Evolution of United States’ private military and security companies. The case of Afghanistan 2001–2021

The withdrawal of troops on 31 August 2021 which was carried out in accordance with the Agreement signed on 29 February 2020 between the U.S. government and the Taliban (an international terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation) marked the end of the international military campaign in Afghanistan which lasted twenty years. Assessing the preliminary outcomes of nearly a quartercentury of the US military and their NATO allies’ presence in Afghanistan, U.S. President Joseph Biden announced the end of “an era of major military operations to remake other countries”. Though the consequences of the Western coalition campaign in the area remain to be evaluated and they are unlikely to turn out to be unequivocal, the Atlantic strategy aimed at rebuilding and democratization of Afghanistan proved itself as bankrupt. Our research focuses on the way the twentyyear military campaign in Afghanistan affected the development of the U.S. private military and security companies (PMSC) industry. For these purposes, we, firstly, studied and traced the transformation of the private military and security services market in the U.S., and examined the changes of approaches and mechanisms used to contract PMSCs. Secondly, we analyzed the way the U.S. authorities addressed the challenges new market evoked, focusing on the measures of legal regulation that were applied to PMSCs, and the way the working of the U.S. institutional mechanisms was transforming. The final part of the research contains conclusions on the perspectives for the development of the American PMSC industry after the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan. We believe that due to its duration and continuity, the Afghan operation ensured a launchpad for the PMSC industry and provided conditions for private military and security companies to acquire and master highend experience which in turn, contributed to the development of a certain market that goes well beyond the involvement of conventional human capital. It provided solutions for the production, utilization, and maintenance of the equipment and technologies, allowing the minimization of the direct participation of specialists in hostilities. Alongside the development of the American PMSC industry itself, the research studies the investigations conducted by the U.S. authorities into the cases of abuse committed by the contractors during their participation in Afghan war. It discusses the way this practice encouraged the transformations of United States procedures and mechanisms aimed at reducing malpractice when performing contracts and launched changes in U.S. legislation. It also demonstrates the lessons learned by the U.S. from the contractual practice with regard to the regulation of PMSCs. The research reveals the strengths and weaknesses of the American policy regarding PMSCs during the whole period of the military conflict in Afghanistan and helps to evaluate the success of the U.S. efforts in monitoring contractors across Afghanistan. To conclude, we reckon that considerable contractual experience acquired in Afghanistan ensures technological and procedural progress of the U.S. PMSC industry. Given the enduring rivalry between the U.S., Russia, and China, including in the military and technological spheres, the twentyyear experience of direct participation in hostilities by U.S. PMSCs boosted its competitive advantage compared to Russia and China, whose PMSCs still lack such an experience.

1. Abrahamsen R., Williams M.C. (2011). Security Beyond the State: Private Security in International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 272 p.

2. Avant D. (2005). The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 324 p.

3. Coburn N. (2017). The Guards, Cooks, and Cleaners of the Afghan War: Migrant Contractors and the Cost of War. Brown University. 10 p. URL: https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2017/CoW_Coburn_Migrant%20Contractors_Aug%2023%202017.pdf (accessed: 02.12.2021).

4. Dickinson A.L. (2007). Contract as a tool for regulating private military companies. In: Chesterman S. and Lehnardt C. (eds.) From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. P. 217–239. DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228485.001.0001.

5. Fenenko A. (2015). Sovremennaya istoriya mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii: 1991–2015. Uchebnoe posobie [Modern History of International Relations: 1991–2015. Tutirial]. М.: Aspect Press. 384 p.

6. Kertzer J.D. (2021) American Credibility After Afghanistan. What the Withdrawal Really Means for Washington’s Reputation // Foreign Affairs. URL: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2021-09-02/american-credibility-after-afghanistan (accessed: 25.06.2022).

7. Khrustalev M.A. (2008). Analiz mezhdunarodnykh situatsii i politicheskaya ekspertiza: ocherki teorii I metodologii [Analysis of International Situations and Political Expertise: Essays on Theory and Methodology]. Moscow: NOFMO. 232 p.

8. Kinsey C. (2007a). Private security companies: Agents of democracy or simply mercenaries? In: Jäger T., Kümmel G. (eds.) Private military and security companies: Chances, problems, pitfalls and prospects. Wiesbaden: Vs Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. P. 87–104.

9. Kinsey C. (2007b). Problematising the role of private security companies in small wars. Small Wars and Insurgencies. Vol. 18. No. 4. P. 584–614. DOI:10.1080/09592310701778472.

10. Krahmann E. (2005). From State to Non-State Actors: The Emergence of Security Governance. In: Krahmann E. (ed.) New Threats and New Actors in International Security. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. P. 3–19. DOI: 10.1057/9781403981660_1.

11. Krahmann E. (2012). From ‘Mercenaries’ to ‘Private Security Contractors’: The (Re)Construction of Armed Security Providers in International Legal Discourses. Millennium – Journal of International Studies. Vol. 40. No. 2. P. 343–363. DOI: 10.1177/030582981142667.

12. Krahmann E. (2016). NATO contracting in Afghanistan: the problem of principal–agent networks. International Affairs. Vol. 92. No. 6. P. 1401–1426. DOI: 10.1111/1468-2346.12753. URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1468-2346.12753 (accessed: 19.06.2022).

13. Lukin A., Gubin A. (2016). Kitai cherez 100 let: do i posle Aziatskoi voiny [China 100 Years Down the Line: Before and After the War of Asia]. In I.S. Ivanov, Kortunov A.V. (eds.)Mir cherez 100 let: sbornik statei. M.: NP RSMD Ves' mir. P. 123–131.

14. Mandel R. (2002). Armies Without States: The Privatization of Security. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 169 p.

15. Phillips J. (2010). Mercenaries, Private Military Contractors, and Non-Traditional Forces. In: Bradford J.C. (ed.) A Companion to American Military History. Chichester: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. P. 507–516. DOI: 10.1002/9781444315066.ch31.

16. Scahill J. (2008). Blackwater. The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army. New York: Nation books. 550 p.

17. Singer P.W. (2007). Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. New York: Cornell University Press. 333 p.

18. Sushentsov A. (2014) Ocherki politiki SShA v regional'nykh konfliktakh 2000-kh godov: monografiya [An Essay on of the US Politics in Regional Conflicts in 2000s: Monograph]. Bogaturov A.D. ed. Moscow, MGIMO-University. 230 p.

19. Tecott R. (2021). Why America Can’t Build Allied Armies. Afghanistan Is Just the Latest Failure //Foreign Affairs. 26 August 2021 URL: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-08-26/why-america-cant-build-allied-armies (accessed: 22.06.2022).

20. Turzi M. (2019). The effects of Private Military and Security Companies on local populations in Afghanistan. A case-study based analysis on the impact of the large presence of private firms on Afghans. Pisa: Pacini Editore Srl. 48 p. URL: https://www.dirittopenaleglobalizzazione.it/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Michele-Turzi-The-effects-of-private-military-and-security-companies-in-local-populations-in-Afghanistan.pdf (accessed: 19.06.2022).

21. Verkuil P.R. (2007). Outsourcing Sovereignty: Why Privatization of Government Functions Threatens Democracy and What We Can Do about It. New York: Cambridge University Press. 232 p.