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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">intertrends</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Международные процессы</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>International Trends / Mezhdunarodnye protsessy</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">1728-2756</issn><issn pub-type="epub">1811-2773</issn><publisher><publisher-name>AEFIR</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.17994/IT.2016.14.3.46.4</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">intertrends-753</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>РЕАЛЬНОСТЬ И ТЕОРИЯ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>REALITY AND THEORY</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Колониальный опыт Великобритании и стратегическое мышление США</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>British Colonial Past and the US Strategic Culture</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Малкин</surname><given-names>Станислав</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Malkin</surname><given-names>Stanislav</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Малкин Станислав Геннадьевич – доктор исторических наук, профессор Кафедры всеобщей истории и методики обучения Самарского государственного социально-педагогического университета</p><p>Самара</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Prof. Dr Stanislav Malkin – Professor, Department of World History, Samara State University for Social Sciences and Pedagogy</p><p>Samara, 443099</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">s.g.malkin@mail.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Самарский государственный социально-педагогический университет</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Samara State Social and Teaching University</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2016</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>20</day><month>08</month><year>2025</year></pub-date><volume>14</volume><issue>3</issue><fpage>52</fpage><lpage>67</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Малкин С., 2025</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2025</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Малкин С.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Malkin S.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.intertrends.ru/jour/article/view/753">https://www.intertrends.ru/jour/article/view/753</self-uri><abstract><p>События последнего времени характеризуются стремительным ростом гражданских конфликтов: от беспорядков на межрасовой почве и межнациональных столкновений до гражданских войн религиозного, этнического и территориального характера. Эти обстоятельства все чаще возвращают академическое и экспертное сообщества к истории становления и развития политики обеспечения внутренней безопасности. При этом именно Лондон и Вашингтон в рамках «гуманитарных интервенций» конца XX – начала XXI вв предпринимают активные и регулярные попытки перенести на чужую почву (Афганистан и Ирак являются наиболее показательными примерами) свой собственный опыт обеспечения внутренней безопасности. Понимание и прогнозирование перспектив этого трансфера чужеродной модели выстраивания системы внутренней безопасности требует глубокого анализа не только ее основных компонентов, но и их идейных истоков. Особая роль силовых структур и ведомств (разведка, контрразведка, полиция, армия), постоянство противоречивого выбора между принципами демократии и требованиями безопасности (включая санкционированные властями внесудебные ограничения прав иностранных подданных и собственных граждан на территории Великобритании и США) сохраняют свое значение и сейчас, позволяя говорить о том, что выработанные в колониальном прошлом Великобритании методы обеспечения внутренней безопасности все еще актуальны в глазах значительной части экспертного сообщества США (хотя далеко не всегда эффективны на практике), а их изучение имеет не только академическое, но и политическое значение. В свете рассекреченных в минувшее десятилетие документов о деятельности служб безопасности Великобритании и США после 1945 г. в колониях и странах «третьего мира», а также современных международных противоречий, связанных с попытками привнести созданную на основе колониального опыта Великобритании модель обеспечения внутренней безопасности в различные страны современного мира (сквозь призму его восприятия в самих США), встает необходимость комплексного изучения этой политики, развития структур, форм и методов обеспечения внутренней безопасности в Великобритании и США в качестве универсального рецепта «антиповстанческих операций» и «операций стабилизации». Настоящая статья представляет собой анализ этого процесса в рамках «холодной войны» и «Войны с террором» на уровне стратегического мышления в качестве одного из наиболее характерных и существенных аспектов перехода от эпохи глобальных колониальных империй к эпохе ядерных супердержав.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>Recent events are characterized by a prompt growth in civil conflicts: from disorder for racial reasons to international collisions and civil wars of a religious, ethnic and territorial character. These circumstances even more often return the academic and expert communities to the history of the formation and development of a policy to ensure internal security. At the same time London and Washington within «humanitarian interventions» of the end of the 20th, the beginning of the 21st centuries make active and regular attempts to move to others soil (Afghanistan and Iraq are the most indicative examples) their own experience of providing internal security. Understanding and forecasting the prospects of this transfer of an alien model of forming a system of internal security demands a deep analysis not only of its main components, but also of its ideological sources. The special role of law enforcement agencies and departments (intelligence, counterintelligence, police, army),  the inconsistent choice between the principles of democracy and safety requirements (including the extrajudicial restrictions of the rights of the foreign and own citizens authorized by the authorities on the territory of Great Britain and the USA) are still valid nowadays, allowing to say that the methods of providing internal security developed in the colonial past of Great Britain are still considered valid by a considerable part of the expert community of the USA (though aren't always effective in practice), and studying them has not only an academic, but also a political value. In the light of the recently declassified documents on the activity of security services of Great Britain and the USA after World War II, in countries of «The third world» and also the modern international contradictions connected with attempts to introduce the model of providing internal security created on the basis of colonial experience of Great Britain to various countries of the modern world, there is a need to study this policy, and the development of structures, forms and methods of providing internal security in Great Britain and the USA as the universal recipe for «counterinsurgency operations» and «operations of stabilization». The present article represents the analysis of this process in the conditions of «Cold war» and «War on terror» at the level of strategic thinking as one of the most characteristic and essential aspects of transition from an era of global colonial empires to an era of nuclear superpowers.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>Империя</kwd><kwd>сверхдержава</kwd><kwd>стратегия</kwd><kwd>контрпартизанская борьба</kwd><kwd>Великобритания</kwd><kwd>США</kwd><kwd>Вьетнамская война</kwd><kwd>война в Малайе</kwd><kwd>колониализм</kwd><kwd>операция в Ираке</kwd><kwd>операция в Афганистане</kwd><kwd>антропология</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>empire</kwd><kwd>superpower</kwd><kwd>strategy</kwd><kwd>counterinsurgency</kwd><kwd>Great Britain</kwd><kwd>USA</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Дериглазова Л. 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