Choosing between Persistent Engagement and Deterrence in the American Cybersecurity Strategy
https://doi.org/10.17994/IT.2020.18.3.62.3
Abstract
The article examines the adoption by the United States of a new policy for ensuring cybersecurity, a strategy of peristent engagement in cyberspace, and how it is related to the strategy of cyber deterrence that remained dominant for a long time. The strategy of persistent engagement implies the constant conduct of cyber operations that do not reach the level of an armed conflict and combining purely defensive activities with offense. Such strategy is designed to prevent US rivals from carrying out malicious actions in cyberspace and to preserve strategic advantages of the United States by imposing additional costs on opponents and creating tactical friction for them. According to experts, persistent engagement perfectly suits the unique characteristics of cyberspace (interconnectedness and the condition of constant contact), unlike a strategy of deterrence that is suitable for traditional areas of military operations. Nevertheless, the US leadership is not ready to abandon the cyber deterrence strategy, and it is looking for ways to conceptually combine the two strategies. The paper presents the key characteristics of persistent engagement, some of which are: 1) cyber operations do not reach the level of an armed conflict; 2) persistent engagement is not an armed conflict; 3) creating "tactical friction" and imposing costs on US opponents; 4) preventive defense. Expert opinions on the prospects of persistent engagement are presented and analyzed. The paper demonstrates the analysis potential advantages and drawbacks of this approach. American specialists expect that persistent engagement will lead to an automatic formation of criteria for acceptable behavior in the process of strategic competition. Among the obvious drawbacks of the analyzed approach, one can single out a possible international escalation due to its application. The author analyzes the transformation of the “conceptual” status of cyberspace and the institutional changes, caused by this new strategic approach. The conclusions regarding the prospects for this strategy are ambiguous. Its effectiveness, safety and risks will become known only with time during the actual application of this strategy and the accumulation of empirical experience. The relevance of the work is due to the current strategic situation between the United States and Russia. Understanding the United States' approaches to cybersecurity and the key strategic changes in them is crucial not only to formulate Russia`s cybersecurity policy, but also to build a constructive dialogue with the United States on cybersecurity issues.
About the Author
S A. SebekinRussian Federation
Mr Sergei Sebekin - PhD Candidate, Department of World History and International Relations
Irkutsk, 664003
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Review
For citations:
Sebekin S.A. Choosing between Persistent Engagement and Deterrence in the American Cybersecurity Strategy. International Trends / Mezhdunarodnye protsessy. 2020;18(3):96-125. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.17994/IT.2020.18.3.62.3