Leadership in the Multipolar World: China’s Strategy in Central Asia

In the multipolar world regional powers play an increasingly important role, as they strive to become leaders and shape the regional order. It is a common situation, when in one region several powers compete to become a sole leader, however, other types of interaction also exist for example, asymmetric leadership. Asymmetric leadership denotes a situation when one power does not strive to become a sole leader in one region in all spheres, but the scope and type of its involvement in addressing common problems in the region varies. This paper explores the phenomenon of asymmetric leadership using the PRC policy in Central Asia as an empirical case. The  theoretical  part of the paper outlines the major points of the leadership theory in international relations, which are later used to evaluate China’s policy in Central Asia. In the empirical part we explore institutions, regional focus, goals and resources of the Chinese initiatives, as well as analyze factors that influence regional strategy of a rising power. In Central Asia the PRC has expressed leadership ambitions in several issue areas, such as non-traditional security, economic cooperation and development assistance, financial governance, and environmental cooperation. However, its strategy has varied from sphere to sphere in terms  of institutionalization, overall regional focus, involvement of other regional power, etc. For  example, in the sphere of non-traditional security and financial governance, the PRC has initiated the establishment of special institutions, which are absent in other spheres. The case of Central Asia, which has traditionally been Russian sphere of influence, allows us to investigate the possible responses of one regional power to leadership projects of another. Russia plays different roles in Chinese projects in Central Asia: a co-leader in counter-terrorism sphere, a follower in financial governance, a competitor in economic cooperation, and an observer in environmental protection sphere. The role of Russia is determined by the available resources in each area and its own leadership ambitions, as well as the desire of the PRC to maintain friendly relations with Moscow.

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