The article studies perceptions of the Peace of Westphalia that were formed in the fields of international relations history and the general theory of international law as a result of conflicting doctrines, with some claiming the Westphalian treaties of 1648 are of universal significance for these scientific fields, and others, conversely, denying that these treaties had any sort of influence on the formation of a modern system of international relations and the formation of international law as a legal system. The article concludes that the treaties of the Peace of Westphalia does not actually contain many of the provisions attributed to them. These norms often arise only from their interpretation. However, the critics of the treaties’ significance for the history of international relations and their international legal regulationwho focused their attention only on the verbatim text of these documents while ignoring the historical conditions surrounding their development and adoption, failed to properly assess their impact. The Westphalian Congress was the first congress in world history that was pan-European in character. Its widely representative nature, the lengthy period of time during which it was held, the content of the treaties and the universally binding nature of their provisions, as well as the protocol rules, allow us to claim that the states of this world region started to identify themselves as part of a single pan-European international community. Moreover, the Congress also saw the creation, in a relatively short time, not only of treaties, but also of customary norms of general international law that were of fundamental importance for the formation of a new system of international relations. Despite the fact that most of the provisions of the Peace Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 havean applied nature, it is by no means an insignificant medieval treaty, the only virtue of which lies in it ending the Thirty Years' War. The Peace of Westphalia is an example of the first pan-European international treaty in world historywhich formulated a number of binding norms for all states of this part of the world. To sum up, the Westphalian Peace Treaty was, a historic breakthrough the creation of treaty norms of general international law, and therefore the it should be deemed a historical milestone in the creation of international law as a legal system.

The article examines the globalization – in its Americanization format – of the international cinematic communication within the perspective of the cultural diversity issue. The globalization process is comprehended as a result of the historical succession of market formations: from free competition in American cinema to an oligopoly and on to a national and an international monopoly. During the period of polipoly, the trail for globalization was blazed by the grande dame of the cinématographe: France. The United States, where in 1908 the market share of French films equaled 70%, mounted a resolute challenge. Under consideration are three factors – institutional, geopolitical, and creative – of the loss by the French of their domination over the American and, then, their own market. To the soft power of American cinema, the French state responded with the quota stimulation for the exhibition of national films, motivating it, among other things, by the necessity of providing for the external and internal security of the state, by the guardianship of customs and national traditions. To the quotas as a means of mitigating the soft power of the United States did recourse some other countries too: larger ones, for economic considerations; smaller ones, for cultural. The globalizational might of the American film industry is explained through the rational choice of the main line for its stylistic development and the filmmakers’ masterfulness, as well as through the professionalism of managemental and marketing actors, investment from big capital, and through support from government in its push for the «cultural hegemony» of the United States. The major studios that emerged during the period of oligopoly (1909– 1929) competed with one another on the terms of a certain accord. With the means of competing by supercostly investments, far beyond the capabilities of smaller studios, the majors established for the domestic market a regime of national monopoly (1930–1946). On the world market the elected method of competition enabled the American film industry, in the second half of the 1940s, to gain the position of the international monopolist. An important role in the process was played by Motion Picture Export Association, established in 1945: a sort of «a diplomatic service» that functioned with permission from and under the support of the U.S. government. From its position of the global monopolist the American film industry strives not only to dominate in the intercultural cinematic communication, but, in this status and as a means of the popular geopolitics, to control it through lobbying and by exporting capital and goods. The transborder circulation of products by various national cinemas and cultural diversity of cinematography have largely fallen prey the globalization process. On the basis of vast factual research is recreated the state of the art for the imbalance in the intercultural film communication. When, in a social­functional respect, the importing of films mainly supplants their production in a certain country, the socium, by a large magnitude, is deprived of the chance to reproduce its culture and, accordingly, its identity with the means of depicting its own image and of mastering it. The making of national cinematic picture of the world and its integration into the communicative process becomes a topical task of providing for cultural diversity.

China boasts prolonged history of relations with Afghanistan. Throughout the 2010s, China has seen Afghanistan as a key part of what can be described the dynamically transnational “Belt-Road-Initiative”. Now with the Taliban takeover of the country, the question arises how China would be able to play a premier role in the post-war Afghanistan while trying to shun itself to be embroiled into the geopolitical mire as the superpowers did in history? The current study addresses two questions through an analytical-empirical approach to how China will realize its geostrategic design in Afghanistan. First, what are China’s objectives which are supposed to differ from those of the USSR and the USA? Second, why would China likely succeed in the country where the superpowers had failed before? Over the past decades, China has geared up its strategic ties with Russia, Pakistan, Iran, known as the Eurasian partners on the Afghan issue, and Central Asian states which are either the neighbors of Afghanistan or the member states of the SCO. Since Beijing endorses multilateralism and inclusive partnership in foreign affairs, it will unlikely act alone on the issue of Afghanistan. Rather, China is supposed to work on it through triple-level platforms–the Eurasian partners, SCO member states with border proximity of Afghanistan and the multilateral organizations such as the U.N. and the G-20–to fulfill its geostrategic designs in Afghanistan.

The paper is aimed at investigating the influence of political foundations upon internal and external policy of a state, analyzing place and role of foundations in international relations. The relevance of the topic under investigation is stipulated by the expansion of semi-official and guerilla diplomacy instruments in governments’ external policy toolkits, which are widely financed by political foundations. The paper deals with the development of contemporary political foundations of the USA and Germany, including comparative analysis of performance features. The classification of foundation functions in the context of international relations is introduced. A conclusion is drawn that German political foundations are designed according to a model of a ministry of foreign affairs with the elements of a political party whereas a typical American philanthropic foundation is based on a model of a business corporation. German representatives tend to be present on the spot, continuously make contacts and keep track of local developments. The Americans apply project-based approach, and aim at creating NGOs or partnerships geared towards concrete actions or tasks making claims for international legitimacy. Foundations in Germany and the US are different in terms of funding models, degree of governmental involvement, scale and methods both serve as proxies and commentators of ruling elites' ideology contributing to foreign policy aims of their countries of origin. Foundations due to distancing from official diplomacy and legal autonomy (although activities of major foundations are frequently adjusted to the policy of a state of origin) achieve a wide room for maneuver. They penetrate into foreign societies and exert influence over sensitive spheres of modern statehood, such as education, domestic policy, expert community, media, etc. Hence a great deal of ties and points of influence “from inside” upon social and power structures of a foreign country are shaped, and could be exploited to further interests of a state of foundations’ origin. Experience of Western foundations is actively employed by other states and organizations, including non-Western. A range of tools could be applied for the strengthening of bilateral and multilateral cooperation within the framework of the Eurasian integration project of Russia according to the principles of mutuality and inclusivity.

The article focuses on the popularity of the President of the Russian Federation and the factors that influence the level of his support among the population. It is shown that most of the previous literature was devoted to the study of the influence of such determinants as macroeconomic indicators, the standard of living of citizens, the media, the use of political technologies, etc. The author notes that researchers have begun to mark a certain impact on the rating of national leaders of international events and interstate conflicts. The review of the literature showed that most researchers studied the factors of approval of the president's activities on the example of the United States. The author came to the conclusion that Russia is also a good laboratory for research and finding answers to a number of questions: Does the country's participation in military conflicts affect the popularity of the President of the Russian Federation? Does the low approval rating of the head of state lead to the initiation of a military conflict? The diversionary theory of war and the «rally around the flag» effect became the methodological basis of the article. Based on theoretical reflection, two working hypotheses were formulated: 1) a decrease in the approval rating of the president leads to an increase in the aggressiveness of foreign policy and the initiation of a military conflict; 2) Russia's participation in military conflicts leads to an increase in the popularity / approval of the activities of the President of the Russian Federation. The purpose of the article is an empirical test of these hypotheses. The author collected data on the rating of Russia’s president from 2000 to 2022 and conducted a regression analysis of time series. A comparative analysis of cases was used as a research method. As a result of statistical and other calculations, the author came to the conclusion that a decrease in the approval rating of the President of the Russian Federation does not lead to the initiation of military conflicts. The article substantiates the idea that the effect of the «rally around the flag» has matter in Russia, the participation of the armed forces in conflicts leads to an increase in the approval of the activities of the President of the Russian Federation.

The foreign policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has undergone significant changes since Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) became the de facto head of state. Riyadh has begun to pursue a proactive policy at the regional level, while at the global level, Saudi Arabia is pursuing a policy of balancing, as it is afraid of being drawn into the struggle of the great powers. Simultaneously, the KSA is striving to diversify its external relations, preparing for the planned reduction of the American presence in the Middle East and the Gulf. The article focuses on whether the rapprochement of the KSA with China and Russia can become an alternative to the strategic alliance of the kingdom with the United States. The author aims to analyze the peculiarities of relations of the kingdom with each of the powers and to identify trends in their further development. The article analyzes cooperation on security issues and economic cooperation. It concludes that the KSA is still interested in maintaining and developing strategic relations with the United States, which remains its key ally and an important economic partner. Relations with China, which has become the main trading partner, are built according to the «economy plus» formula, which suggests gradual development of political ties. Russia is important as a partner in the energy market within the OPEC+ format, and can also help resolve several regional crises. A comparative analysis of Saudi Arabia's relations with the United States, China and the Russian Federation shows that in the medium term there is no alternative for Riyadh but to maintain and develop relations with Washington.

The article examines the phenomenon of the international legal policy of state, which has been conceptually developed in the French legal doctrine. According to the classical concept of the present phenomenon, each state seeks to contribute to the content of international legal norms by participating in the coordination of wills of states in different ways. To promote and assert its position on existing and nascent international legal norms, the state constructs a policy, which guides its international legal practice. However, the conduct of an individual international legal policy raises questions, including critical ones. Interpretation of the role of international legal policy as a simple legal justification for politically motivated decisions leads to the "instrumental" concept of international legal policy. However, in the classical concept, the consideration of international law as an instrument of the state's foreign policy is not acceptable and, moreover, contradicts the very objective of international legal policy – legitimation. The achievement of this purpose is subject to the principle of the rule of international law in international relations. In its turn the instrumental understanding of the international legal policy allows for departures from the existing international law and thereby contributes to international legal destabilization. In this context, the article shows that being flexible the international law develops with the changing interests of states on the international arena on the background of various interstate relations, while the international law’s flexibility is considered as an essential prerequisite for its development. and tasks of states in the international arena. During the development of new norms of international law, the conduct by the state of a competent, active international legal policy, even if its partners do not agree with it, does not per se prejudice the foundations of international law. On the contrary, the policy aimed at its adjustment is a conditio sine qua non for the maintenance of international legal order, its evolutionary adaptation to changing international relations, other challenges of our time. Thuswise the concept of international legal policy allows us to reconsider the competition of multi-vector international legal «manoeuvers" of states.