THE BOTTLE-NECK PHENOMENON IN THE EU TRADE RESTRICTIONS AGAINST THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Under what conditions might the potential for weaponizing economic interdependence through sanctions in EU-Russia relations be exhausted? Focusing on the exemptions provided under Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014, the paper develops a typology that distinguishes between humanitarian and diplomatic derogations, special reservations for deal-making, individual derogations, and exemptions justified by economic security reasons. As for the latter, the analysis draws on trade statistics from 2021 to 2023 – calculating export growth rates from Russia to the EU and employing the Herfindahl-Hirschman index to assess the geographical concentration of exports within the integration bloc. The findings contribute to the literature that views EU anti-Russian sanctions as a tool of weaponization of economic interdependence in Russian-European relations, while also delineating the limits of such weaponization. In particular, the study introduces the bottleneck effect concept observed when EU sanctions policymaking stalls for objective reasons. Here, “bottleneck” does not imply inability to impose sanctions. It reflects a scenario in which sanctions are driven by economic market dynamics rather than political logic contrasting with many other areas of bygone Russian-European cooperation now under sanctions. The paper identifies three cases of this effect: a) when the EU prioritizes other policy objectives over weakening Russia; b) when the imposition of sanctions is stalled for humanitarian reasons – thereby potentially increasing the risk of weaponization via tariff regulation measures; c) when major EU countries guard certain longstanding elements of trade and economic interaction with Russia that are vital for their own economies.

1. Arapova E.Ya. (2023). Novye modal'nosti global'noi sanktsionnoi politiki [New Modalities of the Global Sanctions Policy]. Journal of International Analytics. Vol. 14. No. 1. P. 37–51. DOI: https://doi. org/10.46272/2587-8476-2023-14-1-37-51

2. Afonin S.E. (2023). Perspektivy sozdaniya i funktsionirovaniya klastera po proizvodstvu redkozemel'nykh metallov v Rossii [Prospects for The Creation and a Functional Cluster or the Production of Rare-Earth Metals in Russia]. Vestnik Moskovskogo finansovo-yuridicheskogo universiteta. No. 4. P. 95–106. DOI: 10.52210/2224669X_2023_4_95

3. Brooks R. (2017). How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales from the Pentagon. New York: Simon & Schuster. 448 p.

4. Christou A., Damro C. (2024). Frames and Issue Linkage: EU Trade Policy in the Geoeconomic Turn. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. 62. No. 4. P. 1080–1096. DOI: https://doi.org/ 10.1111/jcms.13598

5. Couvreur S. (2024). Inside the European Union’s Trade Machinery: Institutional Changes in an Age of Geoeconomics. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. 63. No. 1. P. 284–301. DOI: https:// doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13625

6. Demarais A. (2022). Backfire: How Sanctions Reshape the World Against U.S. Interests. New York: Columbia University Press. 304 p.

7. Drezner D.W. (2024). Global Economic Sanctions. Annual Review of Political Science. Vol. 27. P. 9–24. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-041322-032240

8. Ehntin M.L., Ehntina E.G. (2023). Usiliya Rossii, Kitaya, Indii, ES i SSHA po obreteniyu strategicheskoi glubiny v 2022–2023 godakh [Efforts by Russia, China, India, the EU and the US to Gain Strategic Depth in 2022–2023]. Moscow: Zebra E / Galaktika. 760 p.

9. Ehntin M.L., Ehntina E.G., Davranova S.B., Nadzharov A.M. (2024). Teoretiko-metodologicheskie aspekty izucheniya sanktsionnoi politiki Zapada [Theoretical and methodological aspects of the Western sanctions policy research]. Polis. Politicheskie issledovaniya. № 1. P. 7–20. DOI: https://doi.org/ 10.17976/jpps/2024.01.02

10. Farrell H., Newman A.L. (2019). Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion. International Security. Vol. 44. No. 1. P. 42–79. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1162/ isec_a_00351

11. Farrell H., Newman A.L. (2023). Underground Empire: How America Weaponized the World Economy. New York: Henry Holt and Co. 288 p.

12. Faulk G.T. (2024). Strengthen US Sanctions by Enabling Regularized Use of Humanitarian Exemptions. Journal of World Trade. Vol. 58. No. 4. P. 655–680. DOI: https://doi.org/10.54648/ trad2024034

13. Juncos A. (2021). The Institutions of the Common Foreign and Security Policy between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. In: D. Hodson, U. Puetter, S. Saurugger, J. Peterson (eds) The Institutions of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. P. 299–320. https://doi. org/10.1093/hepl/9780198862222.003.0013

14. Keohane R.O., Nye J.S. (1977). Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 308 p.

15. Makarov I.A. (2023). Taksonomiya torgovykh bar'erov: pyat' tipov protektsionizma [Taxanomy of Trade Barriers: Five Types of Protectionism]. Sovremennaya mirovaya ehkonomika. Vol. 1. No. 1. P. 74–94. DOI: https://doi.org/10.17323/2949-5776-2023-1-1-74-94

16. Mallard G., Sabet F., Sun J. (2020). The Humanitarian Gap in the Global Sanctions Regime. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations. Vol. 26. No. 1. P. 121–153.

17. Mulder N. (2022). The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 448 p.

18. Pape R.A. (1997). Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. International Security. Vol. 22. No. 2. P. 90–136.

19. Rastvortseva S.N. (2018). Ehkonomicheskaya aktivnost' regionov Rossii [Economic Activity in Russian Regions]. Ehkonomicheskie i sotsial'nye peremeny: fakty, tendentsii, prognoz. Vol. 11. No. 1. P. 84–99. DOI: 10.15838/esc.2018.1.55.6

20. Romanova T. (2024). Otnosheniya Rossii i Evropeiskogo soyuza v kontekste sovremennoi transformatsii miroporyadka: problemy izucheniya i prepodavaniya [Relations between Russia and the European Union in the context of modern transformation of the world order: Issues of studying and teaching]. Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Ehkonomika. Vol. 40. No. 2. P. 157–174. DOI: https:// doi.org/10.21638/spbu05.2024.201

21. Slaughter A.-M. (1997). The Real New World Order. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 76. No. 5. P. 183–197.

22. Timofeev I.N. (2021). Politika sanktsii Evropeiskogo soyuza. Opyt sobytiinogo analiza [Approaching the EU Sanctions Policy: An Experiment with Event Analysis]. Sovremennaya Evropa. No. 2. P. 17–27. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15211/soveurope220211727

23. Timofeev I.N. (2024). Kak issledovat' politiku sanktsii v proekte «Politicheskiy atlas sovremennogo mira 2.0»? [“Political Atlas of the Modern World 2.0”: How to Deal with the Policy of Sanctions?]. Politicheskaya nauka. No. 2. P. 282–299. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31249/poln/2024.02.13

24. Timofeev I.N. (2024). Torgovye sanktsii Evropeiskogo soyuza v otnoshenii Rossii: sovremennaya praktika [The European Union Trade Sanctions Against Russia: Contemporary Practice]. Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Ehkonomika. Vol. 40. No. 2. P. 233–247. DOI: https://doi.org/10.21638/ spbu05.2024.205

25. Timofeev I.N., Chupriyanova P.I. (2024). Politika sanktsii ES v otnoshenii Rossii posle fevralya 2022 g.: napravleniya izmenenii [EU Sanctions Policy Towards Russia After February 2022: Directions for Change]. Sovremennaya mirovaya ehkonomika. Vol. 2. No. 2(6). P. 43–59. DOI: https://doi.org/ 10.17323/2949-5776-2024-2-2-43-59

26. Quaglia L., Verdun A. (2023). Weaponisation of finance: the role of European central banks and financial sanctions against Russia. West European Politics. Vol. 46. No. 5. P. 872–895. DOI: https://doi.org/ 10.1080/01402382.2022.2155906

27. Schlee R., Opper J. (2020). Weaponizing the world. New Perspectives. Vol. 28. No. 3. P. 314–329. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/2336825X20935233

28. Von Sponeck H.C. (2006). A Different Kind of War: The UN Sanctions Regime in Iraq. With a Foreword by Celso N. Amorim, Foreign Minister of Brazil. New York: Berghahn. 322 p.

29. Wright T.J. (2017). All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the Twenty-First Century and the Future of American Power. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 288 p.