Western Theory of International Military Alliances: The State of the Discipline

International alliances represent agreements between states, which identify parameters of their political and military cooperation in the event of an armed conflict, as well as cooperative practices on the basis of such documents. The theory of international relations paid substantial attention throughout the entire Cold War towards the processes of their creation and operation, as well as their influence on the international security environment. Nevertheless, in the 1990s –2010s research on these issues received new impetus as a result of a more consistent structuring of historical record, greater accumulation of relevant data and active introduction of quantitative techniques. The current analytical review is designed to disclose the main achievements of the theory of international alliances, which on the basis of an analysis of extensive historical experience, reveals the main regulations governing evolution of such associations. It consistently systematizes recent findings on their functions and reasons for creating international alliances. It then explores the issue of reliability in formal military alliances, which for a long time was considered to be problematic. It also touches upon circumstances under which these agreements are terminated or abrogated. The article, finally, assesses the impact of alliances on international conflicts. In conclusions, the author identifies remaining gaps and possible directions for further development of studies on alliances. The current review enables to conclude that studies of alliances are currently structured around a mature and productive research program. However, major developments in the study of international alliances throughout the 1990s – 2010s remained a product of a significant narrowing of a research focus. Given it reliance on particular available databases, scholars limited their studies mostly to the study of formal provisions in alliances. As a result, they not only refrained from testing applicability of their conclusions for the more informal coalitions, but also overlooked broader effect of alliances on cooperation between states.

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