The article analyses dynamics and structure of Russian foreign trade with Africa in 2013-2017. It is revealed that the rapid growth of foreign trade with Russia was provided mainly by several North African countries. The study of three dozen African countries shows that the growth of trade turnover is accompanied by large fluctuations year by year in Russian exports – due to the unstable supply of militarytechnical products, as well as grain, fertilizers, ferrous metals, etc. (and almost every country had its own specifics). In 2017 Russia's exports to Africa were 5.6 times more than its imports from Africa. There are 6 countries in the top 20 suppliers from Africa to Russia that were not included in the top 20 buyers of Russian goods. For instance, Gabon's exports to Russia exceeded the counter flow of goods by almost 46 times, Zambia’s exports – by 33 times, Zimbabwe’s exports – by 20 times, etc. This means that Russian producers have not yet mastered the markets of many countries that are able to make a solvent demand for imported goods. This is partly due to the low competitiveness of Russian products or the lack of production of goods necessary for Africans in Russia, but also the inability to push suppliers from China, the United States, former European metropolises, and sometimes from neighboring African countries. The novelty of our research approach consists in the analysis of changes in Russia's trade relations with Africa in terms of direct and indirect effects of the “sanctions war” with Western countries and competitive pressure from China. In general, the inertia of Russian business is observed, which is only now beginning to consider the intensification of relations with Africa as an option to adapt to the “sanctions war” with the West. At the same time, the increase in the price competition of Russian industrial goods due to the devaluation of the ruble and the intensification of imports of African fruits and vegetables had a slight impact on the growth of Russian-African trade in comparison to the intensification of military-technical cooperation, the supply of Russian grain and even produced cars in Russia (including foreign brands).

Political upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa caused by the Arab Awakening provided a new impetus to studying ‘fragile states’ problematique which came to the forefront in political and expert discourse in the last decade. Examining international engagement in fragile states and situations through the lens of risk-management seems to be especially relevant. This paper unveils key dilemmas faced by external actors in aiding fragile states and choosing the following parameters of engagement: aid volumes, duration of engagement, aid channels, financial instruments, procurement modalities, implementing partner in recipient country, conditionality and priority sectors. Each of correspondent eight sections starts with positing hypotheses about donors’ choices and proceeds with their verification based on empirical data. The paper concludes with observations on potential and limitations of a selected analytical lens and on ways how to improve its utility. First, no option seems to allow external actors to simultaneously mitigate contextual, programmatic and reputational risks and maximize political and economic dividends, and donors tend to prioritize egoistic interests over mitigation of any other risk factors. Second, multiple counterexamples to each hypothesis derive from heterogeneity of both ‘fragile states’, which vary dramatically in terms of determinants, manifestations and consequences of their fragility, and community of donors, which often assess risks of engaging with the same partner countries differently given their specific long-term national interests, aid management systems, imperatives of reacting to shifts in domestic political and economic environment or other factors. Third, to better navigate a logical labyrinth and reconstruct an objective picture of interactions of these two groups one should meet at least three conditions: 1) taking into account the emergence of non-Western donors and its impact on the established donors’ strategic considerations; 2) collecting detailed data on emerging donors’ engagement with fragile states as well as on volumes and composition of military and non-ODA security assistance provided to fragile states; 3) studying the partner countries’ perceptions of risks related to receiving external assistance.

The article attempts to determine the specifics of alliance formation of continental and maritime powers, due to the peculiarities of their geographical location. First, we consider existing literature to explain influence of spatial characteristics on large states’ participation in alliances. Further, we propose original typology of continental and maritime powers strategic motivations and their approaches to choosing allies. The presentation of the concept is accompanied by historical examples from the practice of the international system from the 16th century to the beginning of the 21st century, which justify the correctness of its deductive logic. In conclusion, we apply developed research framework to the analysis of Russian international obligations. It shows that the continental geographical position is significant, but not the only parameter that explains the logic of the Russian strategy and its alliance politics. The geographical position of maritime powers often leads them to various forms of international isolation. At the same time, as dependence on foreign markets, sources of capital and resources increases, as well as risks of accumulating significant resources in the hands of potential adversaries rises, the maritime powers begin to resort to international alliances as tools for projecting power to remote regions. For their part, the continental powers prefer alliances with their immediate neighbors as a mean of reducing the number of defensive lines and creating strategic buffers. For them, attempts to build relationships with remote partners are associated with significant risks, as they, as a rule, do not have sufficient competence in the sphere of control over sea communications. At the same time, creation of military-political coalitions of continental countries with remotely located sea powers aimed against dominant sea powers is strategically expedient, since it allows to shift the center of confrontation further from the boundaries of the continental power. Technological development in armaments and military equipment allows continental powers to project force for considerable distances with less resources.

Global challenges in the energy sector are associated with innovations and underpin the development of economic feasible and environmentally friendly large-scale energy systems. Geopolitical trends and local socio-economic dynamics depend upon emerging trans-continental energy routes. The involvement in these kind of integration processes could potentially make a solid contribution to the national well-being and is therefore supported by national authorities. One way of achieving this target is to undertake institutional transformations. The development of regional energy infrastructure and the enhancement of cross-border trade mechanisms play a positive role in these changes. The strategic objectives of Russia include strengthening of the regional reintegration. Russia plays the central role in the Eurasia due to unique geographical position, exceptional experience in management of large-scale energy systems, diversified infrastructure, high resource and scientific potential. The development of cross-border electricity interconnections in synchronous zones is a key to mobilization of regional economic resources. Gradual integration of electricity markets is the core problem of this article. It is widely considered that the transformation passes through four stages. The proposed model is based on preconditions and current national market structures. The development of basic cross-border trade mechanisms is the initial part of phase I that dwells upon the approximation of tax and pricing policies and measures in respect of norms and standards. The next steps (phase II) should encompass the enhancement of multilateral cooperation by the implementation of unified segments: cross-border bilateral trade and spot markets. It is also inevitable to establish the framework guidelines and network codes. The fundamental tasks of Phase III are mentioned under: unbundling energy suppliers from network operators, strengthening the independence of regulators, unification of construction procedures, provision of non-discriminative access to infrastructure, safeguarding the right to chose a supplier and liberalization of cross-border activities. On the final stage (phase IV) it is proposed to create a common derivative market and optimize fuel and energy balance.

The paper presents analysis of Michael Mann’s theory of globalizations, arguing that globalization is not a singular but plural process, involved global extensions of overlapping but not coinciding networks of ideological, economic, political and military power. It's also complemented with Mann's critical analysis of «hyperglobalizers'» theories. Globalization was a delayed consequence of early modern empires' overseas expansion. Under the influence of its internal incoherence and infrastructural difficulties in good conditions global empires was tended to drift toward lighter forms of imperialism. Comparative and historical analysis of Britain, American and Japan empires shows it. Militarization of Japan empire was a result of concatenation of internal problems with three «half-global crises» – two world wars and Great Depression which discussed as phases of globalization rather than its ruptures. Thus the article shows that recent globalization in not historically unprecedented process. Globalizations of capitalism, of nation-state and the sole remaining global empire, American empire play critical role in shaping of contemporary world. The drift of American empire toward lighter forms of imperialism under the influence if its incoherence, was reversed at the eve of 21th century faced with global crises – neoliberal recession of 2008 and climate change combined with liberal-conservative ideological alliance within US. It appears that militarization and unproductive economic intensification of American imperialism/hegemony would lead to its prolonged decay. According to the british-american sociologist the situation may finished either with positive globalization intensifying transnational interdependency, or with «negative globalization», fracturing the world, reminding globalization of the of early 20th century.

Digital economy – with Internet economy as an important part of it – is among key PRC responses to new developmental challenges. Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent (BAT) as unchallenged leaders of the Internet markets, play here an important role. Due to increased competition, global expansion, and declining efficiency of imitational innovations, BAT are turning into technology companies, investing huge resources in startups (BAT are biggest investors on PRC venture capital markets) and research and development in the most promising areas. As a result, BAT are now key actors and drivers of the Internet and digital economy in the PRC. Moreover, through the spillover effects and implications for inclusive growth, BAT stimulates changes in other industries and regional markets. Government policy played an important role in these processes, although, it was not always effective. At first, regulators preferred stateowned enterprises, but their failures led government to refocus its efforts, choosing BAT as agents for the development of new markets. However, the period of a very moderate government interventions in BAT`s efforts gave BAT needed freedom to develop optimal market solutions and ensure growth. Since 2010s, state policy supported market monopolization by BAT, their international expansion and innovation efforts. For the future, BAT will still play a major role in the development of the Chinese Internet economy. However, challenges are also growing. Innovation development of the PRC Internet markets are imbalanced due to the policy-driven dominance of BAT, with possibly negative consequences of monopolization. High risks are also associated with archaic industrial policy instruments used for supporting BAT. There is also a clear need to optimize BAT`s enormous ecosystems and rationalize hyperactive technological efforts. Changes in BAT strategies are needed – as well as the evolution of governmental approaches towards the agents for development (rising support of competition, new actors, horizontal links in the ecosystems, emphasis on qualitative changes, etc.). Serious weakening of BAT is extremely unlikely, but even small fluctuations will be of great importance for their positions on global markets, development of China’s Internet industries. In many respects, they will define Chinese innovation system and the digital transformation of the PRC economy.

The article examines the impact of globalization on the development of corporate governance. The basic concepts of globalization and the factors influencing the development of the modern world economy are analyzed. The process of liberalization of the business environment, development of technological progress and the development of global financial markets have a decisive influence on the activities of transnational corporations, turning them into global companies. These companies operate worldwide and the scope of their operations exceeds the size of the national income of many countries. Global business structure and international nature of the operations determine the need to develop harmonized standards for the implementation of the activities of large companies. Special attention in the paper is paid to the problems of corporate governance, which mostly determines the important corporate decisions and therefore the effectiveness of business development. The article presents the analysis of the main stages in the development of international regulation in this area and trends of improvement in this area. The study examines the basic models of corporate governance, explains the process of convergence under the influence of contemporary processes of globalization, highlights the main factors of harmonization of corporate governance systems. Special attention is paid to the Russian corporate sector and areas of improvement of corporate governance in Russian companies taking into account the contemporary processes of convergence of the models. There is an active process of harmonization of corporate governance systems worldwide. Large corporations in order to be competitive and efficient are to improve the system and practices of corporate governance taking into account current trends. There is a constant search for new forms of governance, management and leadership in big business, and the Russian public companies have to take into account the best practices of leading corporations and harmonised standards of international organizations in the field of corporate governance in order to maintain and improve competitiveness on the national and international markets.

This article offers an analysis of why Russia does not implement the environmental policies adopted by the government. Transnational Advocacy Networks have an impact on the adoption of environmental laws as they act through various mechanisms and among others on an inter-governmental level without necessarily having an impact on the society itself. This explains why norms get adopted but may not get implemented. Based on the existing literature on TANs the authors analyze the fact that TANs operate not only as Advocacy Networks for the adoption of norms but also as what the authors of this article coin as Expertise and Experience Networks which aid norm implementation. Countries can be affected by TANs but not by TEENs, which explains the paradoxical situation in Russia regarding norm implementation. The difference between the two only becomes apparent in cases when they do not operate simultaneously. The four presented models of the emergence and diffusion of norms show that in the process of adoption of new legislative acts in the country, the initiative can come from political actors of different levels with varying degrees of international pressure. In turn, in the case of states concerned with the problem of protecting their sovereignty, international pressure, as a rule, is carried out not directly, but as a result of routine intergovernmental interaction. At the same time, the effectiveness and degree of such an impact is the higher, the more transnational expertise and experience network are active in this matter, the purpose of which is to adapt the international norm to local country conditions and to facilitate its implementation. Each of the described models for the emergence of norms implies its own peculiarities in relation to the implementation of the relevant norms.

The article touches the subject of the development of bilateral cooperation between France and UK in the nuclear field. The author examines the dynamics of this development throughout the entire period from the moment of nuclear weapons creation by UK (1952) and France (1960) until today. The nuclear cooperation of Paris and London still remains one of the key agenda for bilateral negotiations. This interaction took place in the context of NATO’s nuclear policy and the formation of EU’s defence policy. The United States significantly influenced the development of this bilateral partnership. In the mid-2010s, French-British nuclear cooperation became a new factor of international relations in EU. Still, it was only after the signing of Lancaster House Treaties in 2010 that experts noticed that the integral “French-British tandem” was created. However, contrary to the forecasts of the 1980s, the tandem did not become a basis for EU’s common nuclear policy as it opposed to the project aimed at creation of common European armed forces. It was at the time when EU failed to implement the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and, as a result, the French-British cooperation managed to fill the EU’s security policy vacuum. International political events of the early 2010s showed opposition to that project within the framework of the traditional French-German partnership in EU. This led to a partial decline of Germany’s role in the framework of EU’s military policy. The author concludes that in the longterm, the formation of the French-British tandem weaken rather than strengthen EU. Over the past half century, EU was a FrenchGerman project: it was based on the unification of German economic potential and French military political one. The transition of the leading role to the French-British tandem automatically makes EU more “Atlantic” meaning it is tied to NATO and the American military presence in Europe. The ongoing process of withdrawal of UK from EU reinforces this trend, since France remains a military ally of the country leaving EU.

Mankind has entered the critical zone of breaking the world order. The more and more disruptive in this process is the infogenic narrative. The United States, as one of the leaders of information and communication technologies (ICT), has been adaptively developing and using its cyberpotential in geopolitical competition for over 30 years to implement the doctrine of global information dominance. The US cyber strategies are largely predetermining global trends in the use of ICT. The absence of legally binding international norms and rules of behavior of states in the information space allowed the United States in the latest cyber strategies under false threats to conduct against Russia, the PRC, Iran and the DPRK not only defensive, but also offensive operations both in war and in peacetime in the context of conducting hybrid wars The US intimidates the Western public with “Russian hackers,” attributing to them “hacking” of computer networks almost all over the world. This policy provokes other countries to adopt their cyber doctrine, stimulating the information arms race. Attempts by Russia and its partners in the SCO, BRICS and other formats of cooperation to ensure international information security (IIS) at the UN, OSCE, APEC sites, etc. meet more and more aggressive opposition from the United States and its satellites. This, in particular, was reflected in the failure of the adoption of the final document by the UN Group of Governmental Experts on the IIS in 2017. Against the background of these events, the development under the UN auspices of the global rules of responsible behavior of states in the information space is becoming even more relevant. Russia submitted a draft resolution to the First Committee of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly, as well as the development of a Convention on Cybercrime in the Third Committee.

Interview with Dr Evgeny Nikitenko.

The new challenges that Russian diplomats face every day, and the inability to resolve the crisis by traditional means, lead to the need for an urgent search for new methods that would resolve the existing controversial issues between Russia and the Western countries. That is why nowadays the possibilities of science diplomacy and its prospects have become widely discussed in the scientific community. The definition of science diplomacy was developed during the conference “New Horizons of Science Diplomacy” which took place in June 2009 and was organized by the Royal Society of London in cooperation with the American Association for the Advancement of Science. This definition was the most common among Western researchers and officials. Scientists from Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and North and South America discussed the new role and prospects of science diplomacy in the modern world. According to the concept proposed by the two largest scientific organizations of Great Britain and the United States which was published in the report on the results of the conference, science diplomacy includes three dimensions: “science in diplomacy”; “diplomacy for science”; “science for diplomacy”. It is to this definition that both foreign and domestic experts refer and operate. Despite the fact that the term “science diplomacy” appears in the Russian Strategy for Scientific and Technological Development 2016 and is often used in the media in the publications devoted to the prospects of science diplomacy, Russian scientists and diplomats have still no clear views and consensus on what exactly includes or should include this concept, what are the goals and means of science diplomacy, what distinguishes science diplomacy from international scientific and technical cooperation and foreign policy, and how to implement science diplomacy techniques in practice. The article presents the results of a series of semi-structured interviews with Russian experts involved at the administrative level in organizing international cooperation in the field of science, and therefore involved in the process of designing science diplomacy. Respondents, including experts from the scientific foundations of the RSF and RFBR, responsible for international cooperation, employees of diplomatic educational institutions of MGIMO and the Diplomatic Academy, as well as the specialists in international relations who are directly involved in the realization of diplomatic goals of Russia, gave their definition of “science diplomacy” and also analyzed the tasks, methods and expediency of identifying three dimensions of science diplomacy by Western researchers. Interviews were built around the definition of science diplomacy tools, evaluating the effectiveness of their use and differences from scientific policy techniques, and therefore the most interesting for this study were questions relating to specific examples and practices that characterize each dimension of science diplomacy. Based on the analysis of interview results and respondents' answers, the author comes to the conclusion that the third dimension of science diplomacy – “science for diplomacy” – has the greatest practical value for Russian experts in the context of the influence and interaction of scientists and diplomats within the framework of international cooperation.

A book review: Толстых В.Л. Курс международного права: учебник.  М.: Проспект, 2018. 736 с.

A book review: Фененко А.В. История международных отношений:  1648–1945: Учеб. Пособие / А.В. Фененко. М.: Аспект Пресс, 2018. 784 с.