The paper analyzes the reasons for the ontological dominance of the West, which at the dawn of capitalism benefited from investments in natural sciences. The latter provided its technological superiority and made possible its colonial expansion. The export of innovations became one of the tools of its ontological dominance and the "provincialization" of the rest of the world. It was promoted primarily by the longexisting Western monopoly on the marketing of innovations. After all, it presented a finished product, promoting the Protestant cultural code as the only possible norm. This created a "modernization trap." Westernization embedded the modernized subject into the Western system as a province. Yet "marketing machinery" does not answer the question of how innovations are generated and how scientific revolutions can occur. The authors, relying on the theory of scientific revolutions formulated by Thomas Kuhn, identify another key component, namely, club science. It is a community of the most prominent scientists built on the network principle. They are capable of generating innovations going beyond the usual paradigms. The authors put forward their own model of organizing scientific production, which represents the coexistence of "club" and "normal" science. The first one – the network consisting of members with equal rights known for their results– is able to transcend the dominant paradigms and formulate new ones. The second one – hierarchical – maintains paradigms, verifies and legitimizes them, making them part of basic education. Their coexistence, in fact, creates a full-fledged structure of innovative science. The authors also analyze the Soviet attempt to create its own "club science," which provided the country with nuclear sovereignty, and consider the reasons for its subsequent decline. In conclusion, the authors offer a number of specific steps in terms of gaining absolute sovereignty in the field of scientific production, largely relying on Chinese experience.

The EU has introduced two new concepts in its discourse: European / strategic sovereignty and sanctions. The analysis of the EU’s official texts, its representatives’ speeches and experts’ essays reveals that to date there has been two iterations of the discourse on sovereignty and sanctions. The first one emerged in 2017 whereas the second one took hold in 2022. The goal of the article is to identify key changes between the first and second iterations, as well as the importance of these changes for the EU’s external relations. Theoretically, the article draws on the writings of Robert H. Jackson and Stephen Krasner on sovereignty, supplemented by critical geopolitics studies. Methodologically, the article is based on qualitative contentanalysis and critical discourse analysis. The ideas expressed by R. H. Jackson help to qualify the first iteration of the EU’s discourse on sovereignty and sanctions as sovereignty from (from the extraterritoriality of the USA) whereas the second one can be defined as sovereignty for (for putting pressure on Russia). The article also reveals that in each iteration Brussels reinterprets attributes (aspects) of sovereignty (S. Krasner). Domestic aspect of sovereignty is characterized by deeper cooperation within the Union as well as intensified implementation of already adopted decisions, although some priorities vary between the two iterations. Westphalian attribute of sovereignty has evolved from the limitation of US extraterritorial sanctions to the elimination of economic links with Russia, which, according to the EU, is meant to weaken Moscow and strengthen the European Union. Finally, the interdependence aspect of sovereignty has morphed into the refusal of globality, with the EU clinging to like-minded countries. The evolution from the first iteration to the second one demonstrates Brussels’ transfer from the understanding of economic contacts as a stabilizing factor, which leads to political, legal and normative convergences, to dominating concerns about weaponization of global interdependence. Moreover, sanctions and their support by EU partners help Brussels to structure the global space, on a par with EU-promoted liberal values and their backing. This transformation conditions the present logics of the EU’s foreign policy decision-making.

The EU restrictive measures, causing damage to the Russian economy, have suspended political interaction. Economic entities receive state aid and have already tailored to the new conditions. Russian citizens and fellow citizens, who stay in the EU countries and may not always reckon upon the urgent assistance of the Russian Federation owing to this reason, are the most vulnerable in this situation. The report “On Violations of the Rights of Russian Citizens and Fellow Citizens in Foreign Countries”, submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in the middle of 2022, indicates the “overwhelming discrimination of Russians”, which “was shocking by its absurdity” – that is where the rights of Russians are violated by the “collective West” on a large scale. The report provides information on the numerous recorded facts of the violations in most Member States of the European Union. Russian citizens, against whom criminal prosecution has been initiated, are especially in a precarious position. The article was designed to include information and analysis data, through which Russian citizens as well as fellow citizens could have obtained better protection of their rights in the EU countries. For this reason, the analysis of the relevant provisions of the EU law and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was conducted. Furthermore, the attainability of the right to interpretation and translation, the right to information on rights and information about the charges, the right to legal advice and legal aid, so as the right to communicate with relatives, employers and consular authorities in criminal proceedings was scrutinized. The European Court of Human Rights case-law was examined to denote major rules governing compensatory nature and quality of legal counsel and translation services. Certain recommendations, which Russian citizens may find helpful in terms of protection of their rights when facing criminal prosecution in the EU Member States, were laid down in conclusion of the present Article, which is especially relevant in terms of the unprecedented political pressure the West puts on Russia.

The article analyzes the behavior of middle powers in multilateral institutions, using the example of Italy’s participation in the United Nations as a case study. By employing the behavioral approach in middle powers studies, the authors emphasize the importance of multilateral institutions in their foreign policy. The article demonstrates that the behavior of middle powers can be characterized by positive attributes as well as inherent risks. It is argued that a common cognitive distortion among these states is the tendency to overestimate their influence in multilateral institutions. This discrepancy between policy goals and outcomes, coupled with a reliance on immutable principles, is dubbed “self-delusion”. The purpose of this article is to identify cognitive distortions derived from Italy’s reliance on multilateral institutions and to extrapolate the findings to the behavior of other middle powers. The central research question is: How does the prioritization of multilateral formats affect the behaviour of middle powers? Italy serves as a pertinent example for testing the hypothesis. The country elevates multilateralism to the level of a foreign policy doctrine, making it an ideal case for analyzing “self-delusion,” given the central role of multilateral institutions in Italian foreign policy. The analysis of Italy’s behavior at the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly reveals that its active engagement in the UN activities does not distinguish it significantly from other leading European states while the promotion of prioritized initiatives often did not yield practical results. The article questions the assertion that Italian policy at the UN effectively strengthens Italian heft in the international arena, as claimed by Italian officials. The findings of this paper contribute to a broader discussion about the behavior of middle powers on the international stage. Italy’s policy at the UN seems to be an illustrative case, reflecting not only the Italian approach, but also the general trends in the behavior of middle powers in multilateral institutions, including the overestimation of their influence in international organizations.

The early 2020s saw two simultaneous confrontations between Euro-Atlantic community and Russia, as well as between the USA, its partners and China. It required Western democracies to elaborate the scheme of distribution when it comes to using land forces (army). The latter suffered most from military downsizing in the 1990s – early 2010s, being partly in a state of dystrophy. The article, based on the theories of armed forces building and alliances, studies these processes. The paper focuses on NATO as an institute, on the USA, and on Germany as a key European contributor to multilateral NATO forces. The major documents such as the new strategic concept of the Alliance and New NATO Force Model were adopted at the Madrid summit (2022, June). The second document has provided the Organization with potential 800 thousand troops. The vast majority of them are to be committed by its European member states. It means their troops’ contribution to deterring Russia is of utmost importance, with the American role being politically significant, though practically limited. This has given the USA strategic freedom to exploit large part of its armed forces, first of all land ones, with a view to containing China. The consensus on the specified distribution of responsibility formed not in 2014, but in 2021. The paper investigates the tactics of the USA as a key beneficiary to encourage its partners to adopt the scheme of Vietnam war experience. The author compares practical readiness of major European member states to use armed forces to deter Russia. The paper studies in detail the changes of the US land force groupings in Europe, especially in Eastern Europe and Germany, as well as in the Far East. The article presents the features of structuring military cooperation between Western countries and their partners in the Pacific Ocean in the context of containing China. The author concludes by outlining general features of and prospects for the evolution of the scheme as regards military responsibility distribution.

Southeast Asia has a unique history of interaction with great powers. As a result, the countries of the region have developed a wide range of foreign policy instruments and generated different types of foreign policy behavior, including balancing and bandwagoning. All the while, the rising complexity of global and regional processes, multifaceted confrontation between the USA, Europe and Russia, as well as between the USA and China and the regional projections thereof demand a revision of balancing, inherent in ASEAN and its member states’ policies. This new international situation raises questions about new types of foreign policy strategy of small and middle range countries. The existing research defines them as hedging, which implies various policy actions undertaken to avoid or limit the risk of negative scenarios. Southeast Asian states started to develop their hedging strategies in response to the strategic uncertainty caused by China’s rapid rise. Hence, the focus was primarily on avoiding collateral damage emanating from US-China relations. Yet the meltdown of the European security architecture has redefined the US-China-Russia triangle and its influence on Southeast Asia. A newer version of this triangle differs from its Cold war predecessor and complicates hedging implementation as it provokes a greater divergence of regional and national reactions to the ongoing crisis. Methodologically, the article proves it by analyzing the phenomenon of hedging in the Southeast Asian context, by looking at the European security architecture crisis’ implications for the region and by comparing regional and national reactions to the rising confrontation in the USA-China-Russia triangle.

The article examines 13 doctrinal documents of Germany from 1990 to 2023: coalition agreements, Bundeswehr White Papers and National Security Strategy. The authors presented an analysis model reflecting German elites’ both retrospective and perspective vision of Russia, the USA, France and China. The database for the application of the model consists of the references in these documents to 176 countries, organizations and regions. Three criteria were applied: priority, frequency and quality of objects’ mentions. Taken together, their analysis made it possible to create the hierarchy of clusters into which states can be classified. Specific marker words indicate the perception of Moscow and Beijing as partners and rivals at the same time. When it comes to Washington and Paris, they are deemed reliable allies. Certain categories show the states’ inclusion in the Western “family of values” or their non-belonging to it, as well as their significant weight on the global arena, which Germany must take into account. The data is presented in tables divided into clusters. The complexity and versatility of foreign partners’ doctrinal position has become obvious: in some cases they combine four dimensions. Each object was considered not only as an “actor-goal”, but also as an “actor-means”. In the context of blurred boundaries between positive and negative definitions of interstate relations, the authors propose a research programme for studying German doctrinal documents. This approach forms a country hierarchy of German foreign policy. The final part encompasses the design of potential studies conducted on the basis of this methodological scheme.

Western officials and media accuse Russia, conducting its special military operation in Ukraine, of worsening the situation on the global food and energy markets. In addition to existing financial, diplomatic, political and other restrictions, the West is waging an anti-Russian information campaign, blaming Moscow for the global food and energy crises. In practice, the food and energy crises have long existed in certain states and regions, as well as at the global level, going through transformation, aggravation and mitigation phases, depending on a combination of causes. The authors do not deny a certain impact of the geopolitical events on the stability of the energy and food systems. Yet its real effect is much lower. The profitability of speculations on global and local food and energy markets, the effectiveness of the G7 measures to control prices and pricing, the firm intention to further the sanctioning pressure on the Russian fuel and energy complex, the pilot launch of mechanisms to collect rents from the global fuel and energy complex in favor of the West, the consolidation of the goals of decarbonizing the world economy in binding regulations at the national, regional and global levels indicate that the West’s anti-Russian reactionary measures are of a consistent nature and in the future may be deployed against other actors to achieve their political and economic goals. In a practical sense, this necessitates a consolidation of efforts and a change in the strategy of Russia and its friendly states toward Western countries to reduce dependence on their information agenda and political actions aimed at instigating crises in various spheres.