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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">intertrends</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Международные процессы</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>International Trends / Mezhdunarodnye protsessy</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">1728-2756</issn><issn pub-type="epub">1811-2773</issn><publisher><publisher-name>AEFIR</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.17994/IT.2017.15.4.51.6</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">intertrends-674</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>АНАЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ ПРИЗМЫ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>ANALYTICAL PRISMS</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Современная западная теория военно-политических альянсов: достижения и лакуны</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Western Theory of International Military Alliances: The State of the Discipline</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Истомин</surname><given-names>Игорь</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Istomin</surname><given-names>Igor</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Истомин Игорь Александрович - кандидат политических наук, доцент кафедры прикладного анализа международных проблем МГИМО МИД России</p><p>Москва</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Dr Igor Istomin - Associate Professor, Department of Applied Analysis of International Issues, MGIMO University</p><p>Moscow 119454</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">iaistomin@gmail.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>МГИМО МИД России</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>MGIMO University</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2017</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>02</day><month>07</month><year>2025</year></pub-date><volume>15</volume><issue>4</issue><fpage>93</fpage><lpage>114</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Истомин И., 2025</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2025</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Истомин И.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Istomin I.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.intertrends.ru/jour/article/view/674">https://www.intertrends.ru/jour/article/view/674</self-uri><abstract><p>Международные альянсы представляют собой соглашения между государствами, описывающие параметры их военно-политического взаимодействия в случае вооружённого конфликта, а также практики сотрудничества на основе таких договорённостей. Осмысление вопросов их создания, функционирования и влияния на среду международной безопасности находилось в тематическом фокусе теории международных отношений на протяжении всего периода «холодной войны». В то же время в 1990–2010-х годах исследования этой проблематики обрели новый импульс к развитию в результате более последовательного структурирования исторического опыта, накопления масштабных объёмов данных и активного внедрения количественных методик анализа. Настоящий аналитический обзор призван определить основные достижения теории международных альянсов, позволившей на основе анализа обширного исторического опыта выявить основные закономерности эволюции подобных объединений. В нём последовательно систематизированы современные представления о функциях и причинах создания международных альянсов; о степени надёжности формальных союзов; об обстоятельствах пересмотра или прекращения обязательств государств. В статье оценивается влияние такого рода объединений на международную конфликтность, а также противоречия в их функционировании. На основе проведённой работы автор выявил сохраняющиеся лакуны и возможные направления дальнейшего развития исследований военно-политических альянсов. По итогам проведённого анализа можно заключить, что в предметной области сложилось разделяемое ядро представлений, позволяющее говорить о появлении зрелой исследовательской программы. В то же время наращивание представлений относительно динамики развития международных союзов в 1990–2010-х годах происходило за счёт существенного ограничения области исследования. С учётом особенностей существующих баз данных анализ был сфокусирован преимущественно на изучении формальных альянсов через классификацию доступных документов по ним. Как следствие, за пределами рассмотрения остаются не только неформальные коалиции, но и феномен тайных союзов, а также значение секретных обязательств в рамках документально оформленных объединений.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>International alliances represent agreements between states, which identify parameters of their political and military cooperation in the event of an armed conflict, as well as cooperative practices on the basis of such documents. The theory of international relations paid substantial attention throughout the entire Cold War towards the processes of their creation and operation, as well as their influence on the international security environment. Nevertheless, in the 1990s –2010s research on these issues received new impetus as a result of a more consistent structuring of historical record, greater accumulation of relevant data and active introduction of quantitative techniques. The current analytical review is designed to disclose the main achievements of the theory of international alliances, which on the basis of an analysis of extensive historical experience, reveals the main regulations governing evolution of such associations. It consistently systematizes recent findings on their functions and reasons for creating international alliances. It then explores the issue of reliability in formal military alliances, which for a long time was considered to be problematic. It also touches upon circumstances under which these agreements are terminated or abrogated. The article, finally, assesses the impact of alliances on international conflicts. In conclusions, the author identifies remaining gaps and possible directions for further development of studies on alliances. The current review enables to conclude that studies of alliances are currently structured around a mature and productive research program. However, major developments in the study of international alliances throughout the 1990s – 2010s remained a product of a significant narrowing of a research focus. Given it reliance on particular available databases, scholars limited their studies mostly to the study of formal provisions in alliances. As a result, they not only refrained from testing applicability of their conclusions for the more informal coalitions, but also overlooked broader effect of alliances on cooperation between states.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>военно-политические союзы</kwd><kwd>теория международных отношений</kwd><kwd>исследования альянсов</kwd><kwd>сдерживание</kwd><kwd>вооружённый конфликт</kwd><kwd>внешнеполитическая стратегия</kwd><kwd>балансирование</kwd><kwd>аккомодация</kwd><kwd>реализм</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>military alliances</kwd><kwd>theory of international relations</kwd><kwd>theory of alliances</kwd><kwd>containment</kwd><kwd>military conflict</kwd><kwd>foreign policy strategy</kwd><kwd>balancing</kwd><kwd>bandwagoning</kwd><kwd>Realism</kwd></kwd-group><funding-group><funding-statement xml:lang="ru">Статья подготовлена при поддержке гранта РФФИ «Сотрудничество и конкуренция традиционных и восходящих центров силы в процессе трансформации мирового порядка и перспективы встраивания России в структуры глобального регулирования» (проект № 15-03-00728).</funding-statement><funding-statement xml:lang="en">The article was prepared with the support of a grant from the Russian Foundation for Basic Research "Cooperation and Competition of Traditional and Rising centers of Power in the process of transforming the world Order and prospects for integrating Russia into global Regulatory structures" (project No. 15-03-00728).</funding-statement></funding-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Дмитращенко О.А. 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