The conceptual map of Europe, developed by Stein Rokkan in the 1970s, was a recognized achievement in political science and social sciences of that time. At the same time, its potential and effectiveness remain in demand both in research and in applied political science. The starting point for a conceptual mapping is, of course, the map in the version and configuration which was fixed by Stein Rokkan himself, and which included the concepts of political, social and spatial demarcation; territoriality used as a synonym for geographical or social affiliation, as well as the concept of centre-peripheral polarity. The article considers the limitations laid down by Rokkan for the cognitive use of the map, as well as its contextual limitations at the end of the 1970s – an era of pivotal changes in European and world politics. However, the limitations often turn into a theoretical framework and expand the cognitive horizons and depths of the conceptual mapping, which Rokkan started but left unfinished. Then, the article studies the changes in the map from the 1970s to the present moment taking into consideration the expansion of its spatial coverage. The article continues with the expansion of temporal and spatial horizons into the depths of the past. Finally, the article discusses the possibility of contour projections into the present and future, basing on an extended range of mapping. It pays particular attention to the Intermarium between Baltic and Black seas, which could fasten together the two parts of the double supercivilization, which incorporates Western Europe and Northern Eurasia. The authors conclude that in the current circumstances the role of conceptual mapping is not limited to enable understanding, but also to assist forecasting and active shaping of spatial structures.

The existence of a mechanism for resolving international trade disputes (IFAs) within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the most significant advantages of this organization and is important not only from an economic, but also from a political point of view. Over the 25 years of the existence of the WTO and, accordingly, of the universal dispute resolution mechanism (IFA), it has been possible to achieve greater transparency in the application of the rules, create a precedent base and enable countries to defend their positions on the application of trade policy measures based on a universally recognized mechanism. Proponents of the functioning of this mechanism argue that it helped prevent trade wars while protecting the rights of smaller states in the WTO. In turn, the critical arguments are that only the most powerful states capable of effectively defending their arguments can really take advantage of this mechanism. The allegations of critics have been confirmed recently when D. Trump’s policy of “restoring” American greatness and domination (Make America Great Again) turned this “working” tool into a political tool, which drove the system into a deep crisis and, moreover, questioned the effectiveness of the WTO at large. In the process of forming the WTO, IFAs and representatives of its member countries strove to maximize the transparency, fairness and independence of decisions based solely on the agreed upon principles and procedures. At the same time, in 2019, the DSM was in a crisis situation due to a violation of the procedural principles by some of its participants, due to which, in particular, the work of one of the most important elements, the Appeals Body, was practically paralyzed.

The purpose of this article is to identify the main causes of the current crisis of the IFA and to substantiate the need for its reform within the framework of the WTO reform, taking into account the positions of individual members of the Organization. After analyzing the main causes of the crisis, as well as the proposals of individual researchers and the arguments of countries, the authors draw conclusions about possible solutions to the problems that have arisen, reflecting on the political nature of the problem and the need to maintain this mechanism as one of the foundations of the modern multilateral trading system.

In the process of the 21st century world order formation US actions and American conception of the liberal unipolar order with the US (the West) as the center of this order exert visible influence on the process and policies of other countries and cannot be ignored. It is also necessary to take into account the domestic political situation in Washington. Political crisis does not permit the United States to look critically at its policy and its effect on the general international situation and relations with other great powers. The author uses structural Realist approach to analyze results of the American policy aimed at constructing contemporary world order, with special attention to its contradictions. The hypothesis of the research is: megatrend of world order formation continues, it is preliminary to characterize it as chaotic, however, the American factor is no longer an absolute and decisive one. There emerged serious contradictions between the American vision of the new world order, methods of its construction, and views of leading world powers. On the basis of comparative approach, a number of works of American scholars are analyzed. Special attention is paid to criticism of the American global strategy and its ideology, that caused serious problems for international development and America who tries to perform the role of global leader. The author also refers to the earlier publications of Russian scholars Ed. Batalov, Y. Davidov and A. Bogaturov who already 20 years ago wrote about world order and possible tracks and perspectives of its formation. They also quite correctly drew attention to the deficiencies of the US global strategy that could cause crisis in the international development. Their vision and conclusions presented at the beginning of 2000s turned out to be to a great extent quite correct for the international situation by the late 2010s, when American scholars J. Mearsheimer, S. Walt, P. Pillar, T. Hendrickson suggestred similar conclusions about contemporary international situation.

The article analyses the discussion in the United States regarding the problem of extending the New START Treaty in 2021. In the context of the activities of D. Trump administration, which has embarked upon the path of revising the U.S. foreign policy strategy and, accordingly, on the abrogation of nonproliferation and arms control treaties, the authors examine attitudes of the most influential interest groups within the American foreign policy establishment (progressives, neoliberals, conservative democrats, realists and conservatives) towards the New START agreement. Among these five groups, only the conservatives are aggressively opposed to the extension of the treaty. They consider it extremely harmful to the U.S. interests due to Russia's inability to conform to international treaties and to numerous built-in defects that were developed by the Obama administration as part of the “reset” process. All of the three groups of democrats agree that the New START should be preserved, since it serves the US interests. After February 2020 it will allow for a dialogue with the Russian Federation regarding strategic arms control, including comprehensive and multilateral aspects. Democrats accuse the Republicans – from Bush Jr. to Trump – of strategic destabilization and consider the 2010 "the New START in exchange for nuclear triad modernization" deal still valid. The article also shows that the realists of the Republican party are leaning towards a compromise. They endorse the prolongation of the New START after February 2021 on the condition of annual assessments of Russia’s activity regarding a “comprehensive and multilateral” treaty modernization. Nevertheless, if the agreement has to be suspended as a result of unconstructive behavior of the Russian Federation, no arms race is expected since the both sides will be forced to voluntarily provide a safe “self-control regime”. The authors conclude that the compromise option will be chosen as, first, it is supported by the House of Representatives, and second, it can be helpful for President Trump in the upcoming elections. Otherwise his Democratic opponents will get the opportunity to accuse him of the collapse of the global strategic security system.

Russia has become one of the largest host country for migrant workers in today’s world. Labor migrants from Central Asian countries, Ukraine, and Moldova account for the main influx of labor from outside to the Russian labor market, providing principal labor resources for some regions and sectors of the economy. The article considers a complex hierarchical (three-level) system of access for labor migrants to the Russian labor market, which is complicated by many bureaucratic procedures. However, in fact, the state controls only ten percent of the foreign workforce. In addition, there is no unified system of statistical registration of labor migrants. The labor migration management system in Russia does not fit into the conceptual demographic and migration documents and rather registers the flows of labor migrants than actually manages them. This article gives an overview of the key problems that labor migrants face in the Russian labor market in terms of work, registration, living conditions, and organization. The article offers a number of recommendations for adjusting the migration policy in the field of labor migration regulation, the key of which are the development of interstate agreements, improving national instruments for regulating labor migration, stimulating the adaptation and integration of migrants, and enhancing relevant statistical tools.

The article seeks to explain why there is no formal military­political alliance between the two. The conclusion of one would be logical taking into consideration expanded cooperation including military dimension which puts both countries on the verge of an alliance as well as exacerbating tensions and strategic rivalry with the U.S. By employing International Relations theory, the author highlights the balance between benefits and costs which is not conducive to the creation of a formal bloc, a number of unit­level factors inhibiting it, coexisting convergent and divergent interests, asymmetry of both capabilities and dependency in bilateral relations. As a result of analyzing the key characteristics of strategic partnership, the article demonstrates that Russia­-China relations conform to the notion of alignment structured around the system­level goal of promoting multipolar or polycentric world order and a set of common principles. A new stage in Russia­China relations since 2014 is characterized by closer political, security and economic cooperation. Against the background of strategic competition with the U.S., Russia and China have intensified military cooperation encompassing strategic sphere as well. Whereas global interests of the two states are much alike, the regional ones frequently overlap or diverge. As a result, both states take no interest in entrapment in each other’s conflicts as despite the downgrade of relations with the West it remains an important partner for both Russia and China. It is instructive that Moscow and Beijing balance Washington mostly individually, and they are deemed quite capable by their leadership to conduct military action under most likely scenarios falling short of full­scale war. Adding to potential alliance costs is the reduction of foreign policy autonomy. Growing asymmetry of complex power and economic relations coupled with PLA’s modernization and gradual reduction of China’s dependency on Russia in military technologies and components predetermine the increasing likelihood that Russia­-China alliance would become more asymmetric in future, notwithstanding the fact that it would be fairly symmetric at first. It would it turn exacerbate the risks of Russia transforming into a subordinate player in the long­term perspective. Strategic partnership at present makes it possible for Russia and China to pursue their goals while not bearing the costs of an alliance. However, deepening strategic confrontation between the U.S. and China together with the persistent conflict in Russia-­US relations may draw Russia and China closer together.

International interest in arctic shipping routes has increased significantly over the past few decades. The Northern sea route (NSR) has the largest potential for development in the nearest future due to its better navigational characteristics. It is located in the territorial waters of the Russian Federation and opens up prospects for year-round navigation between the major ports of East Asia and Northern Europe at a shorter distance in comparison with traditional routes. Development of the NSR takes place concurrently with the implementation of large-scale projects in the oil and gas industry along the route, which provide annual growth of traffic and volumes through it. The results of many studies, however, indicate a reassessment of the potential of the NSR, due to the continuing need for icebreaking escort for most of the navigation period. Also, a number of circumstances, such as sanctions imposed on Russia and disputes on NSR navigational procedures, have a significant impact on the development of the NSR. The United States of America (U.S.) are trying to internationalize the transport corridor, as opposed to the Russian Federation plans to strengthen the national maritime sovereignty on the NSR, since the importance of the NSR for Russian Federation is not only in extraction and transportation of hydrocarbons, but also to ensuring national security in this region. In this paper, the authors provide an overview of current research on the status and prospects of the maritime freight transportation via the NSR, point out existing problems and considered solutions. The dispute between the U.S. and Russia on the NSR as important aspect of the state policy in the Arctic is considered.

The prolonged Afghan conflict affects the whole region. It has led to growing extremism and terrorism, drug and arms trafficking, Afghanistan-Pakistan border disputes. Forceful response did not bring the desired result. Coalition troops moved under NATO command failed to restore peace in the country. Against this backdrop, increasing attention is paid to the regional approach to the Afghan conflict settlement. Enhanced cooperation and economic integration could help in peace-building process. The Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process (HoA-IP) was launched in 2011 to encourage the Afghan's neighboring countries to ensure security in the region. This mechanism was designed to play a significant role in strengthening interaction between the participating countries, coordinating joint efforts of Kabul and international community towards the regional stability in the "Heart of Asia". The purpose of this article is to assess the international political significance of the HoA-IP in the context of existing theoretical approaches to conflict resolution.

The author uses the Ripe Moments Theory proposed by William Zartman to examine the Afghan conflict, as well as the work of the HoA-IP. Interactions between the regional players, main achievements and weaknesses of the mechanism are discussed. It was stated that cooperation established within the framework of the Istanbul Process enabled the establishment of a platform for coordinating efforts of Afghanistan and its neighbors on security and socio-economic cooperation. The mechanism also contributed to the implementation of a number of significant infrastructure projects. The author concludes that the HoA-IP can be effective if all the engaged countries are ready for an open dialogue and for making a change in the recent status-quo.

The sphere of security provision is expanding and constantly bringing in new elements, including cybersecurity, information security, computer network security, etc.). The arsenal of security tools is also growing due to the ongoing proliferation of digital technologies (e.g. different technologies and telecommunication channels for collecting, forming, processing, transmitting or receiving information related to security of the state). The article provides an analysis of current methods and technologies for crime forecasting in the national security domain. Achievements in the Data Science and Big Data generated the scientific basis for the development of Intellectual Data Analysis (Intellectual Analysis, Predictive Analysis), based on which mathematical and statistical forecasting of socially dangerous, criminal acts was designed (e.g. anti-terrorism algorithms, algorithms for predicting the activities of organized crime/gangs). The article aims to identify major trends and potential benefits of digital technologies proliferation as well as the challenges that states face while using mathematical and statistical methods for predicting crime. The meta-analysis of scientific researches and implementation of crime forecasting algorithms in different countries (such as USA, China, Japan, Singapore, India) helps to demonstrate a pluralism of approaches in the application of forecasting systems. The first part of the article presents the methodological and technical aspects of criminal data mining. The second part provides an overview of national practices in using crime prediction algorithms by the examples of Singapore, Japan, and India. The third and fourth parts are devoted to a more detailed analysis of the strategies and tactics of using algorithms in the USA and China, respectively. The analysis reveals the risks and benefits inherent in the most frequently applied mathematical and statistical crime forecasting algorithms. First, it is the “militarization” of the civilian sphere. Second, the algorithms, which do not take into account the social, cultural and political features of a given society, lead to the loss of statistical significance of forecasting. Third, historical data (recorded crimes) often contain racial, sexual, and contextual biases. Fourth, existing approaches do not pay heed to personal characteristics of a subject, as well as decision-making processes not infrequently resulting in wrongful conduct. Finally, there is no state control over the balance between the use of algorithms and respect for human rights.

A book review: Сидоров А.А. Конъюнктура еврозоны: Формирование и динамика. М.: ИНИОН РАН, 2019. 194 с.

A book review: Deriglazova Larisa. Great Powers, Small Wars: Asymmetric Conflict since 1945. Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Press Center, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014. 384 p.