The dynamics of regional economic integration remain under-discussed in academic circles. The European Union’s trajectory—from customs union to common market to monetary union—exemplifies Bela Balassa’s well-known stages. The launch of the Economic and Monetary Union 25 years ago with the single European currency marked a significant advance. Yet the 2005 constitutional crisis revealed the limitations of pursuing Balassa’s full economic union, or a total economic integration that presupposes the unification of monetary, fiscal, social and countercyclical policies. Consequently, traditional stage-based models of integration are increasingly inadequate for explaining 21st-century dynamics. Scholars need new ideas and approaches that would help them to grasp the nature of regional economic integration in the first half of the 21st century. This article proposes a hypothesis of long cycles in regional economic integration. This framework rests on two key assumptions. First, regional integration is a collective instrument of globalization, not an insulated, endogenously induced process aimed at getting welfare gains and expanding national markets. Its pace depends on the interplay of internal and external driving forces, whose interrelation and juxtaposition may accelerate or slow down progress. Second, economic integration unfolds cyclically, characterized by long waves of growth and stagnation, rather than a steady, linear advancement. I identify three such cycles in the European context: the first (1951–1984), the second (1985–2019) and the third (2019–present). Each cycle exhibits distinct goals, agendas and programs. With goals almost achieved and programs close to implementation, the additional institutional and operational burden puts more pressure on integration dynamics. If coupled with adverse external impact, it may suppress integration activity and induce stagnation with certain elements of disintegration. Another upward trend may gain momentum with the initiation of a new cycle, driven by a comprehensive upgrade of the integration project based on novel ideology, revised goals and fresh resources.

Heightened uncertainty and conflictual environment fuel disintegration within political elites around the globe. These processes of "inter-elite divergence" give rise to dividing lines in foreign policy. Divergence unfolds through three stages: segmentation, fragmentation, and polarization. Segmentation refers to the division of elites into distinct clusters, with communication channels still intact. Fragmentation indicates a deeper rift, with sustained interaction diminishing and cooperation becoming increasingly limited. Polarization is marked by a complete breakdown of dialogue and the emergence of mutually exclusive positions. To assess each stage systematically, the article proposes an analytical framework based on three key variables: coherence, leadership, and integrity. This classification helps to avoid simplifications when estimating the state of elites. Applying this framework, the paper seeks to analyze patterns of elite divergence in the European Union and the United States, focusing particularly on disagreements over policy toward Russia. Between 2014 and 2022, EU elites experienced segmentation and fragmentation as regards sanctions policy – yet these divisions did not result in policy reversal. Signs of polarization in the U.S., partially triggered by dividing lines regarding relations with Russia, were more pronounced in domestic politics. Despite external contradictions, the overall US policy maintained its continuity. These cases demonstrate that the theory of divergence not only allows for capturing the "depth" of discursive differences, but also highlights that contradictions do not predetermine the inevitability of political dysfunction. By incorporating the concept of divergence stages, the analysis moves beyond the conventional dichotomy of "conflict – cooperation" when it comes to inter-elite interaction.

International legal resolution of interstate disputes is a critical domain within International Relations, as it underpins global peace and security. Empirical evidence indicates that some states turn to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with a view to settling interstate disputes. This study investigates the characteristics of states that submit claims to international courts. Drawing on data from the ICJ, the Correlates of War project and Polity 4, the paper tests two hypotheses derived from rational choice/ expected utility theory and an alliance-based deterrence approach. By employing binary logistic regression, the findings reveal that militarily weaker states are more likely to favor international legal methods of resolving interstate disputes. The hypothesis has been confirmed that States that are not members of military-political blocs are more likely to resort to international legal methods for resolving interstate disputes. The analysis further demonstrates a positive association between dyads dominated by the civil law system and the propensity to seek judicial resolution. In contrast, the democratic regime factor is not statistically significant when it comes to filing claims with the ICJ, possibly due to their greater reliance on a third party or mediation. The results obtained contribute to understanding the motives and strategies of States in choosing peaceful means of resolving international disputes and can be used to develop more effective mechanisms for maintaining international peace and security.

This article examines Chinese agribusiness activity in the Russian Far East in the context of food security in China and Russia following COVID-19 (2020) and the Ukrain Crisis (2022), both of which disrupted global food supply chains, particularly for corn, soy, and grain. After Russia’s Special Military Operation in Ukraine, China resumed food imports from the U.S. to offset the loss of Ukrainian supplies, while demand for Russian agricultural products surged in China, the Middle East, and Central Asia. The Russian Far East, with its geographic proximity and logistical advantages, gained strategic importance in this context. Drawing on field research conducted in Primorsky Krai, Amur Oblast, and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast (2014– 2019, 2022–2023), this study assesses the risks and opportunities of Chinese agribusiness in the region for Russia. Findings indicate that production capacity and infrastructure limitations prevent the Russian Far East from fully substituting for Ukrainian corn or American soy in the Chinese market. However, the region’s advantages—shorter supply routes and favorable conditions for GMO-free soybeans and rice—rein-force its role in China’s premium food supply. For Russia, growing Chinese demand for crops supports regional economic development, though investment in dairy and meat industries remains crucial for national food security. Given China’s strategic focus on food security, agricultural cooperation enhances cross-border economic ties and fosters deeper collaboration between Russian and Chinese agribusinesses, ultimately strengthening bilateral economic relations and regional prosperity in the Russian Far East.

The article is devoted to demographic changes in Muslim communities in the Western Balkans. The study is based on the most recent population censuses (2021–2024) conducted in all countries and territories of the region, except Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to updated data, Muslims make up one-third of the total population in the area. At the same time, the number of local Muslim communities has been steadily declining. Only North Macedonia and Montenegro have demonstrated an upward trend in the number of Muslims. The decline in the Muslim population is occurring against the backdrop of general depopulation across the Balkans. The most significant loss of the Muslim population has taken place over the past decade. Interim results suggest that existing projections of the Muslim population in the region by 2050 should be reconsidered, considering the potential social, economic, cultural, and political consequences.  At present, earlier forecasts appear overly optimistic. In parallel with this process, there has also been a decrease in the size of other major religious communities in the region, particularly Christian ones.  In addition to demographic trends, the study focuses on the issue of the contemporary (self-)positioning of Balkan Islam within a broader European context. The analysis clarifies the boundaries of the Islamic "renaissance" in the Western Balkans. The uncertain current status of Balkan Islam, previously considered “autochthonous” to Europe, is largely driven by changes in Europe's socio-demographic structure over the past decade, particularly as a result of migration and the subsequent integration of large numbers of Muslims from the Middle East. In light of this transformation, the study identifies the distinctive features of Balkan Islam compared to other forms of European Islam: a clear commitment to the idea of a secular state – supported by a broad social consensus across all Balkan societies; the structure of local religious communities (many of which have become relative or absolute religious majorities in their respective states); a still-living generational memory of large-scale and profound secularization; and a relatively high proportion of “sociological Muslims”—those who identify as Muslim by personal or family origin, rather than through regular religious practice.

The tenth direct European elections were held in 2024, with citizens from all member states of the European Union involved. Despite the well-established tradition of European campaigns, the perception that this vote is of little importance and secondary is embedded in the academic political discourse. Several provisions of the concept of second-order national elections are often cited as evidence. According to its proponents, the secondary vote is traditionally characterized by low turnout, setbacks for governing political parties, a high percentage of invalid ballots, and broad prospects for various small, new, populist, radical, or protest parties. This paper aims to assess the applicability of the concept to the 2024 campaign for the European Parliament in Germany. The article employs statistical data making it possible to compare the results of first-order (Bundestag) and second-order (European Parliament) elections. These data relate to turnout, protest voting, and the results of all the country’s main political parties. Special attention is attached to the key elements of the legal and institutional transformation of the European Parliament, as well as the political issues and intra-party crises that influenced the election results. The article concludes by saying that one may detect a definite trend over the last three (2014, 2019, 2024) campaigns, concerning both a gradual increase in citizens’ interest in voting for the European Parliament and a decrease in the percentage of spoiled ballots. Nevertheless, in some respects, the 2024 elections can still be regarded as second-class. For example, turnout in 2024 was significantly lower than in the preceding 2021 federal campaign, while members of the ruling Traffic Light coalition, which is in the second half of its term, were unsuccessful. Protest voting for both Eurosceptics and Eurooptimists was also evident. Finally, the combination of economic, energy, foreign policy and migration issues, as well as the systemic crisis of the Left party, weighed heavily.

While the politics of memory has been extensively explored as a domestic policy instrument, its function in shaping foreign affairs remains underexamined. Drawing on Joseph Nye’s concept of “soft power,” this article investigates how the politics of memory influences diplomatic and cultural engagements in post-Soviet Central Asia. The region is conceptualized as a contested space in which historical memory serves as a strategic resource for external actors – including Turkey, Iran, India, China, and Russia – seeking to project influence and foster alignment among local populations. These “mnemonic actors” deploy narratives of shared cultural and historical legacies, such as the “Turkish world” and the “Legacy of the Silk Road,” to encourage the development of transnational memories that transcend national boundaries. The analysis evaluates each actor’s “mnemonic soft power” by examining the various historical narratives and symbolic initiatives they promote. Turkey emerges as particularly effective, leveraging the notion of the “Turkish world” through collaborative historical textbooks, scholarly conferences, and cultural festivals to solidify a sense of shared identity. China, by contrast, exhibits comparatively limited resources for mobilizing soft power in the region. Meanwhile, Russia – historically the imperial “metropole” – faces significant challenges in forging a common memory that encompasses both the pre-Soviet and Soviet periods. Nonetheless, it relies on the evocative power of World War II as part of the region’s “short-term memory,” although this advantage is likely to erode as generational change reshapes collective memory. The article concludes that memory politics constitutes a pivotal dimension of contemporary geopolitics in Central Asia, with evolving implications for regional alignments.

Under what conditions might the potential for weaponizing economic interdependence through sanctions in EU-Russia relations be exhausted? Focusing on the exemptions provided under Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014, the paper develops a typology that distinguishes between humanitarian and diplomatic derogations, special reservations for deal-making, individual derogations, and exemptions justified by economic security reasons. As for the latter, the analysis draws on trade statistics from 2021 to 2023 – calculating export growth rates from Russia to the EU and employing the Herfindahl-Hirschman index to assess the geographical concentration of exports within the integration bloc. The findings contribute to the literature that views EU anti-Russian sanctions as a tool of weaponization of economic interdependence in Russian-European relations, while also delineating the limits of such weaponization. In particular, the study introduces the bottleneck effect concept observed when EU sanctions policy-making stalls for objective reasons. Here, “bottleneck” does not imply inability to impose sanctions. It reflects a scenario in which sanctions are driven by economic market dynamics rather than political logic contrasting with many other areas of bygone Russian-European cooperation now under sanctions. The paper identifies three cases of this effect: a) when the EU prioritizes other policy objectives over weakening Russia; b) when the imposition of sanctions is stalled for humanitarian reasons – thereby potentially increasing the risk of weaponization via tariff regulation measures; c) when major EU countries guard certain longstanding elements of trade and economic interaction with Russia that are vital for their own economies.