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Economic Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool

Abstract

The article deals with the evolution of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool from the end of the Second World War up to the contemporary sanctions against Russia. The analysis is built around the comparisons of sanctions cases in the period under review. Conclusions are made that could be significant for a theoretical understanding of the place of economic sanctions in contemporary world politics, as well as for making practical recommendations for the use of this instrument in Russian foreign policy and for countering sanctions directed against Russia.

In each of the cases under review, the key importance has been the structure of the international system. In the 20th century, the goals of sanctions were rather ambitious and targeted the vital interests of the targeted states. In the 21st century, the goal of sanctions has been much more limited.

The structure of the international system defined the difference of the role of international institutions in the cases under review, as well as the difference in methods used for ensuring compliance with sanctions.

Indeed, sanctions could be a useful instrument of international relations, however their importance must not be overstated. In most cases, they are not a true alternative to military force. They could be effective only against a state that is not a great power or not significant regional power.

Counteraction against imposed sanctions could be better organized by the private sector of the country being targeted. Offsetting the effect of sanctions on the governmental level is much more difficult. Legislative responses are not effective and could inflict damage that is bigger than the effect of the sanctions themselves.

About the Author

Dmitry Baluev
Lobachevsky Nizhniy Novgorod State University
Russian Federation

Prof. Dr Dmitry Baluev – Chair, Department of Applied Political Analysis and Modeling, Nizhniy Novgorod State University

Nizhniy Novgorod, 603950



References

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Review

For citations:


Baluev D. Economic Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool. International Trends / Mezhdunarodnye protsessy. 2014;12(3):23-37. (In Russ.)

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