Колониальный опыт Великобритании и стратегическое мышление США

События последнего времени характеризуются стремительным ростом гражданских конфликтов: от беспорядков на межрасовой почве и межнациональных столкновений до гражданских войн религиозного, этнического и территориального характера. Эти обстоятельства все чаще возвращают академическое и экспертное сообщества к истории становления и развития политики обеспечения внутренней безопасности. При этом именно Лондон и Вашингтон в рамках «гуманитарных интервенций» конца XX – начала XXI вв предпринимают активные и регулярные попытки перенести на чужую почву (Афганистан и Ирак являются наиболее показательными примерами) свой собственный опыт обеспечения внутренней безопасности. Понимание и прогнозирование перспектив этого трансфера чужеродной модели выстраивания системы внутренней безопасности требует глубокого анализа не только ее основных компонентов, но и их идейных истоков. Особая роль силовых структур и ведомств (разведка, контрразведка, полиция, армия), постоянство противоречивого выбора между принципами демократии и требованиями безопасности (включая санкционированные властями внесудебные ограничения прав иностранных подданных и собственных граждан на территории Великобритании и США) сохраняют свое значение и сейчас, позволяя говорить о том, что выработанные в колониальном прошлом Великобритании методы обеспечения внутренней безопасности все еще актуальны в глазах значительной части экспертного сообщества США (хотя далеко не всегда эффективны на практике), а их изучение имеет не только академическое, но и политическое значение. В свете рассекреченных в минувшее десятилетие документов о деятельности служб безопасности Великобритании и США после 1945 г. в колониях и странах «третьего мира», а также современных международных противоречий, связанных с попытками привнести созданную на основе колониального опыта Великобритании модель обеспечения внутренней безопасности в различные страны современного мира (сквозь призму его восприятия в самих США), встает необходимость комплексного изучения этой политики, развития структур, форм и методов обеспечения внутренней безопасности в Великобритании и США в качестве универсального рецепта «антиповстанческих операций» и «операций стабилизации». Настоящая статья представляет собой анализ этого процесса в рамках «холодной войны» и «Войны с террором» на уровне стратегического мышления в качестве одного из наиболее характерных и существенных аспектов перехода от эпохи глобальных колониальных империй к эпохе ядерных супердержав.

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