успешному установлению мира в долгосрочной перспективе. Контрольные переменные в виде особенностей мирного соглашения также оказывают влияние на положительный исход мирного процесса. Ключевые среди них – повышение транспарентности процедур принятия политических решений и вовлечение различных социальных групп во властные процессы на различных уровнях. Результаты настоящего исследования демонстрируют взаимосвязанность военной силы и успешного посредничества, а также указывают на взаимодополняемость военной и переговорной составляющих в контексте медиации, осуществляемой государством. Таким образом, настоящее исследование предлагает трансформировать представление о посредничестве, доминирующее в настоящее время в теории международных отношений.

The study of mediation in resolving armed conflicts remains a promising area of research in international relations. However, contemporary IR research provides a limited understanding of the role of the mediator's military power in the cessation of hostilities and the implementation of peace agreements. We have suggested that asymmetry and parity can characterize an intermediary's superiority in military power (or lack thereof). To assess the relevant characteristics of military power, we propose to use a generalized indicator of military asymmetry created through a simple comparative analysis. Within the framework of the methodology presented in the article, various metrics of the military power of the parties to the conflict and the mediators were compared in pairs with each other according to the criterion of threshold values (quartiles), indicating the presence of asymmetry of military power or its absence (parity of military power). Various thresholds of sufficient skewness, ranging from 20% to 50%, were then also used to aggregate the binary scores into a single score. As a result of the study, using the assessment of a series of regression models, it was possible to establish that the aggregate superiority of the mediating state in military force over the warring parties to the conflict statistically significantly contributes to both the immediate cessation of hostilities and the successful establishment of peace in the long term. Control variables in the form of peace agreement features also influence the peace process's positive outcome. Key among them are increasing the transparency of political decision-making procedures and the involvement of various social groups in power processes at various levels. The results of this study demonstrate the interconnectedness of military force and successful mediation and also indicate the complementarity of military and negotiation components in the context of state-led mediation. Thus, this study proposes to transform the idea of mediation that currently dominates international relations theory.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.