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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">intertrends</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Международные процессы</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>International Trends / Mezhdunarodnye protsessy</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">1728-2756</issn><issn pub-type="epub">1811-2773</issn><publisher><publisher-name>AEFIR</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">intertrends-886</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>РЕАЛЬНОСТЬ И ТЕОРИЯ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>REALITY AND THEORY</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Эволюция экономических санкций как инструмента внешней политики: от Второй мировой войны до санкций против России</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Economic Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Балуев</surname><given-names>Дмитрий</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Baluev</surname><given-names>Dmitry</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Балуев Дмитрий Геннадьевич – доктор политических наук, профессор, заведующий Кафедрой прикладного политического анализа и моделирования Нижегородского государственного университета им. Н.И. Лобачевского</p><p>Нижний Новгород</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Prof. Dr Dmitry Baluev – Chair, Department of Applied Political Analysis and Modeling, Nizhniy Novgorod State University</p><p>Nizhniy Novgorod, 603950</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">nbaluev@mail.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Нижегородский государственный университет им. Н.Н. Лобачевского</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Lobachevsky Nizhniy Novgorod State University</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2014</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>22</day><month>09</month><year>2025</year></pub-date><volume>12</volume><issue>3</issue><fpage>23</fpage><lpage>37</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Балуев Д., 2025</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2025</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Балуев Д.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Baluev D.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.intertrends.ru/jour/article/view/886">https://www.intertrends.ru/jour/article/view/886</self-uri><abstract><p>В статье рассматривается эволюция экономических санкций как внешнеполитического инструмента с момента окончания Второй мировой войны до настоящего времени. Исследование построено на сравнительном анализе наиболее показательных случаев использования ограничительных мер. Делаются выводы, способные не только уточнить теоретические рамки  понимания мирополитического значения экономических санкций, но и помочь выработке практических рекомендаций по использованию этого инструмента для достижения внешнеполитических целей России и противодействия санкциям, налагаемым на нее.</p><p>Во-первых, в каждом из изученных случаев использования экономических санкций ключевое влияние на особенности их использования оказала структура международной системы. Во-вторых, в XX веке первоначально при введении санкций ставились масштабные цели, которые затрагивали жизненно важные интересы стран, против которых вводимые ограничения были направлены. Санкции нынешнего столетия имели гораздо более ограниченные цели.</p><p>В-третьих, структура международной системы предопределила различия в роли международных институтов в рассматриваемых случаях, а также выбор методов вовлечения дополнительных участников в реализацию санкционных мер.</p><p>В-четвертых, санкции действительно могут стать эффективным инструментом политического давления. Однако их значение не следует преувеличивать. В большинстве случаев они не способны стать адекватной альтернативой использованию военной силы. Санкции могут быть действенны только против государств, не относящихся к числу великих или региональных держав. В-пятых, успешное противодействие ограничительным мерам требует организации усилий частного сектора страны, являющейся объектом санкционного воздействия. Законодательные меры противодействия неэффективны и зачастую увеличивают ущерб для страны-объекта.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The article deals with the evolution of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool from the end of the Second World War up to the contemporary sanctions against Russia. The analysis is built around the comparisons of sanctions cases in the period under review. Conclusions are made that could be significant for a theoretical understanding of the place of economic sanctions in contemporary world politics, as well as for making practical recommendations for the use of this instrument in Russian foreign policy and for countering sanctions directed against Russia.</p><p>In each of the cases under review, the key importance has been the structure of the international system. In the 20th century, the goals of sanctions were rather ambitious and targeted the vital interests of the targeted states. In the 21st century, the goal of sanctions has been much more limited.</p><p>The structure of the international system defined the difference of the role of international institutions in the cases under review, as well as the difference in methods used for ensuring compliance with sanctions.</p><p>Indeed, sanctions could be a useful instrument of international relations, however their importance must not be overstated. In most cases, they are not a true alternative to military force. They could be effective only against a state that is not a great power or not significant regional power.</p><p>Counteraction against imposed sanctions could be better organized by the private sector of the country being targeted. Offsetting the effect of sanctions on the governmental level is much more difficult. Legislative responses are not effective and could inflict damage that is bigger than the effect of the sanctions themselves.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>экономические санкции</kwd><kwd>эффективность</kwd><kwd>последствия санкций</kwd><kwd>противодействие санкциям</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>economic sanctions</kwd><kwd>effectiveness</kwd><kwd>consequences of sanctions</kwd><kwd>counteraction</kwd></kwd-group><funding-group><funding-statement xml:lang="ru">Работа частично поддержана грантом (соглашение от 27 августа 2013г. № 02.В.49.21.0003 между МОН РФ и ННГУ).</funding-statement><funding-statement xml:lang="en">The article was partially supported by a grant (agreement No. 02.V.49.21.0003 dated August 27, 2013 between the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation and UNN).</funding-statement></funding-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Балуев Д.Г. 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