The new outer space natural resources policy of the United States, outlined between 2015 and 2020 by national legislation (including the U.S. Space Resource Exploration and Exploitation Act of 2015 and the U.S. Executive Order of April 6, 2020) and in 2020 also by the U.S.-initiated separate international Artemis Aсcords, is meant to be consistent with the universal Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the basic source of international space law. This policy, which opens access for private investors to natural resources of celestial bodies under the American legislation has commanded a wide international attention not only because of the exhilarating data on the high density of deposits of precious metals and other highlydemanded natural resources on some asteroids, but also because of the question raised during the workings of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: does this policy violate the US obligations under international law according to which the use of outer space, including celestial bodies, constitutes "the province of all mankind"? Or is it more rational for other states to create a similar international format of selective cooperation in order to be among the first to exploit the wealth of nearby celestial bodies without devoting political efforts to collectively establish international offense committed by the United States? Can a national legal and international legal response of Russia, China and other states, which are not subordinated to the United States, supported by their technological and industrial outer space infrastructure applicable to the outer space natural resources activities, become an effective incentive to negotiate a universal special international legal regime? It appears to be feasible since it is necessary to ensure conflict-free and, consequently, economically stable outer space natural resources activities corresponding to the national interests of the majority of states even with different international legal positions.

In 2001 R. Bleiker announced aesthetic turn in IR theory, which presupposed the focus on the intersection between two areas – politics and aesthetics. The vast majority of the works had the emphasis on the politicization of aesthetics in terms of Walter Benjamin, namely, on a process of instrumentalization of aesthetics for political purposes, while the opposite notion of the aestheticization of politics has remained vague. This article aims to compensate such a gap in epistemology and to show the importance of the aestheticization of politics for IR. The author proposes a theoretical and methodological framework that includes the concepts of political-aesthetic hybrids, political-aesthetic logic, superposition, blending and the work of purification as the retrospective separation of the aesthetic from the political. The article provides a ground to consider the concept of the multipolar world in the official discourse of Russia as political-aesthetic hybrid. It contains a sustainable logic linking the multipolar principle in international relations with a harmonious order at the level of the international system and within specific countries/ regions. Future research can focus on some other political-aesthetic hybrids such as "balance of power", "world order", "symmetrical response" to advance our understanding of the field of intersection between international relations and aesthetics. In addition, alternative views on the phenomenon of the aestheticization of politics may be fruitful, but only in the case of consistent conceptualization and, most importantly, operationalization of these models, since many previous theoretical constructions suffered from excessive metaphorical nature and vagueness.

The COVID-19 crisis has disrupted traditional trade connections, significantly altering the global trade landscape. This served as a crucial stress test for international trade and regional integration blocs, challenging trade regionalization. Given these new challenges, we propose the concept of regional integration resilience, defined as the capacity of an integration bloc to mitigate the adverse impact of the pandemic on intraregional trade and minimize the immediate reduction of trade within that bloc. With the fortification of supply chains and greater economic interconnection within the integrating economies, our hypothesis is that regional economic integration could serve as a buffer against the negative consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, we have utilized fixed-effects instrumental variable regression applied to the augmented gravity model to analyze quarterly observations from January 2018 to December 2020. To gauge the influence of being in a trade bloc during the COVID-19 crisis, we introduced interaction terms (participation in a regional trade agreement and COVID-19 parameters) into the model. The findings suggest that the pandemic markedly and adversely impacted bilateral trade. Interestingly, the weight of the COVID-19 pandemic had a more pronounced effect on trade flows compared to its severity. Despite the anticipated positive effects of regional integration on intraregional trade due to its static and dynamic effects, overall, we did not observe any stabilizing influence of regional economic integration. There was no evidence that regional integration contributed to alleviating the negative effects on trade during a pandemic or fostering higher trade resilience within regional trade agreements. However, the impact of regional trade integration may vary across different integration blocs. Among the six integration blocs analyzed, two demonstrated a significant positive influence on trade during the pandemic – the European Union and the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (formerly the North American Free Trade Agreement).

The digitalization of social relations not only simplifies life, but also creates the ground for an increase in the number of offences in cyberspace, including those involving subjects of international law. Victimized countries often resort to the use of disproportionate measures against offending States using traditional instruments of international law. In addition, the lack of optimal means of responding to low-intensity cyber-interference is ineffective. Having considered the main mechanisms and complexities faced by international law when states inflict harm through digital technologies, the authors propose a private law concept of cybertort, the use of which, on the one hand, makes it possible to eliminate the consequences of ex post violations and, on the other hand, does not lead to an escalation of the existing conflict. In describing the problems of interstate interaction, the auxiliary nature of the use of private legal tools is emphasized. Using both systemic and comparativist methods of research, the authors reveal the essence and legal consequences of the variable qualification of an act as an offense (state responsibility) or an act not prohibited by international law (state liability), as well as substantiate the need to apply a flexible system of legal regulation to the law of causing harm on the Internet. Using the critical method, the shortcomings of the modern doctrine of international law in the considered context are revealed. Using the deductive method, with reference to Russian and foreign doctrinal sources, legal acts, as well as judicial practice, an optimal regime of liability for an offence in the digital environment is proposed, which creates appropriate incentives to improve the methods of cyber-interference.

The relations between Russia and Turkey paradoxically combine close cooperation with enmity as well as consistency with unpredictability. How can such ambiguous and controversial nature of Russo-Turkish relations be explained? The existing arguments predicated upon the material factors of security and economic benefits are not able to grasp the essence as to why the two countries forgo benefits for other considerations. Furthermore, these works do not allow for the socially constructed nature of “security”. Putting the current state of relations between Moscow and Ankara in the long historical trends context fails to expose the mechanisms which make these trends function. The paper seeks to shed light on the dynamics of Russo-Turkish relations from the perspective of international status theory. We understand status as the set of collective beliefs about the place a given state possesses among the other states. We apply the status approach to analyze how Russia and Turkey dealt with the conflicts in Syria and in Nagorno-Karabakh. On the one hand, Moscow and Ankara give each other mutual status recognition. In fact they constitute for each other the reference group which satisfies their status aspirations. Therefore it is dramatically important for both states to sustain cooperation. Otherwise the confrontation breaks the mechanism of mutual status recognition. On the other hand there is status disparity between Russia and Turkey. Russia is a nuclear power and the permanent member of UN Security Council. Turkey is a middle range power, claiming great power status. The disparity leads to status competition between Moscow and Ankara and informs rivalry between them.

This study explores the impact of shifting dynamics in Russian-Turkish relations on the foreign policies of South Caucasian states. Since 2016, the interaction between those two actors has changed significantly and had an impact on many regions, including the Caucasus. Analyzing this new mode of Russo-Turkish relations post-2016 and its implications for the region is essential to better comprehend the foreign policy decisions of the South Caucasian states. Therefore, the study begins by delving into the strategic approaches of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey in the region. Then, the article provides a concise overview of the bilateral relations between these two nations. Subsequently, it evaluates the overall geopolitical status of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, considering how their foreign policies might be influenced by the evolving relations between Russia and Turkey. The article concludes that the altered relationship between Russia and Turkey significantly impacts the foreign policies of regional countries. Specifically, the study suggests that Azerbaijan is pursuing a relatively autonomous foreign policy and adopts a strategy of balance, aiming to sustain relationships with both Russia and Turkey without becoming overly reliant on either. This became evident especially after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2020, after which Baku pushed for even tighter relations with both Ankara and Moscow. Armenia, on the other hand, seeks to diminish Russian influence by seeking external support in its conflict with Azerbaijan and exploring opportunities for inclusion in new transit routes. In this context, Yerevan has been seeking closer links with the Western actors, the Islamic Republic of Iran and India. Georgia, the third case of the study, maintains its claim to Abkhazia and South Ossetia but avoids involvement in regional conflicts to prevent antagonizing Russia, following a cautious and observant strategy, in order to avoid any escalation that would turn the country into another front in the current crisis between the West and Russia.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the complex political and economic direction of the development of the European Union - strategic autonomy. The focus of this study is on the strategic autonomy of the EU in the economy. The origin and evolution of the concept of open strategic autonomy in the economic sector, enshrined in the official documents of the European integration association, are considered. The transformation and expansion of the substantive direction of the concept is traced – starting from the first lists of critical raw materials for the development of the economy and up to strategic high-tech manufacturing industries designed to become the basis for future sustainable and dynamic economic growth and ensure the international competitiveness of the entire economic complex of the EU. A set of measures has been studied and systematized, including European long-term strategic projects (with the participation of the European Union as a supranational institution, its member states and individual companies), which are implemented as part of the concept of strategic autonomy. An attempt has been made to assess the prospects for the possible implementation of this set of measures. It is shown that the full implementation of all the provisions of the strategic autonomy in the economy is not possible, especially given the wide scope of the stated goals and objectives. In a favorable scenario the European Union will probably be able to maintain and consolidate its position in terms of resource-saving technologies, including their green aspect. At the same time, the implementation of strategic autonomy in the field of raw materials is likely to be less successful. The probable consequences of the partial implementation of the concept of an open strategic autonomy in the economy for Russia are formulated. As a result of the conducted research, it was concluded that the main problem for Russia is the further exclusion of our country from existing and potential European value chains, primarily from high-tech industries that are especially important for the economy of the future.

The article examines the evolution of domestic political consensus around European Integration in the countries of former Yugoslavia. Being on the different stages of accession process, these countries are exposed to Brussels’ institutional influence which encourages domestic politics and policy change. Ambiguous attitude of national political actors towards the European Union at the start of negotiations did not impede reaching the agreement among almost all the political parties concerning EU accession as a priority goal. Domestic impact of European Integration described by the term Europeanization. The establishment of the pro-EU consensus is viewed as a specific case of the Europeanization of the postYugoslav political parties. Based on new institutionalism theory, the inquiry raises the question of how the interests and programmatic orientations of political parties in former Yugoslavia transform under direct or indirect influence of European institutions. European strategic orientation is formalized in unanimous parliamentary resolutions which preceded the signing of Europe / Stabilization and Association agreements. Consequently, any political alternative to European integration became radical, and therefore the Eurosceptic forces either marginalized or embraced the consensus. The paper concludes that the sustainability of the pro-EU consensus is reinforced by the ideological change of political parties towards the radical centrism which at the same time represents the EU institutional impact. The absence of political space to express the pursuit of alternative to European integration does not correctly reflect public opinion and reveals the democratic deficit issue