2022 could be characterized as crucial for the formation of world order and future world development. Very often we hear that the most important events of 2022 are “the Ukrainian crisis” and XX Convention of the Communist Party of China that declared the beginning of the new period in the Chinese international strategy aimed at reaching global status and influence either equal to American or even greater. Idea of the new bipolar world order has been mentioned, and even acknowledged by certain American and Russian scholars. However, there is no great optimism about such a prospect. It is only a supposition, and a rather unrealistic one. Russia is not interested in this kind of world order. It is also not quite correct to examine everything that is going on in the world in the context of the “Ukrainian crisis”, which is the product of the Western/American policy of social engineering in various countries aimed at their transformation on the basis of Western values. Such policy begun in 1992 has been part of the American global strategy to establish liberal world order with the domineering role of the United States. We suggest taking a new look at international relations. By 2022, the megatrend of the world order formation of the 21st century had entered its decisive phase. The crucial factor that will influence the outcome of this process is developing confrontation between Russia and the West/US/NATO. The result will determine whether we shall live either in a just polycentric world order, or in imperial-hegemonic order (possibly, US-China order). Russia is in a very unfavorable international situation; however, it must continue its efforts in world order formation putting efforts into propaganda of peace and necessity of establishing new institutions not Western-centered reflecting and satisfying interests of the majority of the world community.

This article reflects on the reasons for the collapse of the asymmetrical alliance between the US and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRA), which had existed for 20 years. Particular attention is paid to the roles of both countries within the alliance as senior and junior partners. The goals of the two players are not always the same, which are sometimes contradictory. The level of Afghan influence on American strategy and the cost to the U.S. of managing the alliance are demonstrated, as well as attempts by the Afghan side to manipulate the senior partner with a high degree of dependence on it. The legal basis for the US-IRA alliance is outlined. The author notes the initial lack of a clear U.S. strategy outlining overarching goals, the sequence of steps required to achieve these goals, and the resources allocated to carry out these actions. The rapidly changing political and military environment in Afghanistan has contributed to frequent changes in US strategies. The paper shows that, as a result, Washington was actually forced, along with security, to engage seriously in nation-building in Afghanistan, which was not part of its plans. The ignorance of US officials about the socio-cultural and political conditions in the IRA was an important factor contributing to failures at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The complexity of implementing a state-building strategy was also due to the overly broad range of objectives and the large number of actors involved in Afghanistan. Complicating factors were the unrealistic timeline for reconstruction of the IRA, the endless infusion of funds into Afghan institutions to address insecurity and the corruption of the Afghan government. It is concluded that the foundation of the bilateral asymmetric alliance has been undermined by the US-Taliban arrangements, and Washington's decision to withdraw US troops from the IRA has led to its collapse.

The article examines the perspectives of summit diplomacy in relations between Russia and the countries of the African region. Summit diplomacy in the context of this article can be considered as an integral part of multi-vector network diplomacy, which is an effective addition, and sometimes an alternative to traditional diplomacy, despite the fact that officials also take part in the summits. The authors note that in studies on the diplomacy of summits, insufficient attention is paid to the substantive aspects of the relations between their participants. Thus, the summits imply consideration of a wide range of tasks, including those of a domestic political nature. At the same time, as an instrument of foreign policy, the effectiveness of summit diplomacy depends not only on the structural characteristics of relations, but also on the dynamics of interaction between the participants. The countries of the African region have rich mineral deposits, vast areas that could potentially be suitable for highly productive agriculture; forests, including the most valuable species of trees, as well as a huge population, which can become the basis for one of the world's largest markets for goods and services. It is African countries that occupy the first places in terms of GDP growth prospects and the rapidly growing economy as a whole. Transnational corporations have long been fighting for control over resources, access to cheap labor and the population's money, increasing their presence on the continent. In this regard, Africa has become the object of special attention of leading international players, including Russia. Thus, at present, a certain return of Russia's real interest in Africa is being ascertained. In the first part of the article, the authors analyze the economic opportunities of Russia and its main interests in relations with the countries of the African region. The second part deals with the development of Africa and the negotiating agenda of African states. The third part deals with new points of growth and promising areas of interaction between Russia and Africa.

This article studies evolvement of the United States’ post-colonial Hong Kong (HK) policy from liberalism to realism. The author considers factors influencing this policy and differences between the White House/State Department and Congress in assessment of and reaction to developments in HK and responses to them. In 1992 Congress passed the United States-HK Policy Act which treated HK as a non-sovereign entity distinct from China, made the US a quasi-guarantor of HK’s autonomy and provided a framework for the advancement of US’s grand liberal strategy towards HK in pursuit of promotion of Western-style democracy in this special administrative region of China. During the first seventeen years after HK’s handover to China the US government paid little attention to HK and avoided public criticism of HK and China’s authorities over slow pace of territory’s democratization while some prominent anti-China hawks in Congress were unrestrained in such criticism. Pro-democracy protests of 2014 in HK did not alter US government’s cautious approach to HK. The Obama administration probably hoped for gradual democratic reforms in HK. Washington’s policy towards HK made a dramatic turn in 2018 on the back of rapidly deteriorating Sino-US relations after Donald Trump came to power. The Trump administration was disillusioned with the liberal agenda and was very eager to actively play a HK card against Beijing. Large scale 2019 protests/riots in HK, challenging China’s sovereignty over the territory, were publicly supported and in fact encouraged by top officials of the Trump administration and prominent Congressmen. After Beijing imposed the national security law (NSL) on HK in June 2020 anti-government movement was crashed. This prompted Trump to strip HK of certain privileges under the HK Policy Act. Due to NSL Washington lost many HK allies, its influence in the territory diminished and its ability to promote American democracy agenda was hampered. NSL signifies a final transition from American liberal strategy to realism vis-à-vis HK which is now fully covered by US’s China containment strategy. Washington will likely reduce its economic exposure to HK and use deep-seated anti-Beijing attitudes of some Hongkongers to undermine stability of this vulnerable territory of China.

With the inauguration of President John Biden, the ideas of “managing” competition between the United States and China increasingly began to appear in the lexicon of American politicians and pundits. Most works on US-China competition emphasize its non-military aspects, which does not reflect the efforts that the US puts into competition in the military-political domain, as well as the importance of its regulation in preventing armed conflict between the two powers. This study seeks to solve a dual task: firstly, to identify the ideational content of the concept of "managed competition", and secondly, to analyze the existing formats of managing US-China military-political competition in the Asia-Pacific region in the 21st century. After analyzing the academic and analytical works of recent years, the author concludes that the concept of "managed competition" comprises three components: 1) regulation of competition through institutionalization in order to increase the predictability, strengthen crisis management mechanisms and reduce conflict potential, 2) anticipatory programming of the actions of international actors by creating incentives and deterrents for making foreign policy decisions, 3) describing the measures necessary to achieve success in competition (outcompeting). At a practical level, the management of competition in the military-political relations between the United States and China implies 1) the creation of international institutions to reduce the like-lihood of military incidents in the South China Sea and the Western Pacific, 2) setting the agenda in the Asia-Pacific region (the concept of the "Indo-Pacific region"), the consolidation and expansion of US military-political institutions (QUAD, AUKUS) with giving them the anti-Chinese focus, 3) US actions that impede the implementation of PRC’s military-political goals: reunification with Taiwan, control over the South China Sea, expansion of military-political contacts with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region.

The article seeks to examine the relationship between the current surge in inflation in the eurozone in general and in France in particular, the economic growth problems and the resulting erosion of the population purchasing power. It was found that the surge in inflation began even before the geopolitical tensions of early 2022 and was associated with large-scale packages of State assistance to the population and businesses to combat the economic downturn caused by the outbreak of COVID-19. The rise in inflation at the end of 2021 was linked to monetary factors, and inflation in 2022 became a more complex phenomenon when its acceleration began to acquire a mixed monetary and non-monetary character. This is due to geopolitical transformations that have led to an increase in prices for energy and other raw materials. It is shown that inflation undermines economic growth prospects and erodes household purchasing power. It is concluded that the anti-inflationary monetary policy of the European Central Bank will affect the inflation rate. Yet, at the same time, economic growth will also slow down in the medium term. Not only France, but also other eurozone countries as a whole are interested in stimulating it. Simultaneously, the situation regarding income and purchasing power will display positive, but insignificant dynamics. The article evaluates measures aimed at propping up purchasing power in France as one of the leading countries of the European Union. The French State possesses and employs a wide range of opportunities to underpin the economy.

In 2022 it is planned to release a new strategic concept of NATO. Experts and scholars are taking a prominent part in its development. They have a significant impact on the formation of the foreign policy identity of this transnational political space through their place in the construction of the foreign policy identity of states, NATO institutions and related structures. In the research, using the method of discourse analysis, were studied the publications of think tanks affiliated with NATO, the EU, the US, the UK. The researchers’ current approaches to the strategic development of the alliance are considered, a comparative analysis is carried out, the established scientific schools – NATO, EU, USA and the UK – are highlighted. It is concluded that the scientific community creates narratives about the past and future of the organization, contributes to determining its place in international relations, its partners and rivals. In turn, NATO's foreign policy identity as a transnational political space transforms the identities of the member states, which leads to the homogeneity of the transatlantic security space, isomorphism between its subjects – states. NATO is perceived by Western experts as a community of democratic states with global ambitions and responsibility in maintaining international security and promoting Western values. The key threats are the policies of Russia and China, technological changes, contradictions within the alliance. At the same time, in each of the schools are researched problems that are relevant to it. The most influential are the schools of NATO and the US. European schools, primarily the EU’s, have less influence, which is due to their emphasis on EU defence integration, disagreements within the Union itself, limited results of new defense initiatives after 2016.