The Impact of EU Information Signals About Upcoming and Imposed Trade Sanctions on Russian Financial Markets
https://doi.org/10.46272/IT.2025.23.4.83.1
Abstract
This study verifies the concept of informational sanctions pressure as an autonomous “financial weapon” through an empirical analysis of the European Union’s sanctions policy toward Russia. The author demonstrates that mechanisms of anticipatory risk repricing by market participants are capable of generating real valuation losses comparable to, or even exceeding, the effects of the material implementation of restrictions. The paper substantiates the status of informational signals as an independent instrument of coercion, capable of provoking volatility in financial markets - including exchange rates, equity indices, and sovereign bond yields – regardless of the subsequent physical enforcement of announced measures. Empirical evidence shows that the short-term impact of officially non-implemented measures may reach trillion-scale valuation effects, functioning as a trigger for systemic financial stress. The study also identifies a qualitative transformation in market reactions under the conditions of the post2022 “sanctions tsunami”: while the amplitude of responses to formally adopted EU sanctions packages has declined, indicating systemic adaptation, financial markets remain highly sensitive to the informational environment. The findings expand the theoretical understanding of sanctions as a multi-channel instrument of pressure and confirm the universality of a transmission model operating through financial market channels.
About the Author
Vladislav Rychkov
MGIMO University; Perm State National Research University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Dr Vladislav V. Rychkov – PhD in Economics, Research Fellow, Institute for International Studies; Associate Professor, Department of Finance, Accounting and Economic Expertise
Moscow, 119454; Perm, 614068
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For citations:
Rychkov V. The Impact of EU Information Signals About Upcoming and Imposed Trade Sanctions on Russian Financial Markets. International Trends / Mezhdunarodnye protsessy. 2025;23(4):50-81. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.46272/IT.2025.23.4.83.1
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