The stability of the contemporary international system and the future of U.S hegemony are widely discussed by experts, scholars and researchers all over the world. However, there is significant theoretical and methodological division between two major academic traditions. The first one (mainly realist) understands “hegemony” mostly as material dominance of one or several states that control key resources and militarily dominate the system, while the second (incorporating liberals and constructivists) views “hegemony” as the ability of the leading power to formulate and maintain the rules of international behavior and to provide obedience to these rules. Consequently, methodological uncertainty hampers the comprehensive analysis of the factors of stability and dynamics of the contemporary international system.

To avoid the aforementioned theoretical controversies, the author analyzes both “material” (economic strength, military might and access to the key technologies) and “ideational” (leadership, ideology and legitimacy) factors that determine systemic stability and change. Special attention is paid to the nature of consensual mechanisms for maintaining  hegemonic rule (common values, ideologies and identities) and providing secondary states’ loyalty to the existing order and their acceptance of power asymmetry. Assessing the prospects of stability and change in the contemporary international system, the author concludes that the U.S. economic decline and the rise of new competitors have not yet fundamentally shattered the foundations of the contemporary hegemonic order. The U.S. still enjoys normative dominance based a on worldwide institutional network, that allows it to mitigate revisionist attitudes among less powerful states that are unsatisfied with their role and place in the international hierarchy. Besides, the U.S. still maintains ideological leadership inside the “Western capitalist camp”, preventing systemic challenges to to its preeminence. In conclusion, the author states that the major threat to American hegemony today is its “delegitimation”, which could result in the U.S. losing its ability to transform and maintain the normative order and to provide the most attractive values and models of socioeconomic development to the world.

The article deals with the evolution of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool from the end of the Second World War up to the contemporary sanctions against Russia. The analysis is built around the comparisons of sanctions cases in the period under review. Conclusions are made that could be significant for a theoretical understanding of the place of economic sanctions in contemporary world politics, as well as for making practical recommendations for the use of this instrument in Russian foreign policy and for countering sanctions directed against Russia.

In each of the cases under review, the key importance has been the structure of the international system. In the 20th century, the goals of sanctions were rather ambitious and targeted the vital interests of the targeted states. In the 21st century, the goal of sanctions has been much more limited.

The structure of the international system defined the difference of the role of international institutions in the cases under review, as well as the difference in methods used for ensuring compliance with sanctions.

Indeed, sanctions could be a useful instrument of international relations, however their importance must not be overstated. In most cases, they are not a true alternative to military force. They could be effective only against a state that is not a great power or not significant regional power.

Counteraction against imposed sanctions could be better organized by the private sector of the country being targeted. Offsetting the effect of sanctions on the governmental level is much more difficult. Legislative responses are not effective and could inflict damage that is bigger than the effect of the sanctions themselves.

In modern world politics, the Middle East is the core region where the rivalry among the great powers is taking place, while other conflict regions such as Eastern Asia, the North Caucasus and – lately – Eastern Europe still preserve their significance. However, it is the Middle East that directly influences the balance among the key centers of power. The significance of the Middle East region stems not only from having the greatest hydrocarbon resources in the world, but also from its strategic position  and the concentration of new challenges that are present there, which extend from the rise of transnational terrorist networks to the crisis of nuclear non-proliferation. In the 2000s, the core of US strategy ion the Middle East consisted of the American project of the Greater Middle East. In early 2004, the George W. Bush Administration (2001-2009) formulated two priorities for the countries of the Greater Middle East, which were the democratization of political regimes and a war on transnational network terrorism. However, the Greater Middle East project ended up in a failure. Washington’s efforts to implement a speedy democratization of the Middle Eastern countries – from Iraq and Lebanon to Palestine – have led to the weakening of secular authoritarian regimes and strengthened radical Islamic organizations. These trends\exacerbation the rivalry among the great powers in the region. The article aims to study the core reasons for the ‘Arab Spring’ process, its main turning points, its influence on the situation in the Middle East and North Africa, and the positions of the key actors involved in it. Apart from that, the article concentrates on the US’ conceptual approaches to the regional processes and their implementation, as well as the evolution of US participation within them. The author concludes that the strategies Washington practiced towards the region in the last 5 years failed, and the change in US policies that we are seeing today has let other non-regional powers activate their presence in the Middle East and North Africa.

In the changing conditions of the international environment, there is a clear demand for reassessing theoretical and conceptual approaches to international studies. Among the concepts that have to be revised is the ‘balance of power’ principle, which was formulated in conditions very much different from what is happening today in world politics. Analyzing the evolution of the ‘balance of power’ concept, one may conclude that the understanding of the concept has been changing with new arguments having been added to it. This led to polysemanticism and vagueness of the term. Apart from that, it has become obvious that western and oriental states practice different approaches to the implementation of ‘balance of power’. Furthermore, the concept of power in international relations itself has evolved considerably, as have the ways of exercising it. For instance, in addition to the use of force as a means of reacting to external threats, some nontraditional non-force methods have been practiced. The conditions of the international environment since the second half of the 20th century demand a more critical approach to the classical realist application of ‘balance of power’, which has encouraged new models of international behavior for states to develop. The author of the article studies the main theoretical approaches to the ‘balance of power’ principle and concludes that it has to be re-interpreted and re-defined because of the existing ambiguity and the changing conditions of the international environment. The article also concentrates on the structure of the international negotiation process, whose changes broaden the spectrum of possible ways in ensuring the balance of power. The author, who is studying the principle from the neoinstitutionalist angle, states that it is to be defined as a set of expectations, attitudes and rational approaches to foreign policy that define the behavior of states in world politics and secure certain balance in the international environment.

In the first half of the second decade of the XXI century, international relations have been characterized by an increased regional association both in the peripheral regions of Eurasia (Trans-Pacific Partnership, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) and in Central Eurasia (the Eurasian integration of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan). China is a sea- continental country, which has always paid close attention to the eastern (sea or Asian-Pacific) direction, and the western (continental or Eurasian) direction in its foreign policy. The purpose of this article is to identify new challenges and characteristics of Chinese foreign policy in the western, continental, Eurasian direction in comparison with the Eurasian integration of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

After the return of Vladimir Putin to the Presidency of the Russian Federation, the promotion of Eurasian integration and the creation of the Eurasian Union are regarded as one of the main strategic directions of the foreign policy agenda, and the foundation for fulfilling the "Eurasian Superpower Dream" of Russia. Russia, resting upon the Eurasian Union, aims at strengthening its position in Central Eurasia. According to the plan, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEC) will be set up in 2015. Located to the eastern boundary of Central Eurasia, China has always maintained close political, economic and cultural ties with Central Asia and acted as the "Asian - European" power.

In the view of Chinese researchers, the current Eurasian integration processes are extremely significant for the Western region of China. Therefore, the success in managing China's relations with the new actors such as the EEC in Central Eurasia will certainly be bound and interlinked with the external environment in order to deepen China’s reforms and openness in the forthcoming years. In this context, such questions as ‘how does the Chinese scientific society perceive the phenomenon of the Eurasian Union?', ‘how do the Eurasian Union and the Eurasian integration affect the Sino-Russian relations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)?’, and ‘how will China refer to the Eurasian Union?’ are undoubtedly relevant for the Chinese scientific community.

So the authors believe that, if China wants to develop fructiferous relationships with the EEC, it should insist on the following fundamental principles of its foreign policy: 1) ‘China is a  country close to Central Asia (Jing Zhong Ya Guo Jia)’is a new identity of the state’s foreign policy in the western direction; 2) SinoRussian relations are fundamental for the development of China's relations with the Eurasian Union; 3) The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Eurasian Union serve as two pillars maintaining the development and security of China in the region, which is too close to China’s western part.

The article analyses the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the relations between the European Union and Russia. The purpose of this paper is to define the conceptual obstacles to the cooperation between Brussels and Moscow in the post­Soviet countries on the case of Ukraine. Decisions taken by Brussels, Kiev and Moscow during the events of late­2013 and the first half of 2014 are the basis for analysing the impulses contributing to dialogue or making such cooperation impossible. The article also contains an analysis of the Russian expert community’s approaches towards the political processes in Ukraine. It allows one to draw conclusions about the mutual approaches of the EU and Russia, as well as to identify differences and their political consequences. The main problems in the relationship between both sides arise from misperception and mistrust: the lack of understanding on common issues and respect for the interests of each other. Brussels and Moscow, in relationto the post­Soviet countries, stand as polar opposite models of integrational Centres, which is whatcauses the competition between them. The article presents the basic differences between Moscow and Brussels in attracting new countries to their integration models. The different cooperative goals between them prevent the two from furthering their bilateral relations. The actions of both sides reveal a lack of strategy in their policy planning, which gives grounds to assessing that bilateral relations between the EU and Russia are inertial. At the same time, the mutual dependence on cooperation between them, as well as an understanding of the need for a stable relationship for the internal development of each, does not allow either side to move closer towards confrontation.

At the beginning of the 21st century, states are by far not the only participants in the global energy market, although they are still the principal ones. Publicly traded energy corporations, especially with a transn ational status, play a huge, constantly growing role. Some of them already have much larger economic potential than many states. Two trends are intrinsic to the present corporate sphere. On the one hand, the number of energy companies is decreasing due to mergers and acquisitions provoked by intense competition. On the other hand, ongoing liberalization alongside a new international focus on green energy and unconventional hydrocarbons bring about the creation of new energy business entities all over the world. International governmental and nongovernmental institutions, including clubs and forums, continue to make their tangible contribution to the solution of international energy issues. The need for immense financial resources (e.g. to develop costly offshore deepwater or shale oil and gas deposits) to cope with growing world energy demand involve a bulk of major, predominantly transnational, banking institutions in the sphere of energy supply. Numerous investment funds, and even individual investors who influence the commodity prices and market capitalization of corporations, should be also named “financial participants” in the global energy market. Their manipulations, often speculative, can provoke both positive and negative tendencies not only on the stock exchanges, but also in the real economy. Any destructive forces (separatists, sea pirates, or terrorists, particularly international ones) which disturb energy supplies should be automatically classified as energy market participants. Additionally, ensuring energy security requires access to all energy-related information as well as possession of advanced energy technologies to produce energy cost-effectively, including from sources which were previously unreachable. This expands the circle of participants in the global system of energy supply by involving leading media holdings and news agencies, think tanks, service companies, and technologies suppliers.

A book review: Мегатренды. Основные траектории эволюции мирового порядка в XXI веке: Изд. второе, испр. и доп. / Под редакцией Т.А. Шаклеиной и А.А. Байкова. М.: АСПЕКТ ПРЕСС, 2014. 448 c.

A book review: «Дилеммы Британии: поиск путей развития / Под ред. Ал.А. Громыко, Е.В. Ананьевой. М.: Издательство «Весь мир», 2014. 480 с.

Globalisation, social, economic and political integration, and the IT revolution, which to a various degree affected almost all countries in the world, shape the new political reality of the globe. Although political differentiation and heterogeneity persist and sometimes even increase, the global political world gains more cohesion and unity, while the individual countries that form it, despite their diverging development trajectories, become more interrelated and interdependent. Under these circumstances, it is especially important for both politicians, who make strategic decisions with global implications, and political analysts to study these global puzzles in order to obtain a coherent (integral) and multifaceted picture of the political state of the world. It should reflect such fundamental dimensions of global development as political system, political culture, political behavior, electoral process, party system and political consciousness. This would enable providing an observer with a dynamic image of the global political network, created by numerous interdependent elements. This network is defined by the existence and operations of nation-states, dominating in the current world. Neither Political Science in general, nor Area Studies, nor World Politics as academic disciplines could provide such a panoramic overview, as they do not have such tasks in the first place. Even comparative politics is not able to depict it, although without its methodology, it is impossible to draw such a picture. The author claims that global panoramic overview of the current political reality requires a separate academic discipline with its own focus and field of study. The article offers a possible scheme of formation and the major potential attributes of this discipline, which is referred to as “world-politology”.