Schengen Rules in the Wake of Arab Spring

By studying the process of reform of the Schengen acquis in 2011-2013 inspired by the Arab Spring and the inflow of migrants to the Mediterranean shores of the European Union, this paper seeks to demonstrate how policy entrepreneurs exploit windows of opportunity that open following an external shock (a notion is used to conceptualize the events of the Arab Spring) in order to fulfill their own preferences, regardless of the substance of the external shock in question. How could it happen that the reform initiated by Italy and France in 2011 to “re-nationalise the Schengen” would in the end turn out to be just the opposite of what they sought to achieve? The article suggests that the major factor which helps explain this is the institutional position of the European Commission which holds exclusive right of legislative initiative, and the fact that by using its position, the Commission was able to win over the European Parliament to its side by effectively making it a veto-player in negotiations with the EU Council, thus trapping the Member States into the “joint decision trap”. The research traces the reform process through all of its stages: starting with the agenda-setting by the Italian authorities who applied alarmist rhetoric trying to securitize the migrants arriving to the Italian shores, proceeding with the choice between alternative solutions proposed by different actors and policy reform initiation, multilateral negotiations between the EU Member States and the European Parliament and, concluding with the adoption of the two legislative acts. The concluding remarks put the case into the broader theoretical perspective of comparative politics.

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