The Memory of the Vietnam War in the American Socio-Political Debate Regarding the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq

This study examines how the United States interpreted and framed its major military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq during the first two decades of the twenty-first century, taking into account the enduring influence of memories of the Vietnam War (1965–1973). That conflict generated a distinctive phenomenon commonly referred to as the “Vietnam Syndrome,” characterized by profound socio-politi- cal disorientation within American society throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The memory and perceived lessons of the Vietnam War remain an integral component of any debate concerning the possible use of U.S. military force. The article aims to identify the relevant discursive practices and communities and to elucidate the role of Vietnam War memory within these debates. The findings indicate the existence of several distinct discourses on the military and political lessons of recent wars, reflected in the discursive practices of the respective communities. In the broader public and political discourse–represented in commentary, investigative journalism, and public opinion–wars are assessed primarily in terms of losses and unjustified costs, the legitimacy of initiating military operations, and the responsibility of political leaders who authorized them. These discursive practices, which first crystallized during the Vietnam War, reappear in discussions of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and correspond to a “victimhood” discourse in the sense used in critical discourse analysis. Political leaders responsible for initiating military action tend to justify the legitimacy of the wars and shift responsibility onto military executors and onto the presidents who oversaw troop withdrawals. Military personnel, reflecting on their operational experience, generally attribute responsibility for failures to policymakers who launched the wars, emphasizing the dif- ficulty–or outright impossibility–of achieving political objectives through military means. Comparable discursive practices are found in U.S. Congressional documents and in executive-branch agencies that supervise the allocation and use of funds for war efforts. These communities typically articulate an “exec- utor” discourse and invoke analogous implementation problems from past military campaigns as “lessons” that have been only partially learned.

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