US–Afghanistan: the collapse of an asymmetrical alliance

Abstract

This article reflects on the reasons for the collapse of the asymmetrical alliance between the US and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRA), which had existed for 20 years. Particular attention is paid to the roles of both countries within the alliance as senior and junior partners. The goals of the two players are not always the same, which are sometimes contradictory. The level of Afghan influence on American strategy and the cost to the U.S. of managing the alliance are demonstrated, as well as attempts by the Afghan side to manipulate the senior partner with a high degree of dependence on it. The legal basis for the US-IRA alliance is outlined. The author notes the initial lack of a clear U.S. strategy outlining overarching goals, the sequence of steps required to achieve these goals, and the resources allocated to carry out these actions. The rapidly changing political and military environment in Afghanistan has contributed to frequent changes in US strategies. The paper shows that, as a result, Washington was actually forced, along with security, to engage seriously in nation-building in Afghanistan, which was not part of its plans. The ignorance of US officials about the socio-cultural and political conditions in the IRA was an important factor contributing to failures at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The complexity of implementing a state-building strategy was also due to the overly broad range of objectives and the large number of actors involved in Afghanistan. Complicating factors were the unrealistic timeline for reconstruction of the IRA, the endless infusion of funds into Afghan institutions to address insecurity and the corruption of the Afghan government. It is concluded that the foundation of the bilateral asymmetric alliance has been undermined by the US-Taliban arrangements, and Washington's decision to withdraw US troops from the IRA has led to its collapse.