Highly explosive potential of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, moved aside from top priorities of the regional agenda by new challenges, may add substantially to escalation of the wave of violence which sweeps over the Middle East. Any break-through in the Palestinian-Israeli settlement since ages has been unthinkable without the global political hardliners and regional actors. However the basic precondition for achieving any agreements remains the same: readiness to mutual compromises of the parties to the conflict, which through their actions may both provide premises for dialogue or block any possibility for progress in the visible future. Hence, in order to properly evaluate the current status of peace process and clearly see its perspectives it is important not to forget the lessons learnt in the course of the implementation of the latest peace plan – the Road Map. This is the only plan for peaceful settlement which, let along Israeli reservations, was accepted by the two sides of the conflict and proclaimed establishment of an independent Palestinian State as one of the goals of the final status agreement. The author evaluates “the political stock” which sides of the conflict possessed before adoption of the Road Map and examines achievements of the implementation of the very plan. The author examines the actions of the parties to the conflict on implementation of the Road Map and internal political processes that influenced them. The study reveals the relevance of some results of the period the Road Map implementation to forming the up-to-date positions of the parties involved, such as the collapse of a phase-based approach to the settlement; different vision of the future Palestinian state, which has become an integral part of the agenda; unilateralism which is becoming the dominating line of conduct of the parties to the conflict. The author notes self-reproduction of the policy of unilateralism at a new level.

The end of the Cold War greatly contributed to the spread of thesis that the military power as a means of achieving states' goals within the rules and institutions based global liberal order had become completely obsolete. Indeed, the number of direct military engagements among nations (interstate wars) has been on its historically lowest level for the post-Cold War period, though militarized conflicts within stated in the problem-ridden areas have not lost their severity. However, this same period has seen over 45% worldwide military expenditures rise, and quite a few  states  have  acquired  more  sophisticated  military  hardware. These facts support the assertion that today military power is still being taken into account, it is used as a means of achieving goals and influences the behavior of states even without being applied to adversary, or if conflict has not escalated enough to call it a full-scale war. Two hypotheses are proposed and tested in the article. They may help to explain why states continue to invest scarce resources into maintaining their military potentials and procurements of weapon systems, which may never be used in combat. Firstly, we hypothesize that the available military potentials of states allow to determine to what extent and which states rely or do not rely on this component of the national potential of influence in the world (i.e. for whom the military power has not become obsolete). Secondly, countries for which military power has not become obsolete demonstrate generally similar configurations of components of military power (i.e. evolution of the militaries of these states may show strong similarities). To test the proposed hypotheses, quantitative methods have been used to analyze data on 98 countries of the world at two points in time (2005 and 2015/2016). The cluster analysis in general confirms our hypotheses.  The  comparison  of clusters as of 2005 and 2015/2016 indicates that the states under similar external conditions (for example, constant external pressure, rivalry with neighbors, etc.) build up (or lose)  similar  components  of  the military power.

The article proposes a new, geohistorical research paradigm to the evolution of international relations which focuses on the methods of territorial control: the emergence and improvement of its ways and means, or in other words, in the context of capture division and development of land. In the framework of geohistory the development of human civilization is presented as the story of a particular spatial orders, nomoses, which change through geopolitical revolutions. The geohistorical approach is based on the recognition of the primacy of space for the destiny of the state as a territorial political society that is different from the blood communities that preceded it, and therefore for the academic study of international relations as primarily interstate relations. This is the basis for a specific ‘geomethodology’, the underlying thesis of which is that space predetermines the main manifestations of human activity, and the changes and development of the nature of this activity are due to the improvement of ways of mastering and controlling space. In the development of the provisions of such classical authors as Halford Mackinder and Karl Schmitt, the article shows that within the framework of geo­history, different dominant methods of controlling space replace each other. The most important points of bifurcation of the world civilizational process are the geopolitical revolutions caused by the contradictions between the ways of seizing and dividing the land and manifested in the transition from one spatial political order to another. The basic geohistorical stages of the regularity of the history of international relations are described, on the basis of which it is concluded that at present the world is on the verge of fundamental transformations of the world order that are connected with the discovery and development of the Cosmos and, most likely, will be comparable with the revolutionary transformations of the 16th­17th centuries, caused by the reclamation of the World Ocean.

Following the 2008 global financial crises and more intensely after the fifth generation of Chinese leaders came to power in 2013, Beijing has set a course to enhance its great power responsibility, to increase its leadership  potential  on  the  world  arena,  and  to  create  China-centered  world  order.  Renouncing  its aspiration to dominate the international system and to impose rules, norms and values on other countries, China nevertheless proposes new initiatives, concepts, and ideas, creates global public goods (such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, “Belt and Road” Initiative, the BRICS’ New Development Bank, the Community of Common Destiny), that promote the establishment of such an international system, where China will play guiding and regulatory role. Lacking the leadership experience in the past, the People’s Republic of China is very cautiously enhancing its great power responsibility by learning and adopting other great powers’ experience in global governance and by taking as much international responsibility as it corresponds China’s current capabilities. The article traces evolution of China’s views on its international responsibility and identifies the specific historical periods. It shows the huge differences between China and Western countries in their perceptions of great power responsibility. The article demonstrates the increasing pressure that Western countries exert on China in this direction and explains the motivation for that. By analyzing Chinese official documents and high level officials’ rhetoric, as well as China’s activities on the world arena, the author determines changes in Beijing’s approaches towards international responsibility and China’s role in  the  international  system.  Identifying  current trends and making prognosis, the author argues that Beijing will further enhance its great power responsibility in the following directions: promoting changes in  the  existing  financial  and  economic system so to make it more fair, balanced, inclusive and rational, enhancing China’s role in global governance, strengthening the role of the UN, and creating the belt of security and prosperity in China’s periphery.

The 2016 EU’s Global Strategy introduced the concept of resilience. The goal of this article is to identify continuity and change between resilience, on the one hand, and civilian (soft) power and normative power (two concepts that previously formed the ideational basis of the EU’s foreign relations), on the other hand. Three aspects are compared: historical context of how three concepts developed; the role of values and interests;  and  correlation  between  internal  and  external  for  the  EU’s  processes  in  the  articulation and realisation of the concepts. Historical aspects demonstrate three differences. The concepts of civilian power and normative power emerged as a result of the analysis of the EEC / EU’s activities at the peak of their developments; they have mostly been used in the academia and did not require any official explanation. Resilience was borrowed from the international practice at the  time when  the  EU  faced various crises. However, the EU substantially transformed this concept, which required official explanations. The EU has made an effort to reconcile values, formulated earlier, with interests of today. The notion of principled pragmatism and values defined as interests have been used accordingly. The EU also pays attention to risks (as oppose to the resources of resilience and relevant governance techniques). The instruments to promote values have also undergone transformation: the EU puts greater responsibility on its partners, the process of values’ promotion became more technocratic whereas the EU  prioritises dialogues with civil societies of third countries. Therefore, we suggest defining the EU’s resilience  as defensive normative power. Finally, resilience, like civilian power and normative power before, is used to bridge the EU’s internal developments with its external activities. However, the EU’s resilience is context­ based. Norms are promoted unilaterally, the inclusion of partners into the core is not foreseen. The EU expects transformation on the part of its partners but stabilisation and protection of  what  has  been achieved for itself (rather than further reassessment and development of norms). This interpretation of resilience contradicts the  notion of the  normative power but  allows for  parallels between resilience  and civilian  (soft)  power.

In recent years Kremlin officials have frequently accused the West of conducting an “information war” against Russia. This paper engages with this topic in a novel way by applying the concept of anti-branding. In this context, anti-branding refers to a deliberate campaign by a state actor to tarnish the international image of a rival, thereby undermining that country’s soft power. To understand whether Russia has indeed been subjected to such an operation, this study addresses the case study of the Sochi Olympics of 2014. Specifically, it asks whether Western media reporting of the Sochi Games was unjustifiably critical and whether there is any evidence of government orchestration. It provides answers by means of extensive content analysis of US media and public statements by US officials in advance of and during the Sochi Olympics. In so doing, this paper provides an initial test of a new intellectual model of media analysis that has particular application to Russia. The key finding of the study is that, while it does appear that there was excessively negative Western media reporting of the Sochi Olympics, there is no evidence that this was orchestrated or encouraged by the U.S. authorities. Instead, it may be that the highly critical and often unfair reporting of the Games was the product of unconscious bias by journalists rather than the result of deliberate anti-branding by Western authorities. Further studies will be needed to establish whether this conclusion also holds in other cases in which Russia has been subjected to intense criticism within the Western media.

EU-Russia energy cooperation is being considerably influenced by international law issues arising in the light of the political tension caused by the EU sanctions and the Russian restrictive measures. Based on the said factors along with such issues as the possibility of application of the EU Third Energy Package to the Nord Stream 2 project, the lack of legal certainty in the regulation of the European part of the Turk Stream, the upcoming negotiations on the Russian-Chinese energy  cooperation,  particular  emphasis should be put on the issues of the South Stream project suspension, the detailed analysis of which is given in the present article. The author maintains the position that the key factors that caused the impossibility to continue the South Stream pipeline construction are the issues related to the adoption and entry into force of the EU’s TEP (including the conformity of TEP with WTO rules and the applicable bilateral intergovernmental agreements) as well as the issues related to the application of the TEP to the South Stream project (particularly, the “unbundling” rules of the TEP which impeded PJSC Gazprom’s activity with respect to the pipeline construction and operation in accordance with the EU legislation and the issues of qualification of the pipeline project in terms of the TEP rules). The author addresses the private law aspects of the South Stream project suspension, in particular, the issue of damages suffered because of the unilateral termination of contracts for the supply of goods and services which are now being claimed in international arbitration. The vivid example of such disputes is the one between the Gazprom subsidiary South Stream Transport B.V. and the Italian company Saipem. Based on the dispute in question the author concludes that not only should the arbitrators take into account the respective contractual provisions but also the circumstances that may be deemed as the grounds for exemption of the contractual liability (namely, the consent of the EU member states to the construction of the South Stream project; the acts of the states involved with respect to the project implementation; the adoption of the legislation impeding the project implementation etc.). The author comes to the conclusion that the problems of the EU-Russia energy cooperation within the frame of other pipeline construction projects to which Russia and EU member states are parties may be solved only through a dialogue in full compliance with international law s.

The article discusses the concept of "soft power" coined by J. Nye and its applicability to such a type of non-state actors as diaspora. Nye’s writings provide with theoretical background for this approach to an analysis. The author describes the basic differences between "soft power" and the direct coercion which is based on military and economic resources. This leads to the generalized understanding of the features that social groups have in this dimension and the specifics diasporas have in terms of the issue. Taking into account differences between resources that can be used to project "soft power", it should be noted that the products of such activities can differ remarkably. There are some restrictions and incentives for diasporas to project "soft power". These communities can fail to benefit from the external environment because of their inner insularity. On the contrary, the absence of global regulation of migration issues and the lack of flexibility of states may facilitate diasporas’ activities. There is no doubt that the balance of advantages and limitations varies from type to type of actors. Main directions of the "soft power" formation include the setting the agenda and the formation of a certain discourse. The indirect influence of diasporas in terms of a discourse embraces the use of the dominant ideology in society for a specific purpose, emphasizing certain features of the community and the formation of positive stereotypes in a hostland society. The agenda-setting power consists of participating in the development of common principles, providing information and monitoring of the situation. These forms of indirect influence may increase the impact of diasporas, although it depends not only on the internal processes within communities, but also on the actions taken by other actors in world politics.

This paper examines «the amity-enmity  pattern»  among  the  states  in  Central  Asia  (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan) by content analysis. The amity-enmity pattern reflects the ideational theoretical view of Regional Security Complex Thoery of B. Buzan that it defines the kind of roles (enemy/rival/friend) the states in the region internalise and developes it into a spectrum of conflict formations (enemy), security regimes (rival), security communities (friend), respectively. The conceptualization  was  further advanced  by  K.  Oskanian  into  six  categories:   Revisionist/Status-quo conflict formation (enemy), Thin/Thick security regime (rival), Loose/Tight security community (friend). This paper aims to position the Central Asian subcomplex on the  six  categories  of  the  amity-enmity pattern. First part of the paper defines the analytical  and  methodological  frameworks for  «the  amity- enmity pattern» in the Central Asian subcomplex, a subcomplex in the unipolar Russia-centered Regional Security Complex. The second part attempts to analyze the amity-enmity  pattern  of  the  subcomplex through  content  analysis,  examining  30455  news  articles  published  in  Central  Asian  states  for  the  last 10  years  (from  January 2007 to  December  2016).  Steps  of  the  analysis  follows  the  scheme  of «Structurization of information array for qualitative content analysis» by K. Borishpolets. At the level «A» of analysis, the number of news sources were categorized into three  text  blocks:  1)  inter-state  level  of articles, 2) inter-regional level of articles 3) domestic articles. At the level «B» of analysis, the inter-state level of articles are further classified and total six topics have resulted by frequencies: 1) Integration issues 2) Energy(gas, oil, water) issues 3) Border/territory issues 4) Drug trafficking/criminal issues 5) Radical islam issues 6) Immigration issues. At the level «C» of analysis, the amity/enmity features on each topic are examined and based on the results, this paper concludes that the formation of security culture and the role that the actors play in the Central Asian subcomplex can be defined as Lockean rivalry positioned at the range from 'Thin security regime' to 'Thick security regime'.

The rapidly changing political and economic landscape represents a combination of challenges and opportunities for new correlation of forces between the centers of influence, the emergence and growing activity of new players, the growing role of external factors. For about 20 years after the end of the Cold War, the global politics and economy were dominated by the United States, which had technological, economic, financial, military and political superiority. Being the first state to build post-industrial economy, the USA managed to create an efficient innovation system that provided leading American companies with dominance in the global markets for medium- and high-tech goods and services. The economic leadership of the United States is largely due to their dominance in the global monetary and financial system. In a new political and economic map one can see the loss of influence by Japan and the European Union, while new balance of economic forces emerges under the influence of the interaction and confrontation between the USA and China, as well as the growth of the Indian economy. The global map is undergoing serious changes under the pressure of proposed transregional metagroups and active integration processes as well growth of China's geo-economic activity. The increasing role of Asia-Pacific region in the global economy will especially become apparent as a result of the implementation of China's geo-economic ‘Belt and Road’ initiative. In globalized sectors there are transnational networks dominated by the largest TNCs. The political and economic interests of Russia require changes of the current economic policy and new geo-economic strategy both at the state and the largest companies level.

Interview with Daniel Drezner.

Over the past decades, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has remained an effective tool ensuring national interests. At the same time, while a full range pressure in all spheres is applied against Moscow, the classical instruments of diplomacy become insufficient. Today, in most Western countries, purposeful work is being done to promote a distorted and negative image of Russia. Henceforth, the significance of information component in Russian foreign policy rises. The aim of the article was to identify a number of areas of possible adaptation of national policy which aspires to advance a truthful and realistic representation of Russia internationally. The author assesses the evolution of the Russian approaches to the information activities abroad in a long-term perspective. This review allows to characterize the record of the Russian Empire as very limited, and of the Soviet Union as somewhat contradictory. In the 1990s, purposeful work on promotion of the Russian image on the international arena was absent, but since the mid-2000s, this activity received a significant impetus. As a result, a wide range of tools was created to facilitate humanitarian contacts and wide informational coverageof potential foreign audiences. While acknowledging these achievements, the author points to the need for better coordination of various institutions involved in the formation of the image of Russia. To reflect high priority of these activities, relevant coordinating bodies should be led at the top political level. In addition, the article highlights excessively reactive and defensive nature of Russian activities in the international information space. In this regard, the necessity of a more assertive approach based on the proposal of an alternative worldview with respect to the Western mainstream is substantiated. Finally, the author emphasizes the need to provide information activities with personnel that is able to fully employ the whole range of modern communication capabilities. In this regard, a separate section of the article is devoted to working with young people as a social group that can play a key role in ensuring the formation of realistic, rather than distorted ideas about Russia in the international arena.

A book review: Russia and the United States in the evolving world order / ed. by A. Torkunov, N.C. Noonan, T. Shakleina. – Moscow: MGIMO University, 2018. – 414 p.

A book review: Drezner D. The Ideas Industry: How Pessimists, Partisans, and Plutocrats are Transforming the Marketplace of Ideas. Oxford University Press, 2017. 360 p.

The article reveals the main directions of development of international relations of the countries- participants of the BRICS and EEMA, based on expanding the use of national currencies. The necessity of supporting economic actors State institutions of those countries. The joint work of international teams contributes to the implementation of economic programs of mutual interest, and strengthens the trend towards the formation of a multipolar world. The analysis of problems of development cooperation of the participating countries and BRICS EEMA in the monetary and financial field and shows that the main causes hindering the expansion of the use of national currencies are: hard currency regulation by State; a rare use of the subjects economics letters of credit and guarantees, which increases the financial risk of their operations; significant transaction costs; asymmetrical measures, currency regulation, enduring implementation of the mutual interests of the participating countries and BRICS EEMA. To expand the use of national currencies in international relations are invited to take into account the whole range of political, economic and social factors that contribute to the realization of the national currencies of the participating countries and BRICS EEMA main features the world's money. Analysis of the impact of negative external factors for the development of the Russian economy (the volatility of world market prices for raw materials, the economic sanctions, the instability of world financial markets) has enabled the authors to justify the need to improve macroeconomic regulation in order to increase investment activity, processes of import substitution and accelerated development of the financial market in participating countries and BRICS EEMA. The decision of tasks has predetermined the need to adjust the principles on national monetary policy. This article analyzes the debate on the introduction of a single currency in the Member countries and BRICS EEMA in its classical form and is represented by the position of the sponsors on the advisability of expanding the use of national currencies in the economic cooperation. The task of the monetary authorities, responsible for implementing the monetary policy of the countries participating in the BRICS and EEMA in those circumstances is containment of inflationary pressures, the harmonization of regulation of financial markets and support stable banking systems, which are the basis for international cooperation.