The study of mediation in resolving armed conflicts remains a promising area of research in international relations. However, contemporary IR research provides a limited understanding of the role of the mediator's military power in the cessation of hostilities and the implementation of peace agreements. We have suggested that asymmetry and parity can characterize an intermediary's superiority in military power (or lack thereof). To assess the relevant characteristics of military power, we propose to use a generalized indicator of military asymmetry created through a simple comparative analysis. Within the framework of the methodology presented in the article, various metrics of the military power of the parties to the conflict and the mediators were compared in pairs with each other according to the criterion of threshold values (quartiles), indicating the presence of asymmetry of military power or its absence (parity of military power). Various thresholds of sufficient skewness, ranging from 20% to 50%, were then also used to aggregate the binary scores into a single score. As a result of the study, using the assessment of a series of regression models, it was possible to establish that the aggregate superiority of the mediating state in military force over the warring parties to the conflict statistically significantly contributes to both the immediate cessation of hostilities and the successful establishment of peace in the long term. Control variables in the form of peace agreement features also influence the peace process's positive outcome. Key among them are increasing the transparency of political decision-making procedures and the involvement of various social groups in power processes at various levels. The results of this study demonstrate the interconnectedness of military force and successful mediation and also indicate the complementarity of military and negotiation components in the context of state-led mediation. Thus, this study proposes to transform the idea of mediation that currently dominates international relations theory.

The cybernetic model of governance, well-established at the national level, has yet to be applied in transnational and global dimensions for analytical purposes, despite favorable conditions for its implementation. Global governance practices are increasingly resembling classic cybernetic challenges, such as maintaining the planet's average temperature within a 1.5°C increase relative to the pre-industrial era. This task essentially involves the creation of climate control on a planetary scale. Its resolution demands not only an acceleration of the energy transition and changes in social behavior and economic consumption patterns at an individual level but also a consideration of the mechanisms of the planet's climatic and geological evolution. This article traces the genealogy of the cybernetic governance model from its initial description in the works of Norbert Wiener to contemporary studies in political science, identifying key concepts and limitations of this model. Utilizing the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, particularly the concept of "macro-securitization," the article justifies the selection of climate change as a crucial case for the cybernetic model of global governance. The analysis of the practice of implementing global governance in the field of climate change aligns with the main characteristics of the cybernetic model and can be viewed as its practical application. The cybernetic model's primary challenge in a global context lies in its requirement for an overarching, unified approach to complex and diverse global issues. The model's emphasis on measurable indicators poses difficulties in areas where quantifiable metrics are less apparent or where multiple competing interests and values must be balanced. This necessitates a nuanced understanding of the global political and socio-economic landscape and the intricate interplay between various actors and factors influencing global governance. The article suggests that while the cybernetic model offers valuable insights for certain global challenges, particularly in environmental governance, its broader application across diverse global governance domains warrants careful consideration and adaptation to the complex realities of global politics and policy-making.

The paper deals with official development assistance (ODA) policies of the USA, the EU and China in the comparative context of latest developments. The development approaches of the three actors under investigation demonstrate common features as well as idiosyncrasies in terms of management, resources, and ideological justification. All actors strive towards complex model of influence through ODA including tying together economic projects with sociocultural heft and security. The underlying trends characteristic of the USA, and in significant degree of the EU approaches combine traditional aim of reshaping sociopolitical institutions of target countries with growing securitization concerns. In the case of the U.S., one can speak of ‘militarization’ of ODA which means blurring the lines between military aid (and goalsetting) and traditional development assistance. China is on the way of reforming its international development cooperation industry, seeking to transform it into a more complex toolset of influence, better coordinated, and more closely knit to foreign policy and security objectives. In contrast to the Western paradigm, Beijing avoids imposing its model of development and threat perception upon the aid-recipient countries. The analysis concludes that “soft power” concept is being sidelined in the world of great power rivalry by more complex and hybrid formats of foreign influence which combine sociocultural, political, geoeconomic, and military instruments, with development assistance playing a role of one of the primary foreign policy resources. New dimensions of rivalry associated with industrial and technological race in energy, climate, and supply chains are coming to the fore in ODA policies. The role of sociocultural influence toolkit is growing given information and communication technologies progress, proliferation of non-state actors in international relations, and increasing activity of China in the area, which challenges the dominant positions the Western actors have enjoyed for over 30 years.

The article examines the situation in the area of debt of the non-financial sector in Asia. According to the main indicators, it occupies a leading place among developing economies. The author aims to prove the possibility of increasing instability in the development of the non-financial sector with a further uptick in the debt of Asian countries. The work determines the place of Asia in the global debt of the non-financial sector, the degree of its external and internal debt dependence, conducts a comparative analysis by region and country, gives the ratio of various groups of debt and evaluates the prospects for its prolongation. Among the main risk groups posed by the formation of non-financial sector debt are corporate and household debts. It is emphasized that the period of declining economic growth and, accordingly, falling incomes weakens the resilience of Asian companies to financial shocks. The post-pandemic stage, which starts around 2022, is highlighted as the most difficult for the economies of Asian countries, as the vulnerability of companies, especially small and medium-sized businesses, increases. Government support programs are weakened as a result of deficit financing and are unable to provide guarantees on debts, a significant part of which is external. High growth rates of household debt for both mortgages and consumer loans in a number of Asian countries, exceeding GDP growth rates, also raise the uncertainty of economic forecasts. The recovery from the recession that accompanied the coronavirus pandemic is significantly delayed, which creates new, more difficult conditions for the activities of states and companies. The 2019–2022 recession fragmented the regional economy due to trade, investment and financial restrictions and different approaches to economic policies implemented by each country, which will require significant efforts to restore the financial integration of the region and usher in a new stage.

The ubiquitous implementation of information and communication technologies (ICTs) is giving rise to cross-border security threats that require joint international responses. Fragmentation and growing conflict in the global information space complicates international cooperation within the UN to form a comprehensive global information security regime. Western countries actively support the formation of a cyber security regime based on Western values and promoted as a general initiative of the international community without taking into account the position of developing countries. An alternative approach focused on securing digital sovereignty is being promoted by many non-Western negotiating platforms, among which the BRICS occupies an important place. This article aims to assess the potential of BRICS influence in the framework of the international ICT security regime and the main directions of the BRICS activities in this area. In this paper, the BRICS agenda in the field of ICT security is studied on the basis of official documents of the annual summits and the main commitment made by the BRICS. The discourse analysis of the strategic planning documents of the BRICS countries allows to identify their priorities in the area under consideration, and to assess the potential for the implementation of the achieved obligations at the BRICS level. All the BRICS countries focus on ensuring sovereignty in the field of ICT. However, Russia, India and China consider digital development and ICT security as the most important direction of state policy and international cooperation; at the same time, they are more advanced in the field of digital technologies compared to other countries of the five and, as a result, are more vulnerable. In turn, Brazil and South Africa do not consider this area as a priority, placing more emphasis on ICT development and being more interested in access to technology and bridging the digital divide. However, all five countries are interested in solving the problem of extremism and terrorism in the digital sphere, which is also a promising area for the BRICS multilateral cooperation. A study of the voting of the BRICS countries in the UN and an analysis of their participation in alternative initiatives in the field of forming a cyber security regime promoted by Western countries showed the high efficiency of BRICS as a negotiating platform - the main contribution is made by developing a common position on the norms and principles of the international information security regime and their support at the UN level. Thus, BRICS can make a constructive contribution to the formation of the norms and principles of the international ICT security regime based on the principles of respect for state sovereignty, internationalization of the Internet governance, and counteraction to the criminal use of ICTs. An important advantage of BRICS in this area is the possibility of aggregating the interests and positions of developing countries.

The article deals with the transformation of the small open economies’ approach to the enlargement of the European Union. This issue is of particular scientific interest amid the ongoing discussions about the potential inclusion of new states in the EU and disagreements of the current EU members on this issue. The Netherlands was chosen as an object for the research, as it is a model state that played one of the pivotal roles in the development of integration in Europe. The purpose of the research is to identify the directions in which the Dutch approach to EU enlargements evolved. To achieve this goal, the factors that influenced small states’ approach to each of the EU enlargements are examined in detail using a combination of the concepts of a small state and a small open economy. Also, special attention is paid to the peculiarities of the eastern enlargement, which exacerbated the chronic imbalances in the union and laid the foundation for its structural crises. The research concluded that the Dutch approach to the EU enlargement is coherent: the small state supports the inclusion of more “developed” states in the union, which meets the interests of a trading nation, but takes a tough stance regarding accession of countries with unstable economies and fragile political institutions. The Dutch approach to this process consists of "three models": the first is applicable to the developed countries (the Netherlands supported the EU enlargements until 1995), the second to countries that have achieved a certain stability of the economy (the Hague expressed concern about the inclusion of a large number of CEE countries with economies in transition), the third to potential candidates for accession (the Netherlands rejects the possibility of including a number of Balkan states and Ukraine in the EU in the near future). Thus, the structural crises in Europe, exacerbated by the eastern enlargement, led to a certain hardening of the small open economies’ stance on the inclusion of new states in the EU.

This research underscores the complexities of constructing hegemonic narratives in the face of geopolitical dynamics surrounding military crises. Departing from conventional analyses focused on securitization theory, strategic narratives, or David Campbell’s framework of identity construction in response to external perils, this study draws upon the concept of hegemonic practices as elucidated by Ernest Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Through an exploration of how political actors employ discursive strategies to construct hegemony, the research centers on the Western political elites’ efforts to establish political hegemony to rationalize military intervention in the Middle East. Utilizing the notion of the antagonistic Other, which posits two mutually constitutive Others where one is perceived as the source of violence against the other, representing civilians, this paper examines the political discourse surrounding two concurrent events in the Middle East: the conflicts in Syria and Libya. The analysis reveals that while the Western political class constructed a political hegemony around Libya by portraying Muammar Gaddafi and the victimized civilians as opposing Others, a similar narrative failed to materialize for Syria: Western powers encountered expected challenges in articulating a clear antagonistic Other, on account of the position of Russia and other countries representing non-Western political culture. Throughout the period of 2011– 2014, Bashar al-Assad, despite his role as the Syrian president, was not consistently portrayed as the source of antagonism towards civilians.

The Greater Eurasian Partnership project, put forward back in 2016, has become one of Russia's key initiatives to build its version of a broad regionalism covering a significant part of the continent. The launch of the Special Military Operation and the deepening of the Russian-Western confrontation has created and continues to create huge structural changes in the global and regional international system. It also brings serious adjustments to Russia's foreign policy, its objective capabilities and subjective perception of its initiatives. The aim of this study is to determine the prospects of the Greater Eurasia concept under the changing geopolitical conditions of 2016-2022. It provides a brief overview of the conditions in which Eurasian regionalism developed during the period under review; traces the development of the Greater Eurasia concept in Russian official and expert discourse, shows how the ideological content of the initiative developed, how the initially widely interpreted concept crystallised; considers the achievements in the implementation of the concept, among which the most prominent is the "narrative expansion" on various international platforms, including not only within the framework of the EAEU promoted by Russia, but also within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union. In order to fulfil the objectives of this study, the authors relied on the analysis of statements of public figures of the Russian Federation and other states at international events and publicist literature, analytical articles in scientific journals and press, official documents and statements of international organisations. The main conclusion of the study is the ambiguity of the situation in which the concept of Greater Eurasia has found itself under conditions of increasing geopolitical confrontation and the relatively modest results of its implementation in recent years. At the same time, one cannot help but notice that the increasingly complex conditions can be an incentive for the evolution and concretisation of the concept, as well as the adaptation of the foreign policy leadership's approach to its implementation. Thus, we can say that despite the difficult conditions, the concept can still claim to be a great future.