U.S. Congress plays an increasing role in the American policy of economic sanctions. Although the President and the Administration retain a significant power in national foreign policy, including the use of sanctions, Congress affects political agenda, promotes its own design of sanctions and keeps an eye on their implementation and further upgrade. Emergence of sanctions in the pubic laws, initiated and passed by Congress, usually makes their revocation hardly possible and keeps them for a long term. Such an institutional role of Congress raises a number of research questions. What are the key target priorities for Congress in terms of sanctions policy? Do these priorities overlap with the ones of the Administration? Are there any partisan splits on sanctions or sanctions policy is rather a matter of bipartisan consensus? What instruments of sanctions does Congress prefer? What share of bills finally turns into public laws and what is a connection of bills success to partisan affiliation or priorities concerned? To deal with these questions, the article reflects an analysis of 539 Congressional bills on sanctions, introduced in the House of Representatives and the Senate in 2019-2023. The database of bills includes such variables as targets of sanctions, political triggers of proposed restrictions, list of measures proposed, partisan affiliation of sponsors and cosponsors, etc. Results demonstrate the overlapping of priorities of Congress and Administration, though Congress attempts to constrain Administration on a number of issues, such as Iranian Nuclear Deal. There are specific partisan priorities. Republicans are proactive on sanctioning China, Iran and Afghanistan. Democrats are exploring new areas of sanctions use, such as climate, ecology, minorities’ rights, etc. Still, most of the bills have a bipartisan composition of sponsors and cosponsors. Most of successful bills, which turned into laws, are of bipartisan nature. Congressional bills imply the use of universal instruments of targeted sanctions such as asset blocking, visa bans or trade restrictions. However, country-specific measures, like suspension of particular military cooperation programs, are also on the radars of Congress. China and Russia a key priorities for Congress in terms of sanctions.

There are several problems in the modern theory of international relations that are difficult to solve, but the very existence of which leads to a certain demarcation of possible and received knowledge. These phenomena include the problem of ‘anthropomorphizing’, which is an attribution or an identification of certain human characteristics with complex social actors, including, above all, states. This research technique is often not limited to the use of any figures of speech and serves to ascertain the ontological and epistemological foundations for further theorizing. The purpose of this article is to systematize the existing approaches to ‘anthropomorphizing’ and put forward further directions for understanding this theoretical problem. The author reconstructs the three main traditions of ‘anthropomorphizing’ – back to the works of Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes and Georg Hegel. Each tradition has both a certain understanding as regards the meaning of this research technique and ontological along with epistemological consequences, which implicitly affect the result obtained. The tradition of Hugo Grotius is distinguished by a metaphorical understanding of ‘anthropomorphizing’ associated with a peculiar perception of the rights and freedoms of the individual. On the contrary, the tradition of Thomas Hobbes considers the internal characteristics of the state in comparison with a person while similarities are used to raise new research questions. Finally, the last tradition arose under the influence of Georg Hegel. It connects the problem of ‘anthropomorphizing’ with the processes of external communication of states. The article provides an orderly interpretation of ontological and epistemological consequences as well as the traditions that are linked to existing theoretical schools (as much as possible). The author analyzes the synthesis of several traditions of ‘anthropomorphizing’ presented by constructivist Alexander Wendt. The emerging tradition of ‘anthropomorphizing’ is aimed at clearly defining its own epistemological and ontological foundations while raising the theoretical status of ‘humanization’ itself. As a result, the article concludes on the possibility, limitations and prospects of revisiting and more actively using the concept of ‘anthropomorphizing’ in reflectivist and neopositivist methodologies, as well as the likelihood of hybrid versions of the three main research traditions.

We contribute to the advancement of scholarship on realist constructivism by illustrating its potential to enrich norm theory and elucidate the role of states in shaping identities. The primary challenge in fully realizing the potential of realist constructivism lies in reconciling constructivists' perspectives on norms as carriers of universal ethical standards with realists' emphasis on their instrumental value for state interests. We address this contradiction by highlighting the existence of two distinct types of norms: individual and group norms. Individual norms are grounded in fundamental and inalienable human rights, exhibiting universality and resilience. In contrast, group norms primarily address collective rights and interests, rendering them more susceptible to instrumentalization by states and thus more contingent and changeable. Realist constructivism enables us to acknowledge the coexistence of both types of norms and analyze their interactions. Our framework is empirically tested using two norms concerning individual rights (the norm against anti-personnel landmines and the norm against torture), two norms related to group interests (the norm promoting the green energy transition and the norm of world-class universities), and one borderline case (the norm against genocide). We show that efforts to frame norms of the second category and to graft them onto the human rights discource have yielded intriguing outcomes, legitimizing and empowering new principles of interntional governance. Conversely, the instrumentalization of norms from the first category to serve national interests can weaken them, leading to a loss of credibility on the international stage.

The Israeli democratic system is facing a serious crisis. After five rounds of parliamentary elections within three and a half years, Benjamin Netanyahu was able to forge a relatively strong coalition in late 2022. The political instability, however, did not end and instead morphed into widespread protests against the new cabinet seeking to pass a judicial reform. The meltdown is accompanied by incessant populist rhetoric stemming from Israeli right-wing parties which formed the coalition. Populism is inherent in a great number of countries around the globe. Israel is no exception in this regard. The phenomenon has been gradually taking a central place in its political arena since the 1970s. Currently, most major Israeli parties have certain populist elements in their rhetoric. This is in many ways a consequence of the heterogeneity of Israeli society and a plethora of its intersectoral contradictions. They have constituted an integral part of the state from its inception only to grow deeper. The unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an additional contributing factor. Right-wing populist parties possess a lot of traits that resemble similar movements in other countries, but at the same time are defined by their own specific features. In particular, they often combine inclusionary and exclusionary populism. By “us” these movements imply mainly the Jews and counterpose themselves to the Arab population in the country, as well as non-Jewish migrants. They also prioritize the Jewish character of the state over the democratic one, though without denying the importance of democratic structures. Concurrently, right-wing populist actors envisage their implementation in a different way. Even if they are not the reason for the parliamentary crisis in Israel, they still exacerbate it instigating further escalation in already considerable intersectoral tensions and narrowing opportunities for dialogue with other political actors.

Hypersonic strike systems have become a driving force in the development of offensive weapons. Academic literature offers two perspectives on the prospects of their impact on the military-strategic situation. One approach tends to position hypersonic weapons as a revolutionary technology, while the other proceeds from the premise that hypersonic strike systems represent an evolutionary development of offensive systems. The objective of this article is to establish the specifics and limits of the hypersonic weapons impact on the existing military-strategic balance. The paper analyzes the problem of hypersonic weapons classification, their role and place in military strategy, as well as the evolution and prospects of the Russian, U.S. and Chinese programs on hypersonic weapons. The authors conclude that the advantages of hypersonic weapons cannot automatically be transformed into a guaranteed success amid a full-scale military conflict and are largely available to other strike systems based on less advanced technological solutions. The key scenario, where the benefits of hypersonic weapons can be realized the most, is a limited conflict, in which they are used for the surprise defeat of highly-protected priority targets and the establishment of theater domination. This is evidenced by the hypersonic development programs of the leading military powers – Russia, the United States, and China, – each of which is more or less committed to developing medium- and short-range systems. The implications of the unfolding hypersonic arms race for strategic stability are ambiguous. On the one hand, forward deployment of such systems increases the risks of escalation; reduced flight time to enemy strategic infrastructure facilities encourages the adversary to adopt more aggressive retaliation postures based on the principle of launch-on-warning rather than post-attack. On the other hand, the possession of hypersonic weapons by both sides in the same theater increases their mutual vulnerability and can thus play a stabilizing role.

This article aims to investigate the factors influencing the perception of high corruption levels in a country and examines the potential existence of spatial dependence in the distribution of these factors. It specifically focuses on exploring the interdependence between the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and forty four other factors categorized into six distinct categories. The central hypothesis posits that the interdependence between the CPI and these factors is more pronounced at the domestic level compared to its influence on indicators in neighboring countries. To assess the degree of interdependence between the CPI and each of the other indicators, the Pearson's Coefficient of Determination is employed, enabling an evaluation of corruption levels based on domestic state-specific factors. Furthermore, Moran's Bivariate Spatial Autocorrelation Index is utilized to elucidate the extent to which the CPI in one country influences one of the forty-four indicators in neighboring countries. Additionally, the Index of Spatial Interdependence is employed to ascertain the significance of domestic and international factors for each indicator. The research findings provide several noteworthy conclusions. Firstly, the neighborhood effect proves to be particularly significant for indicators that hold universal relevance for all governments, such as demographic and standard of living indicators. Conversely, indicators influenced by institutional, historical, and cultural differences exhibit stronger interrelations within the state. Lastly, the study establishes that the Pearson's Index holds greater significance than the Bivariate Moran's Index of Spatial Autocorrelation and the Index of Spatial Interdependence, thereby confirming the proposed hypothesis.

The article gives a tentative analysis of factors impacting the domestic and foreign policy of the Republic of Korea amid the growing confrontation between the “global West” spearheaded by the U.S. and the “global East” led by Russia and China. While the conflict between Washington and Beijing is being escalated, the South Korean leadership is likely to find itself in a precarious situation where it has to make a choice between its main economic partner and theideological overlord in terms of value orientation and security . Understanding the upcoming political course of Seoul, especially in light of the conflict over Taiwan, is of great scientific value and is important for applied international relations studies. Based on the analysis of the main trends of global turbulence and regional security, the authors propose a scenario prognosis developed on the basis of situational analysis and author’s modeling techniques , which would include both the general trends of the country’s foreign policy and the level of potential involvement of South Korea into a probable conflict between the U.S. and China in the Taiwan Strait. It is also worth noting that the most evident outcome will be the preserved alliance with Washington which is closer to South Korea when it comes to its social and political values and a gradual deterioration in relations with China, the speed of which may vary. However, the authors conclude by saying that Seoul will go to great lengths to postpone this uneasy choice and will try to distance itself from direct participation in a military conflict.

Selby J., G. Daoust, and C. Hoffmann. Divided Environments: An International Political Ecology of Climate Change, Water and Security. Cambridge University Press, 2022. 362 p.