The article examines the knowledge economy which took shape in the 1990s largely through the efforts of international organizations, with the OECD playing a central role. Drawing on the approaches of intellectual history, the authors analyze the theoretical foundations of the knowledge economy – namely, how disparate intellectual traditions were selectively assembled into a coherent policy framework. The paper situates the concept within the broader field of international political economy, emphasizing how it reflects and reinforces the intersecting interests of national and transnational actors within the global economic order. Four key theoretical pillars underpin the knowledge economy: new growth theory, information society, national innovation systems and human capital. The article demonstrates that each of them emerged from distinct intellectual and socio-political environments, and their validity was historically contingent upon the conditions in which they were first deployed. While the attempt to synthesize them into a common framework highlights their contextual limitations, the knowledge economy is deemed remarkably resilient. It has managed to become background knowledge shaping contemporary understandings of economic progress – even amid global crises. The reason for this endurance is its alignment with the material and ideological interests of a dominant social bloc in the United States during the 1990s–2010s: finance capital, high-tech industries, national and international bureaucracy. The paper concludes that the knowledge economy should be understood as a descriptive framework for the unfolding dynamics of the global economy. This dynamics is best observed in the formation of a three-tiered structure – enterprises centered on intangible assets, capital-intensive enterprises, and labor-exploitative enterprises. The knowledge economy serves as a tool for the ideological articulation of this regime.

This article is devoted to the analysis of the strategies pursued by the Central Asian states in the context of growing international interest in their reserves of rare earth metals (REMs). The relevance of the topic is determined by the intensifying global competition for access to critical mineral resources against the back-drop of China’s monopolistic position in the REM market and the simultaneous efforts of the United States and the European Union to diversify their sources of supply. While Beijing maintains control over REM production volumes by expanding quotas, EU member states are seeking to reduce their dependence on Chinese supplies through investment in the development of alternative deposits, including those located in Central Asia.

The aim of the study is to identify the specific features of the foreign economic strategies of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, as well as to assess the agency of these states under conditions of competition among the leading global players in the REM market. The scientific novelty of the work lies in defining and classifying the principal strategies of the Central Asian countries with respect to the development of the REM mining and processing sector. The authors identify the following strategies: “Balancing between centers of power” (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan); “An open mine for investors” (Kyrgyzstan); and “Development within the regional framework” (Tajikistan).

The differences among these strategies highlight the absence of a coordinated regional policy with regard to critical mineral resources. At the same time, the current stage is characterized by the emergence of preconditions for intensifying competition and clashes of interest among major external actors over access to key regional resources. Various mechanisms may be employed in this process, including the introduction of restrictive provisions (“green transition,” sustainable development) into agreements, manipulation of production quotas, and political pressure. In the absence of coordination among the Central Asian states, as well as without recourse to regional integration frameworks, the region’s dependence on raw material exports is likely to deepen, thereby increasing its political and economic vulnerability.

The article examines the role of strategic culture in shaping security policies of small states, using Finland as a case study. The logic and driving forces behind Finnish foreign and defence policy have remained constant for more than three decades since the end of the Cold War. They are based on the concept of republican realism, within which Finland seeks the state of non-domination of any single power in the security system in the Scandinavian-Baltic region and in Europe as a whole. The observed metamorphosis – from neutrality to membership in a military alliance – represents a process of adaptation to the changing global and regional security situation and reflects the country's leadership's threat perception. The evolution of Finland's policy has been determined by the relationship between two strategic subcultures: ‘relations with Russia’ and ‘integration into the community of Western states’. We can roughly divide this into two stages: ‘Europeanisation’ (1990s – late 2010s) and ‘Euro-Atlantisation’ (late 2010s – 2020s). During the Euro-Atlantic period, a correlation can be observed between the two strategic subcultures: the more Finland perceived Russia's policy as a potential threat, the more it gravitated towards the major Western powers and their institutions, not only in political terms but also in matters of security. The transition from Europeanisation to Euro-Atlanticism was caused by Finland's disappointment in the EU's ability to guarantee its security against the backdrop of the general deterioration of the European security system. Throughout the period under review, the country maintained strong national defence. The case of Finland demonstrates the decisive importance of strategic culture in shaping security policies of small states, despite their limited resources and room for manoeuvre. The concept of strategic culture represents a productive epistemological alternative to the neorealist approach in analysing the behavioural patterns of small states.

Recent shifts in U.S. foreign policy warrant an examination of the role of European actors in shaping a militarized dividing line in Eastern Europe, stretching from Baltic to the Black Sea. Since 2022, military-political processes in Southeastern Europe have been marked by a cautious convergence between France and Italy, which can be attributed to the Quirinal Treaty signed in 2021. However, an analysis of military buildup processes and related political dimensions reveals several significant constraints that could hamper coordination among European security providers. Among them are plans to hold to a moderate and scheduled enlargement of land forces, the composition of NATO multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria and Romania, and divergent foreign policy priorities between France and Italy in the Greater Mediterranean region. The emergence in March 2025 of the so-called coalition of the willing, spearheaded by Paris and London, is to be regarded not only as a reaction to negotiations between Moscow and Washington, but also as a declarative milestone in the militarization of the contact line. This shift signals a transfer of military-political initiative to European NATO members. It also raises questions on the development of multilateral coordination formats in relation to multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary, which were established in March 2022. At least four scenarios for the development of multilateral formats can be identified. They imply increasing the role of Spain, Turkey, Great Britain or regional states, all of which place individual emphasis in terms of operational activities, military buildup and involvement of military logistics in the region.

The article examines the legal and political aspects of the concept of a “green future” for humanity, which should guide the international climate protection regime. The first part of the article systematizes the conclusions made by the International Court of Justice in its 2025 advisory opinion on the international legal climate obligations of states. The second part, based on an analysis of decisions under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, reveals the current status of the international legal climate protection regime. It concludes that over the past five years, the global climate protection regime has been reformed according to a “green energy revolution” scenario, which implies an accelerated transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources. As a result of this reform, the thesis of the climate unacceptability of all types of fossil fuels has been established at the global intergovernmental level, a position confirmed by the International Court of Justice. The Court’s opinion reflects an emerging presumption of illegality regarding activities related to the financing, exploration, development, and consumption of hydrocarbon resources. The third part of the article proposes a model for a comprehensive integrated assessment of the sustainability and security of the “green transition,” within which the risks and challenges of the “green energy revolution” scenario are analyzed, and possible alternative scenarios are explored.