For more than 30 years, Transnistria and Abkhazia separated from their parent states and proclaimed independence. Generations born and raised in unrecognized states have already entered an active age. In this regard, the question of how citizens of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic and the Republic of Abkhazia understand independence, how important it is for them, how do they see the prospects of their states and what life strategies do they choose, becomes especially relevant. In the article, the authors compare the results of 13 focus groups conducted in Transnistria and Abkhazia in the fall of 2020 with the main socio-economic indicators of de facto states and their neighbors. This approach made it possible to connect the perception of the problems of everyday life with changes in the identity of citizens and the internal sovereignty of unrecognized states, to highlight the factors uniting and dividing various social groups, to assess their attitude to the current results and prospects of state building. The different composition of the groups made it possible to compare the opinions, firstly, of citizens who were socialized after the collapse of the Soviet Union and in Soviet times, secondly, different ethnic groups, men and women, and, thirdly, residents of different districts of de-facto states. It was revealed that the main economic indicators of Abkhazia and Transnistria lag behind the average values of neighboring countries. The lack of significant economic progress can potentially affect the loyalty of citizens to the political regime and negatively change the viability of the republics. In this context, signs of fatigue from the inconveniences of life in the unrecognized republic and low-income levels compared to neighboring countries and the mother state were revealed in the Abkhaz and Transnistrian societies.

Lobbying is an integral part of contemporary international processes. Globalization, spread of market relations and transnational links, liberalization of national and supranational governance increased the role of interest groups in international relations. However, interest groups activities at the global level are still largely a terra incognita for international relations theory and international law which requires a more comprehensive analysis. The main goal of the article is to fill the gaps in modern IR theory as well as in theories of lobbying and interest groups by systematization of lobbying regulation experience in international and transnational spheres. Even though single approach towards formalization of international lobbying is hardly feasible, systematization of current global practices should facilitate better understanding of the nature of interest groups activity in international and transnational spheres, of potential and limits for its regulation both in sovereign states and international organizations. The article analyzes separate regulatory regimes aimed at formalizing lobbying in international and transnational spheres. There are two types of regimes: those existing on supranational level that set rules of interaction between interest groups and international organisations; those that regulate interactions of foreign interest groups and sovereign states. Analysis has demonstrated that supranational and national authorities have different approaches towards regulating their interactions with transnational interest groups. Moreover, difference exists not only between these two levels but within levels. I study supranational regulation with the cases of the European Union and the United Nations. The EU is an example of the most inclusive regulatory regime within the international organization. It technically covers all types of interest groups that wish to lobby EU officials. The UN takes a different approach – it officially regulates interactions only with international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). However, real interests behind INGOs include not only public interests but also business groups. There is an unfolding discussion within the UN over what should be the right approach towards regulating business interests. Various UN bodies have varying opinions on the issue that results in existence of various sub-regimes in the organization. The analysis of foreign lobbying regulation regimes in sovereign states has demonstrated that their development is connected mainly to political motivations of national authorities who wish to limit political and information influence by foreign interest groups while leaving economic ties and interaction with foreign business groups relatively immune to such regulation.

The European Union is being dragged deeper into another systemic crisis, largely caused by itself. The EU usually saved face from the crises and got stronger, modernized, with broader powers vested by the Member States. Now the situation is different. The EU has hedged its bets. Using the tools of "deliberative" democracy, it held a Conference on the future of Europe, which is discussed in detail in this article. It was organized in a modern network format. Owing to it, the EU leadership was able to involve tens of thousands of people and all segments of society in the discussion of implementing the European project and deepening integration. According to their plan, such an impressive representativeness legitimizes in advance the widest range of recommendations approved by the Conference. Given these recommendations, the European Parliament, the EU Council and the European Commission can now draw any recipes for revitalizing what they are already doing, tightening their course and renewing the EU. They got a free hand, which they counted on: it will be difficult for opponents of reforms to go against the mandate of voters. Some of the measures proposed by the Conference have already been taken up by the EU institutions. Some may require amendments to the founding agreements of the integration bloc and the convening of a convention. The result could be a profound transformation in the way the EU is organized and functions. However, Brussels' plans seem to fall far from reality, contradict the interests of other world players and promotion of equal international cooperation and multilateralism.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the contemporary US-Chinese relations in the climate sphere and forecasting the prospects for their development in the near future. In the context of the evolution of the problem in the past, as well as taking into account the differences in approaches to the problem in the United States from the two leading parties and the most influential political and ideological groups, the authors investigate the causes of the aggravation of climate relations between Washington and Beijing. It is noted that having occupied the White House, the Democratic administration of J. Biden began to increase pressure on the Chinese government in order to force it to accelerate the passage of "green transit", i.e. the transition from the use of fossil fuels in the economy to renewable energy sources. It is assumed that such a strategy should slow down China's economic development, thus giving America time for internal reforms aimed at achieving its global "green" leadership, which, in turn, should ensure economic dominance in the post-crisis period. Tactically, the administration uses a "separate" methodology, i.e. declares the need to isolate from each other the climate and all other components of the Chinese policy of the United States. This approach is not supported by most political and ideological groups. Thus, the progressive wing of the Democratic Party insists on close climate cooperation with China, which implies a possibility of geopolitical concessions. Moderate Republicans ("realists") consider "constructive competition" with Beijing in the climate sphere possible. Conservatives are confident that China will not fulfill its promises, and therefore they advocate "climate realism", which means carrying out internal reforms in the United States only taking into account what has been done by other countries, primarily China. The neoconservative group demands to abandon climate pressure and rely on tough geopolitical steps against Beijing. It is concluded that disagreement within the ruling elite with Biden's Chinese policy will greatly complicate the approval of the climate reform program in Congress, therefore the "containment" of the PRC will be primarily economic and geopolitical in nature.

The article touches upon peculiarities of interaction of the Republic of Azerbaijan with new NATO members in military sphere by the example of Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. The objective of the work is to show that post-Soviet states, having chosen a successful pattern of cooperation with European countries, are able to gain their place on the international arena even not being a member of a European block. To reach the goal the author of the article gives a review of literature covering different aspects of military policy of Azerbaijan and studies the factors that provoked Baku to advance collaboration with Prague and Sofia in military sphere. Historical and genetical scientific method, decision-making system analysis, case study, institutional, and elements of germenevtic method are applied. The results of the research are the following: after the defeat in the First Karabakh war Azerbaijan focused on modernization of economy and military forces while it continued to conduct negotiations on the conflict settlement under the authority of the OSCE Minsk Group. To achieve this goal Azerbaijan started to collaborate with Ukraine, Belarus, Israel, Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, South Africa and other states in military sphere. The improving of mutually beneficial collaboration with new NATO members was an essential focus area. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan tended to solve both military problems including strengthening the potential of armed forces and political problems aimed at receiving support in the Karabakh settlement. The latter played more important role for Baku than purchasing different arms systems, because by the time Azerbaijan had already had access to weapons markets of Israel, Russia, Ukraine, South Africa, Jordan and Turkey. Thus, two patterns of interaction were constructed – the first case concerns the Czech Republic and full-scale military and political cooperation, the second deals with Bulgaria where the military aspect was an approach to the political integrant. The analysis shows that expertly combining military and diplomatic interaction and military and technical cooperation with new NATO members Baku managed to win the support, even if unofficial, and it became obvious in the Second Karabakh war.

The article analyzes the phenomenon of divided societies, right-wing populism in France and Germany in the context of alternative narratives of the development of the EU “core” states and the problems of divided (primarily Western) societies. The focus is on the social and political divisions and the resulting socio-political crises, as well as the political agenda promoted by French and German populists. Thus, the research problem is to find out how old and new divisions relate to right-wing populism in France (“Lépenisme”) and in Germany (Alternative for Germany), what is common and what are the differences in this respect between France and Germany, and what are the perspectives of right-wing populist political forces in France and Germany? The theoretical and methodological basis is the concept of divided societies and the comparative method. Describing the divisions that exist within French society, the authors note that within the center-periphery cleavage, the ethno-linguistic factor becomes more important. It is overlaid by a new autochthonous-migrant divide, which is closely linked to the issue of Islamization and the Arab-Africanization of France. In addition, in the context of globalization, a division of Eurooptimists and Alter-Europeanists with respect to European integration is taking shape. In Germany, the regional division along the lines of the old lands vs. the new lands has taken on a special role. The migration factor also plays a significant role in the cleavages that exist within German society. The paper concludes that right-wing populist discourse mirrors the cleavages that have emerged in the divided societies of France and Germany. French and German right-wing populists perform a dialectical function, on the one hand, reinforcing existing domestic and foreign political cleavages, and on the other hand, trying to provide their own response to the challenges facing the French and German peoples, as well as offering a kind of strategic alternative to development. Increasing social divisions and political divisions within European societies indicate a crisis within the core of the Modernity. According to the authors, the growth of populism and intra-European rifts suggests that Modernity is in the process of a fundamental transformation.

The article aims at examining the issue which is both urgent and in demand in scientific space and social life: at digitalization and informatization of all spheres of modern society and, above all, in the economic sphere. In fact, digital transformations of the modern world are reflected both in the activities of businesses and in value creation processes, as the latter demands an improvement in tax policy, because the previous systems did not take into account the factor of digital commerce, thus causing the reduction of tax revenues in the budget. The main objective of the research is to analyze the specific traits of the digital transformation of Latin America economies in order to identify the features of their adjustment to the environment in order to improve the VAT collection systems. For its implementation, a systematization of the main characteristics of the digital economy was carried out noted by the OECD as urgent challenges to national fiscal systems,. Among them, a special place is occupied by mobility, the development of multilateral business models, which have an impact both on the economy of the whole world in general and on Latin America in particular. The study has found that, despite a significant increase in the percentage of digital goods in total GDP, only five countries in the region, Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru and Uruguay, have made legal changes on the issue under consideration. Besides, their different visions and some approaches to solving the problem of taxation were considered, main differences were identified, which include a definition of the digital goods and services, as well as the chosen methods of tax collection, each of them having their advantages and disadvantages. The authors explore the issue of VAT, based on the classification of the principles for applying this tax presented by the OECD – by place of origin or by purpose – since these aspects are of the utmost importance in the restructuring of national fiscal systems to the realities of the digital economy. This criterion contributed to the identification of the main models of reform, followed by highlighting their strengths and shortcomings. The chosen multifaceted analytical prism of the digital economy and the problems of taxation in the states of Latin America forms the novelty of the study, actualizing the need for the simultaneous application of various methodological approaches that identify problem areas and prove that within new standards of the digital economy there occur lots of problems, and a systematic approach to them requires further research.

This article seeks to understand the use of religious proselytizing in the Statecraft of the United States and Russia. The different perspectives on this activity is first assessed historically. The experiences that both countries had (or did not have, in the case of the US), provide insights into the disparity of opinion and practice between the two countries today. This historical view reveals how politically important and influential such activity was for Russia. Good relations with religious leaders and their religious movements helped to ensure stability in far flung regions of its territory, and active attempts to convert other people, i.e. proselytizing, was seen as politically aggressive and socially disruptive. The second part of this article looks at the contemporary implications of statecraft and proselytization. One sees a continuity between the imperial, Soviet and contemporary periods regarding proselytism, despite the political diversity of the periods. Domestically, Russia has clamped down on religious organizations with ties to the US and whose practices included active proselytizing. In this way, one can see how it believes religion, and proselytizing in particular, can be politicized or weaponized and used in foreign policy. Beyond its borders, Russia has employed the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in proselytizing or quasi-proselytizing activities to help carry out its political agendas. For the US, religious conversions were traditionally never part of the national or political discourse, and so there is still a tendency to view such activity as innocuous, individual experiences. Meanwhile, Russia continues its crackdown on religions which promote an aggressive proselytizing agenda, and especially US-based ones, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, whose members are often treated as enemies of the state.