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EVOLUTION OF STATECRAFT

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

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«International Trends» (Mezhdunarodnye protsessy) is the first Russian academic journal of international relations theory and the methodology of world–political studies. It is independently published and managed by the Academic Educational Journal on International Relations, a Moscow–based Russian NGO established in 2000.Having no direct affiliation with any state or private institution, the journal aims to facilitate communication among scholars and educators in Eurasia and to foster their concerted effort in developing theoretical approaches to international relations and world politics. Our journal's priorities include new fundamental trends in international relations and world economy, the evolving theoretical agenda of security and conflict studies, international organizations, the ethical dimension of foreign policy and international law, ecology, geopolitics, migrations, and international political economy. Our authors come from universities and research centers based in the former Soviet area as well as Western Europe and North America. The journal circulates in 1,100 copies and also exists in an open–access format at: **http://www.intertrends.ru**. Apart from Russian–speaking intellectuals, analysts, and university faculty, it is distributed among policy makers and officials serving in Russian federal and regional government bodies, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation.

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STATECRAFT IN U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS
MEANING, DILEMMAS, AND SIGNIFICANCE

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Abstract

The article introduces the special issue of International Trends dedicated to the current tendencies in the evolution of statecraft. It sets the analytical agenda for other special issue contributions by discussing the meaning of the term "statecraft" and illustrating the concept through several dilemmas that policymakers commonly face when choosing foreign policy toolkits. The authors posit that, at base, a meaningful definition of statecraft subsumes the ends, means, and ways embraced by a government in its attempt to exert influence over another state short of the resort to brute military force, either directly or via pressures on key non-state stakeholders. The article goes on to highlight how a clear-cut formulation of a country's "national interests" may, on one hand, serve as a lodestar for the national bureaucracy and draw "red lines" for the country's adversaries, but on the other hand, entail a difficult and politically costly choice between mutually exclusive priorities for the country's foreign policy goals. The authors also discuss the impact of technological innovation on the evolution of great power statecraft. They describe a variant of the security dilemma arising from the choice between immediate weaponization of new technology, on one hand, and refraining from such move with the aim of avoiding an arms race or escalation of existing conflicts, on the other. In its turn, developing a strong identity as a means of statecraft for an international player may increase that player's power of commitment, but at the same time, foreclose attractive policy options that cannot be implemented because they could compromise the chosen identity. Pioneering the use of big data in the study of statecraft, the authors find that, notwithstanding very different power positions, traditions, and interests, U.S. and Russian discourse surrounding great power competition resemble each other more than commonly acknowledged.

Keywords:

Statecraft; Foreign Policy; Security; Russia; United States of America; Discourse; Negotiation

This article is a result of a collaborative research project on the modern trends in the evolution of statecraft by the MGIMO School of Government and International Affairs and the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. A Russian version of this article is published in the second part of this special issue of International Trends. The Russian and English versions are not identical. The key term statecraft cannot be translated directly into Russian, that is why the Russian articles in this special issue use a variety of longer definitions of statecraft depending on the context.

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Amid the dislocation caused by the global pandemic and expectations of change surrounding the 2020 U.S. presidential elections, there are palpable signs of continuity in great power politics. Despite calls for rethinking strategic relationships and related domestic political pressures stoking divergent worldviews, the leaderships in Washington and Moscow are bracing for competition over the long-haul. Although the Biden Administration has been quick to castigate former President Trump's idiosyncratic and transactional approach to international relations, early statements align closely with the 2018 National Defense Strategy and preceding National Security Strategy that are moored in waging long-term competition with near-peer rivals from a position of strength. These strategy documents highlight that the central challenge to America's prosperity and security stems from emboldened revisionist-authoritarian leaderships that necessitate not only the need to deter and defeat them in war, but also the need to contest for influence across a broad and complex mix of policy domains. Similarly, there is little illusion in Moscow that political change in Washington will alter America's pursuit of "global primacy" or otherwise dampen strategic rivalry in the "polycentric" international system. Notwithstanding a detected rhetorical emphasis on "diplomacy first" or "strategic stability," the Kremlin is inclined to read the Biden administration's message as a commitment to "double-down on waging non-military campaigns against its designated adversaries, including Russia" [Trenin, 2020]. The prevailing view is that Western sanctions and hostile intervention to foment "color revolutions" both within Russia and its sphere of influence will persist, if not intensify, thus presenting an existential threat to the Kremlin and a competitive edge to relations with the Euro-Atlantic community. Accordingly, the Russian national security establishment actively strives to broaden its strategic options, including bolstering alignment with China and other non-Western powers as well as leveraging informal actors and information. This is part of an inclusive approach to strategic deterrence and rivalry to offset asymmetries while playing to Moscow's strengths at exerting international influence across multiple domains.

The mutual gravitation to competitive forms of statecraft raises more questions than answers regarding the state of great power politics. What are the preferred ends, means, and ways associated with respective U.S. and Russian efforts to exert international influence? How effective are they at shaping the behavior of respective targets and attaining desired outcomes, and under which conditions are they more likely to succeed? How similar or different are the basic conceptions and approaches pursued by the U.S. and Russia? Moreover, how accurate are Moscow's and Washington's perceptions, accusations, and suspicions about key rivals that inform respective competitive influence strategies? What are the risks of inadvertent escalation and the attendant policy dilemmas? In particular, can Washington or Moscow realize competitive objectives in one policy sphere without undermining national priorities or mutual security interests in another [Charap, Shapiro 2015, 2016; Pifer 2015]? Can such problems be mitigated or otherwise transcended to limit the damage of long-term competition or to otherwise advance cooperative U.S.-Russian engagement? These questions lie at the crux of a series of forthcoming articles in these pages that compare U.S. and Russian approaches to statecraft across various policy domains.

1

Statecraft is a much used and abused notion in the study of international relations. On the one hand, there are sweeping conceptions that render it almost meaningless for explicating great power politics. For example, classic definitions center around the "art of conducting state affairs" that span the gamut of efforts aimed at marshalling diverse policies across foreign and domestic dimensions. This includes elements related to a country's policymaking processes, as well as the selection of means in support of generic national policy goals. On the other hand, there are parochial applications that confine the term to the pursuit of an instrumental foreign policy objective (e.g., the "de-annexation" of Crimea), the formation of a particular strategy (e.g., compellence), or the use of a specific policy instrument (e.g., foreign military assistance). While the broad definition

has been abandoned by scholars of domestic public policy because it often conflates power with techniques of policy, the parochial ways of defining statecraft often overlook the multiple dimensions that inform strategic choices by one state to influence another [Baldwin 2020].

At base, a meaningful definition of statecraft subsumes the ends, means, and ways embraced by a government in its attempt to exert influence over another state short of the resort to brute military force, either directly or via pressures on key non-state stakeholders. This places at the center of analysis not only the techniques, logics, and goals adopted by one state, but the conditions that directly affect the scope, domains, costs, and weight of such foreign influence strategies. In this conception, statecraft involves more than the formulation of a specific foreign policy, which is a more static concept; rather, statecraft captures the underlying rationale for employing different instruments. As such, it widens the aperture in the study of strategy, as it draws attention to contending logics and tradeoffs among alternative "ways" that different states seek to influence other foreign actors. In this regard, it constitutes a political act intended to alter the value of a policy that extends beyond the market price, technical specification, or kinetic features that are intrinsic to a specific instrument.

The tools of the trade for statecraft span economic sanctions, malign financing, diplomatic pressure, security assistance, energy supply disruptions, and instrumental diffusion of religious beliefs or information of different sorts that are employed by a state to get rivals to do more of what it wants. This also can cover the political or limited use of force short of all-out warfare to coerce rather than to physically defeat an adversary. Accordingly, statecraft encompasses the information, instruments, and strategies that one state uses to shape the choices and behavior of another rather than to impose an outcome. Statecraft is a concept focused on states' patterns of behavior as they pursue their goals in external affairs. Thinking in terms of statecraft is not so different from examining the patterns of behavior of people or social groups in life. It is a relational concept, not a property or element of power, where international consequences are determined by the interaction of strategies and conditions on respective choices, notwithstanding initial preferences of the specific parties.

This understanding of statecraft lends itself to strategic and comparative analysis. Analysis of the components of statecraft allows for assessment of how specific states not only perceive their own interests and threats, but those of a rival; together, these outlooks inform how they assess tradeoffs among policy tools in the formulation of alternative strategies of foreign influence. This is crucial not only for understanding diverse inputs into respective strategies, but for distinguishing alternative preferences and conceptions among common strategies adopted by different states. While states may pursue shared ends, their approaches to related strategies can differ significantly in terms of the combination of policy instruments marshalled, as well as the character of threats, promises, and inflection points of escalation. Coercive measures practiced by one state, for example, may be perceived differently or go unnoticed by the target that is steeped in its own competitive frame of reference. Thus, default to mirror imaging, assumptions of reciprocity, and failure to comprehend differences can obfuscate preferences, as well as confuse strategic signaling, leading to inadvertent escalation, if not dangerous outcomes.

2

As described above, statecraft is where structure and agency interact in international relations. The techniques of statecraft derive neither strictly from the composition of power and aggregate capabilities of a state, nor from the intentions behind foreign influence attempts. Rather, the focus on statecraft examines how different state actors wield fixed "property" concepts of power based on alternative mechanisms or logics to influence foreign state and non-state actors under the prevailing conditions. Distinguishing between these fixed, variable, and relational dimensions to international competition put in play the dynamic dimensions to the contemporary period of statecraft that present challenges to extant assumptions and precepts.

While the basic elements of statecraft are time honored, the conditions for its practice today are much different than during the Cold War. First, asymmetry rather than parity defines the strategic context for long-term great power competition. Influence attempts at the global and regional levels pit differences in raw material power, stakes, resolve, and values among contending states. Such asymmetries can alter the perceptions, choices, and demands on parties with different dispositions that confound bargaining based on bipolarity or uniform calculations of costs, benefits, and risk associated with classic models of coercion and persuasion. Second, there are both old and new instruments available for states to combine differently in respective influence strategies. Accordingly, the current epoch of statecraft is not dominated by a specific instrument wielded by great powers, such as was the focus with the nuclear revolution. The challenges presented by emerging technologies, such as AI and drones, relate to empowering multiple and non-state actors, as well as to adding new dimensions to nuclear diplomacy, demonstrations of and ambiguous use of conventional military power, economic sanctions, information operations, or energy cut-offs that take place in the "gray zone", above peaceful engagement and below the line of war. This can accentuate, complicate, or attenuate the potency of certain instruments across domains under different circumstances.

Furthermore, the character of contemporary great power statecraft is marked by curious puzzles in national discourse. The GDELT[1] dataset of millions of events from the mid-1990s, for example, makes it possible to illuminate broad trends in the content of strategic discourse surrounding U.S. and Russian international assertiveness that is automatically culled from popular media sources. Using the CAMEO taxonomy of assertive-related codes – which can be disaggregated by source, intensity, policy domain, and tone – reveals several distinct trends of convergence and divergence in the description of U.S. and Russian postures since 2013.

Notwithstanding very different power positions, traditions, and interests, U.S. and Russian discourse surrounding great power competition resemble each other more than commonly acknowledged. As depicted in Figure 1, the patterns in the frequency and intensity of U.S. and Russian international assertiveness are roughly on par at the macro level, as reflected by the popular characterization of their respective postures since 2013 as a percentage of each one's overall international activity. The discourse captured by Russian sources describes patterns in the frequency of Russia's overall assertive international posture in terms that track closely (but with higher episodic peaks in 2014, 2016, 2018, and 2019) with those reflected by the global discourse regarding the analogous American posture (upper figures). Moreover, American and Russian international assertive postures are characterized as moderately aggressive among both Western and Russian sources in the dataset (lower figures), ranging from issuing formal warnings to promising material support[2]. Although on balance the international discussion around U.S. posture tends to reflect a more aggressive strategy, Russia's assertiveness has

[1] GDELT (Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone) is an open-source, machine-coded dataset that seeks to capture and characterize the international behavior and interactions of states. It is generated through an automated method of extracting events from discourse in newspapers, magazines, blogs, and other online resources in over 65 languages from 1979 onwards; similarly, it utilizes the CAMEO event schema to characterize events into nearly 300 sub-classes of 20 categories with weights for intensity. Among other events datasets, GDELT is distinguished as the largest, most expansive in terms of non-Western sources used, and the most extensive with regards to the scraping and cleaning algorithms that they employ. Scholars have used events datasets to describe broad and real-time trends in the characterization of state interactions because they can distinguish actors, targets, and a variety of international behavior and tone culled from millions of reported events that are updated every 15 minutes. That said, there is an active debate within international academic and policy communities about the relative strengths and weaknesses of respective events databases, as well as about the merits of using them to identify and validate causal relationships.

[2] "Intensity" is measured on a Goldstein scale of +10 (extend military assistance) to -10 (military attack).

Figure 1
Aggregate Assertiveness in U.S. and Russian[3] Discourse (GDELT)



Source: authors.

been characterized as more belligerent in the national media during select periods of 2016, 2018, and 2020. This suggests that both great powers not only take long-term strategies for assertive influence seriously, but do so in ways that are widely acknowledged as seeking to avoid direct confrontation, notwithstanding flagrant outbursts of hostility.

These trends are outlined by Figure 2, which underscores that Russian and American strategies of international assertiveness are comprised of more than simply static belligerent postures. Rather, the discourse surrounding assertiveness in both states centers on extending cooperative gestures as much, if not more, than wielding competitive policies in pursuit of international influence (upper figures). Furthermore, the lion's share of respective Western and Russian discussions about assertiveness rest with issuing threats and promises, more than with undertaking concrete steps of military, economic, or political action (lower figures). Again, this reveals the prominence of diverse forms of statecraft rather than a preoccupation with specific strategies of coercion or kinetic action in both U.S. and Russian international postures.

That said, there are distinct differences. Specifically, U.S. and Russian assertive postures vary in terms of their cross-domain character. As Figure 3 highlights, U.S. international assertiveness has been characterized by Western sources as marked by a conspicuous reliance on

[3] Russian-only sources.

Figure 2

Aggregate Assertiveness/Conflictual vs. Cooperative & Materials vs. Rhetorical in U.S. and Russian[4] Discourse (GDELT)



Source: authors.

diplomacy, as well as on economic and, to a lesser extent, military tools. Although Russia, too, has been heavily invested in assertive diplomacy, there has been a greater proclivity since 2014 to hold up the military as an instrument of statecraft while relying less on economic sanctions or inducements. That said, the latter may be gaining prominence among the Russian strategic community just as the discourse on U.S. strategy is reviving the salience of international legal instruments. Irrespective of popular commentary, neither information nor security assistance constitute the mainstays in the overall assertive postures for either the U.S. or Russia. While these patterns do not reflect postures in specific cases or speak to causal dynamics, they do reflect prevailing preferences and the variety of dimensions associated with contemporary statecraft captured in Western and Russian discourse. Accordingly, they raise poignant questions about the risks of escalation, success, and conditions under which both states select different policy instruments to advance respective international influence.

3

The previous two sections examined statecraft as a concept and presented a comparative assessment of aggregate differences in the understanding of statecraft and in the use of different tools of statecraft from Western and Russian perspectives. This section will high-

[4] Russian-only sources.

Figure 3
Aggregate Assertiveness/Cross-Domain in U.S. and Russian[5] Discourse (GDELT)



Source: authors.

light three illustrative dilemmas in the practice of statecraft. These dilemmas underscore the challenges in identifying how states define and conduct foreign policy; how they formulate clear national interests; how policy makers choose among the wide array of tools available to conduct statecraft; and how those choices are received by domestic and international audiences. The dilemmas also help with understanding decisions to modernize technologically and show how a state's identity can convey both resolve and commitment to specific interests.

The first dilemma relates to *defining an overall purpose, or a mission for a country's foreign policy*. Policymakers and their domestic audiences usually need to decide whether and how to define the mission and scope of their country's foreign policy. For example, there is always the basic choice of guns vs. butter, or economic advancement vs. national security. Once the policymakers have decided to define the mission, they will then need to determine whether *national interests* should be formulated in a clear-cut way, and why. This creates a dilemma, because defining a national interest substantively requires making a difficult choice: many goals are contradictory and some even mutually exclusive, while a state usually has limited resources in order to advance its national interests. As a result, policymakers will have to accept that pursuing chosen interests and goals will make them less capable of achieving other important goals that are, from

[5] Russian-only sources.

the policymakers' perspective, still secondary to those chosen. For example, often policymakers are not able to achieve both economic growth and maximum national security, understood as sufficient extent of insularity from the outside world, because in many situations one goal clearly undermines the other–witness North Korea, Venezuela, or Myanmar.

There are advantages and disadvantages to both a clear and a vague definition of the foreign policy mission and national interests. Once national interests are clearly identified, red lines are drawn for the rivals and lodestars are put up for the country's own foreign policy establishment and its allies. These choices may be divisive, triggering a partisan domestic debate. Sometimes policymakers are faced with a transparency vs. partisanship tradeoff and choose to de-emphasize choices in order to avoid domestic controversy and partisanship. As a result, many policymakers seek to bypass such debate, even at the cost of poor public scrutiny of foreign policy goals and moves.

The second dilemma pertains to the tradeoffs surrounding *innovative means of statecraft.* How should policymakers weigh the decision to weaponize new technology despite the potentially destabilizing effects? Emerging technologies can present significant design and strategic effects, which increase capability and efficiency, while creating conditions that can undermine the stability of deterrence. Dual use technologies, for example, allow for open experimentation and refinement, while creating significant security risks given the uncertainty about states' intentions and the possibility of military application. It would be imprudent for a state leader not to consider any new technology from the perspective of its potential use in foreign policy, but should such leader go all in weaponizing the new technology, or try to find the right balance between military and civilian uses and then, if necessary, only gradually escalate the military use?

Upon weaponizing the cyber domain, social networks, artificial intelligence, or space technology, states face what may be called the dilemma of technology in statecraft. Policymakers become concerned (if not scared) if their opponents appear to gain a surprise edge in statecraft because they have mastered a new technology or a combination of technologies. For example, cyber tools pose a number of unique challenges. If one's cyber capabilities are revealed, others get the opportunity to build sufficient defenses, rendering those offensive tools ineffective. However, concealing capabilities may undermine stable deterrence, as is the case in the nuclear domain where a credible demonstration of capabilities in the form of bomb and missile tests can be effectively used to impress an adversary. This "conceal-reveal" dilemma is likely to complicate the practice of statecraft as states continue to pursue the development of emerging technologies. Looking at other domains can also highlight the dilemma of states gaining a surprise advantage; a state may use social networks to delegitimize an adversary's political regime while amassing medium-range missiles or unmanned aerial vehicles for a surprise quick decapitating strike. States also become increasingly concerned with the potential use of vulnerabilities in its electoral process to sway close votes in polarized societies.

This statecraft dilemma is particularly difficult to resolve for policymakers in technologically advanced nations. It is clear that, at the very least, it is important for policymakers to show to other states that a) their country is not weaponizing new technology for offense, but only has defensive purposes in mind, and that b) their nation is only reacting to its opponent's first move. Many actors would still suspect the country of offensive intentions, and while reassuring them, the policymaker's country would need to avoid strategic missteps, overlooking the possibility that an adversary is weaponizing new technology. For that purpose, testing innovative responses may become necessary, which in turn may be considered as an offensive act. Overall, there is no definitive solution in sight because both technological progress and policy entrepreneurship are unstoppable, and it is their mix that can trigger "statecraft scares." This dilemma also highlights the challenge of discerning intentions in an anarchic international environment, and the difficulty distinguishing between offensive and defensive technologies, particularly within the context of dual use technologies.

The third example of a statecraft dilemma concerns the *role of national identity as a purpose and source of commitment* in statecraft. Identity is a useful instrument for a nation to demonstrate general resolve and commitment to specific goals in its foreign policy. State leaders may try demonstrating commitment to a certain goal because it is "in their nation's DNA" as part of the nation's identity, which is by definition almost non-negotiable and must be accepted as a given by other players.

Authoritative experts note that identity is playing a more central role in domestic and world politics alike, and it is becoming increasingly legitimate to cite identity as a source of commitment in foreign policy [Fukuyama 2018]. However, when doing so, a country takes the risk of harming its own interests by foreclosing important policy options. Developing and asserting a clear-cut identity may entail giving up important economic opportunities or civility of domestic political discourse for the sake of leveraging identity for foreign policy purposes.

A final dilemma is related to the choice between *horizonal and vertical escalation*. Vertical escalation refers to the employment of new weapons and technology that were not previously used or the shift to new types of targets, while horizontal escalation refers to the expansion of the geographic and functional scope of a conflict [Kahn 1965]. The practice of statecraft across domains – specifically through the development and potential use of emerging technologies, information, and foreign economic tools – may inadvertently trigger a response by other states, thus precipitating vertical escalation. Alternatively, cross-domain statecraft may play to competitive strengths, thus defusing pressures for vertical escalation, and lessening the risks of instability and accidental escalation.

4

Statecraft as a concept is an important lens through which to understand states' aspirations and the strategic choices that they are likely to make in order to achieve their goals. In an era of increasing uncertainty and protracted competition, compounded by the development of new technologies and cross domain concerns that threaten to undermine strategic stability, it is important to examine which tools of statecraft actors are likely to choose in the conduct of foreign policy, how those choices vary cross nationally, and the impact of those choices on international conflict or cooperation.

Writing during the Cold War, Morton Kaplan recognized that the practice of statecraft is critical to the future of great power politics, international stability, and the likelihood of conflict. He described statecraft as something more forceful than diplomacy, and that as a concept, "it includes the construction of strategies for securing the national interest in the international arena, as well as the execution of these strategies by diplomats. In a day when the world is being divided between two great power blocs, when neutrality is becoming increasingly more difficult to maintain, when statecraft is invading the economic and cultural aspects of social existence, as well as the political and military, when most great problems of domestic life must be reconsidered with regard to their bearing on the international situation, few, if any, can doubt its importance. The successful or unsuccessful conduct of statecraft may settle the fate of our way of life; and, given the possibilities of modern war, it may, in a deeper sense, settle the question of whether any type of civilized life, ours or the Soviets', can survive" [Kaplan 1952].

Kaplan's notion of statecraft captures the importance of understanding how states attempt to secure their national interests, and the strategies they employ for doing so. Even further, the manner in which states practice statecraft can shape the likelihood of cooperation or conflict in the international system. While we are no longer in the bipolar great power competition of the Cold War, during which Kaplan was writing, the concept of statecraft remains critical and is perhaps even more so, given the ever-expanding toolkit from which states have to draw when developing competitive strategies and determining how to behave in the international system.

There are a number of factors that can influence the national of choice that states make in determining how to conduct statecraft. In addition to the factors identified above, includ-

ing national interests, identity, and balancing concerns, statecraft is also driven by a number of asymmetries between states. These asymmetries highlight disparities in power, stakes, and resolve across both countries and domains, and raise a number of important questions regarding advantages to more powerful or weaker states, the importance of political institutions, the role of stakeholders in the public and private sectors, and perhaps most fundamentally the force of structure in the international system. The remainder of this section will examine six specific conditions can shape the decisions made by states.

1) *History – path dependence – tradition.* It may seem that policymakers are strongly influenced by history when making their decisions. But in reality, as Frank Gavin notes, they usually have a distorted understanding of history; so often they use history simply to justify their premeditated choices [Gavin 2019]. Gavin suggests that history can and should only teach us to be wise in terms of understanding that each moment and period is unique. There may be some historical patterns, but sweeping generalizations are often misleading and are therefore a poor basis or foil for policymaking. For example, a state may believe that its experience is exceptional and should therefore be implemented in other states. Such views may have prompted the United States and other major powers to embark on costly nation-building projects as a favored means of statecraft.

Alternatively, states may believe that their country – for example, the Middle Kingdom as the precursor of modern-day China – has always been at the center of the international system, thus it is entitled to behaving as such now, bullying neighbors. In response, those neighbors may challenge that notion and put up a strong resistance, leading to a conflictual pattern of relationships on a regional and – potentially – global scale. Another state may come to believe that powerful nations have always been uncomfortable with its existence and independent foreign policy course and determined to bring about its demise. This type of belief may result in a siege mentality leading to foregone opportunities for collective economic advancement.

2) *Perceptions of changes in the strategic environment.* For example, a state may come to believe that great power rivalry is on the rise, resulting in a decline in globalization. This may trigger a move to more coercive endeavors in trade relations, an emphasis on nuclear deterrence, or a competitive strategy that hinges on asymmetries in power relations and capabilities. Another state may instead proceed from the assumption of an unstoppable progress of globalization, liberalizing its trade, opening up to foreign investment, increasing connectivity to the outside world, and reducing its defense budgets.

3) *New technology* can also provide new opportunities for statecraft. This is one of the most intriguing challenges discussed in this special issue. Does new technology have mainly destabilizing effects when used in statecraft? Alternatively, can emerging technologies improve stability by providing a basis for defense dominance? How fast do major global and regional players develop defenses against weaponized cutting-edge technology? Can failure to deploy such defenses result in the demise of a major international player?

4) *Leadership worldviews* also matter, including the track record of making difficult decisions and the readiness to absorb the ensuing risks and costs. This is an important way in which states can communicate resolve, although in practice resolve is difficult to measure until an actual escalation begins and concrete actions are taken – for example, missiles are launched or a marching order is issued. Ultimately, resolve reflects the willingness to prevail in a conflict estimated on a particular stage of escalation. Assumed worldviews espoused by rival leaders are important factors in estimating resolve, but they should not be taken at face value until they are backed up by action.

5) *Actor identities* also play a non-trivial role in the practice of statecraft – in accordance with the logic of appropriateness: actors behave in a manner that they think is fit for their identity. In turn, collective identities of states are shaped through a complicated process involving the impact of preferences and worldviews of the leaders, public, elites, interest groups,

and others, as well as by how states are perceived by their counterparts. For example, since the end of World War II, Germany has developed a widely-recognized identity as a pacifist nation, while Japan positions itself and is broadly perceived by the international community as a major global donor. In its turn, Russia is widely known in Mandarin as a "fighting nation," or a "nation in the mood for combat," which illustrates an influential perception of Russia by one of its closest international partners. Aware of such an "imposed identity," Moscow is then left to decide how much it is willing to oblige China by catering to these popular perceptions.

6) Generally, *impulses* strong enough to affect a country from within or externally can prompt choices of statecraft, at least in the short term. For example, migration flows into European countries from the Middle East and North Africa prompted the EU to be more resolute in conflict mediation on its periphery, or at least to discuss actively the need for such action. The EU also began to employ serious economic sanctions in its conflict with Russia around Ukraine.

All of these factors shaping statecraft are discussed in this bi-lingual special issue of *International Trends*. Igor Istomin examines how a great power can instrumentalize alliance-building to rally smaller states – mostly, its neighbors – around its diplomatic initiatives, to limit the options of potential rival powers, and to ensure domestic stability in its geographic neighborhood. He shows that these soft goals typical of Russia's post-Cold War alliance-building strategy are different from the traditional purposes that US-led alliances were designed to serve – mainly, assured common defense against external threats and incorporation of alliance partners into the US-led international order. His article points to high utility of soft asymmetrical alliances to their leaders who, like Russia in post-Soviet Eurasia, have been able to ensure sufficient loyalty by most of the smaller alliance members while retaining freedom of maneuver and decisions on intervening into conflicts on behalf of the smaller "soft client" members [Istomin 2021a; 2021b].

Discussing access to oil and natural gas as both a purpose and a source of leverage in world politics, Sergei Golunov suggests that radical statecraft instruments such as invading and seizing control over producer countries or their regions have rarely been used and have almost never been effective. Even the powerful United States successfully resisted the temptation to intervene militarily in 1938 and in 1973 when, respectively, Mexican and Saudi Arab authorities moved to take over the US oil businesses in their countries. Washington used "softer" means of statecraft and eventually coopted Mexico and the Gulf states into the sphere of US influence, deriving much greater benefits than could have been obtained from direct control over oil rigs. This suggests, inter alia, that the fears of an invasion and/or a hostile takeover that resource-endowed countries may have these days are largely overstated – resource consumers are not focused on physical control, and instead seek to ensure unhindered functioning of the resource markets in which supply and reasonable prices are guaranteed by the presence of multiple independent competing producers.

In the meantime, pipeline geopolitics, as described by Golunov, have been perceived by stakeholders as a potent tool of statecraft that has generated pushback on the part of its target states stalemating some of the politically-motivated projects, such as Russia's South Stream, Blue Stream, or Nordstream-2 [Golunov 2021a; 2021b].

Adam N. Stulberg and Jonathan Darsey empirically dissect American and Russian approaches to sanctions. Notwithstanding limited direct evidence of their success, both the U.S. and Russia are escalating sanctions on the other. Moreover, there is mutual complacency about the perpetuation of ineffective "reciprocal sanctions," if not confidence that the surrounding acrimony can be contained and other strategic areas of the relationship can be insulated from the fallout. Applying both text-mining and events data analytical techniques to illuminate trends in Russian discourse and posture on sanctions, the authors unpack heroic assumptions embedded in the prevailing "strategic bargaining model" that undergird

Western thinking about sanctions as a "low-cost" instrument of statecraft. Rather than pursuing "reciprocal sanctions" or simply being satisfied with domestic efforts to mitigate the impact of Western trade restrictions, Moscow is prone to respond to Western economic sanctions by escalating broader forms of coercion across different policy areas. Furthermore, both sides appear to be "worlds apart" in their understandings of the meaning, objectives, and legitimacy of sanctions-related behavior. There also are fundamental differences that pertain to the distinction between sanctions as a substitute versus an instrument of warfare. Together, Russia's orthogonal posture (meaning a cross-domain rather than reciprocal response) and different worldview present challenges to strategic signaling and core assumptions about the strategic application of sanctions, suggestive of new directions for theory and policy [Stulberg, Darsi 2021a; 2021b].

It is tempting, for the purposes of statecraft, to leverage some of the global trends, such as migration, explains Camilla Pagani in her article. At the same time, as a transnational phenomenon, migration contravenes the very nature and definition of statecraft understood as patterns of purpose-oriented activity by state governments. That said, migration governance, such as simple decisions to close or open a state border to migrants, can become powerful tools of policy vis-à-vis other states, as the case with the massive flight of Syrian refugees into Turkey and Europe demonstrated during the decade-long civil war in Syria. The United States and Russia also have been able to leverage their attractiveness to migrants in relations with their neighboring states. While the Trump administration used the migrant factor to improve the terms of trade with Mexico, Moscow's economic integration and political coordination projects in post-Soviet Eurasia hinged in no small measure on a relatively easy access to the Russian labor market for the migrants from the neighboring states in Central Asia and the South Caucasus [Pagani 2021a; 2021b].

Drawing on the rich tradition of identity studies, Anne Crowley-Vigneau and Francoise Le Saux examine the opportunities for using language as a means of statecraft. The power of language can only be assessed by looking at relatively long periods of time. However, there are ways to establish not just correlation, but also causality between, for example, the choice of a global language as official by a certain country, on one hand, and that country's subsequent political alignment with the major power which is the source of the chosen language. The authors show that many of the language-training arms of major national cultural diplomacy institutions, such as the British Council, Alliance Française, or Confucius Institutes, were created with expectations of leveraging the power that global languages can wield upon those who learn and use them [Crowley-Vigneau, Le Saux 2021a; 2021b].

Last, but not least, an illuminating discussion of the role of tradition and self-identity in the choice of statecraft is provided by Maria Shibkova, who uses the case of Italy to show how international structural factors and domestic political patterns become intertwined with the national style of conducting negotiations to form a unique tradition of statecraft for a mid-size power. As a country with a global imprint, Italy is small enough not to provoke adversarial balancing behavior by other states in Europe and beyond. Since World War II, its multi-party and often messy politics have prevented broad public mobilization in support of expansionist goals in Italy's external relations. Nonetheless, Italy has been powerful enough as a global actor to maintain freedom of maneuver and to make sure that its views are taken seriously by its international counterparts. While firmly anchored in the European Union, Italy has for decades remained one of the most pro-US members of the EU, while reserving the right to develop preferential economic relations with Russia and most recently with China.

* * *

The aim of this special issue is to probe a number of key phenomena and trends in contemporary international politics from the perspective of their actual or potential use as foreign policy instruments, and to consider patterns of action by states seeking to instrumentalize these phenomena. Our authors generally

find that instrumentalization of a single trend, such as trade in hydrocarbons or migration, or an institutional arrangement, such as a defensive alliance, has never been easy for those states seeking to wield power. Effective statecraft is usually based on a multi-instrument cross-domain approach that "follows in the footsteps of history," leveraging the structural factors and powerful trends currently at play. Unlike operations aimed at achieving quick or narrow foreign policy goals, statecraft as a set of tools and patterns of action is employed to ensure security, prosperity, and other core objectives of state governments in the long-term. The choice of statecraft is based on a sufficiently long experience of trial and error, and to an extent embodies a national tradition of conducting external relations.

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ВНЕШНЕПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ РЕСУРСЫ И ИНСТРУМЕНТЫ В РОССИЙСКО-АМЕРИКАНСКИХ ОТНОШЕНИЯХ

ОПРЕДЕЛЕНИЯ, ЗНАЧЕНИЕ И ДИЛЕММЫ

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Резюме

Авторы статьи вводят читателя в проблематику специального выпуска журнала «Международные процессы», посвященного ресурсному обеспечению и формам реализации внешней политики в современном мире. В статье проводится анализ существующих определений понятия *statecraft*, которое также иллюстрируется посредством описания нескольких проблем, с которыми сталкиваются лица, принимающие решения, при выборе внешнеполитического инструментария и курса. Авторы полагают, что в основе определения понятия *statecraft* находятся типичные цели, инструменты и методы действий государства, пытающегося повлиять на другое государство без использования военно-силового принуждения. В качестве примера дилеммы, возникающей при выборе внешнеполитических ресурсов, авторы рассматривают целесообразность четкого публичного определения государством на официальном уровне своих «национальных интересов». Ясно сформулированные национальные интересы служат важным ориентиром и позволяют координировать действия внешнеполитической бюрократии, а также указывают государствам-соперникам на «красные линии». Вместе с тем, процесс определения и объяснения национальных интересов общественности приводит лиц, принимающих решения, к необходимости сложного выбора между зачастую взаимоисключающими альтернативами. Такой выбор может иметь серьезную политическую цену внутри страны. Авторы рассматривают влияние технологических инноваций на ресурсное обеспечение внешней политики крупных стран. В статье описывается разновидность «дилеммы безопасности», возникающей при выборе между немедленным использованием вновь изобретенной технологии в военных целях, с одной стороны, и воздержанием от гонки вооружений и эскалации существующих конфликтов, с другой. Авторы также анализируют преимущества и недостатки политики укрепления национальной идентичности как внешнеполитического ресурса. С одной стороны, сильная идентичность позволяет демонстрировать твердую приверженность занятым переговорным позициям. С другой же стороны, фиксированная негибкая идентичность сужает свободу манёвра государства на международной арене и часто не позволяет использовать перспективные формы и способы действий, поскольку они могут противоречить выбранной идентичности. При помощи анализа «больших данных» авторы также показывают, что российский и американский дискурсы, описывающие конкуренцию крупных держав в современном мире, имеют больше общего, чем можно было бы ожидать, имея в виду различия позиций, традиций и заявленных интересов двух стран.

Ключевые слова:

Внешняя политика; ресурсы; безопасность; Россия; Соединённые Штаты Америки; дискурс; переговоры.

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MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY COMMITMENTS IN ASYMMETRIC ALLIANCES

THE CASE OF RUSSIA

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Abstract

From the second half of the 20th century onwards, military alliances have ceased to play an essential role in ensuring the security of major powers; meanwhile, asymmetric alliances, in which a major power remains an incontestable leader surrounded by weak parties, have proliferated across international systems. The literature on this topic explains these relationships in terms of an exchange in dissimilar benefits between states, following the formula "security for autonomy". This explanation seems generally plausible, but it does not reveal specific benefits for a major power from establishing control over the weak states. This article intends to deepen our theoretical understanding of why states resort to asymmetric alliances and to test the significance of suggested propositions through an in-depth analysis of the Russian record of alliances. Russia built allied relations with several neighbors but does not extend similar mechanisms to partners in other geographic areas. This policy is puzzling, since it contrasts with the foreign policy stance that international security and global order should be built on the principle of the indivisibility of security and inclusive international institutions. In its foreign policy discourse Russia strongly condemns exclusive formats with limited membership. The study addresses two interrelated issues: first, it helps to deepen understanding of Russia's foreign policy strategy and the role of various instruments of military-political cooperation in ensuring national interests; secondly, it tests the provisions of the theory of asymmetric alliances, assessing its applicability to a hard case. The article reveals Russia's sensitivity to direct and opportunity costs as well as to potential risks of binding security commitments; however, Russia relies on asymmetric alliances with neighboring countries to reap the benefits of increasing power projection opportunities, legitimizing its foreign policy initiatives, limiting freedom of maneuver for its competitors, and

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stabilizing its strategic surrounding. The Russian experience of building relations with allies differs significantly from the American one, which, due to the scale of the US alliance network, is often presented as a model experience. Nevertheless, it is quite consistent with the provisions of the theory of asymmetric alliances.

Keywords:

military alliance; asymmetry; hegemony; Russia; USA; Collective Security Treaty Organization; NATO.

The classic definition of international alliances in political science dates back to the 1960s: it is "the promise of mutual military assistance between two or more sovereign states" [Wolfers 1968: 268]. Unlike informal coalitions, alliances presuppose the treaty-based validation of mutual commitments, serving as a significant instrument, though not the only one, of political signaling. Throughout history, such alliances have been at the center of international political interaction. One of the pioneers in the study of alliances, George Liska, argued: "It is impossible to speak of international relations without referring to alliances; the two often merge in all but name" [Liska 1962: 3]. In this respect, the management of alliance relations acts as an integral element of the art of conducting foreign policy, as described by the authors of the introductory article of this issue [Jordan, Stulberg, Troitskiy 2021a; 2021 b].

However, alliances have ceased playing a significant role in ensuring the military security of major powers since the mid-twentieth century. Alliances between equal players have virtually disappeared from international practice. On the other hand, alliances where a major power acted as the unconditional leader, providing guarantees of protection to weaker countries, became widespread[1]. Examples include NATO, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, bilateral agreements within the framework of the 'hub and spokes' system in Asia, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

The functioning of asymmetric alliances is associated with the exchange of dissimilar benefits, described by the formula "security for autonomy" [Morrow 1991]. However, it does not reveal what exactly a major power benefits from gaining influence over weak countries. As its allies only have a small material potential, this raises the question of how profitable it is to invest in their security; this question requires developing the theory of asymmetric relations.

Moreover, the proposed formula does not reveal the reasons why individual players shy away from providing commitments of a military or political character. What prevents major powers from providing security guarantees to a potentially unlimited number of weak countries? Whereas the United States has an extensive network of commitments in key regions of the world, by contrast, China and India are reluctant to promise military assistance even to those states with which they have close ties [Istomin, Baikov 2020].

Russia has built allied relations with a number of neighbors, but it does not seek to extend them to partners in other regions [Istomin, Silayev, Sushentsov 2018]. Allied relations imply the creation of exclusive clubs with high entry barriers, which contradicts Moscow's emphasis on enshrining the principle of indivisibility of security and is inconsistent with Russia's condemnation of exclusive formats with limited participation[2].

In this regard, this article seeks to explain the Russian approach to alliance commitments on the basis of the theory of asymmetric alliance. The study has two interrelated objectives: to deepen the understanding of Russian foreign

[1] Here, and further in the text, the concept of "weak countries" is used to refer to actors in international relations that have significantly less material capacity than their partners: that is, as a synonym of the concept of "small and medium countries", but not of the concept of "weak states", when the latter implies weak governance.

[2] See for example, Kontseptsija vneshnej politiki Rossijskoj Federatsii [Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation]. 30 November 2016. URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/41451 (accessed: 10.11.2020); Putin V.V. Rossija i menjayuschijsa mir (Russia and the changing world). Rossijskaya gazeta. 27.02.2015. URL: https://rg.ru/2012/02/27/putin-politika.html (accessed: 10.11.2020);

policy and the role of military and political cooperation tools in its implementation; and to substantiate the original theoretical approach by assessing its applicability to a non-trivial case.

Most studies describing causal mechanisms of asymmetric alliances are based on the American experience [Troitsky 2002; Beckley 2015; Istomin 2017]. Conceptualization of the insufficiently studied Russian record can preempt possible doubts about the generalizability of the proposed theory.

The analysis of Moscow's policy shows its sensitivity to direct and opportunity costs, as well as potential risks associated with military and political commitments. Russia is cautious about providing guarantees based on an assessment of its own interests and capabilities. Asymmetric alliances can bring benefits related to projecting power, legitimizing foreign policy initiatives, limiting competitors' freedom of movement, and stabilizing the regional environment.

The present work demonstrates that managing alliance commitments requires strategic vision and great diplomatic skills. Even under conditions of disparity, alliances do not allow a major power to achieve everything it wants, so the desire to inflate the number of allies is not always justified. In our view, alliances should not be considered as an unconditional foreign policy asset: this view is expressed, in particular, by [Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth 2013] and [Brands and Feaver 2017].

The first section of this article is devoted to the justification of differences in alliance relations between equal and asymmetric players. The theory of asymmetric alliances is outlined, characterizing the possible benefits and costs of this type of alliances for major players, as well as defining its significance in the context of other forms of dominance in international politics.

In further sections, the provisions of the theory of asymmetric alliances are compared with the experience of Russia in the 1990s-2010s. The significance of commitments to allies is demonstrated by comparing them with policies towards other partners. A wide range of sources used – including statistical information, expert publications, official documents, and news materials – allows us to reconstruct the Russian approach to alliances and ensure the validity of the conclusions.

1

Throughout history, alliances have been used extensively to balance opponents by compensating for the weaker players' lagging behind the stronger ones. Frequently, alliances exacerbated the fears of states that were not covered by mutual assurances, thus intensifying rivalries [Christensen and Snyder 1990; Vasquez 1993; Gibler and Vasquez 1998; Kenwick, Vasquez and Powers 2015][3]. Nevertheless, it was difficult for states to refrain from seeking allies for fear of vulnerability [Johnson 2017]: as a rule, a potential war concerned them less than a foreign policy defeat.

This logic does not explain why major powers participate in asymmetric alliances, with significant (manifold) disparity in material capabilities between the leader and other participants. For weaker allies, such arrangement remains an instrument to ensure security, but the leading country does not get a significant surplus to its own power from cooperation with obviously weak countries. Its main benefit lies in gaining leverage over states to which it provides military and political security guarantees [Morrow 1991]. For the major power, asymmetric alliances are a tool to formalize unequal relations. In order to explain the relevance of this tool, it is necessary to outline the reasons

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[3] For criticism of such assumptions see [Kim, Woo, Lee 2020].

for seeking influence on weak countries[4], as well as the costs of acquiring it.

The assessment of the significance of asymmetric alliances cannot ignore the existence of other mechanisms of influence weak countries. An explanation of their role should clarify the question of why major powers resort to alliances rather than other instruments. Military and political commitments should provide better and more reliable ways of influencing as compared to available alternatives.

Consequently, in general terms, the value of asymmetric alliances can be described by the formula:

$$b - c \geq \forall a > 0,$$

where b is the benefits of alliance, and c is the costs. For the maintenance of alliance relations to be meaningful, the difference between them must be not only positive, but not less than in the alternative options (a).

This article presents a detailed examination of the circumstances determining the possible values of these variables, a classification of the benefits, and a description of the costs and the alternatives that provide influence. Such an analysis will make it possible not only to justify the reasons for states to resort to asymmetric alliances, but also to outline the limits of their relevance.

2

What benefits does the major power gain from entering into an alliance with allies inferior in material terms? This question remains unanswerable if, in the spirit of neorealism, the motives of states are reduced solely to the desire to ensure their own survival[5]. Note that such a thesis does not fit well with another position neorealists hold: that major powers do not lend themselves to coercion and are therefore exceptionally resilient [Mearsheimer 2001: 83–114].

The margin of safety allows these states to take into account potential threats over a relatively long horizon[6]. The desire of states to gain long-term benefits with delayed and indirect effects on their security contributes to the transformation of international relations into a highly socialized system where actors compete not only for material resources, but also for status positions.

High status ensures that opponents will be hesitant to test the major power for strength[7]. Meanwhile, its social capital depends on how that state is perceived by other players. In a broad sense, the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu defined social capital as "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group" [Bourdieu 2002: 66]. Thus, the high status of a state implies demonstrative recognition on the part of other actors in international politics; this testifies to the presence of a hierarchy, even if informal, in the system of international relations[8].

[4] The assumption that states pursue influence for the sake of influence presents a Manichean picture of the world that is not shared by most contemporary scholars. Hans Morgenthau remains the only prominent theorist to assume that states pursue national interests, defined in terms of power [Morgenthau 1948]. On the motives of states in international politics see [Organski 1958]; [Morgenthau 1948]; [Waltz (1979]; [Lebow 2008].

[5] See e.g. [Waltz 1979].

[6] It is significant that neoclassical realists distinguish between the restrictive conditions of the state's external environment, which requires an immediate response to new challenges, and the permissive conditions when there are no existential challenges [Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell 2016: 52–55].

[7] Hans [Morgenthau 1948: 55–58] pointed out these consequences of status (or, more precisely, of foreign policy prestige). The literature on social recognition is extremely extensive. On the sources of status in the international arena, see, in particular [Major Powers and the Quest for Status 2011; Status in world politics 2014; Renshon 2017; Ward 2017; Larson, Shevchenko 2019].

[8] On the hierarchy in international relations, see [Gilpin 1981; Keal 1983; Clark 1989; Lake 2009]. Most authors agree that external recognition correlates with state resources (including military and economic), but this correlation remains flexible. A weakened power can, by inertia, maintain high social capital. Inversely, the potential of the rising giant is sometimes underestimated. For more on the under-recipients of recognition and status dependents, see [Major Powers and the Quest for Status 2011].

Table 1
Benefits of asymmetric alliances for major powers

Nature of objectives	Sphere of influence	
	A. Internal development of an ally	B. Foreign policy of an ally
1. Restrictive	prevention of the emergence of independent players	limiting the external ties of an ally
2. Transformative	strengthening the statehood of an ally	engaging an ally in support of the leader's initiative

Source: compiled by the author.

Major powers are capable of responding to more than just existential threats to their own territorial integrity and sovereignty. For example, they make efforts to prevent the cross-border "spillover of instability" from countries with weak statehood, whether in the form of terrorist activity, organized crime, mass migration, or the spread of radical ideologies.

Influencing weak countries, even if it does not increase the major power's chances of survival, gives the latter a number of advantages, which can be actualized in both domestic and foreign policy areas [Lake 2009]. The potential benefits of asymmetric alliances are summarized in Table 1.

By deterring the military and political capacity building of its allies (1A), the major power can prevent a relatively weak player from becoming an independent center of power that would compete with it in the future. In particular, the United States has kept Japan and Germany from rebuilding independent capabilities since the mid-20th century, by making commitments to these countries to protect them, whilst at the same time preventing them from acquiring nuclear weapons. This policy has been less successful in the case of France, which gained an independent deterrent capability that contributed to its opposition towards the United States[9].

The objective of preventing the transformation of an ally into an independent center of power is relevant to those states that initially have latent potential but underutilize it. Asymmetry in this case is a product of conscious efforts rather than a natural condition. It is possible when the ally is aware of the gravity of the costs and risks of building up their own military and political capabilities.

Another function of an alliance is to help strengthen the status of the major power by limiting the ties of its allies with potential competitors (1B). Such influence clearly confirms the recognition of leadership, reinforcing a major power's claim to privileged status in the international system [Istomin, Bolgova, Sokolov, Avatkov 2019].

During the Cold War, the United States restrained countries covered by Washington's guarantees from forming political and economic ties with the USSR. In the economic sphere, it formed the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls, which created barriers to technology transfer from developed capitalist countries to socialist states [Mastanduno 1988; 1992]. The United States tried to limit economic ties with Moscow when the allies themselves demonstrated an interest in establishing such relations. It sought similar loyalty from its allies in the context of intensified U.S.-Chinese rivalry in the 2010s[10].

In addition, restrictions on ties with third countries can act as an instrument of competition for economic markets. Military and political guarantees can be accompanied by expectations to redirect an ally's trade flows or to

[9] On the role of nuclear nonproliferation considerations in the development of asymmetric alliances, see [Security assurances... 2012; Frühling, O'Neil 2017; Lanoszka 2018].

[10] See, e.g., Nakashima E., Booth W. "Britain bars Huawei from its 5G wireless networks, part of a growing shift away from the Chinese tech giant". Washington Post. 15.07.2020. URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/britain-to-bar-huawei-from-its-5g-wireless-networks-part-of-a-growing-shift-away-from-the-chinese-tech-giant/2020/07/13/44f6afee-c448-11ea-b037-f9711f89ee46_story.html (accessed: 10.11.2020).

open their economy to investment [Fordham 2010; Mansfield 2015].

Along with the restrictive objectives of deterring allies' domestic potentials and international activities, major powers resort to asymmetric alliances to modify the international environment in a favorable direction. Among other things, weak states can facilitate the projection of power and control of maritime spaces (2B).

Territories of allied countries can be used to base the armed forces of the major power as entry points for repairing and resupplying warships and aircraft. The major power can resort to diplomatic support of even weak countries in order to legitimize its initiatives in the global arena, including military interventions. In a number of cases, the potential of small countries is needed to solve auxiliary military tasks and, correspondingly, to reduce the costs of the major power [Weitsman 2013; Schmitt 2018].

Illustratively, since the Cold War, the United States has used the territory of its allies to maintain the infrastructure of the global military presence under the concept of "forward deployment"[11], which expanded Washington's capabilities for the projection of military power, including during regional conflicts and intense political crises. In addition, the United States exploited practical assistance and especially the political loyalty of its allies in the 1990s and 2010s, while conducting operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yugoslavia[12].

Finally, from the perspective of a major power, one more function of asymmetric alliances can be the internal political stabilization of the allies themselves (2A) [Quirk 2017]. It is particularly relevant with regard to countries with weakened statehood that risk becoming a source of cross-border terrorist activity, the spread of radical ideologies, drug trafficking, and migration flows[13]. In contrast, stabilization of the situation can turn them into attractive economic partners.

By guaranteeing security against external threats, the major power helps a local government redirect resources toward solving domestic problems. In addition, formalized commitments can form the basis for broad economic assistance. In this regard, throughout the Cold War, domestic instability in Third World countries largely determined the logic of their rapprochement with superpowers [Barnett, Levy 1991; David 1991b]. For example, the desire to strengthen the local regime resulted in the American support for South Vietnam against the Viet Cong. Even earlier, the threat of aggravation of the internal political situation in South-East Asian states prompted the United States to initiate the Manila Pact [Buszynski 1983]. Such steps were taken as part of the global confrontation with the USSR, but were aimed more at preventing the strengthening of communist forces within the countries rather than protection against external invasion.

As illustrated above, cooperation with weak countries can bring benefits to the major power even without affecting its military and strategic capabilities. We should note that these functions are not always in equal demand, and some functions may contradict each other[14]. In this regard, major powers choose individual applications of asymmetric alliances from the menu available.

The ability of large countries to use this set of tools in foreign policy is limited by the costs associated with the development of allied relations. This factor has rarely been in the focus of the theory of asymmetric alliances [Morrow 1991]. At the same time, their impact on the

[11] U.S. military bases were stationed not only in the territory of allies, but also in other states. At the same time, as Alexander Cooley and Daniel Nexon point out, the latter's great autonomy increases the risks of losing the rights to deploy military forces. Not surprisingly, the main support bases of the global military presence are in such countries as Japan, the Republic of Korea, and NATO member states [Cooley, Nexon 2013].

[12] See, e.g., [Pechurov 2008; Istomin, Baykov 2019; Bogdanov 2019].

[13] The widespread belief in the 2000s that state weakness is the main source of threats to international security is telling in this regard (see, e.g., [Fukuyama 2004: 92]).

[14] For example, preventing the strengthening of an ally is poorly matched by assisting in the strengthening of its statehood.

policies of major powers justifies a closer examination of the emerging constraints.

3

Any kind of alliance has its costs, be it military-political cooperation between equal players or asymmetric alliance. Since the costs are not related to ensuring the state's survival but to acquiring advantages of relatively lower importance, one should expect states to be more sensitive to costs.

At the same time, asymmetric alliances make it possible – but do not make it certain – to gain the benefits described in the previous section. Empirical research demonstrated that states fulfill legally binding commitments in the majority of cases, with a probability of about 75% [Leeds, Long, Mitchell 2000].

As a rule, the benefits associated with the influence on weak countries are not contractually enshrined when establishing an alliance. Loyalty is not formalized, because such enshrining would put the sovereignty of the participants of the alliance into question. This would devalue its significance, including as an instrument of status signaling[15]. At the same time, disparity of material potentials does not always ensure the major power has the ability to impose its will on weak countries.

Differences in the level of determination or the availability of alternative ways of securing interests help them resist external pressure [Keohane, Nye 1977; David 1991a; Small states... 2003; Small states... 2012; Womack 2016; Long 2017a; 2017b]. Even when weak states agree to support the alliance leader, their cooperation is conditioned by demands that make it difficult for the major power to achieve its goals. This exacerbates the dilemma of choice between legitimization and maximizing practical returns[16].

Often states are more vulnerable to coercion by their close allies rather than by other players, since they depend on their help and have something to lose should relations deteriorate [Drezner 1999]. The possibility of withdrawing the security guarantees provided by the alliance leader acts as a trump card in his hands in the unfolding bargaining process[17]. The experience of U.S. relations with allies shows that the latter demonstrate more loyalty to Washington than other states [Istomin, Baikov 2019].

Table 2
Costs of Asymmetric Alliances

1. Direct costs	military preparedness
	access to market
	military technical assistance / development assistance
2. Opportunity costs	deteriorating relations with allies' opponents
3. Potential risks	involvement in allies' adventurism
	failed expectations effect

Source: compiled by the author.

At the same time, in asymmetric alliances, the major powers make military and political commitments that inevitably come with the costs related to fulfilling their obligations to allies. The assessment of the ratio of gains to losses cannot be formalized; as the question "How much security in exchange for how much autonomy would be a fair price in an alliance?" cannot have a straightforward answer.

The costs of maintaining asymmetric alliances include direct costs, opportunity costs, and potential risks (see Table 2). Among the former are the costs of maintaining military forces that reassure the credibility of military and political commitment, as gaining an ally's confidence in the credibility of guarantees may require building capabilities beyond the measure of military sufficiency. The U.S. faced this problem during the Cold War, as they had to deal not only with balancing the Soviet Union, but also with deploying sufficient forces in Europe to convince NATO allies that Washington would indeed come to their aid if the need arises. The allies repeatedly expressed doubts

[15] Reference can be made, in particular, to the negative impact on American attempts to legitimize the war in Iraq in 2003 of claims that members of the "coalition of the willing" entered it under American coercion, rather than out of recognition of the justifiability of their actions [Newnham 2008].

[16] See, e.g., [Weitsman 2013; Schmitt 2018].

[17] See in this respect [Johnson 2015].

about the reliability of U.S. guarantees [Trachtenberg 2012].

Another type of possible cost is associated with the granting of economic preferences to allies. For example, in the 1950s the United States, seeking to limit Japan's ties with the USSR and China, unilaterally opened access to American market for it [Cha 2016].

The opportunity costs are manifested in the complication of interaction with states that are in strained relations with one's allies. This dynamic excerbates tensions when a major power does not have disputes with a state, but its alies do have them. The setback in relations can lead to entrapment in unncessary confrontation for a major power. In other words, gaining friends in international politics leads to the emergence of new adversaries. For example, close U.S. relations with Israel and Saudi Arabia reduce the chances of a constructive dialogue with Iran. Similarly, during the Cold War, the U.S. presence in South Vietnam, the Republic of Korea, and Japan caused China's distrust after the breakdown of Sino-Soviet relations.

Finally, the potential risks of asymmetric alliances are associated with a possible increase in the adventurism of weak countries. Relying on guarantees provided by the major power, they can initiate provocations against third states. As a result, the likelihood of dragging the alliance leader into unwanted confrontations grows. In this regard, the art of managing alliance relations often lies in the ability to prevent friends from attacking adversaries [Pressman 2011]. For example, throughout the 1950s, Washington faced repeated attempts by the governments of Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan and Syngman Rhee in South Korea to draw the United States into armed confrontations with China and North Korea.

Historical experience shows that major powers usually manage to slip out of this trap, but such risks complicate the conduct of foreign policy. They increase the need to consolidate influence on allies, which requires additional expenditures [Kim 2011; Benson, Bentley, Ray 2013; Beckley 2015]. Moreover, such micromanagement can cause painful reactions on the part of weak countries.

Divergent expectations among allies regarding the nature of mutual commitments (especially informal ones) create risks of cooling relations. The lack of cooperation from allies (whether a major power or a weak country), even when there are no legally binding guarantees, generates frustration with a negative effect on the prospects of interaction[18].

The described costs, as well as the lack of firm guarantees of benefits, have a negative impact on the value of asymmetric alliances for major powers. At the same time, their willingness to use this tool in foreign policy depends not only on the ratio of gains and losses, but also on the availability or absence of alternatives that better secure the dominant influence on weak countries.

4

Military and political alliance is not the only option for consolidating hegemony. Throughout world history, states have used a wide range of mechanisms to get hold of their clients[19]. Up to the present day, a number of dependent territories have survived, constituting fragments of former vast colonial possessions: until the 1960s, this form of relations played a major role in securing political and economic dominance. Its abandonment was the result of the assertion of the norm of self-determination in the international arena [Simpson 1996].

From the second half of the twentieth century, most instruments imply the preservation of the formally legal autonomy of the participants (see Table 3). Without eliminating disparity, this approach provides weak countries with opportunities for self-organization and the assertion of their own interests, especially in comparison with the previous forms of direct influence[20]. The consolidation of asym-

[18] Awareness of such risks, in particular, influenced the behavior of states on the eve of World War I [Snyder 1997: 201–306].

[19] See, for example, the typology proposed by Michael Mann [Mann 2012: 18–20].

[20] On the other hand, in earlier eras, communication, transportation, and organizational barriers made it difficult for the colonial power to control the situation at the local level.

Table 3
Tools for Securing Political Domination

A. Military and strategic tools	B. Economic tools	C. Cultural tools
1. Colonial possession		
2.A. Protectorate	2.B. Common currency zone and financial integration	
3.A. Alliance	3.B. Trade and economic associations	3.C. Associations by language, history, religion
4.A. Military technical assistance	4.B. Promoting international development	4.C. Organizations for development of humanitarian cooperation

Source: compiled by the author.

metrical relations does not mean the obligatory subordination of the weaker party to the interests of the major power. Moreover, it does not even presuppose a clear prescription of the specific obligations of weak countries. Such consolidation clarifies the status ranking and signals the terms of subsequent bargaining with them. Alliance treaty provides a framework on the procedure for concluding further agreements[21].

Asymmetry can affect different areas of interaction to an unequal degree. In this regard, there is a functional distinction between instruments of influence: military-strategic, economic, and humanitarian[22]. Often, unrelated organizational formats are used to structure ties in separate areas. They are created both separately (for example, the transatlantic community has no economic analogue of NATO) and in parallel (for example, the CSTO and the EAEU have almost identical membership).

The instruments of economic domination ensure the influence of the major power on the weak countries by manipulating access to its market or establishing control over theirs. Mechanisms of cultural influence (such as Francophonie or the World Islamic League) form a common identity that perpetuates a positive image of the major power. It is achieved by appealing to similarities in historical experience, linguistic practices, and religious faith[23].

With all the advantages of these mechanisms, they cannot replace alliances, since they do not provide the weak country with protection from violent influence[24]. They do not function according to the formula "security for autonomy". Only instruments of military and political cooperation, such as the establishment of a protectorate and military technical assistance, can be considered a direct alternative to alliances.

The protectorate format implies a direct control over the foreign policy and security of the territorial community (see, for example, Andorra, Monaco, and Puerto Rico). Major powers have to assume serious political burden, while this format narrows down the field of maneuver and hurts the self-esteem of the junior partner[25]. This situation does not seem attractive to either side, so it seems logical that by now the protectorates has become almost as exotic as colonies.

Therefore, the only real alternative to alliances in the modern world is military and technological assistance in the form of arms supply and help with military training. This

[21] Regarding the specifics of bargaining, see [Fearon 1998].

[22] David Lake distinguished two areas of hierarchies: military-strategic and economic forms [Lake 2009], but in the context of increased interest in using cultural capital to achieve political goals, it is difficult to ignore the newly heightened interest in nonviolent and non-economic mechanisms of domination [Nye 2011].

[23] For more on the concept of cultural dominance, see [Tomlinson 1991].

[24] Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim's conclusion that security guarantees are a necessary condition for the emergence of informal empire is illustrative in this regard [Wendt, Friedheim 1995].

[25] For more on this form of predominant influence see [Lake 2009: 53–55].

format implies fewer reputational risks for the major power, as it does not provide public security guarantees [Yarhi-Milo, Lanoszka, Cooper 2016].

Meanwhile, the complexity of modern weaponry increases its applicability as a tool to secure interest. The need to maintain the supplied armaments creates a strong dependence on the major power, constraining the ability of the weak country to reorient its foreign policy [Shaw 1983; Catrina 1988]. Nonetheless, the state supplying weapons is not always able to control their use [Kinsella 1998]. For example, in the 2000s U.S. supplies to Pakistan were intended to fight Islamist movements, but Islamabad used them in confrontation with India, continuing to cooperate with a number of Islamic groups that the United States was fighting against[26].

Military technical assistance is less suited to perform a number of functions of asymmetric alliances. In the case of a partnership between the major power and a state with significant latent potential, it creates prerequisites for increasing local arms production and, consequently, for gaining foreign policy independence as a result of technology transfer – an outcome that the alliance is designed to avoid[27].

If the receiver of military technical assistance is characterized by an unstable statehood, its organizational capacity may be insufficient to assimilate it. If institutions of power are weak, no supplies will help to ensure security. Moreover, armaments may end up in the hands of those groups whose reinforcement the major power would seek to avoid.

Military technical assistance can be not only a substitute for alliance, but also a complement to it. Binding allies through arms transfers and exports of military doctrine enhances the effect of security guarantees and simultaneously increases the interoperability of forces. It makes the weak country not only a more reliable but also a more useful ally for the major power, facilitating the interaction of its units with the armed forces of the alliance leader[28].

Earlier in this article we repeatedly provided illustrations from U.S. alliance practices. This is not surprising: the U.S. experience is extensive, well-studied, and therefore actively used in works on the theory of asymmetric alliances. However, the use of the same empirical material at the stages of constructing and testing scientific explanations creates the danger of unjustified generalizations.

In order to avoid limitations of the theory based on the experience of a single state, it is worth assessing its applicability to the understanding of the allied relations of other major powers. In this regard, we present an analysis of how the described advantages and associated costs are manifested in the interaction between Russia and its allies. By placing this study on a more solid scientific ground, it will also make it possible to reconsider stereotypical assessments of the Russian experience.

5

The study of military and political alliances with Russian participation is weakened by insufficient attention to the theory of international alliances. It is negatively influenced by stereotypes relayed mainly by Western researchers, which also affects publications of domestic specialists.

Foreign specialists often claim that Russia has no true allies, and alliances under its leadership are described as a smoke screen for neo-imperialism built on direct coercion[29].

[26] Felbab-Brown V. "Why Pakistan supports terrorist groups, and why the US finds it so hard to induce change". Brookings Institute. 05.01.2018. URL: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/01/05/why-pakistan-supports-terrorist-groups-and-why-the-us-finds-it-so-hard-to-induce-change/ (accessed: 10.11.2020).

[27] See, e.g., the role of technology transfer in the development of the Chinese military-industrial complex [Meijer 2018].

[28] The problem of interoperability in collective operations was the subject of active discussion by Western military experts in the context of the experience of the 1990s and 2000s see [Hura et al. 2000; Stewart et al. 2004].

[29] See, e.g. [Allison 2004; Blank 2007; Torjesen 2008; Wilson 2017].

Such speculations presume that Moscow's alliances include only those states, which are unable to evade its pressure, but even they do not actually cooperate with Russia. The refusal of the allies to recognize the independence of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, or the reunification of Crimea is often mentioned in this context[30].

Alternatively, some experts claim that weak countries exploit Russia's desire for status recognition to receive practical concessions. In fact, they exchange attendance of events under Moscow's patronage for material assistance and political support. Thus from this perspective, Russia's benefits from alliance are illusory, and the country is doomed to "strategic loneliness" [Trenin 2009].

Given such Western criticism, Russian authors often underplay the asymmetrical nature of alliances with Russian participation. They portray such alliances in terms of the common benefits for all member states. Under this approach, it becomes inconvinient to talk about the prevailing influence and benefits for Moscow [Kulik et al. 2011; Nikitina 2011; 2012; 2017; Zakharov 2012; Malinovskij, Paschenko 2016; Golub, Golub 2018; Troitsky, Zinoviev 2018].

An exception from this mainstream view was a collective monograph on Russia's allies in the Collective Security Treaty Organization [Allies 2020]. Its authors representing the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, assessed the five member states of this association in accordance with criteria of importance and loyalty to Moscow. This analysis allowed for a more nuanced evaluation of their interaction with Russia, with an explicit focus on the benefits to the alliance leader.

For all the wealth of empirical material presented and analyzed, this collective work suffers from a lack of theoretical grounding, sketchy justification of the variables used, and an inconclusive assessment of their values in connection to the conclusions drawn. Like other publications interpreting the Russian record, it lacks a comparison of Moscow's relations with the countries to which it provides security guarantees and with other partners[31].

The following analysis is intended to close the gap in the explanation of the choice of Russian allies based on the theory of asymmetric alliances. In this case, the main object of study, as in the aforementioned publications, is relations among states sharing treaty-based security commitments. At the end of the 2010s, Russia provided legally enshrined security guarantees to seven countries: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan within the CSTO[32], as well as

[30] See, e.g. [Stronski 2020].

[31] For another example of a nuanced assessment of Russia's experience with the allies, see [Kropatcheva 2016].

[32] Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992. URL: https://odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/dogovor_o_kollektivnoy_bezopasnosti/ (accessed: 10.11.2020); Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization of October 7, 2002. URL: https://odkb-csto.org/documents/documents/ustav_organizatsii_dogovora_o_kollektivnoy_bezopasnosti_/ (accessed: 10.11.2020).

Commitments within the CSTO are duplicated in Russia's bilateral agreements with members of the multilateral alliance. See Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia. 29.08.1997. URL: http://docs.cntd.ru/document/8306454 (accessed: 10.11.2020); Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan. 25.05.1992. URL: http://docs.cntd.ru/document/901764295 (accessed: 10.11.2020); Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. 10.06.1992. URL: http://docs.cntd.ru/document/901728231 (accessed: 10.11.2020); Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan. 25.05.1993. URL: http://docs.cntd.ru/document/1902068 (accessed: 10.11.2020); Charter of the Union of Belarus and Russia. 23.05.1997. URL: http://docs.cntd.ru/document/9043017 (accessed: 10.11.2020).

It is indicative that during the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh in the fall of 2020, the Russian leadership confirmed its commitment to help Armenia by referring to the CSTO, rather than to the bilateral agreement (See "Putin zajavil o gotovnosti RF ispolniat' sojuznicheskije ob'azatelstva pered Armeniej [Putin said that Russia is ready to fulfill its allied obligations to Armenia]". Interfax 07.10.2020. URL: https://www.interfax.ru/russia/730360 (accessed: 10.11.2020).

Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the basis of bilateral treaties[33].

The last two states have limited international recognition and are not members of the United Nations. Their *de facto* status is closer to that of protectorates. Their low potential (in comparison, with the CSTO member states) determines their close dependence on Russia in the political, economic, and military fields[34].

In reproaching Moscow for its inability to keep even close states under its patronage, including in the military and political alliance, its critics refer to the example of Uzbekistan, which joined the CSTO in 2006 and left the organization in 2012[35]. At the same time, Russia has been in no hurry to formalize its alliance with a fairly wide range of partners to which it provides considerable assistance – Venezuela, Serbia and Syria – although the idea of a legally binding alliance with Moscow is periodically circulating in the political circles of those states[36]. Russia actually became the main guarantor of security for Syria in the 2010s by strengthening the government's position in the fight against hostile groups, but this role has not been formalized.

While actively using other instruments, including military technical assistance, Russia does not bind itself legally to assistance outside its immediate neighborhood[37]. Even after expanding the geography of its military presence, Moscow continues to use alliances to formalize privileged relations exclusively in interaction with countries of the post-Soviet area.

In alliances with Russian participation, security guarantees are complemented by extensive military technical armed assistance. Moreover, one of the advantages of CSTO membership is Moscow's commitment to sell weapons to allies at domestic Russian prices, which are cheaper than in other states [Khetagurov 2017]. Russia's contribution to the training of commanding officers and regular joint exercises ensure a high level of interoperability with the allies.

Thereby, having formed a relatively small network of military and political commitments, Russia did not seek to expand it beyond its geographic neighborhood throughout the 2010s, even in cases where there were prerequisites for such expansion. This demonstrates Moscow's sensitivity to the costs associated with the provision of security guarantees that it would later be unable or unwilling to fulfill[38].

At the same time, its continued willingness to invest in the CSTO requires explanation. It has already been noted in the literature that Moscow values the loyalty of the member states of this association [Allies 2020]. This claim is consistent with the theory of asymmetric alliances. In the context of the constructed typology of functions, the next section aims to provide thorough assessment of the specific benefits derived by Russia from allied relations.

This analysis is complicated by the intertwining of different forms of influence in Moscow's interactions with the countries in question. Russia's CSTO allies are simultaneously its partners in the Eurasian Economic Union, the Commonwealth of Independent

[33] The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Abkhazia. 17 September 2018. URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/200 (accessed: 10.11.2020); The Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the Republic of South Ossetia. 17 September 2018. URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/199 (accessed: 10.11.2020).

[34] For a discussion of determining the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in relation to the existing typological models, see [Kazin 2009].

[35] Saipov Z.S. "Factors that Influenced Uzbekistan's Decision to Pull out of the CSTO: The View from Tashkent". Eurasia Daily Monitor. 2012. Vol. 9. No. 136.

[36] See, e.g., Laru D. "Belgrad prizvali k ODKB (Belgrade called to CSTO)". Izvestia. April 3, 2018. URL: https://iz.ru/726511/dmitrii-laru/belgrad-prizvali-k-odkb (accessed: 10.11.2020).

[37] For a comparison of allied commitments and Russia's military technical assistance, see [Fomin et al. 2019].

[38] It is noteworthy in this regard that, despite its military operation since 2015 and intensive cooperation with Damascus, Moscow did not conclude a bilateral alliance with Syria in order to preserve the ability to withdraw support at any time.

Table 4
Material Potential of CSTO Member States

	Population (2019)		Gross domestic product (2019)		Defense expenditures (2019)	
	mln people	% of total CSTO	bln dollars	% of total CSTO	mln dollars	% of total CSTO
Armenia	3.0	1.6%	13.7	0.7%	673.3	1.0%
Belarus	9.5	5.0%	63.1	3.2%	780.1	1.1%
Kazakhstan	18.5	9.7%	180.2	9.1%	1766.4	2.6%
Kirghizia	6.5	3.4%	8.5	0.4%	124.1	0.2%
Russia	144.4	76.0%	1,699.9	86.1%	65,102.6	95.0%
Tajikistan	8.1	4.3%	8.1	0.4%	95.8*	0.1%

* Year 2015.

Source: compiled by the author with data of the World Bank and the Stockholm Peace Research Institute for 2019 (World Development Index DataBank. URL: https://data.worldbank.org/; SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. URL: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex).

States, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization[39]. The beneficiaries of Russia's security guarantees are dependent on its market and investments and find themselves within its socio-cultural influence.

Therefore, it is sometimes difficult to measure the contribution of alliance relations to Moscow's influence. Nevertheless, the following analysis confirms that asymmetric alliances act as at least one channel for securing dominance.

The fact that security guarantees preceded the intensification of regional integration processes testifies in favor of their importance for the consolidation of Russian leadership. It may point to the "spillover effect" of dependence from the military-strategic field to other areas[40]. In some cases (in particular, Armenia's accession to the EAEU), there is a direct link between military and political commitments and Moscow's influence on the policies of its allies.

6

A comparison of the material potentials of Russia and its allies clearly shows a striking disparity between them. Moscow has an overwhelming predominance in terms of population, economy, and military strength (see Table 4). The existing gap gives every reason to characterize the CSTO as an asymmetric alliance. Therefore, the provisions presented in the theoretical sections of this article should be applicable to this association.

The scale of disparity makes the tasks of preventing the emergence of competing players irrelevant. Even the largest CSTO member states after Russia – Belarus and Kazakhstan – have no prerequisites for becoming peer competitors. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, they voluntarily renounced the nuclear arsenals deployed on their territories and do not intend to have any independent deterrence capability.

Henceforth, unlike Washington, Moscow does not have allies akin to Germany or Japan, which have to be kept from becoming independent centers of power. A number of Russian privileged partners, including China, India, Turkey, and Iran, have either achieved recognition as comparable international political powers or claim such a status. Nevertheless, Moscow has not considered the option of providing security guarantees as a means of curbing allies' strategic autonomy[41].

In any case, such attempts would have no chance of success, both because of Russia's

[39] Armenia and Belarus are not members of the SCO, but Minsk is part of the Union State with the Russian Federation.

[40] This effect is described in [Mastanduno 2009].

[41] On the possibility of a military-political alliance between Russia and China, see [Kireeva 2019; Lukin, Kashin 2019].

limited capabilities and because of the foreign policy ambitions of countries that are very sensitive about their own positioning in the global arena [Neumann 2008; Clunan 2009; Forsberg, Heller, Wolf 2014; Larson, Shevchenko 2014][42]. At the same time, their rise throughout the 2000s and 2010s did not contradict Moscow's strategic priorities, which sought to weaken American hegemony by establishing a polycentric configuration of the international system.

Russia did not engage many of its allies in actions involving the use of force: only once in the 1990s, the armed forces of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan took part in a CIS peacekeeping operation in Tajikistan. The allies did not join similar missions in other conflicts in the post-Soviet countries (although the CSTO worked out procedures for the formation of collective forces) [Nikitina 2014; Godovannyj 2019]. Moscow did not expect military assistance from the CSTO and its individual members in Syria either[43].

Russia also relies on allies to meet projection-of-power challenges, as there are Russian military facilities on the territory of all CSTO member states. There are bases in Abkhazia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and South Ossetia, expanding Moscow's military presence in the South Caucuses and Central Asia. In the mid-2000s, following Uzbekistan's accession to the CSTO, the deployment of Russian military facilities in that country was discussed[44].

Minsk's regular refusals to deploy Russian military forces on its territory, which has caused disagreements in its relations with Moscow, became an anomaly in this context[45]. This is further evidence that even in conditions of disparity, heavy reliance does not lead to complete subordination and the major power has to reckon with the policies of its allies.

Meanwhile, both Belarus and other CSTO member states demonstrate a high level of political support to Russia at international bodies. As already noted, Russia's allies did not recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. They also avoided supporting Moscow on the issue of the reunification of the Crimea and in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. At the same time, they did not join the ranks of critics on these topics either[46]. In general, CSTO member states are more likely than other countries to support Russia in international organizations, including the UN General Assembly (see Figure 1)[47].

In addition, allied relations enable Russia to significantly limit ties between CSTO member states and those Western countries with which Moscow has had tensions, and this reinforces Russia's status ambitions[48].

The example of Armenia is illustrative in this regard. Since the 1990s, Yerevan has been actively cooperating with NATO, taking part in NATO exercises and seeking its assistance in reforming the armed forces. Starting from 2010, the Armenian contingent was present in Afghanistan as part of the International

[42] Iran's painful reaction to the disclosure of information about the presence of Russian air and space forces on its territory in 2016 is illustrative. See Kuprijanov A. "Neletnaja pogoda (Nonflying weather)". Lenta.ru. 24 August 2016. URL: https://lenta.ru/articles/2016/08/24/hamadan/ (accessed: 10.11.2020).

[43] Chernenko E. "ODKB ukrepit mir slovom [The CSTO will strengthen peace with words]". Kommersantъ. 18.07.2017. URL: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3360030 (accessed: 10.11.2020).

[44] Solovjov V, Safronov I, Tsuverink T. "Smena karaulov [Changing of the guards]". Kommersantъ. 24.11.2005. URL: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/629202 (accessed: 10.11.2020).

[45] Karmazin I. "Beorusskij front: pochemu Lukashenko otkazals'a on voennoj bazy Rossii [Belarusian front: why Lukashenko refused a Russian military base]". Izvestia. 3 October 2019. URL: https://iz.ru/927892/igor-karmazin/belorusskii-front-pochemu-lukashenko-otkazalsia-ot-voennoi-bazy-rossii (accessed: 10.11.2020).

[46] In particular, they voted against or abstained during the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262 on Crimea in 2014 (the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in support of the territorial integrity of Ukraine). TASS. March 27, 2014. URL: https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1079720 (accessed: 10.11.2020)).

[47] Similar results are presented in [Fomin et al. 2019].

[48] Regarding Russia's desire to secure recognition of its leading status in the post-Soviet space, see [Troitskiy 2017].

Fig. 1
Degree of convergence between the positions of Russia and other states when voting on resolutions at the UN General Assembly



Source: compiled by the author on the basis of UN data, with the methodology described in [Istomin 2018].

Security Assistance Force[49]. Despite all this, in 2013 Armenia renounced the Association Agreement with the EU and joined the Eurasian Economic Union. This decision was crucial for Moscow, because its opposition to signing similar documents by Moldova and Ukraine (which are not Russian allies) had been ignored. Armenia's choice in favor of the EAEU was driven not so much by economic motives as by the strategic importance of Russian security guarantees [Ghazaryan and Delcour 2017; Ter-Matevosyan 2017].

Finally, asymmetric alliances play an important role in Russia's policy of strengthening the statehood of its neighboring countries, in such a way preventing threats of cross-border transfer of instability. This objective is particularly relevant in cooperation with Russia's Central Asian allies: Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan [Basharat'yan 2012; Gusev 2018]. Moscow supports the arming and training of military personnel, as well as border control and law enforcement services of these states. Within the CSTO, there is cooperation on counter-terrorism and counter-extremist issues [Shchekoldina 2019]. Regular "Kanal" (*Channel*) and "Nelegal" (*Illegal*) operations are conducted to track drug trafficking and illegal migration. For a long time, Russian forces have been directly involved in the protection of Tajikistan's borders.

Military-technical assistance to allies complements socio-economic assistance. Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have traditionally been among the main recipients of Russian official development assistance [Zaitsev and Knobel 2019]. Although assistance is provided without a direct link to allied relations, it is an evidence of the coherence of efforts to strengthen the statehood of these countries through various channels.

From Moscow's point of view, assisting its allies in strengthening their statehood is determined by the risks posed by instability in their regions. Since the 2000s, Central Asia has been the main source of migrants to Russia, who become a cause of social tension. Therefore, management of migration flows falls within the

[49] "Armenija prodolzhaet uchastie v missii NATO "Reshitel'naja podderzhka" [Armenia to Continue Participation in NATO Resolute Support Mission]." TASS. December 20, 2018. URL: https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/5934903 (accessed: 10.11.2020).

scope of foreign policy objectives [Ryazantsev and Pis'mennaya 2019].

In addition, drug trafficking from Afghanistan pass through the countries of the region, with a significant increase in the 2000s and 2010s. Finally, people originating from Central Asia are increasingly involved in terrorist activities in Russia[50]. Thus, Moscow's price of maintaining allied relations can be seen as an investment in its own security.

As a result, Russia's foreign policy demonstrates three of the four functions of asymmetric alliances. The experience of Russia's relations with allies does not contradict the theoretical provisions: in exchange for security guarantees, it receives influence on the allies to exploit the benefits associated with the projection of force, legitimization of foreign policy initiatives, limiting the freedom of maneuver of competitors, and stabilization of the regional environment.

Russia did not always obtain concessions from its allies, but it has gained sustainable benefits at limited direct costs, mainly expressed in favorable terms for arms transfers. Moreover, Moscow has so far avoided serious opportunity costs, despite its allies' involvement in acute confrontations with third countries.

More specifically, whereas Armenia is in a protracted conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, Moscow maintains generally constructive relations with Baku. Similarly, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, contradictions persisted between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Tashkent remained an inconsistent partner for Russia during this period. The difficulties in interaction with this country were mainly due to its desire to diversify relations. Uzbekistan's distancing from Moscow was explained primarily by its reorientation toward deepening ties with other major players (the United States, the European Union, and China), rather than by transferring its disagreements with Central Asian states over to Russia [Troitsky 2008; Meshcheryakov 2014; Plotnikov 2015].

In the context of relatively limited direct and opportunity costs, Russia has repeatedly faced the risks posed by asymmetric alliances. For example, the internal political crisis in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, triggered by ethnic clashes, prompted the country's interim government to ask Moscow to deploy CSTO peacekeepers. Russia faced the possibility of unwanted involvement in the internal conflict, and a refusal would have damaged the reputation of the alliance it led. It called into question the credibility of informal guarantees even though in this instance Russian would not violate it legal obligations to defend against armed attack. As a result, Russia refrained from sending its own forces.

Russia pursued a similar strategy in its relations with Armenia. Yerevan was displeased, with Russian arms deliveries to Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, Moscow refused to extend security guarantees to Nagorno-Karabakh, based on a literal reading of legally enshrined obligations[51].

The aforementioned examples are not sufficient for making extensive generalizations, but they do show that Russia, in response to the risks posed by its alliances, tends to shy away from an extended interpretation of promises, even when this is associated with reputational losses. At the same time, it is comfortable with its allies' lack of loyalty, at least as long as Moscow does not have concerns that the allies are attempting a strategic reorientation.

The Russian record of alliance relations differs significantly from the American experience, which is often presented in the literature as an exemplary model. Still, it is consistent with the theory of asymmetric alliances. The limited range of states to which Moscow ex-

[50] For example, immigrants from this region were convicted of preparing and carrying out a terrorist attack in St. Petersburg in 2017.

[51] The importance of Russian guarantees for Armenia and at the same time their limits were clearly demonstrated by the armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh in the fall of 2020. Moscow confirmed that it would fulfill its obligations to protect the internationally recognized territory of Armenia, which do not apply to Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent regions of Azerbaijan. The desire of Azerbaijani forces during the conflict not to allow their actions to cause Russian military intervention is quite indicative.

tends security guarantees, even compared to the number of countries with which it cooperates, reveals sensitivity to the costs of asymmetric alliances.

Russia's reliance on allies in its immediate neighborhood confirms the need for asymmetric alliances as a tool to consolidate influence. Russia's willingness to resort to it is all the more revealing, because joining exclusive military and political alliances is at odds with its normative position – the assertion that international security is best promoted by inclusive formats that reflect the principle of the indivisibility of security[52].

Such a divergence of the value system and practice increases the relevance of the case study for substantiating of the theory of asymmetric alliances. A solid evidence base is ensured by the relevance of the specific empirical experience for the provisions of this theory. It can be argued that the analysis of Russian policy undertaken in this work ensures better validation of the theory as compared to the studies of U.S. alliances.

* * *

The purpose of this article was to expand the theoretical understanding of asymmetric alliances and to deepen the understanding of Russian foreign policy. The relevance of the analysis undertaken is determined by the fact that the traditional definition of "alliance" as a mechanism for aggregation of states' potentials for joint balancing against adversaries is not applicable to a large number of modern cases of military and political cooperation.

Meanwhile, the major powers regularly provide military and political commitments to weak countries as part of the "security for autonomy" formula. Such asymmetric alliances make it possible to consolidate influence on allies, ensuring the prevention of their transformation into independent players, limiting their political and economic relations with their opponents, involving them in maintaining the leader's initiatives, and preventing the spread of instability across borders.

Allied relations do not guarantee these advantages, but they increase the likelihood of gaining them by reinforcing the dependence of weak countries on large ones. At the same time, they entail direct and indirect costs of protecting allies, opportunity costs related to jeopardizing relations with third countries, and the risks of getting involved in unnecessary conflicts or frustration due to inflated expectations. Thus, the functional niche that asymmetric alliances occupy cannot be comfortably filled with other instruments. For example, arms supplies, which often acts as a supplement to security guarantees, is unlikely to become the full equivalent.

Moscow's policy with regard to alliances corresponds to the expectations derived from the theory of asymmetric alliances. Russia has not always succeeded in attracting states of interest into alliance relations. At the same time, it does not seek to expand the network of military and political commitments, even in those cases where there are prerequisites for this. Currently, Russia provides guarantees to seven countries in its immediate vicinity.

Moscow's ambitions are limited by its unwillingness to make commitments it may later be unwilling or unable to fulfill. When it provides security guarantees, it benefits from ex-

[52] Meanwhile, in its criticism of NATO, Moscow appeals to the principle of the indivisibility of security, pointing out the incompatibility of the Alliance's expansion as well as its actions in Central and Eastern Europe. For example: "In the late 1990s, the leaders of Europe, the United States, and Canada solemnly proclaimed the principle of the indivisibility of security, declaring that security can only be common, only equal, and only indivisible, so that no one would take steps that would compromise the security of others. This is written on paper, in the documents of OSCE summits and in the documents of NATO-Russia Council summits. This does not imply the preservation of military-political blocs, but the development of a common legal framework that would equalize all those who are in the Euro-Atlantic space. The admission of Montenegro to NATO, as well as the "waves" of Alliance expansion that took place in the last 15 years, show that NATO does not want common equal security" (Lavrov, S.V. "Speech and answers to questions by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal State University, Kaliningrad, June 6, 2017." URL: https://www.mid.ru/vistupleniya_ministra/-/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/2777284 (accessed: 10.11.2020)).

panding the geography of power projection, legitimizing regional leadership, limiting the freedom of maneuver of Western opponents, and stabilizing the post-Soviet environment.

The case of Russia contributes to the justification of the theory of asymmetric alliances. Examples from the record of other major powers, including rising centers of power, can further support this theory. First of all, it is worth paying attention to cases where military and political cooperation is carried out in the absence of other forms of consolidation of the dominant influence. Such an analysis will give a more clearly defined characterization of the degree of dependence caused by asymmetric alliances.

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УПРАВЛЕНИЕ ОБЯЗАТЕЛЬСТВАМИ В АСИММЕТРИЧНЫХ АЛЬЯНСАХ

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Резюме

В международной политике широко распространены асимметричные альянсы, в которых крупная держава сотрудничает с заведомо уступающими ей по силе союзниками. Возникновение такого рода объединений в литературе объясняют формулой «гарантии безопасности за внешнеполитическую автономию», которая, однако, не раскрывает, в чём именно заключается выгода крупной державы от влияния на заведомо слабые страны. Настоящая статья призвана развить теоретические представления по этому вопросу и проверить их обоснованность на основе анализа российского опыта. Исследование решает две взаимосвязанные задачи. *Во-первых*, оно призвано углубить понимание российской внешнеполитической стратегии и роли различных инструментов военно-политического сотрудничества в обеспечении национальных интересов. *Во-вторых*, оно позволяет проверить положения теории асимметричных альянсов, оценив их применимость к трудному для объяснения случаю.

Россия приняла на себя военно-политические обязательства в отношении ряда соседних государств на основе двусторонних соглашений и Договора о коллективной безопасности. На начало 2020-х годов она предоставляет гарантии защиты на случай нападения Абхазии, Армении, Белоруссии, Казахстану, Киргизии, Таджикистану и Южной Осетии. Таким образом, Москва полагается на асимметричные альянсы в отношениях с рядом близлежащих стран для извлечения преимуществ, связанных с проецированием силы, легитимацией её внешнеполитических инициатив, ограничением свободы манёвра конкурентов, а также стабилизацией собственного окружения. При этом она не стремится вступать в аналогичные альянсы с географически удалёнными партнёрами. Такая сдержанность сохраняется даже в отношении стран, с которыми Москва выстраивает привилегированное сотрудничество. Политика России свидетельствует о её высокой чувствительности к прямым расходам, вероятной упущенной выгоде и потенциальным рискам предоставления военно-политических обязательств. Хотя российский опыт выстраивания отношений с союзниками существенно отличается от американского, который в литературе нередко рассматривается в качестве модельного, тем не менее он подтверждает положения теории асимметричных альянсов.

Ключевые слова:

военно-политический союз; асимметричный альянс; гегемония; Россия; США; НАТО; ОДКБ; военно-техническое сотрудничество; статус; внутриполитическая нестабильность.

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THE ENERGY TOOLKIT OF STATECRAFT
THE CASES OF RUSSIA AND THE USA

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Abstract

While employing their energy potentials for advancing their foreign policy interests, Russia and the USA apply a variety of political tools and practices that can be classified as "positive" or "negative"; regulating energy markets, or reinforcing one's own potential. The author argues that in both cases, the application of energy-related statecraft is largely related either to energy security or to advancing ideologically inspired political interests. These two kinds of incentives can either work together or conflict each other.

To pursue their relevant interests, both Russia and the USA have distinctive potentials, resources, and instruments that to a large extent were developed under the influence of geopolitical and economic shocks: the dramatic growth of global oil prices in the 1970s for the USA, and the centrifugal post-Soviet geopolitical processes in the 1990s for Russia. As a negative tool, the USA most often uses various kinds of sanctions to target their opponent's energy sectors, while the strongest Russian weapon is energy supply restrictions. To safeguard one's own energy security and solidify their political influences, both states manage bilateral complementary "producer–consumer" relations, while to stabilize the global oil price, both states participate in international energy alliances. For instrumental purposes, both states also take advantage of purposeful or spontaneous transformations of their energy sectors (e.g. consolidation of the Russian energy sector and the U.S. 'shale revolution') for foreign policy purposes.

In most cases, the effectiveness of applying statecraft tools for advancing energy-related interests proved to be limited. Those sanctions, and other ways of pressure that targeted opponents' energy sectors (especially if applied unilaterally), rarely led themselves to desirable alterations in those opponents' policies. The results of energy alliances building also have proved to be limited both for Russia and for the USA as those alliances do not secure full-fledged control over global oil prices and are not solid or representative enough.

Keywords:

statecraft, foreign policy tools, energy security, pipeline politics, Russia, USA.

This article is a result of a collaborative research project on the modern trends in the evolution of statecraft by the MGIMO School of Government and International Affairs and the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. A Russian version of this article is published in the second part of this special issue of International Trends. The Russian and English versions are not identical. The key term statecraft cannot be translated directly into Russian, that is why the Russian articles in this special issue use a variety of longer definitions of statecraft depending on the context. For a discussion of English and Russian definitions see the introductory article in this volume.

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Russia and the United States are energy superpowers; they are among the global leaders in oil and gas production. Both countries have the most powerful political and military capabilities that can be deployed, if necessary, to defend their interests in the energy sphere. For both countries, the importance of the energy factor goes far beyond economics, often acquiring a political dimension as a challenge to national security, a means of influencing the opponent, or a basis for political blockage.

What tools and techniques do Russia and the United States use to solve politically charged energy problems? How effective are these tools and techniques? What kind of political agenda underlies them? Under what conditions do respective practices begin to take hold in the political repertoire of the two countries?

The volume of both Russian and international publications on international policy aspects of energy issues is quite substantial. Russian works consider, for example, problems of energy security [Kaveshnikov 2015], trends of politicizing the energy sector on a global scale [Borovskii 2008], the role of individual energy resources (primarily oil) in world politics [Simoniia 2005], and trends of energy issues research within the theory of international relations [Borovskii and Trachuk 2015], amongst others. At the same time, the techniques and practices used by individual states to tackle political problems in the energy sphere have not yet received sufficient attention, and the present paper may contribute to filling this gap.

This article consists of four sections. The first section attempts to conceptualize the energy toolkit used by the states in the foreign policy context. The second section compares some of the key parameters of the energy potentials of Russia and the United States. The third and fourth sections examine the tools used by Russia and the United States: "negative" and "positive" tools of influence on partners and opponents, practices of influence on the global energy market, and the instrumental use of transformations of their own energy sectors.

1

Sometimes political elites respond to challenges in accordance with established patterns, including certain patterns of behavior with the use of an established set of tools and techniques [see for example: Jordan et al. 2021a; 2021b, Goddaed et al. 2019; James 2016]. The study of this phenomenon, denoted in the English-language tradition by the term *statecraft*, is important for analyzing recurrent patterns and comparing the political courses of individual states. In the energy sphere, the use of foreign policy tools is associated mainly with two overlapping groups of challenges: the first of them is related to the energy security agenda, and the second one to using energy potential for political purposes not directly related to economic considerations.

Energy security is usually focused not on all energy resources, but only on those that are critical for a given state. Oil and gas are the most important ones: without the former, the transport sector cannot function properly while the latter, in many cases, is crucial for generation of electricity, the functioning of a number of industries, and providing heating. In the case of oil, pricing conditions and supply opportunities are highly flexible: prices are determined by the global market and cost-effective supplies can be provided by various means (e.g., tankers, oil pipelines, railroads). Gas prices are determined at the regional level and, as a rule, depend on the agreement of consumers with a rather narrow circle of suppliers. Cost-effective methods of transportation are limited to gas pipelines and the (usually) more expensive delivery of liquefied natural gas (LNG).

The meaning of the national energy security concept is vague because the respective interests of various players are specific. There is a significant difference between the interests of *prominent* net producers and net exporters of critical energy resources (i.e., states that produce and export more than they consume and import) and *obvious* net consumers and net importers of such resources. Countries that are actively involved in the transit of energy resources have a specific interest in receiving transit revenues [Grigas 2017].

For prominent net importers of critically important energy resources, the key interest of energy security is to ensure reliable access to such resources at affordable prices [Parag 2014]. Disruptions in access or spiraling prices can have catastrophic consequences for the importing country's economy. In order to prevent such problems, importing countries are often willing to take extraordinary measures. Depending on the resources at their disposal, these measures can range from changing the energy mix to severe measures targeting those actors who impede uninterrupted access. For large net exporters, the sale of raw materials tends to be one of their most important sources of income, the loss of which can have severe economic, social, and political consequences. Therefore, the significant energy security interests of net exporters are to ensure stable and uninterrupted sales at fair prices. Furthermore, they are interested in the stability and efficiency of production and transportation of their energy resources, which makes it important to have access to investment, cutting-edge technologies, means and routes of transportation, and a favorable legal regime regulating the supply conditions[1].

This does not mean that the interests of producers, consumers, and transit countries are antagonistic. There are interdependencies between these groups of countries, and it is a matter of reaching a mutually acceptable balance of interests. Nevertheless, finding a general long-term compromise is a difficult challenge, not only because of the numerous contradictions between representatives of different groups, but also because of the often fierce competition between representatives of the same group.

Energy-related foreign policy tools can also be used to pursue political goals that go beyond economic considerations, such as punishing "wrong" policies or engaging a partner in ideological alliances. The pursuit of these types of political goals may run counter to economic interests of profit or energy security.

Foreign policy tools associated with the energy sphere are diverse, and the author does not claim to make an exhaustive analysis of these tools. A large part of such instruments fit into the framework used to conceptualize the *statecraft* phenomenon, which divides these tools into "positive" and "negative" ones ("stick" and "carrot") [see, for example, Lalbahadur 2016]. The "positive" tools include, for example, forming alliances and organizing joint projects, while the "negative" tools include sanctions, embargoes, boycotts, price wars, and political and coercive pressure.

The problem, however, is that a number of instruments do not appropriately fit into this dichotomy. In particular, attempts by states to influence global oil prices and strengthen one's potential as an energy power are not always intended to reward or punish partners or opponents. Practices such as seeking compromise, signing cooperation agreements, or acquiring assets can involve both positive and negative incentives. For the convenience of the analysis, this article does distinguish between positive and negative tools, with an understanding of conventionality of this framework, but this classification is supplemented by instruments of influence on global market prices that go beyond the dichotomy, as well as the instrumental use of the internal transformations of one's own national energy sector.

2

This article examines the application of energy-related tools in the foreign policy context emphasizing the cases from Russia and the United States. This choice of these two cases is justified by, on the one hand, their high significance (as already noted, both countries are energy superpowers), and, on the other hand, contrasting differences of some imterests and potentials of the two states.

While there are a number of similarities, the energy interests of Russia and the United States and the resources at their disposal vary considerably. Russia is one of the largest net producers

[1] These objectives are reflected, e.g., in the Energy Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation of 13.05.2019, see http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/rsskwUHzl25X6lijBy20Doj88faOQLN4.pdf (accessed: 02.09.2020).

and net exporters of energy in the world (in 2020, production and exports amounted to 512.7 and 232.5 million tons, respectively)[2]. The United States, being one of the largest global oil producers (in 2018, U.S. oil production reached 742 million tons, while Russia's was 560 million tons)[3], was among net exporters until 1949[4] (however, even after 1949 (until the 1970s), a significant share of oil production abroad was controlled by American companies). From 1973 to the 2010s, the United States was the most influential net oil importer on a global scale, and now this state occupies an intermediate position between exporters and importers. Although the "shale revolution" enabled the United States to overcome its dependence on oil imports and even become a net exporter from the fall of 2020 (with surplus of 651 barrels, or 89 tons per day)[5], the U.S. economy remains heavily dependent on price fluctuations in the global market. For these reasons, U.S. energy security interests remain largely consumer-driven. At the same time, due to the same "shale revolution," the United States is increasingly asserting itself as one of the world's largest exporters of natural gas, using political leverage to promote its product.

The nature of the political tools and techniques used by the Russian Federation and the United States is largely determined by the organizational specificities of the national energy sectors. Russia, at least since the mid-2000s, has been characterized by "resource nationalism" – ensuring the dominant position of national companies over foreign ones in combination with the consolidation of major assets under state control. The U.S. energy sector is characterized by "resource liberalism"[6] with a leading role played by the private sector, the long tradition of anti-trust policies, and the absence of rigid deterrence of foreign presence in the energy sector.

Notwithstanding the noticeably longer pipeline system in the United States (2,225,000 km compared to Russia's 260,000 km)[7], the U.S. system primarily serves the purpose of domestic oil and gas distribution and plays a limited foreign economic role. Russia, on the other hand, with the world's most developed system of export pipelines, is undoubtedly the key player in Eurasian "pipeline diplomacy". Given these circumstances, Russia has a greater capacity than the United States to use its infrastructure to transport critical energy resources, although the United States has prospects of coming forward to the top position in terms of the number of LNG export terminals.

The history of interaction between Russia/USSR and the United States in the energy sphere includes examples of both cooperation and conflict. For instance, during World War II, the United States – as the largest net exporter of oil and petroleum products – played an important role in supplying the USSR with aviation gasoline and equipment for its production as part of supplies under the Lend-Lease program. In the 1970s, against the backdrop of the sharp increase in oil prices caused by OPEC policy and the transformation of the United States into an evident net

[2] Oil production in Russia decreased to 512.7 million tons in 2020. This is the minimum in 10 years. TASS. January 2, 2021, https://tass.ru/ekonomika/10398187#:~:text=%D0%AD%D0%BA%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%82%20%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%84%D1%82%D0%B8%20%D0%B8%D0%B7%20%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B8%20%D0%B2,%D0%B4%D0%BE%2018%2C58%20%D0%BC%D0%BB%D0%BD%20%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BD (accessed: 25.03.2021).

[3] Key World Energy Statistics 2020. IEA. August 2020, https://www.iea.org/reports/key-world-energy-statistics-2020 (accessed: 25.03.2021).

[4] Cunningham S. "U.S. Posts First Month in 70 Years as a Net Petroleum Exporter." Bloomberg. 29.11.2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-29/u-s-posts-first-month-in-70-years-as-a-net-petroleum-exporter (accessed: 25.03.2021).

[5] Petroleum and other liquids. *U.S. Energy Information Administration*, https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=mttntus2&f=m (accessed: 25.03.2021).

[6] For discussion of the terms "resource nationalism" and "resource liberalism," see, e.g. [Wilson 2021].

[7] Top 20 Countries By Length Of Pipeline. WorldAtlas, https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/top-20-countries-by-length-of-pipeline.html (accessed: 25.03.2021).

importer of oil, the USSR was considered by the United States to be a potential partner that could influence the reduction of prices in the global oil market [Yergin 1992: 643–644].

In the post-Soviet period, a number of American companies (primarily *ExxonMobil, Chevron*, and *ConocoPhillips*) took part in oil and gas projects on the territory of Russia, while Russian companies (for example, *Lukoil*) took part in projects in the United States. This kind of cooperation was not completely phased out in the second half of the 2010s, despite the unfavorable political environment. The difficult political environment did not prevent Russia from remaining one of the main suppliers of oil and petroleum products to the United States: at the end of 2019, it was in third place after Canada and Saudi Arabia[8].

At the same time, relations between Russia and the United States in the energy sphere periodically are aggravated by economic and geopolitical competition: such competition took place back in the pre-revolutionary period (competition in the global market from the Nobel brothers and Rockefeller), continued in the Soviet period (with the USSR, until the 1970s, being perceived as a price "spoiler" for American oil companies that dominated the world market [Yergin 1992: 515]), acquired a geopolitical character in the 1990s (the United States and American companies lobbied for the construction of oil pipelines from the post-Soviet states to the European Union, bypassing Russian territory), and took the form of competition for gas markets combined with elements of a price war in the global oil market after the American shale revolution. Some of these tensions have had a significant impact on the development of political tools that will be discussed in this paper.

3

In the energy sphere, states have a wide arsenal of "negative" tools to coerce and harm their opponents, including aggressive competition, economic blackmail, supply interruptions, sanctions, and even coups and interventions.

Interventions and military coups to assert control over critical energy resources in other countries are the most radical response to the challenges of energy security. However, stable and long-term control over energy resources in such cases is by no means guaranteed (resistance may arise in the occupied territories), and there are high risks of being sanctioned for flagrant violations of international law, provoking a sharp deterioration of one's international image, and becoming embroiled in international conflicts.

The widespread perception of the United States as a state trying to establish control over oil resources in various regions of the world through interventions and coups is rather simplistic. The history of Washington's relations with "inconvenient partners" demonstrates its ability to take a flexible stance, make substantial concessions, and reach compromises that turn an opponent into a stable partner. This was the case, for example, in 1938, when the United States accepted Mexico's expropriation of U.S. oil companies' property in order to keep the country as an ally and a reliable oil supplier. By doing so, they prevented its transformation into a geopolitical foothold of hostile Germany [Yergin 1992: 277]. A somewhat similar situation arose in 1973, when Washington considered intervening to take control of the fields of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Emirate of Abu Dhabi in response to the Arab oil embargo. In the end, such an idea was considered too risky, partially due to the possible reaction of the USSR[9]. Instead, the United States decided to reach a compromise with Saudi Arabia, eventually agreeing to a gradual nationalization of the *Aramco* oil company. In doing so, Washington ensured that its interests in stable oil supplies at moderate prices were taken into account.

The most prominent example of American "energy interventionism" can be seen in the 1953 Iranian coup d'état organized by the United States and Great Britain to overthrow

[8] U.S. Imports by Country of Origin. *U.S. Department of Energy*, https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_a.htm (accessed: 03.09.2020).

[9] See, for example: Frankel G. U.S. Mulled Seizing Oil Fields in 73. The Washington Post, 1.01.2004, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/01/01/us-mulled-seizing-oil-fields-in-73/0661ef3e-027e-4758-9c41-90a40bbcfc4d (accessed: 03.09.2020).

the government of Mohammad Mosaddegh, who was pursuing a policy of nationalization of oil resources. This coup, organized after unavailing attempts at negotiation, was largely related to Washington's and London's concerns about the threat of Iran moving into the Soviet sphere of influence [see, for example: Abrahamian 2013; Yergin 1992: 457–467]. The coup brought considerable economic dividends to the United States: U.S. companies received 40% in the *Iranian Oil Participants Ltd*. consortium established in 1954 to produce Iranian oil.

After the collapse of the colonial system and the nationalization of oil resources by Middle Eastern governments in the 1970s, interventionist "oil imperialism" has largely become a relic, although some critics of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 have seen the main motive for this intervention as a desire to secure control over the country's oil resources [see, e.g., Gamov, n.d.]. Apparently, the motives for intervention seem to have been complex, although they were partly related to oil interests, such as Washington's perception of the seriousness of the Iraqi threat to oil-producing countries in the region and, possibly, its desire to liberalize Iraq's oil policy and use Iraq's resources to lower world oil prices [Bonds 2013]. The United States has not shown significant persistence in pursuing most of the oil interests attributed to it: it failed to privatize the Iraqi oil sector and secure the country's withdrawal from OPEC, or to ensure the dominant position for American companies in the projects initiated by the Iraqi government to develop the largest fields in Iraq.

As a softer instrument of influence on an opponent as compared to intervention, economic sanctions or equivalent actions (e.g., abrupt interruption of supplies) are applied to the opponent's energy sector. In both U.S. and Russian practice, the application of such measures is most often associated with the desire to revise disadvantageous conditions of energy supplies, undermine the position of competitors, or obtain political concessions from the opponent. Some of these sanctions (for example, restrictions on gas supplies or access to one's own energy market) are relatively effective even when applied unilaterally, while the effectiveness of other types of sanctions (such as restrictions on access to investment and technology) particularly depends on the ability of the sanction initiator to use a "stick" or a "carrot" to bring in countries that can help the sanctioned country minimize the consequences of the sanctions.

As a consumer and importer, the United States objectively has few economic motivations to resort to formal sanctions that prevent oil from certain countries from entering the U.S. market. Nevertheless, the United States has repeatedly used such sanctions to exert political pressure, for example, on Libya (in the 1980s–2000s), Iran (since the 1990s), and Venezuela (since 2017).

U.S. sanctions were not only about closing its consumer markets to opponents, but also about preventing political opponents from gaining access to investment, credit, and advanced energy production technology. For example, such goals were related to the sanctions imposed by Washington against Russia in 2014 in connection with the conflict over Ukraine. According to Elena Sidorova, the effectiveness of these sanctions is relatively low in the short term, but in the long run they may have a negative impact on the supply of high-tech equipment for new field development in Arctic and Western Siberia (Sidorova, 2016).

Internationaslly supported sanctions are more effective in comparison with umilateral sanctions, because in the latter case the sanctioned countries can reorient themselves to other partners or intermediaries. It is only natural that the United States seeks to involve allies and other countries in its sanctions, as well as to create serious risks for those companies that continued cooperation with sanctioned opponents. As part of its sanctions policy toward Iran (especially after U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018), the United States has resorted to financial sanctions and threats to impose them on companies in third countries that were cooperating with Tehran in the energy sector[10]. At the

[10] See e.g., "Iran sanctions: Trump warns trading partners." *BBC*. 07.08.2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45098031 (accessed: 25.03.2021).

same time, as can be seen from the history of U.S. energy sanctions against the USSR and Russia, Washington has not always succeeded in involving European allies in its sanctions policy; in many cases, these countries prioritized their own economic interests [Borovskii 2019]. While the United States insisted on imposing an embargo on large-diameter pipes against the USSR in 1962, American attempts to prevent European equipment deliveries for the construction of the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline in the first half of the 1980s were unsuccessful. However, some of the U.S. and EU sanctions against Russia's energy sector imposed in 2014 (with respect to Arctic offshore production projects in July and August and Rosneft and Gazpromneft borrowings from Western markets on September 12) coincided in time and content, which may indicate some degree of coordination between them. Nevertheless, Germany was not enthusiastic about Washington's attempt to curtail the Nord Stream 2 project in 2019 by imposing unilateral sanctions on the companies involved in laying the pipeline. Although the sanctions were officially justified by a desire to support Ukraine and prevent the excessive energy dependence of the European Union from Russia, many observers considered these actions as an attempt to promote American LNG exports to the European market and block the supply of more competitive Russian pipeline gas to that market[11].

Not having such a wide range of sanction tools as Washington at its disposal, Moscow most often resorted to temporary terminating gas supply to its opponents: with regard to Ukraine (short-term supply cuts in early 2006 and 2009[12]) and Belarus (threatening to cut off supplies at the end of 2006[13]). In the case of Belarus, by violating the previous status quo in which the Russian side tolerated a low price for its gas, Russia tried to force its opponent either to pay a fair price (in its opinion), to cede control over its gas distribution infrastructure, or to agree to deeper political integration.

Over time, Gazprom gained control over the gas transport infrastructure of Belarus and some other CIS countries (Armenia, Moldova, and Kyrgyzstan), but this control was not explicitly used by Russia to exert political pressure on these countries. Ukraine and Georgia chose to pay a sharply increased price without compromising other economic and political interests. The long-standing energy conflict with Kyiv is notable for both sides using a wide range of indirect pressure mechanisms: appeals to international courts (both countries), construction of alternative bypass pipelines, and threats to completely cut off supplies (Russia); the use of reverse gas flows and a powerful gas storage system, integration into the EU energy space, and an appeal to the political solidarity of Western countries (Ukraine).

The construction of alternative pipelines can be partly attributed to the negative pressure tools used by Russia to influence the transit states. Russia began resorting to this tool back in the 1990s, seeking to reduce its dependence on inconvenient partners: first the Baltic States, and then Ukraine and Belarus. From 1997 to 2001, the first stage of the Baltic pipeline system was built, which soon allowed Moscow to retreat from the transit of oil through the ports of Latvia and Lithuania. Russia was compelled to

[11] See e.g., Geropoulos K. "Defying US sanctions, EU lawmakers, Russian ship lays Nord Stream 2 pipe in Danish Waters." *New Europe*. 26.01.2021, https://www.neweurope.eu/article/defying-us-sanctions-eu-lawmakers-russian-ship-lays-nord-stream-2-pipe-in-danish-waters (Accessed 25.03.2021); Giuli M. "Trump's gas doctrine: What does it mean for the EU?" *European Policy Center*. 26.07.2017, https://www.epc.eu/en/Publications/Trumps-gas-doctrine-What-doe~1d888c (Accessed 25.03.2021); Hessler U. "Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline faces sanctions under US defense bill." *Deutsche Welle*, 12.12.2019, https://www.dw.com/en/nord-stream-2-gas-pipeline-faces-sanctions-under-us-defense-bill/a-51641960 (accessed: 03.09.2020).

[12] See e.g., Istorija gazovih konfiktov Rossii i Ukraini. [History of gas conflicts between Russia and Ukraine]. RIA Novosti. 13.12.2019, https://ria.ru/20191213/1562318504.html (accessed: 25.03.2021).

[13] See e.g., Timirichinskaia O. "Chernoye prokliatie: kak neft' rassorila Rossiju i Belorussiju [The Black curse: how oil divided Russia and Belarus]." Gazeta.ru. 18.05.2019, https://www.gazeta.ru/business/2019/05/16/12358003.shtml (accessed: 25.03.2021).

build the second stage of the pipeline, launched in 2012, by periodic conflicts with Belarus that repeatedly threatened to impose high transit duties on Russian oil. Following the escalation of the energy conflict with Kyiv, Moscow, together with its European partners, accelerated the implementation of the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline project, which became operational in 2011. In the context of the escalating conflict surrounding Ukraine, agreements were signed in 2015 and 2016 to build the Nord Stream 2 and the Turkish Stream pipelines[14], the latter of which was commissioned in early 2020. Nevertheless, the new pipelines are subject to unfavorable changes in the political environment. For example, the South Stream pipeline project was halted in 2014 due to the new EU antitrust regime [see, for example: Bunik 2016]; the fate of the Nord Stream 2 project was also called into question due to deteriorating relations between Russia and Western countries, and the effectiveness of the Turkish Stream project is similarly uncertain due to political contradictions between Russia and Turkey.

In those cases where Russia itself acts as a transit state, it wields a number of other negative tools to counteract its opponents. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia initially was trying to maintain its monopolistic position as a hub for oil flows from the former Soviet republics, which allowed it to dictate the terms of transit supplies. Over time, post-Soviet net oil exporters managed to build alternative routes: Azerbaijan via Turkey to the EU, and Kazakhstan to China. However, Russia still has significant opportunities to counteract alternative pipelines, for example by buying significant amounts of hydrocarbon fuel from exporters, which undermines the profitability of competing pipeline projects[15].

In contrast with gas, it is much more difficult for Russia to use oil as a negative tool. The 2020 price war, which resulted from disagreements between OPEC+ members (primarily Russia and Saudi Arabia) and led to a collapse in global prices[16], is a controversial example, as it is difficult to draw clear conclusions about its main initiators and targets, as well as about the acceptability of its results for Moscow based on open information. A year earlier, Russia resorted to an embargo on oil and oil products to Ukraine in response to Ukrainian sanctions; however, Ukraine reoriented to other suppliers and began to buy Russian oil through intermediaries[17]. This example illustrates the flexibility of the oil market, which makes it relatively easy to compensate in the event of supply interruptions with other sellers and alternative means of delivery (e.g., by tankers instead of pipelines). In this case, the sanctioned state can suffer only some damage, but nothing critical.

4

For both Russia and the United States, the main positive tool in the energy sphere is building partnerships and alliances. Bilateral partnerships with Russian and U.S. participation are, as a rule, relations between the supplier and the energy consumer, secured by the presence of common political interests. Multilateral alliances are aimed at ensuring collective energy security and maintaining the price situation in the global oil market acceptable to the participants. However, in practice,

[14] The Turkish Stream agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Turkey, http://docs.cntd.ru/document/420381060 (accessed: 25.03.2021).

[15] See e.g., "Zakupki gaza v Azerbajdjane: ekonomija I strategicheskie zadachi [Gas purchases in Azerbaijan: savings and strategic objectives]." *Vesti.ru*. 3.09.2010, https://www.vesti.ru/finance/article/2107658 (accessed: 03.09.2020).

[16] See e.g., Hestanov S. "Shatkii sgovor [Shaky collusion]". *Novaya Gazeta*. 5.06.2020, https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2020/06/05/85716-shatkiy-sgovor (Accessed 26.03.2020); Calhoun G. "The Saudi/Russia Oil Price War: Historic Blunder #1." Forbes. 03.06.2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgecalhoun/2020/06/03/the-other-epidemic-a-cluster-of-historic-blunders---exhibit-1-the-saudirussia-oil-price-war (accessed: 26.03.2021).

[17] See e.g., Narozhnii D. "Eksperti rasskazali, kak Ukraine snizit' zavisimost' ot postavok nefteproduktov iz RF [Experts explained how to reduce Ukraine's dependence on supplies of oil products from Russia]." *Delo.ua*. 4.06.2019, https://delo.ua/econonomyandpoliticsinukraine/eksperty-rasskazali-kak-snizit-zavisimost-ot-354058 (accessed: 26.03.2021).

such alliances are unable to control certain key supply and demand factors (the "spoiler" behavior or demand dynamics of giant economies such as China[18]) or, in some cases, to force their participants to pursue a common course in a disciplined manner.

In terms of U.S. energy interests, at least two alliances with oil suppliers are of particular importance. The alliance with Saudi Arabia allows stable access to enormous oil reserves and prevents destabilization of the region that might lead to dramatic increases in oil prices. The alliance with Canada also provides access to huge (though not cheap) oil resources, partly insuring the United States from severe economic consequences in the event of destabilization in the Middle East region.

The key multilateral energy alliance for the United States is the International Energy Agency (IEA), created in 1974 at the American initiative (the idea belonged to Henry Kissinger). It is the most influential club of energy consumers and importers, including the United States and EU member states. The creation of the IEA substantially strengthened the position of consumers in the dialogue with exporters thanks to well-designed coordinated policies, including the creation of 90-day strategic reserves and the coordination of investment, technological, and information potentials [see, e.g., Scott 2015]. The organization's ability to develop a coordinated global policy of net energy consumers is weakened by the fact that the largest consumers – China and India – are not full members, but only observers.

As a supplier of energy resources, Russia (like the USSR) seeks to establish stable and pragmatic relations with consumers or to use energy supplies to strengthen political alliances. Examples of the first approach can be found in the relations with a number of EU member states (at least until the second half of the 2010s), and the second approach can be illustrated by the USSR's relations with members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and Russia's relations with net importers from the Eurasian Economic Union (Armenia and Belarus), the strategic alliance with China, and attempts to induce Ukraine to join the Eurasian Economic Union. In a number of cases, pipeline politics played a significant role in building such partnerships and alliances. The construction of Soviet and Russian export pipelines was intended for the needs of members of the socialist bloc, and later other European countries; the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean oil pipeline and the Power of Siberia gas pipeline are aimed at strengthening the strategic alliance with China, and the Turkish Stream pipeline is needed to build an alliance with Turkey. The politicization of a large part of such projects (for example, with the CMEA countries, Belarus, China, and Turkey) in some cases questioned their economic viability.

Compared to the United States, Russia has had a shorter history of taking advantage of close cooperation with global energy alliances. As one of the world's largest net exporters, the USSR and Russia have long been reluctant to work closely with OPEC, trying to play their own game in the global oil market. Nevertheless, mindful of the lessons of the most severe consequences for the USSR and Russia of the collapse of oil prices in the 1980s and 1990s, Moscow opted for such cooperation taking into account its interests after another collapse of global oil prices in 2014. Not having joined OPEC in 2016, Russia became a member of the enlarged OPEC+ alliance, whose efforts contributed to a partial rebound in oil prices [see Beck 2019; Ulatowski 2020]. In 2020, however, the effectiveness of OPEC+ was jeopardized by the conflict between Russia and Saudi Arabia, which led to another plunge in prices. Although this conflict was partially resolved, the viability of OPEC+ remains in question.

Even less effective was the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), established in 2008 with Russia's extremely active participation. This organization was conceived as the equivalent of OPEC in the gas sphere: it united the owners of almost three quarters of gas reserves produced at the time. However, the GECF failed to make a significant impact on the for-

[18] On the influence of the Chinese factor on global energy markets, see e.g. [Mastepanov and Tomberg 2018].

mation of world gas prices, because, unlike oil prices, they are determined not at the global but at the regional level [Hallouche 2006].

The relationship of dominance and subordination is evident in most energy partnerships and alliances, albeit to varying degrees. From the 1940s to the 1970s, the U.S. government actively supported the efforts of its oil companies to build unequal relations with the governments in the Middle East and other oil-producing regions [see, e.g., Vivoda, 2010; Yergin, 1992]. In the second half of the 2010s, Washington made efforts to establish network infrastructure to support its LNG export to Europe and to expand its presence in European energy infrastructure projects. For example, the European Energy Security and Diversification Act came into force in 2020; this provided for, among other things, large-scale investments in LNG terminals, interconnection pipelines, and gas storage facilities. In the preamble, the desire of the United States to contribute to promoting the European energy security was declared; this was apparently combined with the desire to expand the presence of American energy companies in the European market.

Russian efforts to "vertically integrate" gas transmission and distribution infrastructure in other countries have intensified since the 2000s. In the 2000s-2010s, Gazprom, controlled by the Russian government, was proactive in pursuing a "vertical integration policy" by establishing control over the transport and distribution infrastructure in post-Soviet and European transit and consumer countries in order to ensure stability of supply at desirable prices and, possibly, to expand opportunities for political influence. The EU perceived Gazprom's "vertical integration" as a threat to its energy security, and in 2009 it adopted the Third Energy Package, which approved the principle of decoupling control over production and transportation of energy resources [for more details see Murgash, 2018]. The practical implementation of the package in the 2010s forced Gazprom to sell some of its assets in EU countries, and the Russian government to announce its refusal to build the South Stream gas pipeline. This example demonstrates that the strategy of "vertical integration" does not always achieve its goals and that consumers (especially influential ones) who perceive it as a threat to their energy security have their own opportunities to confront it.

5

Tools and practices designed to regulate global markets and optimize the domestic capacity of one's own energy sector can be divided into specific groups. Neither of the two countries has sufficient capacity to control the global oil market on its own over the long term. For achieving a short-term price effect or in coordination with other major producers within the OPEC+ framework, Russia can reduce or increase oil production, while the United States has the ability to sell oil from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (as it did during the military operation against Iraq in 1990–1991 and during the social and political protest activities in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011) or reduce the rate of its replenishment to stop global price increases. These measures have a short-term effect, as the global supply and demand equilibrium stabilizes over time.

The national energy sector has the potential to grow or transform, and instrumentalizing this plays an important role. After the collapse of the USSR, the gas industry remained largely under state control; this made it easier to use it as a foreign policy tool, which has been happening intentionally since the 2000s. In the export policy of the state-controlled Gazprom, some Western policymakers and experts see the use of "energy weapons" to blackmail opponents, while other experts and politicians either deny the use of such "weapons" or consider them ineffective [see, e.g., Stegen 2011: 6506–6507].

Furthermore, in some situations, excessive centralization can be detrimental to Russian economic interests, since state-controlled energy companies tend to be less efficient compared to private ones [see, e.g., Al-Mana et al. 2020]. Besides, Gazprom's vertically integrated structures have become an easier target for EU regulators than the totality of independent Russian gas companies would have been [Bogatova 2019]. As far as the oil sector is concerned, after privatization in the 1990s, it was partially reconsolidated under state control during the next two decades. Moscow uses the strengthening of the

position of state-controlled oil companies to enhance political relations with friendly countries (joint projects with Belarus, Venezuela, China, and Libya) and to build relations with OPEC+. As Russia's largest oil producer, Rosneft has played the biggest role in implementing the agreement by reducing oil production[19]; at the same time, it strongly advocated for Russia's withdrawal from the agreement in March 2020. In many cases, the effect of consolidating the energy sector for political objectives has been limited, and the economic cost-effectiveness of consolidation has been questionable.

In the United States, a key milestone in the relationship between the federal government and private companies was the antitrust case against the Standard Oil Company, which used to dominate the oil sector and was eventually forcefully broken into independent companies in 1911 [see e.g. Bringhurst 1979]. Subsequently, preventing the monopolization of the energy sector became a top priority of state policy. Due to the high efficiency of the private sector, the United States has more opportunities to apply both positive and negative tools: it can use the investment and innovation-technological capacity of the American energy sector, as well as the influence on the global formation of oil and gas prices that such institutions as (for example) the New York Stock Exchange and, in part, the biggest Henry Hub gas distribution center have. At the same time, the federal government retains its own leverage over energy companies, including tax policy, government subsidies, or foreign policy support. For example, the 1926 legislation, which exempted U.S. companies from taxes paid on overseas income, encouraged the international expansion of oil companies and gave them a significant advantage over competitors from other countries [see e.g. Yergin 1992].

The highly competitive and business-friendly environment with government support for technical innovation defined the nature of the "shale revolution" (in the 2000s–2010s). Although the level of American state involvement in this success is a matter of debate[20], the result was a significant strengthening of U.S. energy security, as its dependence on imports of critical energy resources was reduced to a minimum. The ensuing changes in the global oil market have not only opened up new political opportunities for the United States, but also led to new challenges to the country's energy security, since the relatively high cost of shale oil makes the industry vulnerable to price wars initiated by countries where the cost of oil is lower.

With a strong anti-monopoly element in domestic politics, the U.S. government has traditionally been more tolerant of the "offensive" overseas activities of U.S. oil corporations. On several occasions, U.S. diplomacy acted as a conduit for U.S. companies' interests abroad, including their expansion into the Middle East in the 1920s and 1950s and attempts to establish themselves in the post-Soviet space. Nevertheless, the threat of antitrust prosecution of corporations operating overseas appeared occasionally on the American domestic political agenda [Yergin 1992: 537, 556, 600].

Officially, Washington has at times sacrificed the interests of U.S. oil companies for broadly understood national interests; these companies have not always willingly supported the foreign policy of their government. For example, Washington's attempt to encourage oil companies to be active in Iraq in the 2000s was not successful [Bonds 2013], and in the late 2010s, American sanctions forced Exxon Mobile to curtail its projects in the Russian Arctic[21]. In general, the U.S. government often supports foreign activities of energy companies; however,

[19] See, e.g., Samedova E. "Slovo neftianika: kak Rossija vipolniajet dogovorennosti s OPEK [Oil worker's word: how Russia complies with OPEC agreements]". *Deutsche Welle*. 20.03.2020. https://www.dw.com/ru/слово-нефтяника-как-россия-выполняет-договоренности-с-опек/a-37597498 (accessed: 26.03.2021).

[20] Giberson M. "Did the Federal Government Invent the Shale Gas Boom?" *Knowledge Problem*. 20.12.2011, https://knowledgeproblem.com/2011/12/20/did-the-federal-government-invent-the-shale-gas-boom (accessed: 03.09.2020).

[21] Krauss C. "Exxon Mobil Scraps a Russian Deal, Stymied by Sanctions". *The New York Times*. 28.02.2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/business/energy-environment/exxon-russia.html (accessed: 02.02.2021).

Washington can hardly be considered a consistent promoter of their international interests.

In general, the effectiveness of the tools at the disposal of the two countries to influence the global energy markets is limited: both Russia and the United States alone (and even acting within alliances) can achieve only partial and time-limited results. Both states have been able to strengthen their energy potentials to some extent by supporting the transformation of their national energy sectors, but such transformations (consolidation under state control in Russia and the "shale revolution" in the United States) have brought with them not only opportunities but also new challenges and risks. In the case of the U.S., it should be noted that the state does not play a dominant role in the transformation processes, mostly able to contribute to them indirectly.

* * *

In both of the analyzed cases, the use of political tools in the energy context can be linked either to the provision of energy security or to the promotion of often ideologically defined political interests and attitudes (the restoration of the geopolitical role of a Eurasian power or the promotion of democracy). These two groups of motives may coincide, but they can also contradict each other; strict adherence to an ideological course sometimes has a negative effect on energy supplies.

U.S. and Russian resources and tools are largely asymmetric. The United States has the world's largest consumer market for oil, maintains a strong military and political presence in the Middle East, has the ability to subject its opponent to complex and painful sanctions, and is a leader in innovative technology. Russia remains a key supplier of gas to the EU and a number of post-Soviet countries, has a low cost of oil and gas production, and owns the world's longest system of export pipelines, which gives it a powerful trump card in pipeline policy. The emergence and development of this toolkit was in no small measure the result of geopolitical and economic shocks: for the USA, it was a sharp rise in oil prices and awareness of the critical importance of oil supplies in the 1970s, and for Russia it was centrifugal geopolitical trends after the collapse of the USSR. In the long run, the shale revolution may give impetus to the formation of new practices for the United States, whilst for Russia such impetus may be in a sharp drop in oil and gas prices after 2014.

In most of the examined examples, for both Russia and the United States, the effectiveness of using political tools to pursue their interests in the energy sphere has been limited; it is also too early to speak of a pronounced advantage of either country in this case. The analyzed tools can be used to achieve mainly temporary and tactical successes (for example, the realization of profitable projects or damaging specific opponents), but not to change the long-term situation in their favor on the global and regional energy markets, which is dynamically changing and which neither Russia nor the United States can control alone (or even with the help of alliances). Even in terms of achieving short-term goals, the effectiveness of the political tools under consideration seems limited. Targeting an opponent's energy sector with sanctions and other pressure techniques – especially unilateral ones – has rarely led to the desired result. Moreover, the use of negative tools motivates the opponent to build alliances that are undesirable for the initiator of sanctions. The effectiveness of positive tools, in particular alliances, is also ambiguous: their influence on global oil prices is limited, and serious disagreements on critical issues periodically arise between participants. In general, energy-related political practices are rarely self-sufficient, and are therefore used in conjunction with practices related to other areas.

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ЭНЕРГЕТИЧЕСКИЕ РЫЧАГИ ВНЕШНЕЙ ПОЛИТИКИ
ОПЫТ РОССИИ И США

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Резюме

Используя свои энергетические ресурсы для решения внешнеполитических задач, Россия и США задействуют разнообразные политические инструменты и практики, которые можно условно подразделить на «позитивные», «негативные», регулирующие рынки и усиливающие собственный потенциал страны. В статье делается вывод о том, что применение таких инструментов Россией и США связано либо с обеспечением энергетической безопасности, либо для достижения идеологически заданных политических целей. Эти две группы мотивов могут как совпадать, так и противоречить друг другу.

Для реализации соответствующих интересов Россия и США располагают разными инструментами, развитие которых в немалой степени стало результатом геополитических и экономических шоков: для США – резкого роста нефтяных цен в 1970-х, для России – центробежных геополитических тенденций после распада СССР. В качестве «негативного» инструмента США чаще всего используют санкции в отношении энергетических секторов оппонентов, тогда как наиболее сильнодействующим российским оружием становились ограничения поставок углеводородного сырья. Для обеспечения энергетической безопасности и усиления политического влияния обе страны выстраивают двусторонние взаимодополняющие отношения по линии «производитель–потребитель», а для стабилизации глобальных нефтяных цен в своих интересах участвуют в международных энергетических альянсах. В инструментальных целях также используется происходящая целенаправленно либо стихийно трансформация национальных энергетических секторов (например, консолидация под государственным контролем в России или «сланцевая революция» в США).

В большинстве рассмотренных случаев эффективность применения политических инструментов оказалась ограниченной. Нацеленные на энергетический сектор оппонента санкции и другие приёмы давления (особенно односторонние) сами по себе редко приводили к желательному изменению его политики. Ограниченные результаты для России и США принесло и выстраивание энергетических альянсов, которые не обеспечивают полноценный контроль над глобальными нефтяными ценами и не отличаются представительностью и прочностью.

Ключевые слова:

государственное управление; внешнеполитический инструментарий; энергетическая безопасность; трубопроводная политика; Россия; США.

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THE CLOUD OF SANCTIONS
CONTENDING U.S.-RUSSIAN APPROACHES & STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

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Abstract

Economic sanctions have been the defining feature of the relationship between Russia and the U.S. / EU since the 2014 Ukraine crisis, and both Moscow and Washington appear to accept that sanctions will remain in place indefinitely. This persistence of sanctions presents a paradox: Western policy makers have repeatedly increased the breadth and depth of these sanctions, despite little evidence that the sanctions have 'worked' to achieve their explicit and tangible objectives. This paper examines the nature and origin of this paradox using a multi-dimensional examination of Russian and US actions and discourse since the first imposition of Ukraine-related sanctions on Russia in March 2014. This analysis exposes fundamental differences over how the two sides perceive the appropriateness and strategic context of these sanctions, which reflect a basic difference in worldviews between Moscow and Washington. These contending worldviews potentially compound burdens of uncertainty and costly signaling in sanctions between the U.S. and Russia, which also introduces cross-domain risks that can defy efforts to fine-tune the imposition of costs. If not redressed, this dynamic can derail efforts at strategic reengagement, if not inadvertently elevate prospects for dangerous escalation.

Keywords:

sanctions; Russia; US; EU; discourse.

With the sweeping political change ushered in by the 2020 U.S. presidential elections, as well as sobering death tolls and rollouts of vaccines attendant to COVID-19, come expectations of new beginnings in America's contemporary foreign relations with Russia. Despite internal divisions over how to strike a pragmatic balance between power and principle in dealing with Russia, the new Biden administration is sending clear signals of a fundamental corrective to Donald Trump's idiosyncratic and transactional approach, with the reinvigoration of diplomacy at the crux of restoring U.S. global leadership. However, one area of conspicuous continuity amid this effort to "reimagine" America's strategic posture is the

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prominence of economic sanctions directed against Russia.

The prevailing view across Western and Russian strategic communities at the onset of 2021 is that sanctions will remain a fixture in the U.S./EU relationship with Russia. Prior to assuming office, former Vice President Biden made it clear that he supports bipartisan sentiments in the U.S. Congress for tightening sanctions on the Russian ruling elite as part of a "cost imposition strategy." The objectives of this strategy are to change Russian policy: to disrupt and deter out-of-bounds cyber-attacks on American institutions, to pressure the cessation of Russia's involvement in outstanding conflicts, and to protest and curb internal human rights abuses. In response to the poisoning and jailing of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, President Biden moved swiftly to impose a new round of sanctions targeted against Russian senior officials, businesses, and research institutes, expanding current sanctions to include tighter export restrictions on items used for biological agent and chemical production and broadening visa restrictions. The Administration subsequently acted on intelligence that Moscow orchestrated the SolarWinds hack and intervened in the U.S. electoral process with additional sanctions aimed at making Russia "pay a price" for its interference, via a series of sanctions banning U.S. financial institutions from buying Russian government debt in bond auctions, expelling 10 diplomats, and blocking the U.S. financial transactions of 40 companies and individuals[1]. Accordingly, discussions in Washington turn on not whether but to what extent sanctions will persist in ongoing relations with Moscow [Bellinger et al. 2020; Biden, Carpenter 2018].

The EU, too, not only has consistently extended sanctions on Russia, but also coordinated additional restrictions in response to the poisoning of Navalny as part of a new human rights sanctions program. Touted as a "demonstration of transatlantic unity," the U.S. and EU broadly agree on the need to continue exerting pressure on Moscow through economic sanctions, even if they do not always agree on the targets or form that these sanctions should take.

Not surprisingly, there is a pall of resignation across ruling circles in Moscow for having to indefinitely endure the imposition of Western sanctions. New legislation underscores widespread political support for the Kremlin's discretion at introducing countersanctions, as evidenced by the augmented travel ban imposed on European dignitaries following the EU's response to Navalny's poisoning and reciprocal retaliation to Biden's punitive measures[2]. In short, sanctions are alive and thrive as leaderships grope for new footing in the protracted great power competition that is expected to define U.S./EU-Russian relations for the foreseeable future.

Notwithstanding this international political consensus, there remains a curious paradox between the escalation of sanctions and their ineffectiveness at achieving explicit and tangible objectives. Despite the rise in frequency and intensity, Western sanctions on Russia have failed repeatedly to secure Russia's formal compliance with explicit aims, such as restoring Ukraine's sovereignty over Crimea, fully implementing the Minsk

[1] The White House (2021, April 15). "FACT SHEET: Imposing Costs for Harmful Foreign Activities by the Russian Government" [Press Release]. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/15/fact-sheet-imposing-costs-for-harmful-foreign-activities-by-the-russian-government [accessed: 10/06/2021]; Atwood K. (2020). Biden Vows to Impose 'Costs' for Russian Aggression When he Becomes President. CNN Politics (December 18, 2020). Available at: https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/18/politics/biden-russia-aggression-costs/index.html (accessed: 10.06.2021).

[2] Frolov V. No Longer 'Ours': With a Biden White House the Kremlin is Facing a Tough Reality. The Moscow Times. November 12, 2020; Federal law of the Russian Federation. About corrective actions (counteraction) on unfriendly actions of the United States of America and other foreign states. June 4, 2018. Available at: https://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=107003 [accessed 10/06/2021]; Заявление МИД России об ответных мерах в связи с враждебными действиями США. 16.04.21. URL: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4689067 (accessed: 10.06.2021).

accords, admitting guilt in poisoning attacks, withdrawing support for the Assad regime, refraining from election meddling, and thwarting construction of the Nord Stream II pipeline. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the volume of gas exports to Europe steadily increased in the face of targeted sanctions on the Russian energy sector. Since then, the prospects for new secondary sanctions – which historically hit European firms harder than American ones [Timofeev 2019] and stand to take effect when nearly 90% of the pipeline has been constructed – have excited transatlantic dissention over energy security and burden-sharing in standing up to Russia[3]. Similarly, Moscow's "reciprocal" ban on food imports from the U.S., EU, Norway, Canada, and Australia, as well as attempts at monetary/trade diversification and at developing domestic or Chinese sources for certain critical technologies, have yielded paltry strategic results. A combination of ad hoc exemptions to the embargo on European agricultural imports, Belarus' emergence as a willing re-exporter of banned European products to Russia, Russia's restricted trade footprint and dependence on Western financial systems, the difficulties of locating substitutes for key Western technologies, and the declining purchasing power of Russian consumers have consistently foiled such countermoves. Moscow also has not emerged unscathed, with sanctions stunting domestic economic growth but significantly undermining the profitability of targeted firms[4]. The Kremlin also has failed to drive an effective political wedge among Western partners with different stakes and levels of hostility towards trade with Russia.

At the same time, there is mutual complacency about the perpetuation of the perverse state of reciprocal sanctions with the unfolding of long-term strategic competition between Russia and the West. It is widely accepted among Western scholars and policy experts that sanctions are the "least bad option" to protest Moscow's malign behavior. The escalating intensity of targeted sanctions is regarded as a low-cost approach for demonstrating resolve to foreign and domestic audiences and for escalating pressure to punish Moscow's subversive behavior at home and abroad, irrespective of the effectiveness at reversing or deterring the Kremlin's offensives [O'Toole, Fried 2021]. Similarly, Russian officials dismiss the impact of sanctions independent of the shocks imposed by oil price volatility and the pandemic, while trumpeting the resilience of the Russian political economic system. They are strategically emboldened by the combination of the West's general restraint at leveling stringent "blocking sanctions," and the country's seeming success at blunting the impact via import substitution and "de-problematizing" sanctions to the Russian public [Timofeev 2020]. At the crux of respective postures are presumptions that the sides are either deadlocked with conflicting strategies pursued for domestic political purposes, or that the respective sender needs to take more forceful action to convince the other ultimately to back down. All parties seem confident that they can calibrate sanctions and countermoves to manage

[3] Buchanan P. (2021). Why Putin's Pipeline is Welcome in Germany. *Real Clear Politics*. March 26, 2021. Available at: https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2021/03/26/why_putins_pipeline_is_welcome_in_germany_145482.html (accessed 10.06.2021). The EU went as far as to enact a law prohibiting EU businesses from complying with American-enforced secondary sanctions. See European Commission. June 6, 2018. Blocking statute: Protecting EU operators, reinforcing European strategic autonomy [web page]. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/international-relations/blocking-statute_en (accessed 10.06.2020).

[4] One estimate is that Western sanctions have reduced economic growth by .2% per annum from 2014-2018. IMF, *Russian Federation 2019 Article IV Consultation-Press Release*. August 2019. Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2019/08/01/Russian-Federation-2019-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-48549 (accessed: 10.06.2021). Similarly, the ruble initially fell by 2% against the U.S. dollar following the April 2021 round of U.S. sanctions targeting Russian sovereign debt. Russian Markets Shrug Off New Sanctions. The Moscow Times. April 16, 2021. Available at: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/04/16/russian-markets-shrug-off-new-sanctions-a73621 (accessed 15.06.2021).

the political fallout of sustained sanctions, while simultaneously charting a new course to redress mutual and "existential" challenges presented by direct military-military incidents, climate change, pandemics, and the proliferation of dangerous nuclear and emerging technologies.

This paradoxical situation raises several questions at the nub of contemporary great power statecraft. Do Western and Russian leaderships view the strategic predicament in similar terms, prone to reciprocate with carefully tailored sanctions that mirror each other in size, if not in form? Accordingly, is the perverse perpetuation of unsuccessful sanctions the product of uncertainty and the inability of the states to communicate coherent signals and to impose effective costs on each other? In addition, are the U.S./EU and Russia socialized to accept mutually targeted sanctions as "low cost-low risk," either bound or isolated from other domains of the strategic relationship? If not, what are the strategic implications?

This article systematically probes these questions by offering a preliminary examination of Russia's approach to sanctions. Applying both text-mining and events data analytical techniques to illuminate trends in Russian discourse and posture on sanctions, we discern that neither deadlock nor uncertainty are the likely prime reasons for the perpetuation of a "high incidence-low effectiveness" gap in U.S.-Russian sanctions. Rather than pursuing "reciprocal sanctions" or simply being satisfied with domestic efforts to mitigate the impact of Western trade restrictions, Moscow is prone to respond to Western economic sanctions by escalating broader forms of coercion across different policy areas. Furthermore, both sides appear to be "worlds apart" in their understandings of the meaning, objectives, and legitimacy of sanctions-related behavior. There also are fundamental differences that pertain to the distinction between sanctions as a substitute versus instrument of warfare. Together, Russia's orthogonal posture (meaning a cross-domain rather than reciprocal response) and different worldview present challenges to strategic signaling and core assumptions in the traditional Western bargaining model. This pre-analytical assessment of the contours of Russia's statecraft is suggestive of new directions for future empirical research and theory development on the strategic dimensions to the threat and imposition of sanctions in the context of contemporary great power competition.

1

In the canonical Western literature, sanctions constitute instruments of statecraft aimed at withholding economic and financial exchange to advance foreign policy objectives, broadly or narrowly defined. Typically, states craft sanctions as a punitive measure, aimed at changing the target state's behavior by imposing sufficient pain, so that the costs of compliance with the sanctioning state's demands outweigh the benefits of resistance, while presenting a cost-effective option for the sender. Smart sanctions are a subset designed to hurt elites and key supporters of the targeted regime, while imposing minimal hardship on the sanctioned country's mass public. More recently, scholars and policymakers have embraced a coercive perspective, treating episodes as continuous and focusing on the efficacy of sanctions threats and anticipated costs for both the sender and target. By altering the potential costs for targeted supporters, the argument runs, these supporters will pressure the targeted government into acquiescing or reaching a negotiated settlement before the sanctions are fully imposed by the sender [Baldwin 2020; Drezner 2018; Morgan et al. 2014].

Sanctions can serve multiple objectives for a sender state. They can be employed as a signal to compel or deter a target's future action; to send a message to underscore discontent or the importance of an international norm; to physically restrain or punish a target's current behavior; or to force a target's regime change. Sanction deployment strategies come in different forms, including threats of leveling comprehensive punishment or the application of gradual or tailored pressure on a target, or the imposition of direct penalties on home-based firms or extra-territorial partners with commercial connections to a target. As such, sanctions can be directed at enemies and allies

alike, and they often inflict costs on the domestic constituencies of the sending state. In this regard, "success" relates to the attainment of specific objectives associated with respective threats or punishment; "impact" pertains to observable political and economic costs that the sanctions impose on the target. Accordingly, sanctions can carry grave impact for a target but still fail to secure the desired result. Similarly, they can fail as threats if the sender must follow through with imposition [Connolly 2018]. The prevailing research finds that success does not come easy, and that sanctions are most successful when formulated as a symbolic gesture or as a threat to deter or compel a target, as opposed to a punitive measure for imposing material punishment, restraint, regime change, or new international norms [Drezner 2003; Lektzian, Patterson 2015; Morgan et al. 2014].

Ultimately, sanctions are a strategic affair. The comparative utility of alternative forms and outcomes are shaped by the interaction of senders, targets, and third parties that possess asymmetric power, information, and expectations. The challenge rests with navigating the uncertainty of international politics to convey resolve and demonstrate credibility such that the weak appear to be strong and those with incentives to misrepresent will be encouraged to follow through on their threats. Success, therefore, turns on the ability of a sender to issue clear signals that would impose sufficient costs on a target that only a committed actor would be prepared to carry out [Yarhi-Milo et al. 2018]. The mainstream literature tells us that the most propitious conditions for sanctions relate to when they are imposed multilaterally for discrete ends; targeted to affect those with influence on target decision making; calculated as proportionate to the stakes at hand; issued by democratic regimes that are sensitive to audience costs, and imposed on target states that value an exchange; are satisfied with the *status quo*; and lack capacity to pass along costs to broad societal elements [Ang, Peksen 2007; Connolly 2018; Drezner 2018; Hart 2000]. By extension, the efficacy of sanction threats rests on the target state anticipating that the costs of sanctions will outweigh the benefits of current policies. Accordingly, the target must perceive the sanctions to be specific, credible, and difficult to offset [Morgan et al. 2020]. The imposition or threats of sanctions are prone to fail under circumstances that either limit the capacity of a sender to send credible signals that it will follow through on its threats, dampen or manipulate the pain the sender can impose on the target, or that doom the parties to deadlock because national interests do not overlap. Consequently, the seemingly perverse perpetuation or escalation of ineffective sanctions rationally results from efforts by respective parties that struggle with issuing credible threats, imposing sufficient costs, reconciling high audience costs with low sunk costs associated with imposing economic restrictions, or breaking free from irreconcilable domestic political interests [Lektzian, Sprechler 2007].

At the crux of this classic bargaining perspective on sanctions are three critical assumptions. Firstly, actors are treated as rational; senders and targets calculate costs, benefits, and probabilities in respective decisions to impose and comply with sanctions. Those imposing sanctions who can effectively signal or impose greater punishment are more likely to have their demands accepted by a target. Secondly, both senders and targets are assumed to share common conceptions of costs and benefits. Although preference hierarchies may vary and sanctions can affect groups differently within a target state (necessitating tailored applications), there is a presumption that sender and target states share a common appreciation that the greater the pain incurred by influential groups within the target state, the more likely the target will seek relief through compliance. Sanctions work because they impose significant costs on politically relevant stakeholders that lead them to modify the behavior of the target; they fail when the link between economic costs and political influence is disrupted [Drezner 2018]. Third, threats of sanctions issued by senders are presumed to be received as intended by targets. This means that perceptions of audience and sunk costs are assumed to be homogenous and appreciated by senders and targets alike. As a result, the cred-

ibility of the sending state's commitment and resolve to impose sanctions rests with the clarity, coherence, and intensity with which the sender can convey costly signals [Yarhi-Milo et al. 2018].

Notwithstanding the prevalence within Western discourse of this bargaining approach to sanctions as threats or punishment, the traditional perspective is analytically incomplete and empirically problematic at explicating the continuation of disruptive but unsuccessful strategic interactions involving sanctions. At the crux of this strategic model is that senders and targets weigh the costs and benefits of threatening or imposing sanctions in light of anticipated actions by the other party. Yet, there is little evidence to demonstrate that either is empathetic or understands how the other calculates its expected utility. This is especially problematic for assessing the strategic dimensions to sanctions among great power rivals, where power and domestic structural relations vary across multiple domains, and there is a paucity of data and analysis tailored to understanding respective motivations, modalities, and counter-responses [Morgan 2015].

At base, costly signals are in the eyes of the beholder; those sent are not necessarily those received by a target. This results from the fact that the signals sent by sanctions create two interrelated streams of communications: one over the sender's demands and their legitimacy, and the other over the costs that each side is willing and capable of enduring. Here the clarity of communication is not the only problem at the root of signaling effective sanction threats. How signals are received can be as much a function of how aligned a target is at processing them, cognitively or politically [Jervis 2017]. For example, different time-horizons and asymmetries in prior understandings concerning the legitimacy and efficacy of sanctions may lead targets to draw very different conclusions about the credibility of threats or the meaning of specific actions, irrespective of a sender's sincerity at conveying threats or bluntness at incurring or imposing costs. Such systematic biases in information processing and assessment of the legitimacy of sanctions generate sender-receiver gaps, notwithstanding common evaluations of material costs and benefits. Both senders and targets also can incur sunk costs and confront domestically tied hands that lock in mind-sets and policies, offsetting the marginal significance of diplomatic communication [Yarhi-Milo et al. 2018]. Either way, a target's assessment of the objectives of a rival's sanctions and calculation of the costs of noncompliance can differ from those assumed by the sender. This can drive the parties either to perpetuate a negative frame for resolving other mutual interests, or to default to dangerous escalation of sanctions and counter-sanctions activities that each would deem appropriate but otherwise prefer to avoid.

In addition, the effects of signals and punishment conveyed by sanctions are empirically difficult to identify. The traditional model of strategic interaction looks for reciprocal cause and effect relationships, with both the threats and response readily discernable to both the direct parties involved and third-party observers. However, the extant literature on international relations is marred by both incomplete data on coercive behavior and a parochial preoccupation with measuring success from observable binary, action-reaction responses to economic sanctions. This is problematic on several accounts. Firstly, the data available typically measure sanctions threats, imposition, and effects over years rather than weeks or months as assessed by practitioners. This makes it difficult to probe for the discrete effects of the cycles of escalation-response that can occur during protracted sanctions episodes, or to capture the range of variation in behavior among relevant sets of sub-national actors. Secondly, the signals associated with sanctions may be implicit, aimed at bolstering reputations or resonating with specific domestic stakeholders, and thus reflected more readily by an actor's strategic framework and general discourse than by its discrete actions. Thirdly, sanctions and their responses do not occur in a strategic vacuum, but work in concert with other dimensions to foreign and domestic policies [Sisson et al. 2020; Yarhi-Milo et al. 2018]. Fourthly, it is possible for states to respond asymmetrically, not only

reciprocally, to threats or the imposition of sanctions. Asymmetrical responses can take the form of diversifying trade ties; manipulating public support for the regime ("rally around the flag" effect); insulating targeted sectors and individuals from imposed costs; and/or bolstering the resilience of the national economy through import substitution, currency manipulation, and stimulation of domestic innovation [Connolly 2018]. Moreover, a target may choose to countersanctions by taking concerted action in other foreign policy domains, striking out against a sender's interest on different issues or otherwise escalating pressure on the sender on another plane. Such orthogonal behavior is especially difficult to uncover and can be obfuscated by a sender's myopic attention to the target's expected behavior in a single domain. Nonetheless, this reactive, asymmetrical, cross-domain response may not only play to the different comparative strengths of the rivals; they may also defy mutual efforts to compartmentalize sanctions in order to avoid stoking an inadvertent and risky spiral of hostilities.

2

As discerned from the Western scholarship reviewed above, the persistence of U.S. sanctions on Russia rests on the assumption that both states assess sanctions based on calculations of costs, benefits, credibility, and uncertainty. The lack of tangible evidence of Russia's direct compliance with Western demands is suggestive of the need for Washington to be prepared to incur additional costs (e.g., audience, reputational, sunk) to bolster the credibility of its efforts, as well as to further refine the targets of sanctions to calibrate the pressure. As summed up by one prominent American former officials, the purpose of U.S. sanctions policy on Russia is "to discourage risk-taking by the Russians, to carve out small areas where there are abilities to cooperate, and to be very clear in specific and timely reactions that there will always be a cost to Russian behavior"[5]. For Moscow, continued relief derives from a combination of blunting the domestic impact of sanctions, diversifying trade relations, and reciprocating with its own sanctions that target Western vulnerability [Connolly 2018]. Both sides presumably can fumble towards these ends without fundamentally disrupting other aspects of their relationship, until the expected utility of compliance favors one side conceding to the will of the other.

In practice, however, current sanctions between the U.S. and Russia do not follow a discrete, unidimensional, cause-effect script. Although sanctions have become a growing feature of each state's foreign policy directed towards the other since 2014, there is less reciprocity than commonly asserted. This lack of reciprocity can be observed when examining the timeline of Ukraine-related sanctions that the EU and the U.S. have imposed on Russia compared with the sanctions that Russia has imposed on the EU or the U.S. in response since March 2014. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty's "A Timeline of All Russia-Related Sanctions" provides a comprehensive and granular accounting of all Ukraine-related Western sanctions and Russian counter-sanctions events from March 2014 to December 2019, including information on which sanctions are new versus renewed[6]. **Figure 1** aggregates these sanctions events by year and by source, focusing on sanctions originating from the United States, the Russian Federation, and the European Union as a whole. The new or renewed EU and U.S. sanctions on Russia are approximately equal in number for the first three years and then begin to diverge in 2017, which reflects the strong and coordinated initial response to Russia's intervention in

[5] Mohammed A., Psaledakis D., Zengerle P. Analysis: U.S. Sanctions on Russia Will Send a Signal, if Not Deter. *Reuters*, 22 March 2021. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-usa-sanctions-analysis/analysis-u-s-sanctions-on-russia-will-send-a-signal-if-not-deter-idUSKBN2BE16D (accessed 10.06.2021).

[6] Gutterman I., Grojec W., RFE/RL's Current Time. A Timeline of All Russia-Related Sanctions. *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty*. 2021. Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-sanctions-timeline/29477179.html (accessed 30.03.2021).

Figure 1
Ukraine-related Western Sanctions on Russia and Russian Sanctions on the West, 2014 – 2019



Source: authors.

Ukraine that the EU and the Obama administration orchestrated, as well as the decline of this coordination under the Trump administration. Russia's aggregate response is conspicuously muted, as Russia has countered the 79 specific sanctions that the EU and the U.S. have collectively imposed with only 14 sanctions of its own against the EU or the U.S., four of which were simply extensions of the duration of sanctions Russia had previously instituted. Furthermore, Moscow's sanctions on the EU and the U.S. have been weaker and more narrowly targeted than those that the EU and the U.S. have imposed on Russia. In particular, Russian sanctions mainly target agricultural goods while the EU and the U.S. have imposed significant restrictions on the pillars of the Russian economy such as the oil, gas, banking, and defense industries.

Russia's muted embrace of reciprocal sanctions does not necessarily reflect that Moscow has not responded to the escalating sanctions regime that the EU and U.S. have imposed on its economy. However, rather than responding in kind with reciprocal sanctions, there is a notable diversity in Moscow's international behavior that has become more pronounced since the first imposition of Ukraine-related Western sanctions in 2014. This is captured by an analysis of the GDELT and ICEWS datasets, which capture millions of international events starting in the mid-1990s and that makes it possible to illuminate broad trends in Washington and Moscow's sanctions-related postures. Using a CAMEO taxonomy of sanctions-related codes associated with both datasets[7], in combination with a list of 'escalation points' where the U.S. strengthened its sanctions regime on Russia, our preliminary research reveals that since 2010 this sanctions relationship has unfolded more as an increasingly complex tangle than as reciprocal or calibrated interaction.

Escalation points are defined as actions taken by the U.S. that are likely to impose significant additional economic costs if Russia continues to refuse to comply with U.S. demands, such as abiding by the terms of the Minsk Accords leading to the return of Crimea to Ukraine. These escalation points may include the application of existing sanctions to a larger number of Russian elites and/or com-

[7] See online Appendix on the article page at journal website.

panies, more stringent enforcement of existing sanctions restrictions, or the imposition of broader sanctions tools such as sectoral and/or secondary sanctions. To identify these escalation points, we first reviewed the details of each of the 43 specific U.S. sanctions described in the RFE / RL dataset, in conjunction with reports and detailed information on these sanctions published by the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) in the U.S. Department of the Treasury[8]. To understand the full breadth of U.S. and Russian sanctions interactions from 2010 to the present, we augmented the list of sanction events with information on the Magnitsky Act – which the U.S. imposed on Russia starting in December 2012 – as well as with information on the sanctions that the U.S. has imposed on Russia since the end of 2019. In total, we identified 11 major events since 2010 where the U.S. either established new sanctions on Russia or significantly enhanced sanctions already in place[9]. **Table 1**

Table 1

Key Ukraine-Related United States Sanctions Against Russia, 2010–2020

UID	Label (Source Country)	Date	Description
S1	Magnitsky Sanctions (US)	December, 2012	• U.S. passes Magnitsky Act, which imposes sanctions on Russian officials involved in the prosecution and death of investigative lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, but also normalized trade relations between the U.S. and Russia[10]. • In anticipation of the Magnitsky Act, the Russian Duma bans international adoptions of Russian orphans by U.S. couples.
S2	First Ukraine Sanctions (US / EU)	March – April, 2014	• First U.S./EU Ukraine-related sanctions-asset freezes and travel ban for limited no. of individuals tied to Crimea annexation and its financing. • Three U.S. Executive Orders[11] (EO #13660, 13661, 13662) signed by Obama, which provide legal authorization for the application of more expansive individual, company, and sector sanctions on Russia. • Russia responds with travel bans on key leaders in the U.S. government.
S3	Sectoral Sanctions – Energy (EU / US)	July – September, 2014	• U.S., as well as the EU, imposes first sanctions on Russia's energy-sector – Limited sanctions imposed on major Russian financial companies (e.g., Gazprombank, VEB Bank) restricting any issuance of new financing with maturity of more than 90 days[12]. • U.S. imposes sectoral sanctions prohibiting new long-term debt issuance to Russian energy companies (e.g., Gazprom, Novatek, Rostec), as well as +7 defense companies. Restricting sales of advanced oil & gas technologies to these companies, as imported technologies are critical to both the ongoing operations & exploration projects of these companies[13]. • U.S. imposes sectoral sanctions on Russian defense industry, restricting the issuance of new long term debt over 30 days maturity[14]. • Russia imposes countersanctions which ban the import of many agricultural products from the EU and the U.S.

[8] United States Treasury Office of Inspector General, "Consolidated Sanctions List Data Files'. Washington, DC: Office of Foreign Asset Controls, United States Treasury Office of Inspector General. 2020. Available at: https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/consolidated-sanctions-list-data-files (accessed: 10.06.2021); Gutterman, Grojec & RFE/RL's Current Time, "A Timeline of All Russia-Related Sanctions".

[9] Ibid.

[10] "Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act", Title XII, Subtitle F of P.L. 114-32. 22 U.S.C. 2656.

[11] Executive Order No. 13660, 79 FR 13491(2014); Executive Order No. 13661, 79 FR 15533 (2014); Executive Order No. 13662, 79 FR 16167 (2014).

[12] Directive 1 Pursuant to EO 13662, 79 FR 16167 (2014), issued July 16, 2014, amended September 29, 2017.

[13] Directives 2 Pursuant to EO 13662, 79 FR 16167 (2014), issued July 16, 2014, amended September 28, 2017.

[14] Directive 3 Pursuant to EO 13662, 79 FR 16167 (2014), issued September 12, 2014.

Table 1. **End**

UID	Label (Source Country)	Date	Description
S4	Crimea Leadership Sanctions	December, 2014	• U.S. imposes sanctions on transactions with Crimea-based persons and entities, as well as sanctions against Russia-backed Crimean leadership[15].
S5	Cyber-Related Sanctions	April, 2015	• U.S. issues blocking sanctions against Russian persons and entities deemed to have engaged in cyber activities that threaten U.S. national security, foreign policy, economic health, or financial stability. Sanctions freeze assets and prohibit U.S. transactions blocked individuals, as well as ban them from entry into the United States[16].
S6	CAATSA Passed (US)	August, 2017	U.S. enacts "Countering American Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA)" on August 2, 2017. This law imposes Congressional constraints against the softening of sanctions on Russia, and also imposes new sanctions on Russia for 2016 electoral interference in U.S. as well as Russian actions in Ukraine and Syria.
S7	Kremlin Report (US)	January, 2018	U.S. issues 'Kremlin Report', which identifies 210 Russian government officials and business elites that could be subject to future U.S. sanctions.
S8	First Use of CATSAA Sanctions	March, 2018	First use of CATSAA law, with U.S. Treasury imposing blocking sanctions on two entities (FSB, GRU) and six individuals related to cyber actions taken on behalf of the Russian government[17].
S9	Skripal / CWB Sanctions	August, 2018	U.S. issues additional sanctions on Russia related to the Skripal poisoning in the U.K. Sanctions ban arms sales, arms financing, government credit / financial assistance, and export of many sensitive goods and services to Russia. U.S. threatens to impose additional sanctions on Russia within 90 days unless it complies with the 1991 U.S. 'Chemical and Biological Weapons and Warfare Elimination Act'(Hedberg 2018).
S10	Sovereign Debt Sanctions	August, 2019	U.S. impose additional sanctions on Russia related to the CBW Act of 1991. These sanctions prohibit U.S. financial institutions from participating in the primary market for Russian government bonds, the direct lending of funds to the Russian government. It also directs that the U.S. government oppose any loan to Russia by international financial institutions[18].
S11	Pipeline and Missile Sanctions (Including PEESA)	November – December, 2020	• U.S. imposes additional sanctions on Russia related to support of Iran's missile development programs. • U.S. imposes sanctions on companies / individuals involved in construction of Russian energy pipelines (PEESA Act)

Source: authors.

lists and summarizes each of these 11 sanctions episodes.

As a baseline, we examined how closely the escalation points in Russia-U.S. sanctions interactions since 2010 map onto the sanctions event data present in the GDELT and ICEWS datasets. **Figure 2** represents the 11 key escalation points as either vertical dashed lines (for sanctions episodes contained in a single month) or vertical grey bars (for multi-month sanctions episodes) overlaying Russia and U.S. reciprocal sanctions events. Russia's events that impose sanctions on the U.S. are represented by the dark grey areas, columns, and lines, respectively, on the first, second, and third charts; U.S. sanction events targeted against Russia are presented in light grey. The sanctions data within GDELT and ICEWS line up fairly well with the escalation points in the Ukraine-related U.S-Russian sanctions, which

[15] Executive Order No. 13685, 79 FR 77357 (2014).
[16] Executive Order No. 13694, 80 FR 18077 (2015).
[17] U.S. Department of the Treasury (2018, March 15). "Treasury Sanctions Russian Cyber Actors for Interference with the 2016 U.S. Elections and Malicious Cyber-Attacks". [Press release]. Available at: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0312 [accessed 10/06/2021].
[18] Executive Order No. 13883, 79 FR 38113 (2019).

Figure 2
Reciprocal Sanction Events (Russia vs. the United States, the United States vs. Russia)



Source: authors using GDELT and ICEWS data.

is not surprising since the GDELT data encompasses all U.S.-Russia sanctions interactions including but not limited to those related to Ukraine. On one hand, this broader context demonstrates that since 2010 the U.S. and Russia have resorted with more frequency to imposing sanctions on each other. Russia's sanctions-related activity as a percentage of its overall foreign attention to the United States tracks closely with the analogous U.S. sanctions-related activity as a sub-set of events directed at Russia. Moreover, upticks in Russian sanctions events follow nearly all upturns in U.S. sanctions targeting Russia since 2010. On the other hand, the scale of Russia's overall response to U.S. sanctions is hardly reciprocal, which mirrors Russia's response to EU and U.S. sanctions related to Ukraine. In both cases, neither the magnitude nor intensity of U.S. sanctions on Russia are directly countered by Moscow. In short, Russia's sanctions activity is a much less prominent feature of the actions it takes targeting the United States than are sanctions within U.S. assertive actions targeting Russia.

This pattern is consistent with detailed insights into Russia's sanctions posture. Some scholars argue, for example, that the Kremlin is more prone to practicing "differentiated retaliations" with its counter-sanctions, aimed less at leveraging economic advantage against vulnerable Western targets than at exacting maximum punishment against the states that Russia perceives as the main drivers of anti-Russian policies – such as its nearest neighbors and the U.S. – while minimizing strategic damage to important European major powers such as the UK, France, Germany, and Italy [Hedberg 2018]. Others tie Russia's sanctions behavior to factors related to geographic scope, to financial and institutional features of Moscow's sanction-related behaviour, and to

Figure 3
Russia and U.S. Reciprocal Coercion Events (Russia vs. the United States, the United States vs. Russia)



Source: authors using GDELT and ICEWS data.

divergent perceptions of threat from across economic sectors [Aalto, Forsberg 2016]. Such a case analysis is reinforced by broader trends in Russia's posture.

Yet, as illuminated by the events data, to the extent that there is a "reactive" dimension, the "main events" may be more across-strategy/domain, rather than reciprocal. Specifically, U.S. sanctions targeted at Russia tend to correspond with more frequent and intensive surges in Russia's overall coercive posture directed at the West, especially since 2015. **Figure 3** illustrates that Russia's coercive threats and material action directed at the U.S. not only follow a pattern close to the imposition of U.S. targeted sanctions, but that both forms of coercion meet and sometimes exceed the frequency of U.S. sanctions, especially since the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014.

There also seem to be distinct cross-domain and geographic patterns to Russia's broader coercive counter-response. **Figure 4**, in particular, reveals that Moscow tends to impose predominantly legal forms of coercion directed at the U.S. – with occasional bouts of military and security forms – prior to and during periods of U.S.-imposed sanctions.

In addition, **Figure 5**, which depicts by target state the domains through which Russia has deployed material coercion since 2014, shows that Russia appears to embrace a geographically differentiated approach to its use of material coercion in 2014, the first year of Ukraine-related sanctions. Not surprisingly, Russia used the military domain in its coercive attempts against Ukraine that year, but Russia also preferred the military channel when it attempted to coerce Estonia, Finland, and Poland. Likewise, the majority of Russia's material coercive actions against Iran took place in the economic domain, but this is not true in the case of the U.S., the U.K., France, or Germany,

Figure 4
Domains of Russia and U.S. Reciprocal Coercion Events



Source: authors using GDELT data

Figure 5
Forms of Material Coercion Used by Russia in 2014, by Target State

Frequency and Domains of Russia's Use of Material Coercion Against Target States, 2014
GDELT dataset. Country colors represent Russia's material coercion as a % of all Russian events to target. Size of pie chart represents raw number of material coercive events, with wedges relative percentage of these by event domain.

Source: authors using GDELT data.

despite the leading role that these countries played in imposing a coordinated EU-U.S. sanctions regime on Russia. Such targeted statecraft, however, does not seem to be preceded by graduated threats of imposing sanctions on the West.

3

The distinctive orthogonal dimensions to U.S.-Russian sanctions-related activity suggests a blind-spot to the prevailing Western bargaining model of international sanctions. The persistence of seemingly unsuccessful bouts can derive from factors other than a sender's problems with communicating or imposing sufficient costs – sunk, audience, or punishment. Rather, painful or ineffective sanctions can be rationally sustained by senders and targets that operate on different conceptual planes. The problem can rest with the very different ways that each side understands the appropriate context and role of sanctions. This is especially apropos to the contemporary U.S.-Russian context, as revealed from multidimensional analysis of the respective national discourse surrounding sanctions.

Contending Worldviews

We have argued elsewhere that Western and Russian strategic communities embrace alternative "worldviews" – comprised of shared basic beliefs, values, and coherent understandings regarding the meaning, processes, and legitimacy of sanctions as an instrument of political influence [Darsey, Stulberg 2019]. Such worldviews do not constitute theories or logical explanations for sanctions; rather, they represent pre-analytic prisms – comprised of axioms about relevant types of issues, actors, goals, and appropriate relationships – that inform the construction of causal arguments. Holders of worldviews interpret new information through these filters. Although they represent deeply rooted knowledge within a community, their tenets and coherence are conspicuous and can be readily articulated [Brown, Phillips 1991; Griffiths 2007; Wright 1982]. Such discourse may not reflect objective truth as much as "the practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak [Foucault 1972]". Thus, by linking texts to social contexts, discourse analysis illuminates how actors construct meaning and appropriateness from the artifacts of sanctions around them.

This raises the question of whether contending strategic conceptions translate into real-world differences in the signals that Russian and non-Russian policymakers intend to send when they impose and respond to economic sanctions, such as the sanctions that the EU and U.S. have imposed on Russia since March 2014. This question is important because the non-Russian academic literature largely reflects how EU and U.S. policymakers employ economic sanctions and the signals they intend to communicate through their use. Western policymakers employ sanctions assuming that Russian targets can interpret the signals the West conveys through sanctions, as well as that Russia's response to the sanctions should be interpreted in like manner. If instead policymakers in Russia, the EU, and the U.S. are 'worlds apart' in how they use sanctions and the signals they intend to convey through these, then it becomes more likely that the current sanctions persist, potentially leading to the 'locking in' of mutual distrust and perpetual low-grade conflict. Conversely, shared understanding opens the possibility for the resolution of the differences underlying the sanctions, or at minimum that the dispute over sanctions does not spill over into other areas where Russia and the West share important interests, such as combatting terrorism and preventing nuclear proliferation.

The questions that we raise cannot be answered directly[19]. Given that sanctions impose costs on both the target and the sending state, as well as the fact that these costs are likely incurred by a limited set of industries or companies in the sending state, the demands

[19] Such definitive answers would require uncovering the "true" message that political leaders in the sanctioning state want to signal through their policy choices, as well as the target state actions or behaviors that they wish to trigger and that would satisfy the sanctioning state's demands.

that the sending state convey are likely to be a compromise between competing interests and the priorities of different groups within the state. Even if the sender wished to communicate these directly, it is unlikely that it could do so with a unified voice. Likewise, the words and actions that the target state takes in response to sanctions are likely to be the result of internal deliberation and compromise between competing groups, given the unequal distribution of both the costs imposed by sanctions and the ability and willingness to endure these costs. Even if both sides were unified in the messages that they intended to convey through sanctions, it is not clear that either side would have an incentive to communicate these messages directly, or how, when, and where they might communicate such a message.

Accordingly, there is no single source of data available to establish the interests, motivations, and demands of the source and target states engaged in using economic sanctions to resolve a dispute. However, both sender and target states provide partial clues to their intentions, interests, messages, and desired outcomes in the words that they use and the actions that they take during the period when one state imposes sanctions on the other. These clues exist in different sources, including strategic documents, the statements and 'on-the-record' comments that government officials make to the press about sanctions, in the less formal comments that these officials and influential private citizens make to the press on background for news reports, as well as in the record of everyday interactions between sender and target states that occur outside of the realm of sanctions. Each of these sources offers an important but incomplete perspective of the interests, motivations, and intentions that drive the 'sanctions dance' between the imposing and target state. When examined together, however, these sources form a mosaic picture of each side's interests and motivations, with patterns of congruency and divergence emerging between statements and actions.

To construct such a mosaic, we utilized the above list of major sanctions events as reference points, or 'anchors', in a layered analysis of multiple data sources that characterize Russia's response to sanctions. These sources include Russia-sourced events within the GDELT database and statements in Interfax made by Russian political and economic leaders in reaction to Ukraine-related Western sanction. Using these data sources, together with recent scholarship on the relationship between sanctions and war, we found that the significant differences we observed between Western and Russian communities of scholars and related research on sanctions resonate with how the Russian press portrays U.S.-Russia relations and the statements made by Russian elites concerning Western sanctions. The two communities of scholars draw insights and operate in isolation of each other, as well as emphasize different intrinsic dimensions to sanctions, which is suggestive of fundamentally divergent core conceptualizations of sanctions. This echoes in the Russian popular press' portrayal of the strategic interactions between Russia and the U.S., which tends to inflate conflict between the two states and de-emphasize the degree to which Russia drives this conflict. Furthermore, when Russian elites talk with the press about Western sanctions, they devote less attention to the strategic dimensions of sanctions. Instead, they focus more narrowly on the macroeconomic impact, as well as the utility of asymmetrical responses including import substitution, domestic regulation, national innovation, and strategic trade diversification away from the West and towards India and China [Darsey, Stulberg 2019].

Same Events, Divergent Perspectives: Russian vs. Non-Russian Depictions of U.S.-Russian Interactions During the Ukraine Crisis (2014–2020)

The previous findings are reinforced by data analysis of the broader non-academic policy discourse on sanctions in the Russian press. To develop this perspective, we utilized the automatically extracted structured event data from the GDELT system, including a curated corpus of Russian-language articles from the popular press that included multiple mentions of sanc-

tions-related terms[20]. For this analysis, we utilized the scope and scale of the GDELT data to identify similarities and differences in how Russian and non-Russian publications have portrayed U.S.-Russian interactions surrounding Ukraine-related Western sanctions on Russia[21].

Figure 6 distills Russian and non-Russian portrayals of U.S-Russia interactions by showing the net difference in the percentage of conflictual and conflictual-material events extracted and reported in GDELT from Russian and non-Russian sources. Overall, this analysis shows that Russian publications are mainly aligned with non-Russian publications in describing the ebb and flow of interactions between Russia and the U.S. However, Russian publications portray the nature of these interactions quite differently. Specifically, they depict Russia and the U.S. as being locked into more peer-like competition, where Russia is the target of a greater share of U.S. events than is reported by non-Russian news outlets. This suggests that Russia commands relatively the same attention among U.S. policymakers as the U.S. commands among officials in Moscow. Another aspect of this difference rests with how Russian publications portray the nature of Russia-U.S. relations. Russian sources report a greater percentage of conflictual U.S.-Russian interactions than do non-Russian publications. Similarly, the Russian-sourced discourse emphasizes the material, action-oriented dimension to this conflict over the diplomatic and verbal dimensions. This combined conflict and action-oriented portrayal was particularly pronounced during the first two years of the Ukraine crisis. Relative to non-Russian sources, in 2014 Russian sources over-hyped the percentage of conflictual interactions that the U.S. targeted on Russia, as well as the extent of material conflict between the two states. Conversely, Russian sources portrayed a much more material response to the U.S. from April 2015 to June 2016 than suggested by actual events where the U.S. progressively increased its sanction regime without substantive reciprocal response from Russia. Taken as a whole, these patterns suggest that there are substantive and systematic differences in how Russian news portrays relations with the U.S. that may, in turn, reflect a broader basis for the 'different worldviews' seen in the Russian and non-Russian academic discourse.

Sanctions as Substitutes vs. Instruments of War

The distinct asymmetrical and multidimensional patterns to contemporary U.S.-Russian sanctions-related postures also dovetail with fundamental differences in the contextual framing of sanctions among respective Western and Russian strategic communities. In traditional Western scholarship, sanctions constitute a non-kinetic instrument of international coercion aimed at indirectly influencing a target's behavior. They serve as a form of economic warfare – aimed at weakening the economy of a target – that, in turn, shape the strategic choices of a target. They can represent foreign policy "on the cheap," applying sufficient pressure on a target to avert the costly use of force. Accordingly, sanctions are conceived of as a non-violent alternative to employing brute force or waging military warfare that are traditionally characterized by physically imposing a sender's will on a target [Baldwin 2020; Peterson, Drury 2011]. Although the employment of sanctions may be part of a strategy to coerce or soften up a target for subsequent military attack, as well as correlate with incidences of the use of military force, there is nonetheless a clear dichotomy between

[20] We based our identification of Russian publications on the URL associated with GDELT's structured event data. Since mid-2013, GDELT data has included a URL field for all coded event records, which provides a basis for identifying events sourced from known Russian publishers, as well as additional publishers using a 'ru' domain name indicating that the publisher's location is the Russian Federation. Russian publications are the source of more than 500,000 interstate event records in GDELT from 2014–2020, which represents approximately 5% of the total events that GDELT reports during this time period. This affords the opportunity to compare how Russian and non-Russian sources describe Russian and U.S. actions since the first Ukraine-related Western sanctions in early 2014.

[21] Elsewhere, this comparison informs more in-depth analysis of the full text of 3,000,000 Russian language articles that discuss sanctions from the Russian popular press. This is used to identify key concepts and themes as they evolved over the same time period.

Figure 6

How Russian and Non-Russian Sources Portray Level and Nature of Conflict Events in U.S. – Russia Interactions



Source: authors using GDELT data.

decisions regarding the imposition of sanctions and those related to the escalation to engagement in violent warfare. At base, sanctions are conceived as non-violent instruments of policy that are part of a bargaining process aimed at manipulating the perceptions and choices made independently by target decisionmakers.

Conversely, from the Russian perspective, sanctions are part of an emerging broader definition of war that subsumes both kinetic and non-kinetic domains. Sanctions are integral to the contemporary strategic discourse that features a continuum of hostility with rivals, blurring clear distinctions between peace and war. Although often discussed as part of Western strategies of coercion and hybrid warfare, there is mounting emphasis on sanctions as an intrinsic part of the changing nature of warfare, not simply as a precursor to the escalation of kinetic warfare. As detailed by Jonsson, the broad discourse reflected in official documents and among Russian national security and defense intellectuals and policymakers has undergone profound change whereby the nature of war is no longer confined to violent conflict. Rather, the widespread diffusion of information technology and advent of "color revolutions" now present existential threats to sovereign states on par with violent territorial conquest [Fridman 2018; Jonsson 2019].

The unprecedented capacity by external foes to use military and non-military means to subvert or otherwise forcibly orchestrate regime change in a rival state directly implicates sanctions as an element of warfare. Accordingly, sanctions are intrinsically linked to the conduct of color revolutions by external states, used to stoke "controlled chaos," escalate extremism, empower fifth columns, and undermine targeted regimes that are tantamount to defeat on the battlefield [Jonsson 2019; Nikitina 2014]. Putin, in particular, has characterized sanctions as an instrument of war, aimed explicitly at eroding national sovereignty, destabilizing unwanted regimes, and provoking coups in order to physically impose the will of a foreign state on the society and leadership of a rival state [Nikitina 2014]. By the same token, sanctions have been called out as forms of asymmetrical, low intensity, and next generation warfare by military scholars that integrate them into the predominant non-kinetic dimensions to contemporary campaigns of war [Adamsky 2018; Berzins 2019]. Thus, whereas Western scholars regard the resort to sanctions as a distinct form of coercion that substitutes for engaging in war, the Russian strategic community increasingly treats sanctions as part of the transformation of warfare where they are critical to intra-war escalation by non-military means.

Leadership Framing of Cross-Domain Response to Sanctions

An additional aspect of the contending worldviews between Russia and the U.S. can be discerned from the statements about Western sanctions that the Russian political and business leadership make in the press in response to current sanctions events. These statements represent the evolving externally-focused messaging on sanctions as communicated by different major Russian government bodies, as well as the positions conveyed by executives from leading Russian companies in the face of targeted EU and U.S. sanctions. Since these statements occur contemporaneously with the evolution of Western sanctions on Russia, they offer insights into how the Russian leadership acknowledges, processes, interprets, and responds to Western sanctions in real time, as well as provide guidance for the strategies and tactics of Russia's response.

To understand how Russian political and business elites have responded to Western sanctions, we reviewed all news headlines that included the terms 'Russia' and 'sanctions' in the title or abstract published between March 2014 and October 2020 by *Interfax*, one of the leading media aggregators of Russian-language news. We filtered this dataset of approximately 2,500 headlines to include only those articles that reported a statement made by senior leaders in either the Russian government/parliament or in Russian industry; we then applied machine learning tools to identify and categorize the speaker's stance towards Western sanctions. This allowed us to analyze patterns in *who* within Russia's elite responds to different sanctions episodes, as well as *what* response these sanctions elicit. Specifically, this exposes the degree to which Russian official reactions to Western sanctions comport with the West's understanding of the intended purpose, legitimacy, and signals tied to sanctions. We looked for statements that indicated either how the speaker interpreted the impact and intended message of each 'sanction incident' or conveyed a threat or actual response to EU-U.S. sanctions taken by Russia. We classified these responses into three major groups: 'Statement, Claims or Comments About Sanctions'; 'Reciprocal Responses to Sanctions'; and 'Non-Reciprocal/Orthogonal Responses to Sanctions', as described in more detail below.

Figure 7 identifies the major organizational groups and sub-groups associated with each speaker. Most headlines attributed to Russian officials were for those affiliated with the Office of the President, the Duma (lower house of parliament), and the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Military Technological Cooperation, and Defense; for these groups, we identified the specific functional or technical role that the individual plays within the group. Examining government statements with this level of detail allows for assessing differences in the messages and/or perspectives addressed by different government stakeholders, as well as for examining whether these different sub-groups

Figure 7

Number and Source of Russian Elite Statements About Western Sanctions, 2014 – 2020



Source: authors using Interfax Newswires.

may be tasked with delivering certain types of messages[22]. The greatest variability in this data is in the absolute and relative number of statements made by Putin or his senior staff in the Russian Presidency, which peaked at the beginning of the Ukraine crisis and again in 2018. These points coincide with the greatest number of statements made by Russian elites.

The number of newswire articles containing statements about sanctions by Russian political and business leaders tracks closely with each of the major escalation points in the U.S.' sanction regime against Russia. Russian government officials and business leaders were particularly vocal in March/April 2014, when the U.S. and the EU first imposed Ukraine-related sanctions on Russia, as well as over the summer of that year. The latter period coincided with the issuance of the U.S. Treasury Department's initial sanctions target lists and the attendant Russian government's counter-sanctions in August 2014. Two other noticeable spikes in the frequency of government and business comments occurred in January 2018 and August 2019, corresponding with the release in the U.S. of the 'Kremlin Report', that listed 210 additional potential sanctions targets and the initiation of a broad set of sanctions against the Russian arms industry. However, these latter spikes in the number of Russian comments is less than the volume of such comments in early 2014, despite the fact that U.S. sanctions imposed progressively larger costs on the Russian economy over time. This suggests that government and business elites may have become resigned to accept sanctions as a lasting feature of Russia's relationship with the U.S.

At the same time that the volume of Russian elite comments on U.S. sanctions has declined, the nature of these comments has changed. This is captured by the shift in relative size of the colored areas on the chart in **Figure 8**, which represent three broad classes of statements about Western sanctions issued by the Russian elite. The most prominent of these colors across all months on the chart is light grey, which represents statements of fact or opinions about Western sanctions. These comments include condemnations of Western sanctions, such as statements that these sanctions are unwarranted or hypocritical, as well as claims about the actual or potential impact and effectiveness of these sanctions. While the West's sanctions serve as prompts for these statements, they are essentially part of the regular give-and-take of diplomatic discourse,

[22] This can include differences in the communications of official responses made by the Russian government to Western sanctions, as well as different patterns in who speaks that may change over time or in relation to the intensity/novelty of the sanctions that the West imposes.

Figure 8
Major U.S. Sanctions on Russia and Categories of Russian Political and Business Elite Statements About Sanctions, 2014 – 2020



Source: authors using Interfax Newswires.

as they do not communicate information about any actions that Russia may threaten or take in direct response to the West's sanctions.

Russian elite discourse concerning the direct reciprocal versus non-reciprocal response to Western sanctions is captured in the intermediate grey and dark grey areas on the chart in **Figure 8**. We defined "reciprocal responses" as those that align with Western academic literature on sanctions and associated strategic interactions between states – that is, responses that either threaten or announce Russia's capitulation to Western sanctions or the threat or imposition of counter-sanctions that are of similar scope and impact to the sanctions the West has imposed on Russia. Non-reciprocal responses constitute threats or actions that Russia has clearly tied to Western sanctions, but that are fundamentally different from the West's sanctions in size, scale, scope, and target. The majority of these statements exhibit 'issue linkage' between continued Western sanctions and *reduced cooperation* by Russia with international issues that are not directly related to Ukraine or the West's related sanctions. Most of these statements pertain to reducing Russia's support for international sanctions imposed on other countries, such as Syria, Iran, Venezuela, and North Korea. These statements generally express the solidarity that Russia has with other states that are subject to similar 'unjust' international sanctions, and in some cases they convey Russia's intention to undermine the effectiveness of these sanctions on other states including Iran and North Korea.

Another set of statements link Western sanctions to a *refocus in Russia's relations* with other countries, such as discontinuing U.S.-Russian joint terrorism efforts or re-centering Russia's foreign relations on Asia. Finally, a relatively small but important set of statements reflect *possible asymmetric retaliation* by Russia against

U.S. or the EU. These contain vague threats that could indicate an escalation and/or broadening of Russia's conflict with the West, such as threats of sanctions that will 'cause serious discomfort to the American side'[23], 'painful countermeasures'[24], or 'asymmetrical actions'[25]. Although conspicuous, these threats contrast markedly with the larger number of 'reciprocal response' statements that explicitly use the language of Western academic discourse on sanctions. The latter include promises that Russia will respond with 'reciprocal sanctions'[26] that are proportionate in effect to the sanctions the West has imposed on Russia[27].

* * *

Sanctions are increasingly regarded as a long-term fixture in the gathering great power competition between Russia and the West. Notwithstanding their limited effectiveness at achieving direct aims, scholars and experts on all sides treat them as low-cost measures to signal displeasure, coerce, or punish the other in an ongoing struggle. Within American policy analytic circles, sanctions are regarded "simply as fact of life," aimed at minimum to send a proportionate message to a recalcitrant Moscow: "we are watching these (malign) activities, we're going to call them out"[28]. Similarly, pragmatists in Moscow call on the Kremlin not only to refine calibrated coercion campaigns but to "regard U.S. sanctions as a stimulus to work towards further economic, financial, technological, informational, and cultural independence amid global competition [Trenin 2021]." Such views are predicated on the classic bargaining model that places real and anticipated costs and benefits, as well as international signaling, at the crux of strategies to threaten and impose sanctions and to account for a target's response.

Yet, as we demonstrate in this paper, critical assumptions at the crux of this strategic dynamic are empirically and analytically circumscribed. The multi-dimensional data analytical examination of Russian discourse and posture regarding sanctions exposes fundamental differences over their appropriateness and strategic context. As reflected in Russian discourse, unilateral sanctions imposed by Western rivals not only lack legitimacy, but reflect the adversary's commitment to fomenting colored revolutions and undermining the Kremlin's political legitimacy through non-violent means. In this context, Moscow is prone to view U.S. sanctions as an instrument of war, thus potentially widening and deepening the dimensions of confrontation. At the same time, with growing confidence in key regional and strategic conventional and nuclear military balances, Moscow is emboldened to employ sanctions together with other non-military instruments as part of assertive and wide-ranging cross-domain coercive campaigns [Ven Bruusgaard 2021]. This flies in the

[23] Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, quoted by Interfax in "'Serious discomfort; to be caused to U.S. in response to new sanctions against Russia – Peskov', Moscow: Interfax. December 30, 2016.

[24] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, quoted by Interfax in "Russia to take painful countermeasures if U.S. expands sanctions – Foreign Ministry'. Moscow: Interfax. October 19, 2016.

[25] Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, quoted in Intefax in "Russia will respond to sanctions imposed against it using principles of mutuality, but asymmetrical actions are also possible – Peskov'. Moscow: Interfax July 31, 2015; Franz Klitsevich, First Deputy head of the Federation Council Defense and Security Committee, quoted by Interfax in "Broader U.S. sanctions against Russia to kill last chance for normalizing bilateral relations – Federation Council member". Moscow: Interfax. October 27, 2017.

[26] Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, quoted by Interfax in "Peskov on Moscow's possible reaction to extension of EU sanctions: reciprocity principle applies". Moscow: Interfax. June 18, 2015.

[27] See especially Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2021), Заявление МИД России об ответных мерах в связи с враждебными действиями США (Russian Foreign Ministry statement on retaliatory measures in connection with hostile actions by the United States). Available at: https://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/us/-/asset_publisher/unVXBbj4Z6e8/content/id/4689067 (accessed 10.06.2021).

[28] White House. Remarks by President Biden on Russia *The White House Briefing Room*. April 15, 2021. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/15/remarks-by-president-biden-on-russia/ (accessed 10.06.2021); and Mohammed A., Psaledakis D., Zengerle P. Analysis: U.S. sanctions on Russia Will Send a Signal, if Not Deter. Reuters. March 22, 2021. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-usa-sanctions-analysis/analysis-u-s-sanctions-on-russia-will-send-a-signal-if-not-deter-idUSKBN2BE16D (accessed: 10.06.2021).

face of the prevailing Western conception that sanctions constitute means for strategic competition that are distinct from war or that clearly signal intentions to slow or avert escalation. Accordingly, assumptions that Russia and the West mirror image each other in this strategic contest are not only problematic, but can blind us to inadvertent outcomes to what otherwise appear to each side to be low-cost demonstrations of resolve or calibrated action.

This discourse analysis suggests that expected utility calculations and incoherent signaling alone do not capture the dynamic and multidimensional character of the transatlantic sanctions snarl. Rather, the contending worldviews potentially compound burdens of uncertainty and costly signaling in sanctions between the U.S. and Russia. Moreover, the mutual default to sustaining unsuccessful unilateral sanctions ironically not only confirms each side's parochial assessments of its leverage over the other, but it also introduces cross-domain risks that can defy efforts to fine-tune the imposition of costs. If not redressed, this dynamic can derail efforts at strategic reengagement, if not inadvertently elevate prospects for dangerous escalation.

The disconnect between Western and Russian approaches to the threat and imposition of sanctions, therefore, suggests several constructive avenues for future research. Firstly, future research on the coercive use of sanctions should endeavor to embrace an empathetic approach to signaling. Because contending worldviews frame the strategic context within which sanctions are perceived, considered, and assessed, adversaries need to refine signals to demonstrate commitment, credibility, reassurance, and reputation in a manner attuned to the other's frame of reference. Therefore, new research should be devoted to understanding how best to tailor signals to be received in a desired manner rather than myopically focusing on refining the impact of sanctions on a discrete target.

Secondly, given the proclivity for at least some actors in a sanctions tangle to blur boundaries between peace and war, future research should explore how sanctions threats and punitive measures are interconnected. With the growing attention to coercive dimensions, there has been a movement to treat sanctions threats and imposition as part of a strategic continuum. While some now underscore that contending logics may warrant treating them as distinct, the research here suggests that the threat and imposition of sanctions may be directly linked due to risks of inadvertent escalation [Morgan et al. 2020]. The mechanisms that produce sanctions threats as a calibrated form of coercion for one party may only fuel the escalatory logic behind the other's resort to both non-military and military instruments of war. Accordingly, the attention to calibration should begin by reassessing preferred outcomes, targeting sanctions and inducements to affect critical inflection points in a target's decision-making, rather than by defaulting to strategies for gradually escalating impact.

Finally, future research on sanctions should be directly tied to broader analysis of the dynamics of cross-domain strategic coercion, warfare, and stability. Because sanctions, like other non-military instruments, are contrarily seen by rival strategic communities as substitutes versus instruments of warfare, such threats and punitive measures raise the specter of both horizontal and vertical escalation. From one perspective, this could contribute to a stability-instability paradox, whereby balance at the kinetic level among great powers may encourage more frequent but moderated cross-domain competition. However, divergent worldviews suggest that such competitive strategies are neither discrete nor linear. As one party may see sanctions as a means to signal displeasure while diffusing vertical escalation, the other may regard them as a form of vertical escalation. Accordingly, what may seem to one party to be a low-cost form for maintaining steady and graduated pressure on a rival below a red-line may be more akin to walking blindly in the other's minefield. The latter inadvertently risks either precipitating reflexive escalation across the red-line into violent kinetic warfare, or plummeting political relations to depths that confound prospects for constructive engagement even under more propitious strategic circumstances. In this regard, focusing on the interaction of contending sanctions worldviews and postures can yield new insights into enduring and unintended strategic consequences of great power rivalry.

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ТЕНЬ САНКЦИЙ

СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИЕ ПОСЛЕДСТВИЯ РАЗЛИЧИЙ В САНКЦИОННОЙ ПОЛИТИКЕ США И РОССИИ

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Резюме

Экономические санкции стали определяющей чертой отношений между Россией и США / ЕС после начала украинского конфликта в 2014 году. И Москва, и Вашингтон, похоже, согласны с тем, что санкции будут оставаться в силе на неопределённый срок. Такое постоянство представляет собой парадокс: западные политики неоднократно вводили дополнительные ограничения, несмотря на отсутствие свидетельств того, что санкции сработали для достижения декларируемых целей. В данной статье исследуется природа и происхождение этого парадокса с использованием многомерного анализа действий и дискурса России и США с момента введения санкций в отношении Москвы, связанных с Украиной, в марте 2014 года. Этот анализ выявляет фундаментальные различия в том, как стороны воспринимают целесообразность и стратегический контекст этих мер, которые отражают коренное различие во взглядах Москвы и Вашингтона. Эти противоречия в мировоззрениях потенциально способны усугубить бремя неопределенности при санкциях между США и Россией, что также создает риски перелива конфликтности, которые могут препятствовать усилиям по точному дозированию имеющихся затрат. Если не исправить эту динамику, это может подорвать усилия по возобновлению стратегического взаимодействия, а то и непреднамеренно повысить вероятность опасной эскалации.

Ключевые слова:

санкции; Россия; США; ЕС; дискурс.

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MIGRATION STATECRAFT
MANAGING MIGRATION FLOWS AT A BILATERAL LEVEL

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Abstract

This article assesses the theoretical contours and effectiveness of migration governance and diplomacy as an instrument of statecraft in interstate relations. The first part provides an overview of the stakes and challenges of migration within the fields of international relations and political theory. In particular, the category of migration defies the theoretical model of the nation-state, on which traditional IR and political theory are grounded. The second part highlights how the state, through the securitization of migration, uses migration as a tool to reaffirm its defining features: reinforcing its borders, legitimating state sovereignty, and building societal security. The third section demonstrates the usefulness of the category of statecraft within the context of migration governance at a bilateral level owing to the absence of a global normative framework. This relationship can serve different purposes, depending on the context: to harm, to deter, to bargain, to escalate. The last section presents contemporary case studies of the application of migration statecraft by the United States and Russia, as well as by member states along external border of the European Union and within the Schengen space. The elements of "migration statecraft" evidenced by these episodes focus on several objectives: trade blackmail, cooperation in an asymmetrical relation, political threat, and diplomatic escalation for electoral purposes. The variety of these cases illustrates the specificity of statecraft in comparison with foreign policy analysis. While the latter refers to a general and long-term strategy, the former is context-dependent and specific to achievement of a precise desired outcome.

Keywords:

Statecraft; Nation-state; Securitization; Migration; Russia; United States; European Union.

This article applies migration diplomacy theory [Adamson, Tsourapas 2018] to the study of evolution of contemporary statecraft. The definition of statecraft as "patterns of behaviour of states as they pursue their goals in external affairs" [Jordan et al. 2021a; 2021b] proves to be relevant within the context of migration governance at a bilateral level. Contemporary mass migration is a global phenomenon, which includes the movement of people from one state to other states due to various reasons: war, economy, labour, demography, climate change, family linkages, and many others.

This article is a result of a collaborative research project on the modern trends in the evolution of statecraft by the MGIMO School of Government and International Affairs and the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. A Russian version of this article is published in the second part of this special issue of International Trends. The Russian and English versions are not identical. The key term statecraft cannot be translated directly into Russian, that is why the Russian articles in this special issue use a variety of longer definitions of statecraft depending on the context. For a discussion of English and Russian definitions see the introductory article in this volume.

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This article assesses the theoretical usefulness of "statecraft" as a category in the analysis of international migration governance. The first section provides an overview of theoretical perspectives on the stakes and challenges of migration. In particular, the category of migration defies the theoretical model of the nation-state, in which traditional IR and political theory are grounded. The second section demonstrates how states, through the securitization of migration, use migration governance as a proxy tool for the purposes of reinforcing state borders, legitimating measures to increase state sovereignty, and building societal security. The third section of the article demonstrates the usefulness of the category of statecraft for analyzing migration governance at the bilateral level. Due to the lack of a global normative framework concerning migration, the most common form of migration governance occurs at the bilateral level. This relationship can serve different purposes: to harm, to deter, to bargain, or to escalate, depending on the context. As an illustration, the last section discusses the contemporary cases of the United States, Russia, the external border of the European Union, and the borders between the Schengen zone states. I show that the tactics of "migration statecraft" may have various objectives: improving the terms of bilateral trade, forcing cooperation in an asymmetrical relationship, issuing political threats, and ginning up diplomatic escalation for electoral purposes. The variety of these case studies illustrates the specificity of statecraft in comparison with foreign policy analysis. While the latter refers to a general and long-term strategy, the former is context-dependent and specific to the achievement of a specific desired outcome.

1

In order to tackle the complexity and the multi-dimensional features of migration, it is necessary to follow an interdisciplinary approach combining political theory with international relations. Since migration questions the very category of the state and the traditional state-centric perspective, it poses an explicit challenge for political and theoretical categories in both traditional IR and political theory literatures. Therefore, as a starting point, this article adopts a critical approach, looking at the multidimensional character of the migration process.

Migration refers to mobility and the flux of people, goods, services, and ideas. According to the UN, there were 272 million migrants in 2019 (3% of the global population), 65.5 million forcibly displaced immigrants, 22.5 million refugees, and more than 10 million stateless people in the world. With this wide phenomenon of mass mobility worldwide and within the context of globalisation, we live in what has been defined as "the age of migration" [de Haas et al. 2019], or "the migration state" [Hollifield 2004]. The United Nations describes "migrant" as "an umbrella term, not defined under international law, reflecting the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons"[1]. In addition, there are broader categories of those who temporarily cross borders, which can overlap: tourists, commuters, and expatriates.

A large amount of literature in IR highlights how migration, through the process of crossing borders, challenges most of its theoretical premises. In particular, the phenomenon of migration puts into question: a) the distinction between domestic and international realms, namely the "Great Divide" in international relations [Clark 1998]; b) the traditional state-centric approach, which is replaced by a world politics paradigm based on interdependence and transnationalism [Nye, Keohane 1971]; c) the idea of fixed borders, which causes "the end of territories" [Badie 1995]; d) the spatial idea of territory, namely the "territorial trap" [Doty 1996]; e) state security, with the introduction of the category of societal security [Waever et al. 1993]. One major theoretical

[1] International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2019). viewed 27th April 2021. URL: https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf (accessed: 11.06.2021).

challenge to the study of IR is that the source of power and authority lies in the inviolability of the nation-state. Migration, due to its transnational nature, challenges the sovereignty and authority of the nation-state, to the extent that it threatens the principle of territorial integrity [Hollifield 2004].

From a constructivist and critical perspective, Roxanne Doty [1996] argues that, by blurring the divide between domestic and international domains, global migration breaks the "conventional spatial imagery" of territory and the interconnection between territory, national identity, and political community. In other words, migration discloses a "territorial trap", which was based on three arguments: a) states as fixed units of sovereign space; b) the dichotomy between domestic and international arenas; c) states as spatial containers of societies. In addition, illegal immigration undermines the authority of sovereign states. Doty looks at borders and boundaries not as a natural given, but as subjects of negotiation, disputes, and national interests.

Likewise, in political theory literature, migration challenges a number of aspects of the nation-state model, including the category of membership in a polity [Arendt 1976; Walzer 1983], the ideas of political representation [Benhabib 2005], and national identity [von Busekist 2004]. These criticisms usually follow two paths: either the multicultural theory [Kymlicka 2007] or the post-nationalist and globalization theories [Appadurai 1996]. The nation-state model is based on the premise that the state as "the political structure where sovereign power is exercised within a specific territory over a population" is defined through three interconnected elements: territory, population, and sovereignty [Bobbio 1989: 90]. This model relates to Westphalian sovereignty, which is grounded in the idea of territorial integrity and borders. By contrast, "nation", following a constructivist approach, is a more recent ideology that binds people together in a shared network of values, interests, cultures, and languages through state-led policies in education, media and culture [Anderson 2006; Gellner 1983]. According to Agnès Czajka [2014], from a Foucauldian perspective, state and nation were conceived as opposites before the French Revolution. The state epitomized the sovereign, whereas the nation the people. After the Revolution and especially during the 19th and 20th century, the nation-state was conceived as a category whose main purpose was the protection of its citizens, understood as its nationals [Foucault 2003]. Similarly, Hannah Arendt defines the nation-state as a "tragic" result of the combination of state and nationality. Her theory of "the right to have rights" demonstrates how the state changed from being an instrument of the law to becoming an instrument of the nation, excluding *de facto* those who were not members of the national community [Arendt 1976: 230].

The issue of membership and the classification of categories of people, be they citizens or stateless, is key to understanding the contemporary theoretical challenges brought to political theory by migration. Accordingly, American liberal philosopher Michael Walzer underlines the importance of membership in a political community and stresses the divide between nationals and foreigners (namely *metics*), citizens, and denizens [1983: 87]. Access to citizenship rights and the attainment of political membership rights by non-members are among the most important contemporary political issues. Migrants do not belong to a single nation-state; rather they move from one state to another or many others, mixing and combining identities (in some cases even having dual citizenships), paying taxes in different countries, voting in a country other than their nationality, and building links across countries, languages, cultures, and religions. Political philosopher Seyla Benhabib argues that the very scale of global migration causes a crisis of territoriality. According to her theory, the normative model in which a unitary concept of citizenship corresponds to a defined territory, a national identity, and an administrative bureaucracy no longer exists [2005]. The EU provides an outstanding case of this form of "disaggregation of citizenship", distancing the categories of territory, citizenship, and national identity. The privileges of political membership are

indeed allocated to all citizens of member countries of the Union who may reside in territories other than those of their nationality. The divide has therefore shifted to insiders/outsiders of the EU, as the case of Brexit has perfectly demonstrated.

2

Because migration challenges the sovereignty of the nation-state, the state, through various policies of securitization, uses migration as a way to reaffirm the importance of borders and to define territories and national identities. Within the framework of the politics of fear, the securitization of migration has been developed as a new political category within the context of homeland security and the "war on terror". Since 9/11, migration has become above all an international security concern. According to the critical school of security studies, securitization of migration is carried out through various policies: a) the framing of legal/illegal, regular/irregular migrants, asylum seekers/economic migrants as potential threats [Huysman 2006]; b) the use of technologies of control like DNA fingerprints, electronic tagging, biometric ID cards, passports, and facial recognition systems, smart CCTV systems, screening, and risk-profiling; c) the overlapping of military and police functions [Bigo 2014]; d) the connection between security, borders, and immigration [Bigo 2011]; e) suspicions of illegality and the criminalization of migration, or "crimmigration" [Resnik 2017; Benhabib, 2020].

Securitization of migration is a state-led policy of control, border design, identity politics, and foreign relations. From this perspective, it should be considered as a policy that allows the state to reaffirm its power and to "reterritorialize the deterritorialized flows inherent in globalization" by "reproducing boundaries (spatial, social, cultural, economic, and political) as natural" [Doty 1996: 175]. By placing nationals and foreigners, and legal and illegal migrants, in opposition, and by dividing citizens into those who will be allowed to cross state borders and others that will not, whilst tracking all their movements, governments try to reaffirm the sovereignty of the state [Huysman 2006]. Border controls and migration governance become state priorities to the extent that they are meant to protect its defining features: territorial integrity, sovereignty, and the identity of a population or "societal security" [Buzan, Waever 1993].

Classification of migrants or decisions over migrant quotas can become powerful "weapons" in interstate relations [Greenhill 2010]. Instead of being a challenge, migration becomes a strategic tool for states to reaffirm their sovereignty through policies of securitization. The management of migration flows is therefore at the core of state's interests, in particular in their bilateral relations.

3

Nonetheless, there is a theoretical dilemma in traditional IR: prioritizing the nation-state makes it difficult to fully grasp the complexity and multi-dimensionality of the migration process in its *relational* aspect. By contrast, statecraft proves to be a useful analytical tool in the field of interstate migration governance. More dynamic than foreign policy analysis, statecraft studies are better suited for migration policy comparisons [Jordan et al. 2021a; 2021b].

Although migration is a global and permanent phenomenon, multilateral migration governance is weak, while a unified body of international migration law is absent. Therefore, regulation of migration is a key aspect of state sovereignty and interstate relations [Hampshire 2013]. According to Hampshire, there are several modes of migration governance: a) formal multilateralism, b) informal multilateralism; c) the EU as a supranational regional governance structure, and, most importantly, d) bilateral relations.

Formal multilateralism is typical of the international refugee management system, which is based on the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol. It is overseen by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and is grounded in the non-refoulement principle: "the right of refugees not to be returned to a country where they risk persecution". Worldwide, there are

22.5 million refugees, with 80% of them residing in developing countries [UN 2019]. *Informal multilateralism*, by contrast, is not binding, and applies to the context of the North-South dialogue on migration and developments such as the annual intergovernmental meeting of the Global Forum on Migration and Development. Furthermore, the European Union is based on dualism between free movement of goods, services, capital, and people within the Schengen area – a *supranational regional governance structure* on the one hand, and strong external border security on the other hand [Huysmans 2000]. *Bilateral relations* at the regional level are by far the most common form of interstate migration governance. It is precisely within this framework that the concept of statecraft becomes primordial. How is migration managed at the bilateral level? What are the outcomes of particular choices of migration governance for the states involved?

In international relations, statecraft can be considered as a toolbox with different instruments to be chosen in terms of desired outcomes and effectiveness depending on each a particular context[2]. There are three main categories of tools: military, economic, and soft power. Soft power includes diplomacy, information, religion, and language policies [Crowley-Vigneau, Le Saux 2021], as well as diasporas. The combination of different statecraft tools enables achieving specific and concrete objectives depending on the status of one's counterpart. In the post-Cold War context, where "low politics" competes with "high politics", social, cultural, and soft power is used as an instrument besides traditional military, economic and political power. Within this framework, the "tool" of the securitization of migration plays a key role in interstate relations. The current global context has been described as a gray zone between peace and war, where different asymmetries coexist: asymmetries of power, of stakes, of values [Jordan et al. 2021a; 2021b]. Other rising asymmetries in current global trends are the asymmetry of climate and the asymmetry of demography, with a growing pressure from Africa on Europe, from Latin America and the Caribbean on North America, and from Central and South Asia on Western Asia [UN 2019].

Decisions to open or close a border, allowing or preventing the movement of millions of people, can become powerful tools of negotiation, bargaining, threat, or escalation. Statecraft, understood as an "attempt to exert influence over another state short of the resort to brute military force" [Jordan et al. 2021a; 2021b], is a suitable interpretive lens of analysis in the field of migration. More precisely, it should be applied to the field of "migration diplomacy", namely a "state's use of diplomatic tools, and procedures to manage cross-border population mobility" as stated by Adamson and Tsouparas [2018: 3]. According to them, migration diplomacy focuses "on how states employ cross-border population mobility management in their international relations, or how they use diplomatic means to obtain goals relating to migration" [2018: 4].

Likewise, statecraft should be considered as a tool by which a state achieves its foreign policy ends short of using force. According to Jordan, Stulberg and Troitskiy [2021a; 2021b], statecraft has a multi-dimensional character aimed at influencing others' choices. Looking at migration from the perspective of statecraft understood as patterns of behaviour undertaken to achieve measurable outcomes, one can distinguish various tactics of "migration statecraft". Interstate bargaining over migration proves to be an effective instrument in order to achieve measurable outcomes, especially within a context of an asymmetrical power relationship. The UK-EU Brexit negotiations provide a telling case. The 2016 referendum was meant to end freedom of movement and to make EU citizens subjects to the same immigration rules as citizens from the rest of the world [Walsh 2020]. The threat of border closures for Europeans in the UK and conversely for British citizens in the EU, involving respectively nearly 3 million and 1 million citizens, as well as defying the right

[2] *Zagorskyi. A* (2020). Lecture MGIMO-Gatech.

of free movement of people were key bargaining instruments during Brexit negotiations. The UK Immigration Act, which was passed by the House of Commons on 18 May 2020, introduced a points-based system, which likens Europeans to non-Europeans, making Europeans potential immigrants.

Migration statecraft varies depending on the state's status. According to Adamson and Tsouparas, the mode of "strategic use of migration flows" depends on whether a receiving, a sending, or a transit state is involved, although in some cases these statuses may overlap. First, a *sending* state could adopt *emigration* diplomacy as a means of influencing target countries, as Egypt did during the 1950s and 1960s in the Arab world [2018: 6]. Second, a *receiving* state might change its immigration norms depending on specific objectives of its foreign policy. Likewise, Robbie Totten's historical research on the use of immigration in US foreign policy strategy demonstrates how migration laws have been modified in order to achieve pre-meditated outcomes. His study specifically shows how migration as an instrument of statecraft makes it possible to reach three foreign policy objectives: to please allies, to harm adversaries, and to bargain. For instance, Totten considers the case of US *immigration* diplomacy vis-à-vis people fleeing the Soviet Union as a way of harming adversaries [2017: 354]. Third, a *transit* state can act differently depending on the context and on its relations with the other involved countries. Adamson and Tsouparas argue that in general transit states possess "zero-sum mentality", as evidenced by Libya during Gaddafi's "coercive migration diplomacy" or Turkey during Erdogan's presidency.

Finally, as an instrument of influence, migration statecraft refers to the achievement of concrete economic, political, or other goals in a short-term perspective – in a defensive or offensive manner – while maintaining or changing the status quo.

4

"Migration statecraft" should be considered as a cross-domain tool that a state uses in its bilateral relations in order to achieve a specific goal within a context of asymmetries of power and/or stakes, short of resorting to the military option. The following case studies illustrate how migration was securitized as an instrument of statecraft by tightening border controls. Migration statecraft cannot serve long-term foreign policy goals; it is available only in certain contexts, while the actors involved can usually adapt their policies to neutralize its impact. Migration statecraft can be employed in a zero-sum context, such as the Gaddafi-era agreement between Libya and the EU [Greenhill 2010] or in a positive-sum context, such as cooperation between Russia and some of its neighbors [Ivakhniuk 2017].

a) Bordering as trade blackmail: US/Mexico

In the case of the United States and Mexico, the asymmetries of power are very significant. With a 50-million immigrant population, the US receives the highest number of immigrants of all countries [UN 2019]. Liberal philosopher Michael Walzer defined American identity not in terms of a particular ethnic group, but as "a politics that is qualified by so many religions and nationalities as to be free from any one of them" [1990: 598]. By contrast, Mexico is at the same time a sending and a transit state. Migrants from Mexico represent the second largest diaspora in the world with 11.8 million people [UN 2019]. Remittances from the United States account for 3% of Mexico's GDP, the third–largest source of foreign revenue after oil and tourism. Nonetheless, recent studies show that emigration from Mexico has dropped, while transit migration through Mexico from Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala on the way towards the US has increased [Meierotto 2020: 158].

The aggressive bordering strategy practiced by United States – especially during the years of the Trump administration – had twin domestic and foreign policy objectives. Domestically, Trump built its political campaign on the promise to build a wall on the US border with Mexico. The foreign policy objective was to put pressure on Mexico in the context of a trade negotiation. Trump's instrument of choice for immigration policy was travel ban [White House 2017]. Immigration rules were

further tightened amid rising unemployment during the COVID-19 pandemic[3].

Changes to the crossing regime on the US-Mexican border directly affects 12 million people living in the area. Organized crime, including drug smuggling rings, operate across this border, with 224 illegal tunnels discovered between 1990 and 2016 [Felbab-Brown 2017]. The US-Mexican border provides one of the clearest examples of the securitization of migration [Meierotto 2020]. US legal scholar Judith Resnik employs the concept of "crimmigration", namely the criminalization of migration, to explain the merging of criminal law and immigration system in the United States since the 2010s. As a result, prosecution of illegal migration accounted for more than a half of the annual caseload in US federal courts between 2008 and 2015 [Resnik 2017]. The Trump administration increased this phenomenon by extending the criteria for "expedited removal", viz. "a process by which low-level immigration officers can quickly deport individuals who are undocumented or have committed fraud or misrepresentation"[4].

Trump's policy of hardening the border with Mexico went hand-in-hand with threats to impose tariffs on imported Mexican goods. In May 2019, President Trump directly linked the threat of tariffs with the demand that Mexico stop US-bound migrants. In June 2019, the United States and Mexico signed a migration agreement to prevent the imposition of tariffs. Accordingly, Mexico agreed to employ the National Guard on its borders, dismantle human trafficking networks, and adopt migrant protection protocols. The protocols provide for Mexico to host asylum seekers and give them access to jobs, healthcare, and education while they wait for the adjudication of their asylum claims to the US[5].

In a nutshell, the relationship between the United States and Mexico epitomizes the liberal paradox described by Hollifield [2004]: the need for commercial openness and trade coexists with the pressure for closing borders for political and security purposes. In 2019 Mexico became United States' primary trading partner ($614.5 billion), replacing China [Roberts 2020]. In July 2020 a United States-Canada-Mexico Agreement (USMCA) came into force as a replacement for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In this relationship, securitization of migration proved to be a key tool of statecraft. An aggressive politics of bordering coupled with threats concerning the terms of trade with Mexico allowed the United States to achieve desired domestic and foreign policy objectives. In its turn, as a transit state, Mexico enacted a similar approach to securitizing migration within its own territory, aiming to safeguard its exports to the US. Considering the prominent role of migration in US-Mexico relations, migration statecraft proved to be a more successful cross-domain tool to advance trade goals, as compared to military or diplomatic options.

b) Negotiating regional integration: Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States

According to the UN, Russia is the fourth largest country in terms of immigration, with a migrant population originating from Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) and the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan)[6]. It has adopted a visa-free policy limited to 90 days for migrant workers coming from the former Soviet countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Nonetheless, many of

[3] Proclamation—Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of Certain Additional Persons Who Pose a Risk of Transmitting 2019 Novel Coronavirus. U.S. White House. 2020. URL: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-suspension-entry-immigrants-nonimmigrants-certain-additional-persons-pose-risk-transmitting-2019-novel-coronavirus/ (accessed: 27.04.2021).

[4] American Immigration Council 2019, *A Primer on Expedited Removal.* URL: www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org (accessed: 27.04.2021).

[5] Joint Declaration and Supplementary Agreement Between the United States of America and Mexico. U.S. Department of State. 07.06.2019. URL: https://www.state.gov/u-s-mexico-joint-declaration/ (accessed: 27.04.2021).

[6] Trends in International Migration, Population Facts. No. 4. New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2019. URL: https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/index.as (accessed: 27.04.2021).

these workers are not counted in official statistics, leading to a large unaccounted immigrant population from Central Asia working in the informal economy [Schenk 2018].

In order to understand migration into Russia, one should look at the system of migration flows across Eurasia as a system in which the knowledge of the Russian language provides migration opportunities, while intra-regional migration on a considerable scale corresponds to the interests of many regional players [Ivakhnyuk 2017]. Since the collapse of the USSR, migration within the post-Soviet region has been intense. Between 1989 and 2007, 3.6 million ethnic Russians relocated to Russia. Currently Russia has an official foreign-born population of 11 million people, but the real numbers are higher given the large number of temporary workers and illegal migrants. According to political scientist Caress Schenk, there may be 16 to 18 million immigrants in Russia from other CIS countries [2018]. Since 2002, within the context of the second Chechen war, migration has been a security concern for Russia. Domestically, xenophobia and fear of immigration were counterbalanced by need for labour resources. After testing in the Russian language was introduced in 2015 as a requirement to obtain work permits, many migrant workers have taken the path of illegal employment [Ivakhniuk 2017].

The cultural legacy of the Soviet Union and the need for political stability in the region have influenced Russia's migration statecraft. Most migrants arrive in Russia from CIS countries that are Russia's main partners in regional integration [Chudinovskikh, Denisenko 2014]. Russia's key interest in the region is to boost economic and political integration. In an official statement in November 2016, President Putin stated that developing "bilateral and multilateral cooperation with CIS member states and further strengthening integration structures operating in the CIS space" constituted Russia's foreign policy priorities [Ivakhniuk 2017]. Because Russia and other countries have a common interest in regional economic advancement and integration, Moscow regards migration as a positive-sum game. There are considerable asymmetries of power and stakes among post-Soviet countries. Russia has bilateral inter-governmental agreements on labor migration with Tajikistan (2004) and Uzbekistan (2007).

Analyses of international migration in the post-Soviet region should take into account the existence of the Eurasian Economic Union. According to Ryazantsev et al. [2017: 40] "labor migration has become a form of mutual economic and political integration of former Soviet republics, facilitating the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)". Along similar lines, Ivakhniuk argues that "the consistently constructive stance that the CIS countries take on migration cooperation will largely determine the future of integration in the post-Soviet space" [2017]. EAEU members enjoy free movement and employment for their citizens across the Union. Such opportunity may be "an important incentive for other states to join this regional integration structure" [Ivakhniuk 2017]. For instance, Uzbekistan announced its interest in becoming a Eurasian Union observer state. In an official address to the Uzbek parliament in January 2020, President Shavkat Mirziyoev stated: "With a view of creating favourable conditions for our citizens, who are working in Russia and Kazakhstan, at the moment we are scrutinizing the issue of putting in place Uzbekistan's interaction with the Eurasian Economic Union"[7].

Russia's migration statecraft, therefore, should be considered in connection with Moscow's interest in regional integration. In asymmetrical relations with its neighbors, Russia needs to reach two main goals: to meet the need for immigrant labor and to foster economic and diplomatic relations in the strategic post-Soviet region. Since regional stability is one of Russia's priorities, its ability to regulate regional migration is becoming a key objective for balancing these objectives for Moscow.

[7] Address by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev to the Oliy Majlis. UN Permanent Mission of the Republic of Uzbekistan. 2020. URL: https://www.un.int/uzbekistan/news/address-president-republic-uzbekistan-shavkat-mirziyoyev-oliy-majlis-0 (accessed: 27.04.2021).

Securitization of migration can become an important source of leverage in a trade negotiation, while the ability to influence international migration governance allows for controlling and safeguarding social stability and security in a very diverse region. Tajikistan, for example, is highly dependent on migrant remittances from migrants working in Russia: they provided 28% of its GDP in 2018[8]. These remittances are a key factor of social cohesion as well as of national and regional security.

c) Political threat: Turkey/EU

The political threat posed by Turkey as a transit state to the European Union and the "world's main destination regions for immigrants" (Hampshire, 2013, p. 98) represents a noteworthy case of migration statecraft (although the EU is not a state, but a supranational region). According to Hampshire, EU governance provides an interesting exception as it is based on supranational policymaking processes and not on intergovernmental negotiations in which individual states could wield a veto.

Under the pressure of the migration crisis during the civil war in Syria, where one million refugees and other migrants arrived in the EU in 2015, Turkey and the European Union reached an agreement in March 2016[9]. According to this agreement, Ankara had to control the outflow of migrants from Turkey and accept the Syrian refugees returned from the Greek islands around Turkey. In exchange, Turkey received 6 billion euros in EU aid for migrants and refugees. The agreement also provided that: a) for each Syrian individual resettled from Greece to Turkey, another would be resettled from Turkey to the EU; and b) the EU was meant to work towards lifting visa requirements for Turkish citizens by the end of June 2016. As a result, the number of migrants arriving to Greece precipitously dropped [Terry 2021].

Nevertheless, due to the worsening of political relations between Turkey and the EU, the European Parliament voted on November 2016 to suspend EU membership meetings with Turkey. Consequently, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatened to cancel the deal on migration governance and to open its borders[10]. Turkey, as a transit state, was already hosting 3.7 million Syrian refugees, as well as migrants from other countries such as Afghanistan. Turkey's strategic geographical position in the Eastern Mediterranean and the ability to control the flow of refugees and migrants into the European Union constituted a key bargaining tool in Turkish migration statecraft [Adamson, Tsouparas 2018; Içduygu, Üstübici 2014; Greenhill 2016].

As the humanitarian situation in Syria deteriorated, with the number of refugees approaching one million, this threat became even more potent in 2020, when President Erdogan stated that Turkey was no longer willing to prevent migrants from entering the EU and allowed migrants to pass through its territory and reach the Greek border. Unlike during the 2016 deal, in 2020 Turkey-EU relations had significantly worsened. In this context, migration was perceived as a bargaining instrument within the Syrian conflict framework[11] and in the competition for energy in the Eastern Mediterranean [Talbot 2020]. Turkey's energy interests, driven by its Blue Homeland doctrine [Çandar 2020] and the discovery of natural resources around the divided island of Cyprus, led state-owned company Turkish Petroleum (TPAO) to conduct drilling activi-

[8] World Bank. 2019. URL: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=TJ (accessed: 27.04.2021).

[9] EU-Turkey statement. European Council (EC). 18 March 2016. URL: www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement (accessed: 27.04.2021).

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[11] Stevis-Gridneff M., Kingsley P. (2020). Turkey, Pressing E.U. for Help in Syria, Threatens to Open Borders to Refugees. *The New York Times*. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/28/world/europe/turkey-refugees-Geece-erdogan.html (accessed: 27.04.2021).

ties in waters internationally recognized as part of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Republic of Cyprus, an EU member state [Skinner 2020]. This provoked an escalation between Turkey, Cyprus, and Greece, and consequently with the EU.

As these tensions escalated, migration statecraft was used as an instrument of political leverage. Given European leaders' fear of another migration crisis, Erdogan was in a "particularly favorable position regarding any potential conflict with the EU" [Skinner 2020].

The difference between the Turkish and Mexican cases boils down to two main aspects. Firstly, unlike Turkey, Mexico is also an emigration state, which makes it more vulnerable to additional US restrictions on migration. Secondly, Mexico came under direct threat of economic sanctions by the US that, in turn, made it more pliable; in its turn, Turkey had a much stronger hand in negotiations with the EU on migration because of Ankara's key geostrategic position in the Mediterranean, as well as EU leaders' determination to avoid another potential migration crisis.

d) Escalation: Italy and France in 2019

Although Italy and France are historical partners and founding states of the European Union belonging to the Schengen space, they recently experienced a few episodes of diplomatic and political escalation around migration governance at the border between them. In February 2019, the French ambassador in Italy was recalled from Rome after months of tensions. French foreign ministry officials described it as having no precedent since 1940. Several diverging interests weighed in on the border regime negotiations, including the political fragmentation in Libya, political interference by representatives of the Italian government into the yellow vests movement, and a migration crisis on the French-Italian border [Pagani 2019].

From 2013 onwards, Italy felt abandoned by its EU partners on migration governance issues. Every European country has been following a nationalist policy in pursuit of electoral and self-centered interests. The French-Italian border became an object of securitization, causing transportation backlogs and negatively affecting the daily life of the local population. As a matter of fact, a few incidents happened at the border in Clavière in the Alps during October 2018. Italy set up a border patrol in response to French police intrusions into Italian territory in the course of operations to expel illegal migrants. This incident resulted in a tense dispute involving Italian and French interior ministers. The opportunistic and calculated use by the sides of border security issues can be understood in the context of the upcoming European elections.

Migration was not the only source of controversy between Italy and France, as well as among EU members in general, in the run-up to the election. Nonetheless, the management of migration and border security played a key role in affecting and influencing various decisions and interests at that specific political moment. By upping the ante, Matteo Salvini and the new EU parliamentary political group "Identity & Democracy" tried to consolidate an alliance with Marine Le Pen's Rassemblement National and other European populist leaders by posing as strong opponents of the European liberal model. Salvini's main adversary was French President Emmanuel Macron, who represented the European liberal group, and not the Secretary of the Italian Democratic Party Nicola Zingaretti. Ginning up tensions around migration across the French-Italian border served as an instrument of statecraft for achieving the electoral result desired by the key Eurosceptic members of the Italian government. This act of escalation was the sign of the Europeanization of the political debate, rather than a rivalry between two historical partners [Pagani 2019].

* * *

This article provides evidence of the nexus between migration, security, and statecraft, by bridging the perspectives of international relations and political theory. The article contributes to the testing of the effectiveness of statecraft as a category of analysis. Using the case studies of the United States, Russia, and the European Union, I demonstrate the range of tactics available to the users of migration statecraft.

Although these cases differ by scale, context, and geography, they highlight the potent applications of migration statecraft. Within the context of power asymmetries, and short of resorting to the military option, securitization of migration in bilateral relations can serve specific and concrete objectives: a) improvement of the terms of trade with Mexico for the United States; b) beefing up Russia-led economic and political integration projects in post-Soviet Eurasia; c) extracting political concession for Turkey from the European Union; and d) campaigning in a European election, as in the case of Italy and France.

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ИНСТРУМЕНТАЛИЗАЦИЯ МИГРАЦИИ

УПРАВЛЕНИЕ МИГРАЦИОННЫМИ ПОТОКАМИ В ДВУСТОРОННЕМ ФОРМАТЕ

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Резюме

В настоящей статье разрабатываются теоретические подходы к оценке успешности инструментализации миграции и миграционной дипломатии в межгосударственных отношениях. В первом разделе представлен обзор рисков и проблем миграции с точки зрения исследований международных отношений и политической теории. В частности, миграция бросает вызов модели национального государства, на которой базируются устоявшиеся исследовательские традиции. Во втором разделе демонстрируется, как государство посредством секьюритизации использует миграционные потоки в качестве инструмента для подтверждения своих определяющих характеристик: укрепления национальных границ, легитимации государственного суверенитета и поддержания общественной безопасности. В третьем разделе обосновывается полезность концепции управления внешнеполитическими ресурсами (statecraft) для анализа миграции на двустороннем уровне при отсутствии международно-правовой базы. Посредством миграционной политики возможно причинять вред другим государствам, сдерживать их, усиливать переговорные позиции, повышать ставки в ходе конфликта. В последнем разделе статьи представлены исследования, показывающие каким образом США, Россия, а также некоторые государства–члены Европейского Союза пытаются использовать миграцию как внешнеполитический ресурс. Как показывают приведённые примеры, «управление» миграционными потоками может предприниматься в целях получения преференция в торговле, принуждения к сотрудничеству в асимметричных отношениях, способа выдвинуть политическую угрозу или повысить градус конфликта. Применение концепции *statecraft* к анализу миграции позволяет выявить преимущества данной концепции как инструмента анализа по сравнению с традиционными исследованиями внешней политики (foreign policy analysis). Например, попытки выявить долгосрочную стратегию государств посредством традиционного анализа внешней политики чаще всего не дают убедительных операционализируемых результатов; в то же время формы и методы управления ресурсами внешней политики государства остаются стабильными на протяжении длительного времени и могут служить надежным ориентиром для наблюдателей.

Ключевые слова:

государственное управление; национальное государство; секьюритизация; миграция; Россия; США; Европейский союз.

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LANGUAGE AND STATECRAFT
AN OLD TOOL FOR NEW GOALS?

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Abstract

This paper investigates how language as a tool of statecraft has changed over time and whether it remains relevant and legitimate in the current globalised context. Viewing the issue from an interdisciplinary perspective, it considers the role language policies have played at different stages in history, from enabling European nation-states to forcibly to carve out a new identity around a unified language, to fulfilling the imperialist mission of 'educating' colonised populations in an attempt to generate lasting economic and cultural benefits for colonial powers. Language policies survived the decolonization process and took new soft power forms in an attempt to address current day challenges. The authors argue, based on the analysis of expert interviews and data sources (both primary and secondary), that while the discourse and means of implementing language policies have changed under new conditions – particularly the rejection of force in language promotion, the domination of English, the protection of minority dialects, and the technological changes linked to globalization – the belief in the power of language to shape allegiances remains, on the political level, unchanged.

Keywords:

statecraft; language policies; minority dialects; soft power; globalization.

"Our hard power is dwarfed by a phenomenon that the pessimists never predicted when we unbundled the British Empire, and that is soft power – the vast and subtle and pervasive extension of British influence around the world that goes with having the language that was invented and perfected in this country, and now has more speakers than any other language on earth"[1].

This statement by Boris Johnson succinctly yet compellingly captures popular perceptions of the role of language in yielding and projecting a country's power. Indeed, many countries have rolled out and maintain networks of cultural and language institutes aimed at improving their image aboard. Even the UK, with the dominant language of the international system, still feels the need to maintain its support for

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[1] Johnson B. Conservative Home. Britain the soft-power superpower of global liberalism. 2016. URL: https://www.conservativehome.com/parliament/2016/10/britain-the-soft-power-superpower-of-global-liberalism-boris-johnsons-conservative-conference-speech-full-text.html (accessed: 21.07.2021).

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the work of the British Council. Recommendations have also been made that the United States improve its perception abroad and its brand overseas by implementing a similar initiative [Brett & Schaefer 2019].

Statecraft has been defined in several ways. It refers to the ways a government attempts to exert influence over another state [Jordan, Stulberg and Troitskiy 2021a; 2021b], but also to amplify its own capacity to project power and implement foreign policies optimally. Although the term 'statecraft' is used more frequently in Realist International Relations theories than by Liberal or Constructivist scholars, it reflects a generic process of conducting any state's foreign affairs; therefore it applies, to a varying degree, to all IR schools of thought. In the process of 'doing statecraft', the government can use not only hard power instruments (coercive, unidirectional vectors of power projection, leaving the other state no alternative or choice in submitting to the course dictated) but also soft power instruments (instilling the desire to follow the proposed policies). Language policies are typically perceived to be part of the latter.

Historically, language policies were at the heart of the creation of modern European nation-states, with a unified language being considered by many 18th and 19th century governments to be essential to building national communities capable of surviving and overcoming adversity from within and without. When these European states embarked on the colonial enterprise, some accorded language policies an important place in their relationship with conquered territories by diffusing their language, while others purposely chose not to share their language with their new subjects for fear it may unduly empower them. These divergent choices ultimately determined how widespread the colonial languages later came to be in independent nations; they continue to influence the language policies of European states to this day.

While coercion has been largely abandoned in language promotion and is frowned upon in the international arena, states still funnel significant resources into teaching their language abroad through the creation of cultural and language institutes. In this paper, we explore how language as a tool of statecraft has changed over time and consider whether it remains relevant and legitimate in the current globalised context. Through a series of cases, the authors consider whether language can still be regarded as an effective instrument of statecraft, providing a historical, cultural, and political analytical overview of language policies. The historical cases of France, Spain, Britain, Cambodia, and the Philippines are explored through the study of primary sources, including laws, decrees, and official statements, as well as secondary documents, among which are specialised academic literature. Original expert interviews were used to collect data on the contemporary language policies of France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and China[2]. The interview findings were verified and triangulated with primary and secondary sources of data emanating from official websites and press articles. The goal of this paper is not to present a comprehensive overview of language policies over time, but to draw upon specific examples, both historical and contemporary, to highlight the changes in how language is used in statecraft. While the existing academic literature puts a focus on exhaustive, usually historical, single case analysis, this study bridges the gap between past and present by offering highlights from a larger number of cases to analyse continuity and discontinuity in language policies.

1

Language has been widely recognized as a core aspect of nation building [Wright 2000; Connor 1994]. Most language policies rest upon the nation-state ideology, according to which a nation must be as homogeneous as possible, politically, culturally, and linguistically [Durand 1996]. A textbook example of a country with a centralized language policy is

[2] Information on the interviewees is summarized in Appendix 1. The numbers of expert interviews in the following references correspond to the numbers in the appendix.

France. Throughout history it was acceptable for a state policy to ban and uproot local dialects [Citron 1992] and France has a long history (since Louis XIV) of forbidding dialects (Picard, Occitan and Franco-Provençal, among others). The French Academy has been regulating the use of French since 1634, acting on the belief that languages should be uniform and not vary [Durand 1996]. The codification and desire of the intellectual elite to consolidate the exclusive use of French in the entire country does not imply that linguistic unification had been successfully accomplished, however. The monarchy tolerated the use of local languages and, according to a survey by the politician l'Abbé Grégoire in 1790, out of a total population of 26 million, 46% either could not speak or could not understand French whilst an overwhelming majority could not speak it correctly [Walter 1994]. After 1789, the new French Republic began to assert the need for greater linguistic and social unity more aggressively; local languages were associated with being a traitor to the new regime [Durand 1996].

Jules Ferry consolidated the French language as the sole language of the nation when he made school free and compulsory for all in 1882, but he did so at the cost of the dialects, which were labelled *patois* (literally meaning 'rough, clumsy, or uncultivated speech') [Gardy 1990]. Other factors which rooted the use of French in daily life were military conscription and the creation of a large professional civil service, or centralized state bureaucracy. The use of *patois* was severely sanctioned in schools where, starting from 1860, children speaking regional languages instead of French would have to carry a 'token of shame', an object they would pass on to the next person heard speaking *patois*, and the child carrying it at the end of the day would be subjected to public punishment and humiliation [Walter 1994; Durand 1996]. To this day, France persists in its attempts to unify the language, as illustrated by the Toubon Law of 1993, which reaffirms that French is the language of the republic and requires its use in a myriad of situations ranging from advertising to job contracts and publishing [Sauliere 2014].

The idea that languages differ *per se* from idioms results from an ideology which spread during the 19th century and itself contributed to the emergence of nation-states [Heller 2002]. In 1808 Friedrich made a distinction between "organic" and "mechanical" languages: the first type (among which are Sanskrit, Persian, and European languages) are considered superior to the second (Chinese, Basque, Arabic) because it has words with roots and additional flections making them highly adaptable to describe new concepts and nuances in changing semantics [Errington 2007]. This academic "analysis" of language evolution, though arbitrary, shows that language became associated with new cultural and historical meaning during the 19th century [Errington 2007] and that some languages were considered better instruments to serve a nation in the long term than others. State power has, over time, become less a question of the state coercing the population into adopting a united ideology and more about the state's ability to gain its citizen's loyalty [Gramsci 1971]. In spite of changes in perceptions, having a common language is still regarded as key factor in ensuring a state's unity and survival.

Language became an important political consideration during the process of colonization as European nations were confronted with different cultures and dialects they had to make sense of. The debate concerning the humanity of the people discovered in the New World centered, *inter alia*, on cultural and linguistic practices. Christopher Columbus's notes on his voyages betray a hesitation in actually conferring on the communications he witnessed the status of a language [Todorov 1984]. In 1492, Anton de Nebrija confided to Queen Isabel that "language was always the companion of empire. . . . language and empire began, increased, and flourished together" [Errington 2007]. Language played an important, albeit dual, role from the very onset of the process of colonization, which by and large amounted to not recognizing the local dialects and imposing the colonial language. The Requerimiento of 1513, a declaration by the Spanish monarchy that it was entitled to conquer the New World and enslave or slay its in-

habitants, offers an interesting illustration of the role of language. Indeed, before any conquest, the victims were read this request in Spanish, suggesting that the Native Americans' inability to understand the request to submit was justification for all the actions that ensued. As noted by Errington [2007: 26] the Requerimiento was a "kind of early prototype for linguistic asymmetries of colonial power: the nonintelligibility of speech provided sufficient grounds for subjugating them because it was evidence not of their difference, but of their deficiency." While some early friars attempted to bring Catholicism to the New World without changing the language practices of the Native Americans, considering them as unsullied by the Spanish and their vices, most missionaries abided by recommendations of the Church that translating prayers into dialects could distort the word of God and lead to the infiltration of paganism in Christian religious practices [Burkhart 1989].

On the other hand, language was also viewed as one of the main tools for gaining control over Native Americans and shifting their political loyalties. As colonialism morphed into imperialism, diverging language strategies were adopted by different metropoles. Whereas in the British and French empires, education was widely organized in the colonizer's language, the Germans were reluctant to share their language with their colonial territories [Mazrui 1975]. Teaching the language of the empire to colonies, they reckoned, could in the long run contribute not only to closing the gap between the two but also act as an enabler for the elite of the colonies, who, after receiving a French or British education, began to aspire to equal opportunities. As noted by Errington: "*The effects of work by colonial linguists [...] outran their intent, which neither they nor other imperial officials could fully control or recognize. Colonial subjects pirated "their" languages for purposes of their own, showing how teaching a language is a bit like providing information or money: once given, the giver loses control of the ways they are used*". [2007: 25]

The language policies of the French and British empires were aimed at consolidating their influence over the colonies by 'shaping the minds' of native populations via education, as well as creating an administrative elite fluent in the metropole's language and capable of administering the territories on its behalf. Language diffusion was also seen as a factor of power and a facilitator of trade. This strategy of integrating the colonies into a tight-knit empire did not, however, prevent all the colonized territories from achieving independence; it may even have led to more traumatic post-colonial outcomes than other colonial approaches.

Globalization is commonly defined as a qualitative increase in transactions and economic interdependency around the world, followed, accompanied, or sometimes preceded by a global consciousness of the emergence of a world society of humankind [Meyer 2007]. While the globalization discourse initially focused on the role of transnational actors and the erosion of differences around the world in linguistic as well as cultural terms [Rosenau 1984], it later concentrated on the backlash from states and communities which seek to preserve their identities. Globalization is frequently viewed as the vector of hegemonic normative influence exercised by powerful countries [Bourdieu 2001], and has led to cultural resistance that has taken different forms. In a context where national cultural and language specificities are perceived as threatened, countertrends to globalization have rapidly developed.

States concerned about foreign cultural and linguistic influence linked to globalization may adopt "localization" strategies, which mainly rely on schooling and television broadcasting to protect their culture and language [Chiang & Zhou 2018; Schriewer 2003; Lingard 2000]. The idea that globalization carries within itself different counteracting waves of cultural and linguistic conquest and, as a result, fosters diversity rather than unity is also common in the literature. Russian political scientist Bogaturov described the co-existence of two normative substructures, or enclaves: modernity promotes rational forms of social organization, based on written prescriptions as well as the observance of formal rules and legally implemented norms;

the second enclave – *traditionalism* – is concerned with reproducing traditions and time-honored practices [Bogaturov 2010]. Most countries are systemic in the sense that one of the two described substructures dominates; however, in a number of countries, which due to the specificities in their social institutional development have become conglomerates, the two enclaves cohabitate in the mindset of their populace, on a roughly equal footing, and even the traditional enclave can be modernized to emulate contemporary social practices in form, but not in substance. The social dynamic in conglomerates such as Russia, China, or Italy is problematic as the state has to manage (and pay heed to) two or more value systems simultaneously. Globalization is increasing heterogeneity rather than homogeneity, as countries with a modern substructure (because of incoming migration) can face the challenge of managing this growing traditional value system, which is embodied in ever-larger diasporas and migrant communities. While migration governance is a powerful short-term instrument of statecraft [Pagani 2021], highly restrictive policies are not viable in the long term, as migrant communities grow to have two value systems and may end up culturally changing their host countries.

While globalization has been associated with the increasing dominance of global (super) languages over local ones, some scholars have taken note of the opportunities that have opened up for the local in a globalized world. "Glocalisation" [Robertson 1994] may offer local languages and cultures more development opportunities than the national context ever did. While local languages were openly repressed and forbidden in many nation-states, multiculturalism as a mature global norm now ensures that dialects are increasingly protected by international rules and states that infringe upon them face criticism. Indeed, at the United Nations, the protection of minority languages is considered a human rights obligation according to the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities of 1992. Minority languages are no longer restricted by a national geographical context and at the mercy of national state bureaucracies promoting national unity agendas [Craith 2007]. Multiculturalism is interpreted not only as a guarantee of the survival of individual ethnic groups, but also as the need for official recognition of their rights, up to the possibility of self-determination. Meanwhile, the resurgence of local languages that has accompanied globalization has changed the political landscape over the world, creating more territorial contestation.

2

We have seen that languages are considered a key aspect of nation-building, and language policies can help redefine political communities. We will further explore to what extent language can be perceived as an effective means of **statecraft**, i.e. *the purposeful application of a variety of national resources to attain the state objectives.* More specifically, this part deals with the advantages provided to a country by having the dominant language internationally.

At the start of the 21st century, English admittedly enjoys the foremost position in the world [Crystal 2003]. While it has been overtaken by Chinese in terms of the number of primary speakers, English still holds the first position globally when counting primary and secondary speakers together (1,268 million for English vs. 1,120 for Mandarin)[3]. The status of English is linked to it being by far the preferred language of international communication in the vast majority of contexts, from the internet to international business, research, and diplomacy. Linguistic inequality in academia, for instance, has been the object of numerous studies, including the "free ride" native speakers of English have when seeking to have their work published [van Parijs 2007]. Most top scholarly journals require research articles be submitted in English, creating an in-built discrimination against non-natives. However, mastering English as a foreign lan-

[3] Infoplease. Most Widely Spoken Languages in the World. URL: https://www.infoplease.com/world/social-statistics/most-widely-spoken-languages-world (accessed: 21.07.2021).

guage, even to a high level of proficiency, may not reset the balance[4]. Indeed, language is not an objective vector for communication in which all are equal. Second language learning rarely allows non-native speakers to attain the level of fluency of native speakers, putting them at a natural disadvantage compared to native speakers, especially when it comes to being convincing in public debate or when teaching [Ramirez & Kulh 2017]. A limited vocabulary range or being oblivious of subtle usage nuances or unregistered connotations may lead to a reductive representation of a person's ideas, as well as to articles (or arguments) being rejected by research journals [Flowerdew 2019].

Quite obviously, having the dominant language provides a number of advantages not only to its speakers but also to the state. Language is the basic currency of international communication, so if other countries use your language, to continue the metaphor, then it boosts your trade and others will need to borrow from you to be able to interact. If societies abroad can speak the language of a country then it offers a ready vector to promote the country's worldview, culture, and to get foreign populations to be somewhat more accepting of its foreign policy. Popular support abroad facilitates the diffusion of a state's norms, thus paving the way for effective statecraft.

English has a special status or is the official language in 75 countries across the globe [Majhanovich 2013]. English is the dominant language for international treaties. While the UN charter exists in several languages, time has shown that the English version is informally considered to be the most accurate. Treaties are most often first drafted in English, after which, in the UN, Secretariats' translators are in fact not permitted to consult with embassies in the process of translation, meaning that the translators may need to invent new terms or make approximations to convey new concepts[5].

English is the lingua franca used within regional organizations. The EU, for example, while recognizing the official languages of its members, still has two thirds of its official documents drafted only in English [Majhanovich 2013]. In spite of a campaign for "European linguistic diversity" led by the French Minister for European Affairs after Brexit[6], English is most likely to remain the preeminent language for interaction within the organization.

Likewise, when a regional organization chooses English as their official language, it gives Anglo-Saxon countries more power of conceptual and normative influence over a given organization. Thus, English is the principal language of the African Union, made up of 55 states, or of ASEAN, representing 10 states. In their agreements, these organizations use the linguistic array available in the English language, along with the meanings originally attached to these words and concepts. The term "democracy" may have different meanings in different languages, but the western understanding takes precedence as that is where it took shape. The Russian language still has no terms for "empowerment", "privacy", or "statecraft", reflecting how language choice shapes conceptual understandings[7].

English is used not only as an official communication medium in a majority of international and regional organizations, but also during informal international negotiations. Indeed, discussions on the sidelines between politicians and policymakers normally take place in English, and politicians stand to lose informal credibility in the group of equals if they are unable to speak the common (read: dominant) language[8].

American sociolinguist Fishman systematically demonstrates how the obligation to study

[4] Expert interview 3.
[5] Expert interview 4.
[6] Bensaid A. French call to replace English with Latin as Europe's official language. TRT Wprld. 2021. 15 March. URL: https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/french-call-to-replace-english-with-latin-as-europes-official-language-44961 (accessed: 21.07.2021).
[7] Expert interview 8.
[8] Expert interview 6.

English at almost all levels of education in most countries provides strategic advantages to Anglo-Saxon countries [Fishman 2006]. English fluency is required in most universities around the world, regardless of the subjects a student majors in. The new model of World Class universities (promoted by the West and requiring universities to compete with each other for students and faculty, to excel in research, to focus on stakeholders, and to implement a commercial business model) makes universities around the world compete with English-speaking US and UK universities in line with their rules, acknowledging their headstart from the get-go [Crowley-Vigneau et al. 2020]. Anglo-Saxon universities top international quality rankings in all categories, reflecting the advantages they reap from having designed the model and diffusing English as the dominant language. Indeed, dominating the world education system itself enables Anglo-Saxon countries to attract talented people and lead technologically. Having the dominant language also yields economic advantages related to providing an attractive business environment and to linguistic tourism.

The widespread practice among states of opening and financing language institutes abroad is just one small illustration of the fact that states recognize the power of language in "befriending" civil societies abroad.

3

One telling example of *effective language statecraft* is the case of the USA and the use of English in the Philippines. The country was colonized successively by Spain (1565–1898) and the United States (1898–1946), with these two countries having been the most significant foreign influences in the Philippines. Spanish became the dominant language for many centuries, overcoming local dialects. From the 17th to the beginning of the 20th century, Spanish was the language of state administration, the army, literature, and recorded acts of civil status, as well as the language of schooling [Sibayan 2000]. Even the instigators of the failed liberation revolution of 1896–1898, Filipinos like Jose Rizal, Marcelo del Pilar, penned their pamphlets, articles, novels, and plays in Spanish, revealing to what extent the language was anchored in the country [Anderson 1983]. Spanish was the only language of communication that bound together all the different islands comprising the country's dispersed territory. In 1900, 60% of the population of the Philippines spoke fluent Spanish as a first or second language and some of the local dialects had up to 40% of words borrowed from Spanish [Grinina & Romanova 2019].

The Spanish-American war of 1898 led to the defeat of Spain that year and their departure from the Philippines. American influence stared to expand from that point onwards. The USA had come up with a meticulous and, to an extent, remarkably smart language policy in the Philippines: they encouraged the national leaders to create their own national language based on a number of traditional dialects, particularly the Tagas Usus dialect of the inhabitants of Manila, with this new language being designed to replace Spanish as an official language [Grinina & Romanova 2019]. In parallel, English came to be introduced as a de-facto medium of communication into different aspects of social life. Firstly, this was done in secondary school classrooms by American soldiers who started to teach in Corregidor in 1898 [Martin 2014]. In the early 1990s, the US started sending groups of teachers, the Thomasites, to the Philippines, to help establish a school system in English [Tarr 2005]. The influence of English grew progressively with radio and television broadcasts in English. In 1935, English became the official language together with Spanish, and in 1973, Spanish lost its official status and stopped being mandatory in schools [Grinina & Romanova 2019].

But how was the dominance of the Spanish language overthrown? Some may associate it with the defeat of Spain in the war of 1898. However, Spain lost control of other territories to the USA, such as Cuba, which did not give up on the Spanish language [Grinina & Romanova 2019]. In the 20th century, Spanish was linked with the colonial regime and the political past, while English was associated with democratic politics, modern economies,

and advanced cultural trends [Craith 2007][9]. English also offered women their first chance at education with the creation of mixed schools taught in English as opposed to more discriminatory Spanish schools, opening the path for equal opportunities.

Effective statecraft in this case rested upon a sound strategy consisting of firstly undermining the existing language, then replacing it initially with a dialect which was highly likely to be widely approved of, and in parallel pushing for the development of the new state's language by sending teachers and promoting popular globalized values. English became a superstructure that enhanced the sense of local identity in the Philippines by encouraging the use of the local languages. At the same time, English was considered necessary, as the local languages did not provide access to the global knowledge infrastructure [Smolicz & Nical, 1997]. This policy was supported by the USA's positive image as a liberator during the two world wars.

The American influence in the Philippines served the USA well during the Cold War and still provides it with a strategic advantage for its military containment of China. While the US withdrew from the Clark Air base in 1991 and the naval station Subic Bay in 1992 after volcanic eruptions and disagreements, starting from 2012 the US military restarted building up their presence there, with a Visiting Forces Agreement signed in 1999 allowing large-scale military exercises [Woodley 2016]. Indeed, the country has the status of "major non-NATO ally" of the US and offers a strategic position to the US in its policy shift towards the Pacific. 80% of inhabitants of the Philippines in 2019 viewed the USA positively, which makes them the third most pro-American country in the world after Israel and the US itself[10]. The recent political tensions between the Philippines and the US have not yet changed their ally status.

An example of *ineffective language statecraft* is the case of Cambodia, which switched from French, the former colonial language, to English. One would have expected the French influence to ensure that it remained the second language, with *Khmer* (also known as Cambodian) gaining in influence after the country became fully independent from France in 1953. However, in spite of the country remaining formally associated with France as part of the Francophonie nations and French being taught in some tertiary programs in universities, English has become much more impactful [Majhanovich 2013].

The French influence on Cambodia can be traced as far back as to 1863, with the French setting up schools for local children to attend shortly after. Ninety years later, only a small percentage of Cambodian students attended French schools: this failure to exert a linguistic and educational influence on the colony has been put down both to poor planning and to Cambodian resistance [Clayton 1995]. The country was less of a priority for the French (compared to Vietnam, which was considered to be of more strategic importance); some scholars have pointed out that the French may have purposely curtailed their investments in the linguistic development of Cambodia, given it was primarily used as a buffer zone for Vietnam to push back English interests in Thailand [Osborne 1969]. Analysis of Cambodian resistance typically underscores the incompatibility of French education with existing traditions in the country, its perception as illegitimate, and the emergence of linguistic resistance [Clayton 1995]. The failure to develop the influence of the French language during the colonial period and to root it in society appears as the primordial reason why Cambodia managed to set it rapidly aside. Nonetheless, French continued to be the main language of administration during the colonial period and gained a foothold in Cambodia, with the civil servants of the country being required to speak French fluently and the elite considering it as conferring them an economic advantage [Majhanovich 2013].

[9] Expert Interview 10.

[10] Pew Research Center. Global Indicators Database. Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/database/indicator/1/survey/17/ (accessed: 21.07.2021).

At the same time, English, while it was much less common, came to displace French as the international language due to a number of factors. Cambodian students have started to privilege English in tertiary education and over half of the population is capable of speaking it fluently, maybe due to it becoming a compulsory school subject in 2014 [Kirkpatrick 2012]. The push for English came both from inside and from outside. The United States began its involvement in Cambodia in the late 1950s, providing economic aid and military assistance, and supported the democratic transition of the country after the Paris Peace Accords of 1991. Although it was originally bilingual (French and English), English eventually became the preferred language of the United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia, which came to employ more than 60 thousand Cambodians who were required to speak English [Clayton 2007]. A new official need for English appeared in 1999 when Cambodia became a member of ASEAN, which has English as its working language [Majhanovich 2013].

The case of Cambodia shows how, with relatively little input from the United States, English came to replace French as the main international language of the country. Ninety years of foreign influence were replaced by the pragmatic need to adopt the dominant language of the international system: English. Rocky relations with Anglo-Saxon countries and closer relations with China have not dissuaded Cambodia from the necessity to speak English.

4

While language policies based on constraint have outlived their usefulness and would in the current context be highly likely to backfire, utilising soft power (or power of attraction) through language remains an important object of state policy, but, alas, not of systematic academic inquiry.

When noting during a 2010 TED talk that "It's not whose army wins; it's also whose story wins", Joseph Nye underlined the significance of being the author of the dominant narrative globally [Nye 2010]. A country's capacity to spread its worldview and its norms across the globe is highly dependent on its attractiveness and its ability to communicate and be understood. States' public diplomacy efforts are often tied with language diffusion, as illustrated by the network of language and cultural centers opened by different countries all over the world. While the German Goethe Institute, the French Alliance Francaise, Spain's Cervantes Institute, the British Council, the Chinese Confucius Institute, and others are currently comparable in their missions, they can be clearly divided in two categories based on historical factors. On the one hand, the Alliance Francaise and the British Council (formally called British Committee for Relations with Other Countries) were created respectively in 1883 and 1924 and formed part of the project of colonial rule through language and cultural expansion; on the other, the foundation of the German Goethe Institute (1951) and the Chinese Confucius Institute (2004) resulted from a perceived need to improve their countries' images due to recent reputational damage. All these organizations aim to spread a country's culture and language, thus creating a national brand capable of spreading a national identity [Dinnie 2015]. However, they present structural and ideological differences that affect their mission.

'L'Alliance Francaise pour la propagation de la langue nationale dans les colonies et l'étranger' ("The French alliance for the propagation of the national language in the colonies and abroad") was established in 1883 as part of the French imperial mission, more specifically to support France's colonial ambitions in Tunisia and in countries around the Mediterranean Sea where it had a strong presence [Horne 2017]. During the first few decades of its existence, the organization focused on disseminating propaganda aimed at levying funds to finance the creation of schools in the French colonies. Subsequently, it shifted its focus to propagating the French language and culture in Europe, America, and Latin America, the last of which became its absolute priority focus after the Second World War [Cortier 1998]. The French Alliance moved

progressively from a "civilizing mission" to a soft power mission, and in spite of brutal decolonization wars (particularly the Algerian war which lasted from 1954 to 1962) and its association with the colonial mission, the organization kept its original name or more specifically a shortened version of it. France's "focus on language as a tool of empire was unprecedented among the colonial powers" [Horne 2017: 95].

In 2019, l'Alliance Francaise counted 832 alliances in 131 countries teaching 490 thousand students. It pursues three main goals: (1) to offer French classes for all, both in France and abroad; (2) to raise awareness of French and Francophone culture; and (3) to promote cultural diversity. The organization currently finances most of its activities from the courses it teaches, whilst the government provides only 5% of its budget[11]. The network of the French Alliance is constituted of independently run franchises, but the brand "Alliance Francaise" belongs to the Alliance Francaise foundation which allows local organizations to use it only after careful examination of the statutes and stated objectives. The foundation receives no income from the use of the brand. The French government separately runs a network of 150 cultural institutes which have a similar mission but are directly controled by the French government. This model is financially advantageous for the French government and is based on the historical presence of French in a large number of countries. French cultural diplomacy rests strongly upon its 19th century imperial expansion [Horne 2017].

The 'British Committee for Relations with Other Countries' was founded in 1934 to teach English and promote British culture abroad. Its name was changed to 'British Council' two years later[12]. The Council inaugurated its first offices in Romania, Egypt, Portugal, and Poland in 1938 to encourage cultural, scientific, and educational cooperation with the United Kingdom and combat the rise of fascism. While its first endeavors were not linked to its imperial past, the creation of the Commonwealth after 1949 and political motives to promote Britain in former colonies led the Council to progressively set up offices in the majority of countries of the Commonwealth. By contrast to the French model, *in this British case the creation of the Council was not linked to the imperialist mission of educating the population of the colonies but to a need to ensure the transition from the colonialist model to a soft power relationship with Commonwealth countries*[13]. Some offices were opened in countries under British rule, such as Cyprus in 1935 before the start of the Greek Cypriot independence struggle. However, this case resembles more a British public diplomacy effort in trying to convince a population of the importance of its ties with Britain than a colonial educational mission [Hadjiathanasiou 2018].

The British Council currently operates in over 100 countries worldwide and has 6,800 members of staff. It stresses values such as equal educational opportunities and building international trust, all the while running language and scholarship programs including the GREAT scholarships, the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship, the Charles Wallace India Trust, and Hornby scholarships[14]. The Council is mostly funded though teaching and examinations, tendered contracts, and partnerships, but also receives around 15% of its income from the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office[15]. The governmental initiative of the 1990s, focused on putting a new emphasis on ties with the Commonwealth through the work of the British Council, have been undermined in recent years by cost-cutting initiatives, leading to the controversial closure of Council

[11] Expert Interview 5.
[12] Expert Interview 9.
[13] Expert Interview 1.
[14] British Council. What we do. URL: https://www.britishcouncil.in/about/what (accessed: 21.07.2021).
[15] British Council. Finance. URL: https://www.britishcouncil.org/about-us/how-we-work/finance (accessed: 21.07.2021).

offices in regions considered to be of little strategic importance[16].

Launched in 1951, the Goethe Institute was designed as a hybrid organization, primarily funded by the country's foreign ministry. Named after the famous German author and intellectual Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, the institute was designed to advance the German language across the globe, overcome prejudices regarding German culture, provide information about German society and politics, and promote mutual understanding with other countries through education exchanges [Lanshina 2015]. The Goethe Institute replaced the Deutsche Academy, which had discredited itself by spreading Nazi propaganda [Brett-Schaefer, 2019]. The new organization was set the tough task of improving Germany's image abroad, which was negatively affected by the country's role in the two world wars, the Nazi ideology, and difficulties dealing with the past. In 2021, there are 157 Goethe Institutes operational in 97 countries. The network comprises Goethe Centres, cultural societies, reading rooms, and exam and language learning centres. As Germany has grown into the third economy in the world[17], interest in learning German and in cooperating with Germany in all fields has increased. The work of the Goethe Institutes has been positively assessed by experts for its contribution to cultivating a productive dialogue with countries near and far and improving the country's attractiveness [Jaschke & Keita 2021; Brett-Schaefer 2019; Lanshina 2015].

Launched in 2004, the Confucius Institutes project was named after the Chinese ancient philosopher Confucius and inspired by the Goethe institutes [Hartig 2016]. The institutes were put under the responsibility of the Office of Chinese Language Council International. The goal was to enhance China's soft power while teaching Chinese to foreigners as part of a larger initiative to improve China's image abroad. While the Goethe institutes are often standalone entities, the Confucius Institutes are based in universities where most of the demand for Chinese language training exists[18]. The terms of the agreement are adapted to the conditions and financial resources of the countries where the institutes have been opened: while in developed countries, universities provide around half of the funding, in third-world countries all costs are taken care of by China [Chew 2007]. Although the funding and language teaching are widely welcome in universities across the world, some controversies have emerged relating to the terms of the cooperation and ideological requests of China concerning sensitive political issues [Brett-Schaefer 2019]. The institutes have a productive financial model where the recipient country gets financially involved, which encourages bilateral cooperation and the effective use of language as a medium of soft power [Gil 2017]. However, negotiations with and attempts to control political choices made by partner universities have led to conflict situations, with the potential to deteriorate China's image.

Whereas language and cultural institutes all aim at increasing their country's soft power, their structure and specific goals may vary based on the reasons behind their creation. While 19th and first half of the 20th century institutes are more likely to directly refer to a country (Alliance Francaise, British Council), more recent organizations are discreetly named after illustrious and internationally recognized authors or philosophers (Goethe Institute, Confucius Institute). Institutes that were established long ago have the power to retain a large influence, in spite of changing political lines, as illustrated by the case of the French Alliance. France's prioritization of the French language since the French Revolution continues to inform and guide its public diplomacy efforts to this day. The British Council benefits from the asset of already having the dominant international language and can focus on speci-

[16] Expert Interview 2.

[17] Investopedia. The Top 25 Economies in the World. Available at: https://www.investopedia.com/insights/worlds-top-economies/ (accessed: 21.07.2021).

[18] Expert Interview 7.

fically promoting the British culture to attract students and create new economic opportunities. It also appears that rehabilitating a country's damaged image may be easier if the controversial behaviour is in the past (Germany) rather than ongoing (China).

5

For centuries, language policies have been considered to be an effective tool of successful statecraft: first through bringing together European nation-states via the eradication of local dialects and the imposition of a national unified and codified language in an attempt to carve out a new state sustaining identity, then through fulfilling an imperialist mission of 'educating' colonised populations with the goal of forcibly creating lasting economic and cultural ties between colonies and the imperial powers. In the same vein, language planning was part of some countries' strategies to foster new allegiances after the end of colonial rule and remains a noticeable part of the foreign policy arsenal of states to date. While the discourse and means of implementing language policies have changed under new conditions – particularly the rejection of coercive measures in language promotion, the de-facto domination of English as the new lingua franca of politics, business, and science, and the legal protection of minority dialects – the belief in the power of language to shape allegiances remains unchanged on the political level. Indeed, irrespective of scepticism amongst language planning experts, long-term and coherent language policies can yield promising results, as in the case of the Philippines conferring a durable strategic advantage to the USA, or in the case of the Goethe Institute that contributed to improving Germany's image around the world. However, the efficiency of language policies and their most productive forms remain understudied to this day. Furthermore, the compatibility of the declared goals of cultural institutes operating abroad (mutual understanding, universal access to education) and their true objectives (promoting their country's interests, financial gain in some cases) warrants further study.

The analysis of the efficiency of language policies can be placed in the larger context of academic work on soft power. While proponents of soft power insist that language, education, and overall attractiveness can be a significant foreign policy advantage [Nye 2013], other academics note that the concept is based on unverified assumptions that it can change people's behaviour [Ohnesorge 2020; Lomer 2017]. The efficiency of language policies depends, according to the findings of this paper, on the nature of the goals of states and their compatibility with the current context. Improving a country's image abroad with language policies to bury historical bones of contention, attract larger tourist flows, and increase commercial exchanges with neighbouring countries appears to be a realistic goal, although long-term. Using soft power for neo-colonialist purposes and to conceal infringements to international norms will likely lead to failure and to the backfiring of language policies.

* * *

This paper shows that language as a tool of statecraft has changed over the last few centuries, with governments having to adapt to the new globalised and liberal context. While the time when states would forcibly to carve out new identities around a unified language and place language policies at the heart of imperialist missions to dominate the world has come to an end, language remains in the political realm. Language policies not only survived the decolonization process, but actually took on new soft power forms as states attempted to address new challenges. While the discourse and means of the implementation of language policies have changed under new conditions – particularly the rejection of force in language promotion, the domination of English, the protection of minority dialects, and the technological changes linked to globalization – the belief in the power of language to shape allegiances remains, on the political level, unchanged, as reflected by the significant funds funnelled by states into language and culture centres around the world.

Appendix 1

Interview List

Interview number	Gender	Place of work	Nationality	Interview Language
1	M	University	Russia	English
2	F	British Council	UK	English
3	M	University	UK	English
4	M	University	Russia	Russian
5	F	French Alliance	France	French
6	F	Media	Russia	Russian
7	F	University	China	English
8	M	University	Russia	Russian
9	F	University	UK	English
10	F	University	Spain	English

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ЯЗЫК КАК РЕСУРС ВНЕШНЕЙ ПОЛИТИКИ

СТАРЫЙ ИНСТРУМЕНТ ПОД НОВЫЕ ЗАДАЧИ?

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Резюме

В статье исследуется язык как инструмент внешнеполитического влияния, эволюция подходов к его использованию с течением времени, а также вопрос о том, остается ли он актуальным и допустимым в нынешней международной обстановке. Давая обзор использования языка как инструмента внешней политики с междисциплинарной точки зрения, авторы рассматривают роль языковой политики на разных этапах истории: от появления возможности у европейских государств принудительно создавать новую идентичность вокруг единого языка до выполнения имперской миссии – «просвещения» колонизированного населения в попытке обеспечить экономические и культурные блага колониальным державам на длительную перспективу. Успешно пережив процессы деколонизации, к началу XXI века языковая политика обрела новые формы и уже как элемент арсенала «мягкой силы» привлекается государствами для решения внешнеполитических задач сегодняшнего дня. Основываясь на анализе экспертных интервью и источников (как первичных, так и вторичных), авторы показывают, что вера в способность языка формировать лояльность к определённому государству на политическом уровне остается по-прежнему сильной, невзирая на то, что нормативный дискурс и средства реализации языковой политики в современных реалиях претерпели серьёзную трансформацию, в частности произошёл отказ от применения силы для продвижения языка, наблюдается почти тотальное доминирование английского языка, утвердилась норма защиты языковых меньшинств, а также происходят обусловленные глобализацией технологические изменения, ослабляющие роль языка в формировании политической идентичности и устойчивых внешнеполитических лояльностей и ориентаций.

Ключевые слова:

внешнеполитические ресурсы; языковая политика; язык меньшинства; мягкая сила; глобализация.

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AD HOC ALLIANCES AS ITALIAN KEY STATECRAFT TOOL

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Abstract

Despite economic troubles and constant political instability, Italy manages to retain its historical role as a key EU state and one of the three major economies of the region, which justifies its G7 membership and therefore formally endues it with a great power status. This is due to accommodationism having been the main behavioral pattern since the establishment of the Italian Republic, and the skillful use of *ad hoc alliances* – a pragmatic statecraft tool which renders Italy flexible and unpredictable. Too big to be defensive, but too small to be offensive, Italy does not provoke antagonism in any EU country, potentially becoming a universal ally. Cooperation with Greece on fiscal flexibility, with Spain and France on Corona bonds, and with Hungary on EU common migration policy strengthens its bargaining power in the EU, since the latter needs Italy for reasons of security and solidarity. Having furthermore been a devoted US partner since the end of World War II, Italy considers the United States a guarantor of its national security and position on the international arena and is inclined to lend its support to Washington even if such actions contradict the policies of closer geostrategic partners in the EU. Thanks to such an allegiance Italy manages to preserve a certain room for maneuvering in interactions with other non-Euro-Atlantic partners to an extent that does not imperil its strategic alliance with Washington, which has always been an invariable of Italian foreign policy. However, scarce attention from the USA under the Trump administration made Italy utilize its statecraft tools towards Washington as well, and a pragmatic rapprochement with China on the Belt and Road Initiative and humanitarian aid during the pandemic presents a clear example thereof.

Keywords:

Italian foreign policy; statecraft; coronavirus; coronavirus crisis; Italy-Russia relations; Italy-EU relations; Italy-US relations; Italy-China relations.

The term statecraft, although it is widely used in foreign works on political science, has not yet received a generally accepted equivalent in Russian. One of the textbook definitions was given by Professor Kalevi Holsti from the University of British Columbia: "Organized actions governments take to change the external environment in general or the policies and actions of other states in particular to achieve the objectives that have been set by policy makers" [Holsti 1976: 293]. Russian researcher Mikhail Troitskiy inter-

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prets statecraft as "a set of behavioral patterns used to achieve measurable results" [Jordan et al. 2021a; 2021b]. The most appropriate interpretation of statecraft appears to be "a foreign policy toolkit". At the same time, the ways of conducting foreign policy "should demonstrate a clear connection between cause and effect and be replicable" [Jordan et al. 2021a; 2021b].

While analyzing a state's foreign policy tools, technologies and methods used in foreign policy in order to change the behavior of other players in accordance with the own interests of the state have been considered as examples thereof. As a rule, states are prone to stereotypical behavior and are guided by the same attitudes, formed – depending on the state's choice – on the tradeoff of ideology and pragmatism, readiness to seek compromise and demonstration of force, or alliance commitments and disposition to show flexibility and variability in the choice of coalitions. Accordingly, the study of foreign policy in terms of the application of certain tools and methods does not aim to analyze the intentions and ultimate goals of the state; it is the tools themselves and their combinations that matter. Therefore, the key research question is not "What does the state seek to achieve?" but "How does the state achieve what it wants?".

Russian researchers have traditionally focused on foreign policy analysis, to which significant contributions were made by A.D. Bogaturov, M.A. Khrustalev, T.A. Shakleina, A.A. Baykov, I.A. Istomin, and many others [Modern 2009; Khrustalev 2011; Introduction... 2014; Istomin 2018; Istomin, Baykov 2019]. At first glance, the subject fields of foreign policy analysis and foreign policy tools overlap; this makes it difficult to single out the latter as a separate branch of knowledge. Substantial similarities of these areas do occur; however, the study of foreign policy tools allows conceptualizing the state's behavior in the international context, tracing the evolution of its actions in the international arena, and comparing its tools with other states without affecting its goals and interests, unlike in the case of general foreign policy analysis.

The study of foreign policy tools also differs from the study of foreign policy strategy, since the latter implies the consideration of state actions to achieve a certain *a priori* known goal. Another related area is the analysis of foreign policy resources, but its practical applicability is limited by the fact that the presence of great potential in states does not automatically imply its full application, whereas a state with a relatively low foreign policy potential, on the contrary, may pose a threat to the entire world community. In other words, "strong" is not always identical to "dangerous," or "weak" to "harmless". The study of strictly foreign policy resources does not allow us to make predictions about the actual behavior of a state, because there is no direct correlation between the amount of resources and the willingness to use them. The study of behavioral patterns is, therefore, of great practical relevance, since their transformation, being noticeable at the proper depth of analysis, will signal a change in the goals, intentions, and, subsequently, the strategy of the state in the international arena, which would have only been guessed at in the absence of observations over the foreign policy tools.

1

In terms of foreign policy tools, Italy is not a trivial object of analysis. A member state of the Group of Seven, and one of the founding countries of the European Union, it ranks equally with the strongest powers in the global context, despite the absence of nuclear weapons and global ambitions, a fairly modest defense budget[1], a non-aggressive foreign policy (in the postwar period), structural economic problems, and an unstable domestic political situation. Italy has positioned itself as "the smallest among the big ones and the biggest among the small ones". At the same time, participation in the Group of Seven suggests the

[1] On average, 1.5% of GDP over the past 20 years according to SIPRI. URL: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988–2019%20as%20a%20share%20of%20GDP.pdf (accessed: 14.09.2020).

possibility of granting the country a great power status as well. It is obvious that such an image has been formed as a result of the effective and sustainable foreign policy tools, having nothing to do with the methods of hard power, which are considered an integral part of any state's strength and influence in international affairs.

Speaking of the Italian perception of foreign policy goals and instruments, one cannot fail to mention the country's fascist past, from which it sought to move as far away as possible throughout the postwar period. After World War II, Italy – like Germany and Japan – underwent major changes in its foreign policy strategy: after the heavy defeat suffered by the country's ideology and the widespread global understanding that the war was not worth the large-scale political, economic, and human losses incurred, the power in Italy was taken by the new politicians who advocated the principles of rejecting the use of force as a foreign policy tool and preventing military conflicts. In the postwar period, Italy's foreign policy was built from the perspective of a «middle power» [Nuti 2011], which meant mainly moving away from the global ambitions of the past, adhering to democratic norms, and protecting its economic interests. Having chosen the United States as its main ally and participation in European integration as the main path of development within the Western bloc, Italy staked on a "strategy of international re-legitimization" [Diodato, Niglia 2017], designed to help the country restore its status as a responsible actor in international relations, behaving exclusively within the legal framework.

Throughout the Cold War, Italian foreign policy remained relatively passive in order to avoid incitement of further divisions within the Italian society already split into Communists and Christian Democrats. In a number of areas (e.g., the Mediterranean), Rome nevertheless took the initiative, defending its interests that did not go beyond its alliance with the United States. The very logic of the international situation at that time – the confrontation of the two superpowers – left no room on the "stage" for other states. In this sense, Italy, having entrusted its national security to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), did not challenge decisions of the U.S. administration, remaining a loyal but inactive partner within the NATO framework. Professor Paolo Rosa of the University of Trento called Italy during the Cold War 'an accommodationist state' (Rosa, 2014), describing in this term Rome's consistent but passive support of its main ally and security guarantor (Washington), while unwilling to build up its own military power and take international initiatives involving the use of force, preferring instead to entrust the resolution of armed conflicts to international organizations. This term could be translated into Russian as "opportunism," but this has a distinctly negative connotation, although it reflects to some extent the political pragmatism inherent to Italy in the context of relations with the United States. Accomodationism as a model of foreign policy behavior was not indicative of isolationism: in the postwar period, Italy was part of UN missions in Somalia, Egypt, Lebanon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Laos.

If the passive foreign policy strategy in the period of the bipolar confrontation was logical and prompted by the objective need for a clear choice of bloc, in the post-bipolar world the situation has changed significantly. It should be noted that the Italians are traditionally much more concerned about their domestic politics than about events beyond the national borders, due to the Italian mentality, which is reflected in exclusive preoccupation with their family, small business, hometown, etc. This fact is reflected both on the domestic level – in any newspaper, the "politics" section of the news will be about the situation in Italy rather than abroad – and on the political level – electoral platforms of the parties are almost entirely devoted to the domestic policies, while the foreign policy is at most sketched at the end.

Nevertheless, the Italian authorities are fully aware of the extent to which their domestic policy depends on changes in the external environment. The birth of the Italian Republic coincided with the beginning of the Cold War, the logic of which determined all the subsequent years of the state's existence. With the end of bipolar division, Italy was reborn and

began a new chapter in history under the name of the Second Republic; accommodationism nevertheless remained the main characteristic of its foreign policy. From a devastated and economically backward country, Italy has developed into one of the world's leading powers, a member of the Group of Seven, and one of the ten strongest economies in the world (in 2019, it ranked eighth by GDP volume)[2]. The country's foreign policy has a strong pacifist component; the use of force is seen as possible only with a mandate from international organizations, where Italy demonstrates active participation. Since 1991, the country has participated in 30 missions in Africa, Asia, and Europe, and currently there are ten missions under the aegis of the UN, the EU, and NATO[3] that are in an active phase. At the same time, Rome continues to demonstrate its loyalty to Washington, considering it its main ally and guarantor of security.

2

Relations with the United States occupy a special place in the Italian system of coordinates; for Rome, in exchange for its loyalty, the great power status of this overseas partner serves as a pillar of support and a guarantee of a stable position in the international arena. Italians, unlike many of their European neighbors for whom cooperation within the EU is an integral part of a broader concept of Western partnership with the leading role of the United States, traditionally draw a distinction between the concepts of Europeanism and Atlanticism. Alternation of these two key foreign policy priorities takes place depending on the political views of a particular cabinet of ministers: the center-right historically gravitated toward Washington and the center-left toward Brussels [Maslova 2016: 107]. Commitment to Atlantic solidarity did not always imply maintaining high loyalty within the European bloc and, on the other hand, tensions within the EU did not affect Italian-American relations.

Osvaldo Croci, professor at Memorial University of Newfoundland, distinguishes two approaches to the correlation of the concepts of Europeanism and Atlanticism: they are either seen as mutually exclusive and opposing phenomena, or as a 'nested game'[4]. According to its rules, Europeanism is a part of Atlanticism, which is "traditionally considered by the Italian leadership as a policy aimed at strengthening Atlanticism" [Croci 2008: 139]. Loyalty to the Atlantic bloc remains a key foreign policy stance for Italy for at least two reasons: firstly, Italy perceives NATO membership as the cornerstone of its security due to its vulnerable geopolitical position on the external borders of the alliance; secondly, close friendly relations with the United States guarantee Italy a place among the four (only three after Brexit) EU policymakers, as well as the prestigious title of one of the members of the closed Group of Seven.

More importantly, Euroscepticism, popular in Italy in recent years, is rooted in the turn toward Atlanticism during Silvio Berlusconi's first and second governments and the more active development of this trend (compared to Europeanism) during his third and fourth governments. The pendulum of center-right foreign policy more often tilted toward strengthening ties with the United States, which led to a decrease in the intensity of cooperation with European partners. One of the members of NATO most loyal to Washington, Italy was the first member of the alliance to deploy Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles on its territory in 1959; in 1979, the Italian parliament approved the deployment of Pershing-2 intermediate range ballistic missiles, and later the government agreed to deploy cruise missiles; in 1999, Italy played a key role in providing the logistical component of the NATO intervention in Kosovo, providing allied forces with its air-

[2] World Bank Statistics. URL: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD. (accessed: 11.09.2020).

[3] Operazioni Internazionali. Ministero della Difesa. URL: http://www.esercito.difesa.it/operazioni/operazioni_oltremare/Pagine/default.aspx (accessed: 11.09.2020).

[4] The term 'nested game' was coined by George Tsebelis (Nested Games. Rational Choice in Comparative Politics, 1990) to refer to the intertwining and embedding of one concept into another.

fields. Rome's unequivocal support of Washington during the periods of center-right government also led to explicit condemnation by leading European countries. For example, Italy participated in military operations in Iraq (despite German and French criticism) and in Libya (notwithstanding the ambivalent position of Berlin).

By consistently proving its loyalty to the principles of Atlantic solidarity, Italy has earned "room for maneuver" [Croci 2015: 51]: that is, the opportunity to act independently in matters that are not of key importance to the United States, but are sensitive to Italy. Since 2014, Rome has demonstrated the same approach with regard to anti-Russian sanctions: it defended its own interests and pursued an independent policy line as long as this did not jeopardize relations with the United States.

The pursuit of national interests in areas that are not strategically important to the United States and by means that do not call into question Rome's pro-Atlantic orientation is not a 21st century novelty. The first outcomes of such policy date back to the postwar period and can be illustrated by the example of Italian-Soviet relations.

In the Cold War era, contacts between countries from different blocs were highly undesirable because they touched on the subject of loyalty, a matter sensitive for both superpowers. Nevertheless, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Italy adopted the policy of neo-Atlanticism, which involved "developing a privileged partnership with the United States while secretly striving for hegemony in the Mediterranean" [Manta 2018: 208]; thus, it began to form a new international image of a mediator between East and West. This role was perfect for Italy because of its geostrategic position on the border of the Iron Curtain in the Mediterranean.

The new Italian policy involved the task of establishing contacts with countries that were not part of the capitalist bloc. According to the Italian establishment, at the new stage of the Cold War, military deterrence was no longer sufficient, and "delicate capillary work was needed to devastate the Soviet power from within in order to weaken it and assert the superiority of the Western system" (Salacone, 2014: 112). In an effort to be a useful member of NATO and simultaneously defend its own interests, Italy went into rapprochement with the USSR, mainly using the tools of economic diplomacy, which had become available to it due to the rapid growth and transformation of the Italian economy.

Rome and Moscow were of mutual interest to each other: the "Italian economic miracle" looked like a worthy example to the USSR that was concerned about its industrial backwardness compared to the West; Soviet natural gas reserves attracted Italy, which was in search of new sources of energy for the growing domestic demand. Another powerful factor in the rapprochement between the two countries was the Italian Communist Party, the largest in Western Europe with about two million members. According to Alessandro Salacone, researcher from the University of Naples, "the presence of the Communist Party in Italy, as well as its ties with the CPSU, were crucial in shaping the Italian vector of the Soviet foreign policy" [Salacone 2013: 4]; this consequently served as a particular starting point for bilateral cooperation and a constant area of mutual attraction. It was Rome that was destined to open the Iron Curtain, and it took advantage of this opportunity.

In 1960, the Italian oil and gas company Eni signed a four-year contract with the USSR for the supply of 12 million tons of oil per year[5], thus becoming the first non-Socialist importer of Soviet oil. Further cooperation with Moscow expanded. In 1969, after years of negotiations, Russia signed a twenty-year contract with Eni for the supply of six billion cubic meters of natural gas per year[6] in exchange

[5] *Sviazannie energiej. 40 let sotrudnichestva Gazproma i Eni po puti sledovania prirodnogo gaza*. (Connected by energy. 40 years of cooperation between Gazprom and Eni along the natural gas route.) 2009. URL: https://www.eni.com/ru_RU/attachments/pdf/eni-gazprom-bassa.pdf C. 4. (accessed: 15.04.2021).

[6] Ibid. P. 10.

for pipes and equipment for the construction of gas pipelines. An important milestone in bilateral economic relations was the signing in 1966 of an agreement between the Italian Fiat Group and the Soviet "Avtopromimport" on the construction of the AvtoVAZ automobile plant in the city named after Palmiro Togliatti, the general secretary of the Italian Communist Party.

One of the leading Italian masterminds behind establishing economic ties with Moscow, chairman of the Fiat automobile group Vittorio Valletta, saw in the development of non-military production in the USSR the possibility of "the much-needed demobilization of the USSR's labor force and military industry to redirect resources to consumer goods production and economic consolidation" [Castronovo 1999: 1058]. Consequently, one can conclude that the development of cooperation with the USSR was also in NATO's interest, since the increase in the number of Soviet citizens employed in non-military industries and the redistribution of state resources from the defense-industrial complex, including through the establishment of relations between Rome and Moscow, contributed to the easing of tensions between the blocs, which were especially deep after the construction of the Berlin Wall and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Anyway, having established an energy dialogue with the USSR, Italy remained a faithful ally of the United States within NATO on the main foreign policy fronts, as evidenced, above all, by its clear commitment to the course of European integration. For its part, the United States could not afford to "throw around" allies and had to give Italy a certain "freedom of maneuver". Through this process, it was in the 1960s that "the foundations of Soviet-Italian relations were laid and the features that would distinguish their bilateral ties in the future were defined" [Salacone 2018: 140].

At the present stage, it appears that Moscow, rather than Rome, attaches somewhat greater importance to the Russian-Italian political relations. The friendly nature of bilateral ties in the 21st century cannot be denied, but the peak of mutual interest was reached during the premiership of Silvio Berlusconi, known for his personal friendship with Russian President Vladimir Putin. With the onset of EU sanctions against Russia in 2014, Moscow began to see Rome as a savior and apparent 'rebel' capable of breaking the vicious circle of constantly renewed mutual economic restrictions with its voice in the European Council. These expectations were particularly heightened after the entry of the League party into the ruling coalition in 2018, whose secretary Matteo Salvini "repeatedly publicly expressed sympathy for the Russian President" [Shibkova, Maslova, Loreto 2019: 151].

Despite uneasy relations with Brussels over the migration agenda, fiscal discipline issues, and, more recently, issues of European solidarity in connection with the fight against the coronavirus, Rome is adhering to the EU's common line on the sanctions issue. The explanation for this stance is again the priority relationship with the United States: Russian-Italian relations are beyond the freedom of maneuver granted to Rome by Washington. In this context, the pro-Russian sympathies, expressed by Italian parties at various intensity, were destined to remain mere rhetoric, since the same League, having moved from opposition to the ruling coalition, did not influence Italy's vote on the approval of anti-Russian sanctions in the EU institutions.

Italian Eurosceptic parties – positioning themselves as opponents to the unfair EU policy toward Russia, the dominant power of Brussels, and the infringement of Italian national interests in this regard – were forced to choose between Moscow and Washington on the sensitive issue of anti-Russian sanctions. Given the traditional importance of Atlanticism for the center-right, namely the League and Forza Italia parties, there is no reason to argue that the choice could have been made in favor of Russia. The main Atlanticist Silvio Berlusconi, alongside his party in the European Parliament, tries to stick to neutrality, which, in particular, was reflected in his reaction to the American bombing of Syria in April 2018 that took place against the background of acute tensions in US-Russia relations. The politician offered to

play the role of mediator in the establishment of dialogue between Moscow, Brussels, and Washington, while stressing the unconditional alliance with the United States[7].

Matteo Salvini's words about 'madness'[8] were associated with substantial criticism of U.S. actions because, in his words, "the examples of Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya have not taught the Americans anything"[9]. In fact, however, he gave no reason to doubt his Atlantic solidarity. The League's election campaign "Italians First" slogan resonated with the "America First" campaign slogan of Donald Trump, and the U.S. president himself made an impression on Salvini, as the latter stated during their meeting in Philadelphia in April 2016 before the preliminary election. Salvini's foreign policy adviser, Guglielmo Picchi, once claimed that the Atlantic orientation of the party remained unshaken, despite some isolated instances of divergence of opinion. According to Picchi, apart from the leader of the League, other politicians, such as Angela Merkel, criticized the U.S. actions in Syria, but "no one questions her Atlanticism"[10]. Picchi's words are confirmed by the fact that the first foreign representative that Salvini met with after the election results were announced was Lewis Eisenberg, the U.S. Ambassador in Rome.

Therefore, it seems evident that the Atlantic solidarity is at the core of the Italian foreign policy, and departure from it, including in the form of "flirting" with Russia, indicates nothing more than autonomy within the limits that do not jeopardize the allied relationship with the United States.

3

If strategic relations with the United States remain a perpetual principle of Italy's foreign policy, Rome's interactions with its EU partners and with Brussels are characterized by a sequence of alternating ups and downs. As one of the founding countries of the European Union, Italy was one of the most loyal Euro-optimists until the end of the Cold War. Since the mid-1990s, the Cabinet of Ministers led by Silvio Berlusconi[11] brought the Atlantic direction of foreign policy to the forefront, to the detriment of the European one. Rome's relations with Brussels, Berlin, and Paris worsened in the context of the global financial and economic crisis; this situation developed into a crisis of eurozone sovereign debt, followed by EU demands for austerity, resulting in higher taxes and unemployment. Another factor that magnified Eurosceptic sentiments in Italy was the migration crisis, especially Brussels' decision on mandatory refugee quotas, which caused discontent among both citizens and political forces, who demanded that Brussels apply the principle of solidarity in practice.

It came as a surprise to Brussels that in 2018 the Eurosceptic coalition, whose both members had once campaigned against the EU and eurozone and harshly criticised EU institutions, came to power in Italy . Nevertheless, the need to maintain constructive relations with Rome, regardless of the political orientation of the cabinet left the European Commission, Berlin, and Paris no choice but to collaborate with the ruling coalition. At the first EU summit after the formation of the Italian cabinet, the new Prime Minister

[7] Berlusconi Mediatore: "Alleati degli USA ma Mosca non è Nemica. Il Giornale. 16.04.2018. URL: http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/berlusconi-mediatore-alleati-degli-usa-mosca-non-nemica-1515764.html (accessed: 30.07.2020).

[8] Salvini-Berlusconi, l'Attacco in Siria Divide il Centrodestra. Il Leghista a M5S e Forza Italia: «Basta Insulti». Corriere della Sera. 14.04.2018. URL: https://www.corriere.it/politica/18_aprile_14/attacco-siria-questione-che-spacca-ancora-piu-centrodestra-385862fc-3fdc-11e8-b74e-8ed1421730a4.shtml (accessed: 30.08.2020)

[9] *"Raketni siurpriz Donalda Trampa". Aviaudari SSHA vizvali protivorechivuji reaktsiju v mire*. (Donald Trump's Missile Surprise. The U.S. airstrikes have provoked a controversial response in the world.) Izvestia. 07.04.2017. URL: https://iz.ru/news/678914ю. (accessed: 14.04.2021).

[10] Lega Atlantista. Il Foglio. 17.04.2020. URL: https://www.ilfoglio.it/politica/2018/04/17/news/lega-atlantista-189757/. (accessed: 30.09.2020)

[11] Silvio Berlusconi served as Prime Minister of Italy from 1994 to 1995, 2001 to 2005, 2005 to 2006, and 2008 to 2011.

Giuseppe Conte managed to get concessions from member states on the migration agenda, the most sensitive issue for Rome. Conte agreed to a three-point compromise proposed by Emmanuel Macron: the establishment of camps for immigrants by EU countries on a voluntary basis, where refugee status would be confirmed or denied; the possibility of moving immigrants to a country other than the requested one (also on a voluntary basis); and enhanced protection of the EU external borders. It became possible to reach such a decision not because of the personality of the Italian prime minister, but because of an understanding in Brussels, Paris, and Berlin of the need to keep Italy within the European framework. Unity is especially needed in the face of pressing challenges, because of which the European Union "is increasingly exposed to accusations of excessive bureaucracy, technocratic domination, and deficit of democracy, which inevitably leads to a deepening gap between civil society and institutions of the European Union" [Zonova 2019: 64].

Italy seems to get away with its repeated violations of financial discipline and its demonstration of political autonomy (its e.g. participation in military operations in Iraq and Libya), as every time European partners seek to make concessions and prevent Rome's 'drift' toward Russia, the USA, or China. In such a way, Italy maintains its status as one of the three (post-Brexit) leaders of the European Union, making it reckon with Italy's opinion. This position has been achieved with the successful use of a specific instrument of foreign policy: *ad hoc* alliances; in this context, these are purely pragmatic situational alliances with less powerful EU countries, as well as with third countries, to 'bargain' concessions from Berlin, Paris, and Brussels. Having created an image of an unpredictable and sometimes flighty country, Italy has turned it into its strong point and a lever of pressure in relations with various partners.

Examples of the use of *ad hoc* alliances include the rapprochement with Greece in 2015 and support for the country's newly elected Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras. At the time, southern European countries with high levels of public debt to GDP and negative or zero economic growth were particularly exposed to the effects of austerity measures – recession and a spike in unemployment. The Greek Prime Minister chose a trip to Rome as one of his first official visits, during which Matteo Renzi, then Prime Minister and leader of the center-left coalition, expressed his intension to strengthen bilateral cooperation on all fronts. The Italian Minister of European Affairs stated that the election of Tsipras "presented new opportunities for changes in Europe that would promote growth, investment and the fight against unemployment"[12]. The desire for more flexible fiscal policies and relaxation of austerity has become a common interest between the two countries.

This rapprochement did not last long: on the eve of the Greek referendum in July 2015, Renzi came down on the side of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The Italian prime minister urged Greece to abide by the established rules, the same for all, and not to "consider themselves the most cunning," because "the Italians did not reform the labor market so that some Greek ship-owners would continue not to pay taxes"[13]. For his part, Tsipras presented the election campaign as a choice between himself and the European Commission, and in fact it was a choice between "the euro and the drachma". Italy's initial support for the Greek new government was a strategic move aimed at drawing attention of Germany to Italy's problems and demonstrating a willingness to coordinate action with other "non-systemic" players who are taking a more critical stand with regard to measures for dealing with the eurozone crisis.

The issue of migration also led to temporary alliances. For example, after the League came

[12] Rome and Athens Allied against Austerity? The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. February 2015. URL: https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/comment7_2015eng.pdf (accessed: 07.05.2020).

[13] Ibid.

to power in 2018, the notion of the "Salvini-Orbán axis" began to appear in the media. The then Italian deputy prime minister met several times with the Hungarian prime minister, known for his radical position on quotas for refugees from African and Middle Eastern countries in EU member states, and he even personally inspected the wall built on the border with Serbia. Both politicians stressed they agreed on protecting national borders from the influx of immigrants, as well as on reviewing agreements with non-EU countries that do not cooperate with the integration association on repatriation of those who entered the EU territory illegally. Matteo Salvini supported Orbán's tough policy, justifying it by the need to "protect the security, the family and the Christian identity of our continent"[14].

The coronavirus pandemic opened up space for new strategic alliances for Italy. Rome presented a united front with the states most affected – Spain, France, and Portugal – against the lines of Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and Finland. Rome advocated the introduction of "coronabonds", or bonds jointly issued by eurozone member states, guaranteed by the ECB, and forming a "debt union" where tax burden would be equally distributed among citizens of the EU states, regardless of the extent to which they were affected by the pandemic. The proponents of this idea refer to it as *a new Marshall Plan for Europe*.

As an alternative, Berlin and its allies insisted that the countries with the greatest losses turn to the European Stability Mechanism. According to the affected countries, this would have led to a deepening economic crisis, as in Greece in the past decade. Although the consolidated position of the southern European states did not lead to the launch of coronabonds, the northern countries made concessions and agreed to create a $2 trillion coronavirus fund, of which $209 billion is earmarked for Italy[15]. Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte called the measure adequate, stating that it would "restart Italy and change its image"[16].

Rome's success in finding temporary 'allies' was made possible by the image the country has developed in the international arena. Eternally balancing between the great powers and never initiating interference in the internal affairs of other states, Italy is seen as too small to offend, and at the same time too big to be offended. Membership in the leading multilateral formats allows Italy to keep in line with the major players, being considered "the smallest among the greatest," while at the same time exploiting the image of "the greatest among the smallest" when building relations with less powerful partners.

The overall positive image of the country is also supported by its cultural component, which plays the role of soft power. The cradle of European civilization, the owner of unique historical heritage and tourist destinations, the founder of opera, fashion and renowned cuisine, the producer of popular cars, and the speaker of a beautiful language: all these definitions attest to the country's attractiveness. In the last five years Italy never fell below 13th place in the international ranking of *The Soft Power 30*, and the report traditionally includes "nature, architecture, lifestyle, brands and cuisine" among the strengths providing a large potential of soft power of the country[17]. As a result, the advantageous political neutrality, combined with a fragile economy and a rich culture, expand the country's capabilities in negotiation process, making Italy an ideal partner and mediator that does not stir up ill-feeling of others.

[14] Merkel Gela l'Alleanza PPE-Sovranisti. Corriere della Sera. 02.05.2019. URL: https://www.corriere.it/politica/19_maggio_02/salvini-ungheria-visita-muro-anti-migranti-felice-vedere-l-efficacia-governo-orban-ca8ee232-6ce4-11e9-bcbb-8ef451e0c86f.shtml (accessed: 12.05.2020).

[15] Accordo sul Recovery Fund, Conte: Piano Adeguato alla Crisi. Salvini: Fregatura Grossa come una Casa. IL Sole 24 Ore. 19.07.2020. URL: https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/vertice-ue-kurz-c-e-ancora-molta-strada-fare-ADS9GEf. (accessed: 30.08.2020).

[16] Ibid.

[17] The Soft Power 30. 2019 Overview. URL: https://softpower30.com/country/italy/ (accessed: 16.04.2021).

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Riccardo Alcaro, Research Coordinator at Affari Internazionali, a leading Italian international relations think tank, noted in an article written last year on Italian-American and Italian-Chinese relations in light of the pandemic that "it is widely believed among experts that one of the most important results of the coronavirus pandemic will be an increase in existing geopolitical competition, rather than international cooperation, against a backdrop of exchange of information and coordination on management of joint health systems and potentially disastrous economic consequences"[18]. The United States and China remain the main competitors on the global stage, whose relations, in addition to the earlier trade war, have been exacerbated by the former U.S. president's efforts to label China as the perpetrator of the Coronavirus and the global lockdown[19, 20]. For its part, China has sent medical equipment and personnel to the most affected countries, gaining a reputation as a responsible, caring, and influential player in international relations.

European countries, being at the center of the intersection of U.S. and Chinese interests, are faced with the need to make a choice in favor of one of these powers. The example of Italy, with which China has been developing massive cooperation in recent years, is quite illustrative in this respect. The activation of bilateral ties began in the mid-2010s [Alekseenkova 2020], but during the premiership of Giuseppe Conte the Chinese agenda expanded so much that, at the behest of reformers from the Democratic Party, the press started talking about the existence of a pro-Chinese lobby in the Italian parliament[21], alluding to the head of the cabinet and his closest associates. Conte's speech in the Chamber of Deputies before the vote of confidence in the government in January 2021, where the Italian prime minister spoke of the shared values and principles between China and Italy and effectively equated Beijing with Washington in Rome's foreign policy priorities, sparked particular indignation among the traditionally pro-American right-wing forces.

Italy is the only G7 state to officially support China's Belt and Road Initiative: a bilateral memorandum of understanding and cooperation was signed in March 2019[22]. Although there was immediate speculation in the press about Rome's estrangement from Washington, or at least a number of right-wing politicians saw signs of such a trend, the memorandum is not binding. Its signing falls within the very 'room for maneuver' granted by Washington. The proavocative rapprochement with China should be seen as another example of *ad hoc* alliance, aimed this time at the United States in order to regain its attention, given this partner has neglected Italy amid conflicts with Iran and North Korea, as well as domestic political problems.

During the acute phase of the coronavirus epidemic, the headlines of Italian media were filled with stories of Brussels leaving Rome to its fate[23],

[18] Covid, Trump Accusa la Cina: «Ha Aperto le Frontiere per Favorire la Diffusione del Virus». Il Messaggero. 22.09.2020. URL: https://www.ilmessaggero.it/mondo/coronavirus_usa_cina_trump_virus_covid_seconda_ondata_onu-5478634.html (accessed: 17.04.2021).

[19] Trump Accusa la Cina: «Sul Virus ha Fatto un Tremendo Errore». Oms e Pechino: «Nessuna Prova». Agenzia Italiana. 04.05.2020. URL: https://www.agi.it/estero/news/2020-05-04/trump-accuse-cina-coronavirus-oms-prove-8517417/ (accessed: 17.04.2021).

[20] Covid, Trump Accusa la Cina: «Ha Aperto le Frontiere per Favorire la Diffusione del Virus». Il Messaggero. 22.09.2020. URL: https://www.ilmessaggero.it/mondo/coronavirus_usa_cina_trump_virus_covid_seconda_ondata_onu-5478634.html (accessed: 17.04.2021).

[21] Draghi: «Grazie, ci Rivedremo in Parlamento». Il Premier Incaricato non Parla dei Ministri. Corriere della Sera. 08.02.2021. URL: https://www.corriere.it/politica/21_febbraio_08/draghi-grazie-ci-rivedremo-parlamento-premier-incaricato-non-parla-ministri-bc66991e-6a5a-11eb-924b-61776b6fba88.shtml. (accessed: 20.02.2021).

[22] Memorandum d'Intesa tra il Governo della Repubblica Italiana il Governo della Repubblica Popolare Cinese. 23.03.2019. URL: http://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/documenti/documenti/Notizie-allegati/Italia-Cina_20190323/Memorandum_Italia-Cina_IT.pdf (accessed: 16.04.2021).

[23] Coronavirus, l'UE Ora Ci Prende a Schiaffi. Ci Lascia senza le Mascherine. Il Foglio. 06.03.2020. URL: https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/cronache/coronavirus-italia-chiede-pi-mascherine-allue-nessuno-ci-1836472.html. (accessed: 16.04.2021)

member states choosing their own national interests over European solidarity, and China and Russia being the only ones who did not abandon Italy[24]. Representatives of the Italian mainstream expressed their gratitude to the aid received from these countries, and "China was also included in the category of friends, despite the fact that it was the original source of the pandemic" [Maslova, Savino 2020: 46]. The issue of humanitarian aid to Italy was of geopolitical importance not only for Beijing, but for Rome as well, since the goal of returning to the focus of Washington's attention was indeed achieved: in April 2020, U.S. President Donald Trump personally pledged $100 million in aid to Italy. Later, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, confirming this figure, assured Italians that "no other nation will do more for you than the United States will do"[25]. The signing of a presidential memorandum on assistance to "one of the closest and oldest allies ravaged by the pandemic"[26] was an indication that with the intensification of Italian-Chinese cooperation, Washington felt the need not only "to demonstrate U.S. leadership in the face of Chinese and Russian disinformation campaigns"[27], but also to return Rome, which had its eye on the East, back into its sphere of influence.

The period of the fight with the pandemic was difficult for Italy, not only because of the human losses, the strain on the health care system, and the enormous economic losses, but also because of the extreme political instability. The victory of two opposition parties in the 2018 election, the year of a coalition government, and the formation of a new cabinet again headed by the nonpartisan Giuseppe Conte made the development of a foreign policy strategy situational and dependent on specific personalities in the structures of power.

Arguing on all points of the political agenda, the coalition partners of the League and the Five Star Movement were not united on the issue of enhancing cooperation with China. While the then Minister of Economic Development Luigi Di Maio claimed that the memorandum on the Belt and Road initiative offered "many opportunities for Italian SMEs to work in China, which means spreading 'Made in Italy' products around the world"[28], the Italian Minister of the then Interior Matteo Salvini stated that he would "say a firm 'no' if any Chinese acquisition would threaten Italian national security"[29]. He added that any investment in strategic sectors requires the utmost caution, and "if we were talking about Americans, it would be a different matter". Di Maio also stressed that "we are not talking about a new geopolitical alliance"[30] between Italy and China.

In other words, it was not a matter of of replacing Washington with Beijing, but the Italians used the ostensible rapprochement with the main rival of its main ally quite skillfully – in a sense, it was political blackmail – as a foreign policy tool. The increased attention to Italy's problems on the part of the U.S. administration proves the effectiveness of this tool.

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In the post-bipolar era, accommodationism – which is expressed in the avoidance of armed conflicts, the preference for diplomatic

[24] Dai Paesi UE Nessun Sostegno Medico, Solo la Cina Ci Ha Aiutato. Europa Today. 11.03.2020. URL: https://europa.today.it/attualita/coronavirus-cina-ue-mascherine.html (accessed: 16.04.2021).

[25] Coronavirus, Intervista a Mike Pompeo. Corriere della Sera. 09.04.2020. URL: https://www.corriere.it/esteri/20_aprile_09/coronavirus-intervista-mike-pompeo-per-l-italia-siamo-quelli-che-fanno-faranno-piu-collaboriamo-la-cina-ma-esigiamo-trasparenza-2389cfa6-79c7-11ea-afb4-c5f49a569528.shtml. (accessed: 20.08.2020).

[26] Memorandum on Providing COVID-19 Assistance to the Italian Republic. White House. URL: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-providing-covid-19-assistance-italian-republic/ (accessed: 31.08.2020).

[27] Ibid.

[28] Via della Seta. Di Maio e Salvini Divisi sul Memorandum d'Intesa tra Italia e Cina. Avvenire. 14.04.2019. URL: https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/via-della-seta-per-salvini-non-e-un-dogma-per-di-maio-s-ha-da-fare. (accessed: 06.06.2020).

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

ways to resolve international conflicts, and the passive fulfillment of allied obligations within NATO and other international organizations with absolute loyalty to Washington – remains an integral part of national strategic culture and the main behavioral pattern of Italy. Autonomy in foreign policy is available only within the limits that do not undermine the strength of the established Rome-Washington axis. Italy is capable of using ad hoc alliances for foreign policy blackmail; participation in such alliances allows it to increase its value in the eyes of its partners and maintain influence in the international arena.

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АЛЬЯНСЫ *AD HOC* КАК ДОМИНАНТА ВНЕШНЕПОЛИТИЧЕСКОГО ИНСТРУМЕНТАРИЯ ИТАЛИИ

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Резюме

На протяжении всего послевоенного периода Италия, несмотря на экономические проблемы и политическую нестабильность, оставалась ключевым игроком ЕС, членом «группы двадцати» и «группы семи», что наделяло её статусом великой державы. Не имея глобальных амбиций, Италия выступала влиятельным субъектом международных отношений благодаря аккомодационизму как основному поведенческому паттерну, а также инструментальному использованию ad hoc альянсов – прагматического подхода, делающего политику страны гибкой и непредсказуемой. Слишком мала для того, чтобы представлять опасность, но при этом достаточно велика, чтобы бояться самой, Италия не вызывала раздражения потенциальных партнёров, что сделало её универсальным союзником как в Европейском Союзе, так и за его пределами. Сотрудничая с Грецией в борьбе за отмену мер жёсткой экономии, с Испанией и Францией по вопросу введения коронабондов, с Венгрией по миграционной проблеме, Италия повысила свою значимость в глазах Парижа, Берлина и Брюсселя, нуждающихся в ней для обеспечения безопасности и солидарности.

Стратегическое партнёрство с США – константа внешней политики Италии – позволяет последней чувствовать себя уверенно на международной арене. Один из наиболее преданных союзников Вашингтона, Рим предпочитает двигаться в фарватере его политики, даже когда это противоречит позиции географически более близких партнёров по Евросоюзу. Высокая степень лояльности позволяет Италии сохранять «свободу манёвра» во внешнеполитических вопросах настолько, насколько это не ставит под угрозу прочность оси Рим–Вашингтон. Тем не менее национализм администрации США Джозефа Байдена заставил Италию применить *ad hoc* альянс уже против Вашингтона, выбрав во временные союзники Пекин, сотрудничество с которым активно развивается на фоне участия Италии в инициативе «Пояса и пути», а также гуманитарного сотрудничества в борьбе с пандемией.

Ключевые слова:

внешняя политика Италии; инструментарий внешней политики; коронавирус; коронакризис; российско-итальянские отношения; отношения ЕС–Италия; итальянско-американские отношения; итальянско-китайские отношения.

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