intertrendsМеждународные процессыInternational Trends / Mezhdunarodnye protsessy1728-27561811-2773AEFIR10.17994/IT.2019.17.4.59.44intertrends-540Research ArticleАНАЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ ПРИЗМЫANALYTICAL PRISMSАмериканский политический класс о судьбе контроля над стратегическими вооружениямиAmerican Political Class on the Fortunes of the New START TreatyГолубЮрийGolubYurii

Голуб Юрий Григорьевич - доктор исторических наук, профессор, заведующий Кафедрой международных отношений и внешней политики России Саратовского национального исследовательского государственногоуниверситета им. Н.Г. Чернышевского

Саратов

 

Prof. Yurii Golub - Chair, Department of International Relations and the Foreign Policy of Russia, Saratov National Research State University named after N.G. Chernyshevskyi

Saratov, 410012

goloub@info.sgu.ruШенинСергейSheninSergey

Шенин Сергей Юрьевич - доктор исторических наук, профессор Кафедры международных отношений и внешней политики России Саратовского национального исследовательского государственного университетаим. Н.Г. Чернышевского

Саратов

Prof. Sergey Shenin - Professor, Department of International Relations and the Foreign Policy of Russia, Saratov National Research State University named after N.G. Chernyshevskyi

Saratov, 410012

Саратовский национальный исследовательский государственный университет им. Н.Г. ЧернышевскогоРоссияSaratov National Research State University named after N.G. ChernyshevskyiRussian Federation2019050520251744964Copyright © Голуб Ю., Шенин С., 20252025Голуб Ю., Шенин С.Golub Y., Shenin S.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.intertrends.ru/jour/article/view/540

В контексте деятельности администрации президента Д. Трампа, взявшей курс на ликвидацию традиционных договорных механизмов нераспространения и контроля над вооружениями, остро стоит вопрос о перспективах продления Договора о сокращении стратегических наступательных вооружений, подписанного лидерами Российской Федерации и США в Праге в 2010 году (СНВ-3). Настоящ ая статья призвана оценить характер развернувшихся среди американских экспертов и политиков дискуссий, представив позиции как сторонников, так и противников пролонгации данного договора. Такой анализ будет способствовать не только более точному прогнозированию перспектив спасения соглашения, но и позволит углубить понимание господствующих взглядов на проблематику контроля над вооружениями политических и интеллектуальных элит одного из ведущих мировых игроков. Тем самым настоящее исследование внесёт вклад в активизировавшиеся отечественные дискуссии относительно возможностей сохранения договорных механизмов поддержания военно-политической стабильности в современном мире. Авторы исследуют отношение к судьбе договора с Россией наиболее влиятельных групп интересов внешнеполитического истеблишмента (прогрессистов, неолибералов, консервативных демократов, реалистов и консерваторов). Из этих пяти групп только консерваторы безапелляционно выступают против продления договора: они считают его вредным для интересов США. Между тем три основные группы демократов, при всех их разногласиях, едины в том, что существующие договорные механизмы надо сохранить, поскольку пока они работают в русле интересов Соединённых Штатов. Демократы обвиняют республиканцев – от Дж. Буша-мл. до Д. Трампа – в стратегической дестабилизации и считают сделку 2010 года – «сокращение стратегических вооружений в обмен на модернизацию ядерной триады» – действующей. В статье показано, что политики реалистского крыла Республиканской партии сформировали компромиссную позицию: они поддерживают продление договора с Москвой после февраля 2021 года, но только при условии ежегодной оценки активности российской стороны в контексте пересмотра договора. Авторы приходят к выводу, что компромиссный вариант имеет серьёзные шансы возобладать, поскольку его поддерживает Палата представителей Конгресса, и для самого Трампа его реализация может быть полезна в контексте президентских выборов 2020 года.

The article analyses the discussion in the United States regarding the problem of extending the New START Treaty in 2021. In the context of the activities of D. Trump administration, which has embarked upon the path of revising the U.S. foreign policy strategy and, accordingly, on the abrogation of nonproliferation and arms control treaties, the authors examine attitudes of the most influential interest groups within the American foreign policy establishment (progressives, neoliberals, conservative democrats, realists and conservatives) towards the New START agreement. Among these five groups, only the conservatives are aggressively opposed to the extension of the treaty. They consider it extremely harmful to the U.S. interests due to Russia's inability to conform to international treaties and to numerous built-in defects that were developed by the Obama administration as part of the “reset” process. All of the three groups of democrats agree that the New START should be preserved, since it serves the US interests. After February 2020 it will allow for a dialogue with the Russian Federation regarding strategic arms control, including comprehensive and multilateral aspects. Democrats accuse the Republicans – from Bush Jr. to Trump – of strategic destabilization and consider the 2010 "the New START in exchange for nuclear triad modernization" deal still valid. The article also shows that the realists of the Republican party are leaning towards a compromise. They endorse the prolongation of the New START after February 2021 on the condition of annual assessments of Russia’s activity regarding a “comprehensive and multilateral” treaty modernization. Nevertheless, if the agreement has to be suspended as a result of unconstructive behavior of the Russian Federation, no arms race is expected since the both sides will be forced to voluntarily provide a safe “self-control regime”. The authors conclude that the compromise option will be chosen as, first, it is supported by the House of Representatives, and second, it can be helpful for President Trump in the upcoming elections. Otherwise his Democratic opponents will get the opportunity to accuse him of the collapse of the global strategic security system.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.