This article examines the work of the United Nations Working Group on Legal Aspects of Space Resource Activities in the context of the emerging special international legal regime governing the use of natural resources in outer space. It analyzes the positions of states and the European Space Agency on key issues, including the definition of “space resources”; the scope of space resource activities; the permissibility of recognizing private property rights over natural substances extracted from celestial bodies; attitudes toward the 1979 Moon Agreement and the Artemis Accords; possible restrictions and quotas on resource extraction; protection of the space environment; the establishment of “safety zones” at resource development sites; the creation of a special international body; and the equitable sharing of benefits derived from space resource activities. The article shows that an increasingly clear differentiation of state approaches to the legal regulation of space resource activities is taking shape within the United Nations, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, its specialized subcommittees and working groups. It argues that the preliminary draft Principles on Space Resource Activities, prepared under the auspices of the Working Group, is a compromise instrument of a recommendatory nature, which may facilitate its broad support at the universal level but does not eliminate fundamental disagreements among states on key issues. The article raises the question whether the current political and legal differentiation of state positions amounts to a fragmentation of universal international space law, whose core remains the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, elaborated through a difficult Soviet-American compromise. Against the background of growing economic interest in the natural resources of celestial bodies, this question is examined as one of the central challenges for the future development of international space law.

This article examines the relationship between the concepts of “historical politics” and “politics of memory” in Central Europe after 1989. The author focuses on the political and commemorative forms of engaging with the past that have emerged in the context of post-socialist transformation, democratic transition, and European integration. Particular attention is given to the analysis of the Europeanization of memory as a process in which national historical narratives are correlated with supranational European norms and symbolic frameworks. Drawing on Polish, Hungarian, Czech, and Slovak conceptual traditions, the author demonstrates that historical politics and the politics of memory in scholarly and public discourse often converge but are not reducible to one another. Historical politics refers primarily to institutionalized strategies of public authorities for managing the past, whereas memory politics encompasses a broader sociocultural and commemorative register of practices. Overall, the distinction between these concepts retains independent analytical and methodological significance for the study of Central European approaches to the past after 1989. 

This study verifies the concept of informational sanctions pressure as an autonomous “financial weapon” through an empirical analysis of the European Union’s sanctions policy toward Russia. The author demonstrates that mechanisms of anticipatory risk repricing by market participants are capable of generating real valuation losses comparable to, or even exceeding, the effects of the material implementation of restrictions. The paper substantiates the status of informational signals as an independent instrument of coercion, capable of provoking volatility in financial markets - including exchange rates, equity indices, and sovereign bond yields – regardless of the subsequent physical enforcement of announced measures. Empirical evidence shows that the short-term impact of officially non-implemented measures may reach trillion-scale valuation effects, functioning as a trigger for systemic financial stress. The study also identifies a qualitative transformation in market reactions under the conditions of the post2022 “sanctions tsunami”: while the amplitude of responses to formally adopted EU sanctions packages has declined, indicating systemic adaptation, financial markets remain highly sensitive to the informational environment. The findings expand the theoretical understanding of sanctions as a multi-channel instrument of pressure and confirm the universality of a transmission model operating through financial market channels. 

The article analyzes the opportunities and challenges of cooperation between BRICS and ASEAN in the field of nuclear energy within the context of an emerging new architecture of international energy relations. The relevance of this research stems, on the one hand, from the growing importance of nuclear energy amid the global trend toward decarbonization and the ongoing debate on achieving carbon neutrality in national economies. On the other hand, the 21st-century “nuclear renaissance” is marked by an increasing share of developing countries in global energy consumption, with BRICS nations accounting for a significant portion of global nuclear electricity generation. The authors test the hypothesis that, as cooperation between BRICS and ASEAN in the field of nuclear energy becomes institutionalised, its character transforms from fragmented bilateral contacts into the formation of stable network structures. This network acquires a predominantly centralized character, within which the key exporters of nuclear technologies form clusters of cooperation with partner states, while horizontal linkages among the latter remain limited. The scientific novelty of the research lies in a comprehensive analysis of the political, economic, and institutional dimensions of cooperation between the two major groupings of the Global South, examined through the lens of international political economy. The article explores the prerequisites for the development of nuclear energy in ASEAN countries, institutional mechanisms, and formats of BRICS–ASEAN cooperation, followed by a network analysis of bilateral agreements. The study concludes with key findings and practical recommendations. The network analysis reveals a low-density interaction structure, where Russia, China, and India emerge as central actors. The authors conclude that transitioning from fragmented bilateral links to a stable regional architecture requires the development of unified regulatory standards, educational programs, financing mechanisms, and nuclear safety centers. These measures could enhance the structural connectivity of the cooperation network, strengthen energy security, and, in the long term, transform nuclear energy collaboration into one of the key drivers of deeper dialogue between BRICS and ASEAN member states.

This paper examines the institutionalization of U.S. normative leadership in 1981–1983 as a critical juncture in the construction of the global governance architecture of the late–Cold War order. It focuses on the Reagan administration’s efforts to translate universal norms, primarily human rights and democracy into systematic instruments of legitimation and foreign-policy leverage. Drawing on executive directives, internal policy memoranda, speech transcripts, legislative materials, and official policy statements, the study reconstructs how a normative agenda was embedded in executive decision-making routines and interagency coordination. Methodologically, it combines institutional analysis with historical processtracing, treating normative leadership not as an expression of universal moral impulse but as an administratively governed project built by the executive branch. The article develops a three-stage model of normative leadership: articulation, institutionalization, and projection. It traces, empirically, the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy**, the reconfiguration of State Department structures, and the incorporation of normative criteria into foreign-aid allocation. It also identifies mechanisms of selective norm application, especially the instrumental distinction between “authoritarian” and “totalitarian” regimes, which expanded policymakers’ strategic flexibility. The 1983 U.S. intervention in Grenada is interpreted as an early case within an emerging repertoire of humanitarian-justificatory arguments. The article argues that U.S. normative leadership in this period is best understood not as the product of moral consensus or transnational advocacy, but as an institutionalized and administratively sustained foreign-policy strategy. Overall, 1981–1983 marks a foundational phase in which moral discourse was routinized into durable instruments of U.S. influence.

The article examines how threats to regional security and stability in Eurasia originating from Afghanistan have shaped the priorities and institutional framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), as well as the organization’s role in promoting multilateral regional cooperation with Afghanistan following the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021. The SCO was established at a time when Afghanistan had become a major focus of international attention in the context of the US-led “war on terror.” Given that most SCO member states are Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors, the organization could not remain indifferent to this source of instability on its borders. However, despite the member states’ direct interest in stabilizing the regional security environment, maintaining a sustained dialogue with Afghanistan, and creating such mechanisms as the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) and the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group, the organization has so far failed to become the principal platform for multilateral regional engagement on Afghan issues. Instead, most regional interaction concerning Afghanistan has taken place outside the SCO framework. This outcome can be explained both by the SCO’s institutional design, particularly its consensus-based decision-making procedures, and by the preference of its member states for bilateral engagement with Afghanistan in line with their established foreign policy practices.